RADICALIZATION: FORESIGHT AND WARNING CENS – GFF WORKSHOP

CONFERENCE REPORT

3 – 5 FEBRUARY 2008
SINGAPORE

S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

NATIONAL SECURITY COORDINATION SECRETARIAT

GLOBAL FUTURES FORUM
CREATING NETWORKING POSSIBILITIES

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REPORT OF A WORKSHOP JOINTLY ORGANIZED BY
THE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY (SINGAPORE)
AND
THE GLOBAL FUTURES FORUM (INTERNATIONAL)
WITH THE SUPPORT OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COORDINATION SECRETARIAT (SINGAPORE)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Centre of Excellence for National Security (Singapore) and the Global Futures Forum (International), with the support of the National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS), Singapore, jointly organized a two-day (4–5 February 2008) workshop on "Radicalization: Foresight and Warning" at the Marina Mandarin Hotel, Singapore. The workshop, also known as the "CENS-GFF Workshop", was the first meeting on violent radicalization that the GFF has held in Asia.

The workshop looked into recent violent manifestations of religious radicalization in the Southeast Asian region and beyond. Prominent academics, active frontline counter-terrorism officers and homeland defence analysts were invited to either present their latest findings on violent radical movements in their respective countries or participate in the syndicate sessions and work on possible counter-terrorism policy outcomes together. In total, 12 counter-terrorism operations and terrorist cell-modelling experts were featured over the two-day workshop.

On the first day of the workshop, participants had the privilege of hearing first-hand accounts of counter-terrorism and post-terrorist attack investigation findings from homeland defence specialists such as Clark McCauley, Andrew Silke, Fernando Reinares, Muniruzzaman, Tito Karnavian, Arvin Bhatt and Hoo Tiang Boon. Moreover, on top of networking opportunities, all participants were also given time to further query and clarify the issues, challenges and recommendations broached by the speakers.

On the second day, Jonathan Farley, Nicholas O'Brien, Mohammed Hafez, Zamzamin Ampatuan and Mohamed bin Ali presented on the various mathematical network models, social network theories and rehabilitation programmes that have been pursued by the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines and Singapore to deter or mitigate the growth and repercussions of terrorist activities. Following that, during the syndicate sessions, participants examined the applicability of the counter-terrorism solutions proposed by the speakers to the homeland defence strategies of their individual countries.

The workshop closed with a roundtable discussion cum question-and-answer session where solutions and suggestions to further advance global counter-terrorism efforts were debated. All in all, the workshop set the tone and momentum needed for the creation of communities of interest to deliberate on pressing security issues at the Track 2 level in the Asia-Pacific region.

OPENING SESSION

AMBASSADOR BARRY DESKER, WELCOME REMARKS

Ambassador Barry Desker, Dean of RSIS, delivering the welcome remarks.

Ambassador Barry Desker, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), warmly welcomed all guests and participants to the first workshop on "Radicalization: Foresight and Warning"—jointly organized by the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) and the Global Futures Forum (GFF)—in Asia. The workshop brought together active homeland security officers and analysts from Europe, North America and the Asia Pacific to deliberate and work on pressing security threats in the region and beyond together.

Ambassador Desker commented that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the discovery of Al-Qaeda networks and, most recently, cases of self-radicalized individuals in Southeast Asia have re-drawn attention to the challenges that radical or extremist ideologies might pose to the security of the region and beyond. In particular, three broad but critical trends could be observed of radical movements in the region:

1. It appears that individuals could now take on a "self-inspired" or "self-driven" route to violent radical behaviours and actions, confounding traditional explanations of group or network theory.

2. Religious radicals from the Southeast Asian region are increasingly educated in the fields of science and engineering or trained in distinguished professions such as law or medicine from universities in their home countries and the West.

3. The path towards self-radicalization often involves the interplay of religious, sociological and even mathematical elements.

In this regard, states would have to adopt an integrative and multidisciplinary approach and understanding towards the stemming of terrorist tendencies in the society. Hence, Ambassador Desker urged all workshop participants to seize the opportunities presented by this landmark workshop to learn, share and network with an elite cast of academics, frontline homeland defence officers and homeland security administrators from Europe, the U.S. and the Asia-Pacific region.

AMBASSADOR PATRICIA HERBOLD, WELCOME REMARKS

US Ambassador Patricia Herbold delivering the welcome remarks.

On behalf of the United States Government, Madam Patricia Herbold, U.S. Ambassador to Singapore, extended her welcome and thanks to all workshop participants. She hoped that all participants could, through the collective analysis of pressing global security issues, deepen their professional relationships and contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon of violent radicalization as well as the means to mitigate it.

The global effects of violent radicalization serve as a reminder that, despite differences in each state's national interest, social and political environments, there are common concerns and, thus, grounds for cooperation. Commenting on the importance of cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts, Ambassador Herbold noted that one of the main goals of President Bush's National Security Strategy is to strengthen alliances to prevent terrorist attacks and, ultimately, to defeat global terrorism.

Ambassador Herbold mentioned that, in the long run, the war on terror is essentially a battle of ideas. In general, three key observations could be made of terrorist ideologies and their worldview:

1. Terrorists exploit political alienation.

2. Terrorists rely on conspiracy theories and misinformation.

3. Terrorists often use ideologies that justify murder.

Southeast Asian nations have taken quite a lead in their counter-terrorism efforts in the region. Most states in the region—with logistical aid, intelligence and training support secured through global partnerships—have gained an upper hand against terrorism. Likewise, the United States has maintained active partnerships with countries in the region not just on counter-terrorism matters but also in areas such as economics, cultural exchange and education. Speaking on Singapore-U.S. partnerships, Ambassador Herbold noted that both countries have achieved much in promoting economic development, peace and security in the Southeast Asian region.

All in all, she cautioned that, despite recent successes in counter-terrorism efforts, the threat from religious radicals and terrorists has not been fully eliminated. In this regard, she urged participants of the workshop to carefully explore and analyse the various factors that push individuals or groups towards violent extremism.

MR. PETER HO, OPENING REMARKS

Opening Speakers' Morning Reception and Discussion

Mr. Peter Ho, Head of the Singapore Civil Service and Permanent Secretary for National Security and Intelligence Coordination, began his opening remarks by noting the trans-national nature of today's most pressing strategic challenges and the impact that Asian counter-terrorism strategies would have on the U.S. and Europe.

Mr. Ho stressed that the threat posed by radical extremists has grown over the past decade. The recent discovery of self-radicalized individuals not only points towards a new worrying trend but also underscores the need for constant vigilance and foresight. Indeed, there is the concern that these self-radicalized individuals could also double up as so-called "spiritual sanctioners" and instigate the growth of larger and more lethal self-starter groups through warped justifications for jihad.

What is more, these self-starter cells might share an ideological affinity with the original Al-Qaeda network even in the absence of any institutionalized training or recruitment—and the upshot of this can be deadly. Mr. Ho highlighted, for example, that self-starter cells of varying degrees were responsible for the Madrid bombings of 2004, the London bombings of 2005 and the Toronto 18 Plot in 2006. He added that conventional theories might not suffice in the explanation and analysis of the emergence and the behavioural patterns of such groups. A broader range of models and frameworks that could potentially detect weak signals and pick up early indicators of radicalization should thus be explored.

In this regard, the GFF and CENS had, through the workshop, brought an international and multidisciplinary focus to the issue of radicalization. In a complex and inadequately understood problem like radicalization, in-depth insights are more likely to be gained when diverse and varied perspectives are brought to bear. In addition, over and above the creation of communities of interests in Asia to facilitate networking among the intelligence and academic fraternity, Singapore's Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) programme could also be used to support and reinforce the work of the GFF.

In conclusion, Mr. Ho stressed that the RAHS system, like the CENS-GFF workshop, is a platform for breaking down information-sharing barriers. Both the RAHS system and the work of the GFF represent efforts made to address the issues and challenges of an increasingly unpredictable environment by harnessing domain expertise, analytical resources and early warning programmes.

PANEL ONE

The Threat And Process Of Violent Radicalization: Why Do Ordinary People Become Extremists?

I. Models and Mechanisms of Political Radicalization

Clark McCauley speaking on the models and mechanisms of political radicalization.

In his presentation, Clark McCauley explored the process of violent political radicalization from the perspective of a psychologist. In particular, he focused his presentation on the interest and radicalization of groups fighting against the United States. He outlined the various stages of self-radicalized individuals' commitment to the cause—ranging from those who were neutral to sympathizers and activists—and noted that the radicalization trajectory may not necessarily be linear as an individual can sometimes move from being merely a sympathizer to a radicalized extremist. That said, people who feel that acts of violence are justified only make up a very small minority; not everyone who believes in violence engages in violence.

McCauley observed that there are often attempts to show how radical organizations act like "conveyer belts" of terrorism—a metaphor laced with strong connotations. What ought to be done instead is to raise questions of the correlation between intentions of activism and violent radical intentions. For instance, the Hizbut-Tahrir could either be seen as a threat or competitor to those who want to use violence.

There are some common grievances that are often assumed as the root causes of violent radicalization. These include socio-economic deprivation, religious fanaticism, the pronounced lack of social identity and political grievances. Among all of these, McCauley believed that political grievance is the most salient factor, especially among sympathizers. He further added that, based on his study, he has found that radicalization can occur at three levels: the individual, the group and the masses.

The study revealed that variables such as negative personal experiences, self-persuasion, influences of loved ones, the ability to identify with a group and its grievances are usually critical influences on an individual's decision to sink deeper into extremism. At the group level, collective or shared thoughts and ideology are noted as powerful mechanisms of radicalization. McCauley explained that radical groups usually have a bipolar worldview of what constituted good and evil and this Manichean perspective is often used to distinguish what is a part of, or conversely a threat to, the group's ideals and goals.

At the level of the masses, however, McCauley observed that there is a tendency to de-humanize the enemy as an entity that is evil by nature. In addition, studies on the mechanisms of radicalization at the level of the masses would also have to deal with and explore the appeal or role that martyrdom has in shaping or pushing the masses towards the attainment of a common goal.

McCauley opined that while mass radicalization can be tracked, the notion that radicalization goes through a conveyor belt-like process appears to be too simplistic. There are larger and several pathways to radicalism. He also argued that understanding radicalization in terms of political grievances, as opposed to the idea that radicalization is due to, for instance, identity frustration and economic factors, would more likely give a better insight. In fact, for greater explanatory power, it would be desirable to widen the area of analysis to include actors who were radicalized but did not become extremists. In sum, McCauley concluded that, perhaps by casting a wider analytical net, there would be greater visibility of the very complex and nuanced nature of the radicalization process.

II. The Psychology of Terrorist Radicalization

Andrew Silke presenting on the psychology of terrorist radicalization.

Andrew Silke presented on the homegrown terrorist threat in the United Kingdom. For the context of his presentation, he defined and referred the homegrown terrorist as one who is born, educated, lives, works and marries in the U.K. He noted that there is a growing number of people from the United Kingdom who are willing to carry out attacks, or who have tried but failed. At the same time, support and sympathy for extremists has also been increasing.

According to Silke, there is really no standard profile of what constitutes a terrorist or a radicalized individual. In general, radicals can come from diverse backgrounds and various cross-sections of society. Silke noted that the U.K. Security Service, the MI5, has some 2,000 individuals under their radar and these include so-called "spiritual sanctioners" as well as financiers. The key difficulty, however, lies in trying to weed out the real threats from the pool of potential threats while at the same time ensuring that the rest of the population is not isolated.

Silke cautioned that one should avoid making the facile assumption of associating radicalization purely with "jihad". The path to radicalization, in other words, does not just rest on jihad-related sources alone. Indeed, individuals can be radicalized for a whole host of reasons. For instance, Timothy McVeigh, David Copeland, Jerry Adams and even Nelson Mandela could be considered radical individuals because they were willing to kill for a cause. Therefore, Silke argued that a broad-based theory is necessary for the understanding and study of radical individuals and radicalization. It should encapsulate a wide extensive group and not focus only on a select category of people. Most of the individuals who are of concern in the United Kingdom now are, in fact, relatively ordinary and—to quote Silke—rather "dull" people. In other words, they do not display psychopathic behaviours. The 2007 Glasgow attacks, for example, were carried out by doctors.

For Silke, there are several drivers of radicalization that should be explored. These include status and personal rewards. He mentioned that for most terrorists, the opportunity to join a terrorist group and fight for a perceived honourable cause is generally considered the most meaningful things to do. Other than the chance to be part of a perceived cosmic "good-versus-evil" war, most terrorist recruits also felt compelled to support or partake in terrorist activities as a response to social problems such as marginalization and discrimination. Silke noted, for example, that Muslim communities in the United Kingdom are not only under-represented politically but also, among many other problems, suffer from one of the highest unemployment rates and receive the lowest level of education.

In conclusion, Silke argued that it is difficult to determine—for sure—if someone is becoming radicalized. Likewise, it is also tough to measure the level of sympathy that individuals might have for the Al-Qaeda group. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize the reality that the trend now points unequivocally towards an increasing support for the Al-Qaeda by sections of the British Muslim community. According to Silke, this implies that the battle for the hearts and minds of the British Muslim masses is becoming increasingly grim.

Discussion

Both panellists agreed on the impact that current regional and global conflicts have on the radicalization process. In particular, one of the panellists noted the extent towards which a social consensus could emerge simply from inspirations drawn from current conflicts. Moreover, the war in Iraq has also, in many aspects, successfully turned the tide in favour of Al-Qaeda and this is evident from the flood of individuals that have embraced Al-Qaeda's ideology and cause.

A participant sought further clarification on the difference between the notion of activism and radicalism, especially with regards to the ability of activist groups to create a political environment that may lead to radicalization in the future. A panellist replied that those who are capable of political violence would not use a legal platform knowing fully well that activists are often the ones placed under surveillance. As such, the open activist environment would not be a safe "embedding" ground for such individuals.

On the concept of developing theories, the panellists were asked if they saw a need for a disaggregated theory instead of an all-encapsulating one. The immediate response was that there is a need for a broad and all-encapsulating theory that includes both Islamist and non-Islamist extremists. This stems from the established view that individuals often follow a seemingly ordinary psychological path to radicalization. The use of a disaggregated theory is based on the assumption that extremists are different.

PANEL TWO

Case Studies Of Violent Radicalization: The European And Asian Experiences

I. Islamist Radicalization: The Case of Europe

Fernando Reinares sharing with the workshop participants Europe's experiences with Islamist radicalism.

Fernando Reinares mentioned that the current and main terrorism threats confronting Europe is from jihadist terrorist cells, groups and networks. He defined Islamist radicalization as a progressive process through which individuals adopt attitudes and beliefs that later lead to direct or indirect involvement in the activities of jihadist terrorism. He argued that this process is crucial for such cells, groups and networks to finance themselves, obtain support from their respective populations and recruit new members.

The level and intensity of violent radicalization associated with jihadist terrorism varies greatly across Europe depending, for instance, on Muslim population size aggregates at the national level and their country of origin. While some were radicalized abroad, Reinares noted that, in Europe, "radical potentials" tended to be recruited at places where Muslims congregate, such as mosques and related sites. That said, the relative importance of mosques as hot spots for radicalization has, due to the level of surveillance conducted by the authorities, somewhat declined over the past years. Therefore, alternative locations for radicalization activities now include private houses and public places like community centres.

According to Reinares, the jihadist radicalization process is gradual and individuals often move from an increasing radical orientation to a willingness to support extremist action before progressing to actual contribution. However, the process is usually conducted on an ad hoc basis and through small, loosely linked networks. Face-to-face interaction is critical in the radicalization process and it often involves contact with religious leaders or prominent and revered figures at the early stages. While there are cases of self-radicalized individuals who referred to and are influenced by jihadist websites, on the whole peer group pressure remains important since violent radicalization is frequently based on affective kinship and friendship ties.

Although jihadist terrorists in Europe have different motivations, the most common one is a moral obligation to engage in jihad. Reinares also added that other variables such as feelings of frustration, powerlessness and humiliation could also act as pulling factors of radicalization. Furthermore, most jihadist terrorists, in view of the treatment of Muslims in regional conflicts, often feel moved by a sense of injustice.

All in all, Renaires concluded that while relative deprivation is more likely to motivate first-generation Muslim immigrants to embrace jihadist radicalization, particularly in Spain or Italy, second- and third-generation Muslim descendents, for instance, in France, Belgium or the United Kingdom, are more likely to be influenced by identity crisis and anomie. They also tend to be single men in their twenties or thirties who come from diverse socioeconomic and educational backgrounds. Finally, he observed that, with the exception of the United Kingdom, the majority of these actors are of North African origins.

II. Violent Radicalization: The Case of Bangladesh

Muniruzzaman speaking on the threat of radical Islamist activities in Bangladesh.

Muniruzzaman argued that although Bangladeshi Islam has traditionally been moderate in nature, there has been an alarming trend of radical Islamist activity since 1999. In addition, he emphasized that, given Bangladesh's unique geographical position (situated between two of the world's fastest and largest growing economies), any radical Islamist spill-over from India or China could have disastrous effects on the region and even beyond.

Meanwhile, Qaomi Madrassa (QM) education has contributed significantly to the radicalization process. The curriculum is completely theological in nature, and excludes science and mathematics. Under this curriculum, not only do the textbooks endorse and preached Wahabi Islam but the schools are also mostly run with grants from oil-rich Arab states.

Muniruzzaman opined that poverty in Bangladesh has also facilitated the rise of radical Islamist elements. Bangladesh has suffered recurring famine and destructive sporadic flooding. Double-digit inflation has made essential food grain prices grow beyond the reach of the overwhelmingly low-income population. Islamist social welfare organizations are thus able to tap on this state of inadequacy to gain recruits by moving its operations into disenfranchised areas.

According to Muniruzzaman, Islamists are also rapidly spreading their sphere of influence into the financial sectors. Their sources of income range from Islamic banks, insurance companies and leasing companies to extortion, revenue derived from illegal arms and drug trafficking. Monetary aid could also come in the form of remittances from Bangladeshi expatriates based in the Gulf region, which is difficult to track.

The radicalization process involves a number of variables. Firstly, the ideological component involves attracting an audience, gaining legitimacy, recruiting new members and gaining financial strength. Secondly, Muniruzzaman mentioned that radical infiltration of politics is facilitated by the lack of democratic institutions and democratic accountability, frequent military interventions and poor governance. Thirdly, he spoke about the logistical support, training and protective functions that trans-national linkages could provide and play in the radicalization process. Finally, a strong Islamist economy enables the financing and mobilizing of resources for militancy.

Muniruzzaman stressed that ideology is a critical ingredient in the radicalization process. In his opinion, it is a cost-effective and highly sustainable radicalization tool. Thus, ideology as a strategic approach is thought to be particularly useful and often used to sensitize the Islamist "donor community". He also observed that both urban and rural frustrated youths are particularly susceptible to radicalization. Many jihadists have also been to Lebanon and Afghanistan.

In conclusion, Muniruzzaman offered several possible approaches that Bangladesh could adopt to address its radicalization problems. The three key ideas, over and above the list of solutions provided, could be summarized as follows:

1. The need to apprehend radicals when they are young.
2. The need for a systematic de-radicalization education and training programme (including the modernization of madrasah education and the engagement of religious groups, prisoners and youth).
3. The need to monitor the growth of Islamist economies.

III. Radicalization in Poso and the Strategy to Counter It

Tito Karnavian briefing the audience on the radicalization threat and process in Poso, Indonesia.

Tito Karnavian noted that Poso, the site of intense Christian-Muslim communal conflict since 1998, has become an important centre for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) operations from 2000 to 2007. According to him, the JI had systematically recruited hundreds of local youths from the area. He added that a small number of the recruits eventually became perpetrators of bombings, murders and armed robberies

Karnavian divided the Christian-Muslim communal violence into three periodic phases: 24–28 December 1998, April 2000 and May to July 2000. In 2001, the government-facilitated Malino Accord put an end to Christian-Muslim violence. Despite Malino's relative success in getting both Christian and Muslim leaders to agree on, for example, the need for law enforcement, Muslim militant-planned skirmishes continue to plague the area. In fact, Karnavian noted that in 2002 and 2003, several Poso towns and villages were attacked. The victims were initially Christians, but it soon included moderate Muslims as well.

According to Karnavian, group-led attacks had reduced considerably during the period of 2003–2006 but independent attacks persisted despite efforts made to identify and dismantle the militants' networks through the creation of a task force.

The Poso case study provides three key learning points that are crucial in the understanding of the radicalization process: (i) personal grievances; (ii) public outrage; and (iii) radical ideology. Karnavian noted that Christians and government officials are labelled and seen as infidels by Islamist extremists in Poso. Hence, they felt that the killing either Christians or government officials is permissible. He also commented that, based on research conducted in Poso, modes of radicalization included indoctrination processes, military training (especially during the 2000–2001 conflicts), influence of relatives and friends, and extremist teachings at mosques.

Karnavian suggested a number of strategies to stem the tide. For one, to counter discipleship, extremist professors and sheikhs should be implicated and arrested. Next, authorities should encourage moderate Islamic leaders to play more active roles in the lives of Muslim youths. Authorities should similarly seek out and clamp down on places of worship that have been used as venues for spreading extremist ideology. Finally, subsidized modern Islamic boarding schools should also be considered and provided.

Karnavian concluded by stressing that the biggest challenge now is to develop a suitable inter-agency approach to address and identify the root causes of radicalization.

Discussion

Both speakers and analysts agreed that worldwide intelligence communities generally under-emphasize the importance of outreach to moderate imams. It was suggested that moderate Islamic voices are needed to be actively engaged in counter-terrorism efforts. However, according to one speaker, the line between moderate and extremist European imams is a thin one.

One speaker emphasized the disservice analysts were creating for themselves by labelling Islamic extremists as "jihadist". By invoking what is essentially a positive concept in Islam and attributing it to terrorists, analysts are in fact inadvertently extending legitimacy and credibility to the fanatics. The term "jihadist" should therefore not be designated to terrorists.

PANEL THREE

Early Warning Methods And The Detection Of Radicalization: Putting Theory Into Practice

I. Radicalization in the West – New York Police Department

Arvin Bhatt presenting on the NYPD's approach to counter extremism and community engagement.

Arvin Bhatt presented on the New York Police Department's (NYPD) perspective of the threat of Islamist terrorism to New York City. He stressed that as New York City continues to be among the top targets of terrorists worldwide, it is exceptionally vital for the NYPD to study the radicalization process in the West and understand what drives—in his words—"unremarkable" people to become terrorists. This understanding, he added, also aids in the development of effective counter-terrorism strategies.

According to Bhatt and based on assessments made from examining Western European case studies, the four distinct phases of radicalization are: (i) pre-radicalization; (ii) self-identification; (iii) indoctrination; and (iv) "jihadization". Although this conceptualized model is sequential, individuals do not always follow a perfectly linear progression or pass through all the stages. Many do stop or abandon the process at different points.

The pre-radicalization stage is essentially the point of origin and covers the life situation of individuals before they are exposed to and adopt Jihadi-Salafi Islam as their ideology. Bhatt remarked that the majority of these individuals are unremarkable. They hold ordinary jobs, live ordinary lives and have little, if any, criminal history.

Next, self-identification marks the phase when individuals, influenced by both internal and external factors, begin to explore and adopt Jihadi-Salafi Islam, gravitate away from their old identity and begin to associate themselves with like-minded individuals. The catalyst for this "religious reorientation" is a cognitive opening, or crisis, that shakes one's certitude in previously-held beliefs and opens an individual to new worldviews.

Individuals are deemed to have entered the indoctrination phase when, especially through the influence of a "spiritual sanctioner", their beliefs intensify and they choose to adopt Jihadi-Salafi ideology wholly, concluding without question that existing conditions and circumstances call for action, i.e. militant jihad, on their part.

Bhatt proceeded to explain that "jihadization" is the phase whereby members of the cluster accept their individual duty to participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahideen. Ultimately, the group begins operational planning for a terrorist attack. While the other phases of radicalization generally run over two to three years, the jihadization component can be a very rapid process, taking only a few months, or even weeks, to run its course.

Bhatt shared that the transformation of a Western-based individual to a terrorist is not triggered by oppression, suffering, revenge or desperation, but rather it is generally the search for an identity and a cause, which they find in extremist Islam. There is no useful profile to assist law enforcement or intelligence officers in predicting who will follow such a trajectory of radicalization as the individuals who take this course usually begin from "unremarkable" roots and come from various walks of life. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that operational terrorist cells often include a "spiritual sanctioner" who provides the theological justification for jihad and an "operational leader" who is essential in organizing, controlling and keeping the group focused and its motivation high.

The subtle and non-criminal nature of the behaviours involved in the process of radicalization makes it difficult to identify or even monitor from a law-enforcement standpoint. Taken in isolation, individual behaviours can be seen as innocuous. However, when seen as part of the continuum of the radicalization process, their significance becomes more important. Bhatt concluded that, considering the various radicalization phases and the need to identify those entering this process at the earliest possible stage, the role of intelligence in thwarting or preventing attacks is critical.

II. Aiding the Analyst: The RAHS Approach to Understanding Radicalization and Its Early Detection

Hoo Tiang Boon speaking on the RAHS system.

Hoo Tiang Boon explored the potential utility of the Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) system for helping analysts develop a better understanding of radicalization and its early warning. Religious terrorism has emerged as the foremost national security threat with great social, economic and political impact after the Cold War. Beyond the conventional "guns and more guns" counter-terrorist approach, more can be done. RAHS looks to provide insights on why people actually become extreme enough to resort to political violence.

Hoo defined radicalization as a psychological process by which an individual experiences a significant personality change through internalizing a revolutionary subculture. This individual sheds his old persona and adopts new ways of thinking, feeling and acting. It is also important to note that while every terrorist has undergone a radicalization process, not every radicalized person becomes a terrorist.

RAHS is an initiative started by the Singapore government in response to strategic shocks in the region such as the Asian Financial Crisis and SARS. It was conceived as a complementary approach to traditional scenario planning. To this end, Singapore's National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS) has designed a suite of software tools to aid the analyst in engendering better anticipatory analysis and understanding of complex strategic issues. The RAHS Software Platform contains multiple functionalities that can aid the analyst, such as advanced search tools, entity/timeline/network analysis, cross-consistency matrix, and scenario and ranking builders.

The RAHS system seeks to give early warning of possible emerging strategic-level surprises, typically on the two- to five-year time horizon, so that policy choices can be made, and either pre-emptive or preventive steps can be taken where necessary. Elaborating further and using the problem of radicalization as a reference, Hoo highlighted how—via the RAHS scenario builder functionality—a system map charting the variables impacting the radicalization process could be constructed. Hoo, however, cautioned that variables identified in the system map are not to be understood in isolation. For example, it is simply presumptuous to say that a person with a high level of dissatisfaction with the status quo is on the verge of being radicalized. However, taken together as a whole and understood in the context of a system, the variables form a composite picture that tells a coherent story.

Another interesting functionality of RAHS is the use of the ranking builder. This basically evaluates a user-defined situation in a ranked hierarchical tree. Nodes are first created and weighted based on user-defined rules or algorithms. The data entered into each node is then aggregated based on these user-specified weights to give scores for higher-level nodes, eventually culminating in a final index. Hoo clarified that the resulting indexes are not meant to be definitive or deterministic—just a guide to complement the existing assessment or experience of the analyst.

Hoo closed his presentation with the emphasis that the RAHS system is not about threat prediction. Rather, it is designed for anticipatory analysis: to pick up weak signals or outliers pointing towards worrying trends, potential crises and major turning points. It is also important to understand that the tool cannot replace the human analyst: it cannot replace instinct and it cannot ask the right questions. At the end of the day, RAHS is about augmenting the work of analysts through the automation of some of the more tedious aspects of research work as well as generating potentially useful insights via its modelling capabilities.

Discussion

Three salient points were made during the question-and-answer session. Firstly, it was noted that the movement of individuals abroad is an important factor in the radicalization process. Among the individuals who travel overseas in search of jihad, some end up as mujahideen and fight in foreign lands and some are re-directed to commit acts in the West, often in their country of origin, while others simply give up and return home because they cannot endure the training regime or have a change of heart. Secondly, it has been observed that groups and even plots that are highly connected to the Al-Qaeda core leadership are, in general, more operationally sophisticated. Thirdly, it has been observed that as women organize and socially network differently from men, further study on women radicals is required.

PANEL FOUR

Terrorism Cell Modelling: Systematically Studying How Extremist Cells Form

I. How Can Mathematical Methods Help Combat Terrorism?

Jonathan Farley explaining the role and potential of mathematical modelling tools in counter-terrorism.

Jonathan Farley started his presentation on a mathematical approach to counter-terrorism by highlighting the fact that the National Security Agency is the world's largest employer of mathematicians. He suggested that a number of mathematical methods might be used for counter-terrorism purposes: computational, statistical/probabilistic, theorem-based, game theory, discrete mathematics and computational optimization/linear programming.

Farley also elaborated on the utility of the reflexive theory for counter-terrorism, which, he noted, is already employed in military studies to make better sense of an adversary's decision-making processes. He then illustrated to the participants on how mathematical methods could help security agencies map out the probability of terrorists penetrating various entry points along American borders. Overall, he argued that the application of mathematical tools in border security, for example, aids in the effective deployment of security forces.

Farley proceeded to compare the effectiveness of a mathematical approach with the social network analysis approach to counter-terrorism. He opined that social network analysis typically computes statistical data from graphs to locate the person with the most connections—the implication being that the most connected node must be eliminated in order to disrupt the network. However, by using an ordered set approach that analyses the data not as a graph but as an organizational chart, the possible passages in which information is passed become more evident. These links are usually prematurely eliminated in the social networking analysis graphs. The ordered set approach therefore allows one to disrupt the flow of information from the leaders to the foot soldiers within an organization more effectively through the identification of critical information nodes or points.

Farley also illustrated how a branch of lattice theory—formal concept analysis—could be useful and harnessed for profile building. This mathematical tool could be used to identify less obvious implications from a set of data relating to terrorism. Nevertheless, he cautioned that one has to acknowledge the limitations of profiling and take into account the fact that creating too many profile categories could run into problems of "dimensionality".

Farley concluded by reiterating that mathematical methods could potentially be highly effective counter-terrorism tools.

II. Terrorist Cell Modelling

Nicholas O'Brien sharing with the audience the key lessons learnt from the post London bombings investigations.

Nicholas O'Brien spoke on the current nature of terrorist cells and how they have shifted from the traditional tightly knitted groups to loosely structured ones. O'Brien highlighted, for example, that the 9/11 hijackers were encouraged to keep a distance between themselves and other cell members to minimize disruptions to the network should one member be apprehended.

O'Brien commented that, considering the myriad of definitions and the complexity of determining what constitutes terrorism definitively, analysis of the phenomena is no easy feat. Therefore, for the purpose of his analysis, he confined his definition of "terrorism" to the use or threat of either violence, or serious damage to property in connection with a political, religious or ideological cause, while a "terrorist cell" refers to a group of people formed to support and/or commit acts of terrorism. He proceeded with an analysis of the cell structure based on findings of the following case studies: (i) the Madrid bombing of 2004; (ii) the London bombings of 2005 and 2007; and (iii) the Dutch Hofstad group.

In general, O'Brien observed from his comparative study that, apart from the fact that terrorist cells have resorted to violence to attain their political, ideological and religious goals, the identification of common or consistent terrorist cell structures is still difficult. He noted, for example, that while the Madrid cell consisted of up to 28 members, the perpetrators of the two London bombings and the Dutch Hofstad group operated with a much smaller cell. Moreover, as terrorist groups employ both foreign and homegrown terrorist elements, it is impossible that one umbrella cell characteristic could be used to describe the cell make-up and modus operandi of all terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, he mentioned that most Al-Qaeda operatives are more likely to be Muslim males under the age of 40.

O'Brien also raised the issue of "lone wolves" and examined their links to the main terrorist cell or network. In the United Kingdom, for instance, two different individuals who were convicted of preparing to commit acts of terrorism were, according to O'Brien, in contact with people who either knew or sympathized with their beliefs. Hence, while these individuals might seem to be ostensibly working on their own, he questioned if they were ideologically or operationally separated at all from the general terrorist cell structure.

In conclusion, O'Brien reiterated that terrorist cell sizes could range from two persons to more. Secondly, it would be a mistake to believe that there is such a thing as a typical terrorist cell; this would make the task of investigation by police and intelligence agencies more difficult. Thirdly, the fact that Al-Qaeda operatives are no longer working in a rigid cell structure suggests that its command and communication structures may have been disrupted. Furthermore, this also points towards and corroborates the trend that individuals are following the ideology of Al-Qaeda rather than its leadership per se.

Discussion

A participant commented that lone wolves do not appear to have any support from terrorist groups and governments might have limited resources at their disposal to conduct thorough investigations on every potential terrorist suspect. There were also concerns on the potential and magnitude of damage that lone wolves could inflict. Therefore, it was asked if it would be worthwhile to invest resources into the tracking of lone wolves.

A panellist replied that most bomb experts have agreed, for instance, that while bomb-making instructions found on the Internet might look viable, in reality, the results might be unstable. Hence, it would perhaps be more practical to track information media such as bomb-making websites and their influences on individuals than on lone wolves per se. It was also added that partially ordered set theory could be developed to identify jihadist websites that are important and worth tracking.

Another workshop participant highlighted that the problems of information asymmetry render sense-making of terrorist behaviours an uphill task. The panellists generally agreed with the comment that it is a challenge to make sense of the behaviours and movements of terrorists out of an imperfect knowledge of their background. However, they differed in their positions on possible solutions. One panellist opined that the only practical approach would probably be to keep an open mind about new perspectives and theories on the issue. On the other hand, the co-panellist remarked that academic theories could only provide alternative angles to make sense of the terrorist phenomena. In his opinion, the usefulness of theories is only as useful as law enforcement practitioners make them to be.

Finally, a participant sought clarity on the degree of involvement a person has in a terrorist plot before he can be considered a terrorist. A panellist argued that a person who merely sympathized with a terrorist cause should not be considered a part of a terrorist cell. A terrorist would be one who, at the very least, has both knowledge of and assisted in terrorist acts planned by the cells.

PANEL FIVE

Putting It All Together: Lessons Identified And The Way Forward

I. Countering Radicalization in Saudi Arabia

Mohammed Hafez elaborating on Saudi Arabia's religious rehabilitation programme.

Mohammed Hafez evaluated Saudi Arabia's strategy to neutralize the appeal of violent extremism. The approach is based on the two broad objectives of counter-radicalization, which involves preventing individuals from being drawn into radical movements, and de-radicalization, which is targeted at rehabilitating radicalized individuals.

Counter-radicalization involves: (i) rebutting the core assumptions, ideological claims and justification for violence; (ii) undermining the legitimacy of radical authorities; and (iii) offering alternatives to radical action. To achieve these ends, state-endorsed religious establishment, the media and rehabilitated militants are mobilized to portray radical movements as deviants and enemies of Islam. Hafez noted that while the Saudi government is making headway in countering radical ideology and challenging the legitimacy of the radical authorities, it has failed in its endeavour to offer an alternative to radical action, as there is no alternative to the established orthodoxy other than militancy. Moreover, it is also difficult to replicate the Saudi model in democratic societies.

De-radicalization focuses on: (i) disengaging militants from violence; (ii) encouraging them to renounce their radical beliefs; and (iii) reintegrating them into society. Hafez highlighted three obstacles to de-radicalization: (i) a strong sense of loyalty to radical group members; (ii) difficulty in extricating oneself, especially when one is already entangled in clandestine and criminal activities; and (iii) high exit costs, such as uncertainty of the future. Hence, a successful programme should be centred on engagement, not retribution; provide alternative support networks; provide training and jobs; and, lastly, make strategic use of rehabilitated radicals as counter-radicalization and de-radicalization workers.

Hafez concluded that it is too early to evaluate the success of the Saudi programme as it was implemented only in 2004. Still, assessments of such programmes need to be approached with a dose of healthy scepticism in order to move forward.

II. The Islamist Extremists Movement in the Philippines: A Case Study

Zamzamin Ampatuan speaking on the Islamist Extremists Movement in the Philippines.

Zamzamin Lumenda Ampatuan traced the emergence of Islamist extremism in the Philippines. By tracing the historical role of the sultanate system of governance in pre-colonial Southeast Asia, he argued that the aspirations of extremist movements such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have deviated from the form of Islam adhered to by the majority of the locals. Firstly, although Islam was the state religion during Sultanate era, Islamic laws did not form the basis of governance, nor was the religion imposed on non-Muslim inhabitants there. Secondly, the concept of jihad was remote from the layperson's understanding and practice of Islam.

Nevertheless, the influence of Islam on the country declined under colonial rule. Its revival can be traced to the 1960s, when the Philippines opened its doors to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This essentially resulted in an influx of predominantly Muslim missionaries from the Middle Eastern Wahabi and Salafi schools of thoughts. According to Ampatuan, this created opportunities for Filipino youths to participate in the mujahideen insurgency against the Soviet Union. He added that weak governance and Manila's failure to stem political unrest also provided a socio-political climate conducive for the growth of extremist ideology.

Ampatuan also added that the utopian extremist ideologies adopted by such groups as the MILF, the Abu Sayaaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah might appeal to certain sections of the community. He noted, for example, that the discontented—usually students who are in want of economic opportunities—are often the ones who are easily influenced by the teachings of extremists. While the eventual victims of such misguidance are ultimately Islam and the general Muslim population, the moderate majority largely remains silent due to the fear of reprisal and the consequences of being accused of impiety and disloyalty.

Ampatuan concluded by outlining the Kalimudan Campaign and other state efforts to win the hearts and minds of the people. This campaign seeks to offer an alternative brand of Islam that is specifically tailored to address the day-to-day needs or problems faced by the masses. Nevertheless, he mentioned that dislodging extremism remains a daunting task as long as extremist groups continue to receive support, especially financial aid, from the Middle East.

III. Rehabilitation and De-radicalization: The Singapore Experience

Mohamed Bin Ali presenting on Singapore's religious rehabilitation programme.

Mohamed bin Ali outlined the Religious Rehabilitation Group's (RRG) role in counselling Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) detainees as part of Singapore's counter-terrorism efforts. The detainees were mainly Singaporeans educated in secular institutions and who were gainfully employed. Mohamed shared that although their priority in life was a religion-driven desire to be better Muslims, they had a shallow understanding of Islam and were often psychologically predisposed to indoctrination. Therefore, the Singapore government's approach (towards combating such radical orientations) is not just to be punitive in nature but also focuses on rehabilitation and working closely with the Muslim community.

Formed in 2003, the RRG is a volunteer group consisting of local Islamic scholars and teachers. Their objective is to counter the misguided ideological interpretations of the JI detainees and facilitate their re-integration into society. The RRG's counselling approach centres on: (i) extricating their negatively imbibed ideology; (ii) negating their misunderstood theology; (iii) replacing negative ideology with positive ones; and (iv) instilling a better understanding of true and correct Islamic theology.

The RRG's role in counter-terrorism includes the counselling of the families of the detainees and serves as a resource panel on religious extremism and radical ideology.

Moreover, recognizing the likelihood that extremists could tap on media such as books, videos and the Internet to increase their sphere of influence, the RGG also actively engages the public in counter-terrorism topics through talks, publications and cyber discussion forums.

He concluded by reiterating that there are no easy solutions to neutralizing radicalism, and that it is imperative for all segments of society to be actively engaged in any counter-terrorism effort.

Discussion

The discussion started with an observation that the presentations suggested that the challenge of radicalization is, to a large degree, an intra-civilizational struggle requiring multiple tools to deal with.

Reservations about the rehabilitation of detainees were also expressed. It was noted that efforts at counselling radicalized individuals in other countries have met with resistance. In response, it was clarified that not all the detainees in the Saudi example could be rehabilitated and only those who evinced an inclination are identified for the programme. In the case of Singapore, rehabilitation and counselling are mandatory for all detainees, and will continue even for those who are released under restriction orders.

Another concern that was raised pertained to the monitoring of Islamic curricula in schools. In some countries, pressure from NGOs and the international community impedes the state's attempts to regulate the content of its religious curriculum to ensure that it is not guided by extremist ideology. It was mentioned that the religious curriculum in Saudi Arabia is not monitored although it does contain elements of intolerance. Meanwhile, it was also remarked that radicalization does not stem from religious schools but, rather, motivated by pan-Islamic themes based on struggles like those in Bosnia and Afghanistan.

In the case of the Philippines, the state is beginning to impose some form of regulation. However, such regulatory measures might be a double-edged sword as extremists often quote and criticize them as examples of governmental control. In the case of Singapore, the madrasah curriculum is overseen by the Majlis Ugama Islam Singapore (MUIS) or Islamic Religious Council of Singapore and is thus state-regulated. It was suggested that for states with a strong democratic tradition, their governments could work closely with NGOs to address this issue together.

BREAKOUT GROUPS SUMMARY

Consultants and analysts were divided into six groups and asked to address a series of related questions. Participants addressed various topics including indicators to detect radicalization, the pitfalls of developing early warning indicators, and the role of cell-modelling in counter-terrorism. The groups came up with the following themes and key takeaways.

Group One

Group One discussed the speed of radicalization. It was agreed that radicalization is often such a slow process that the individual who is radicalized is not even aware of the transformation. On discussing social ties in the radicalization link, it was argued that it is appealingly abstract to treat links as if they are mathematical abstractions; rather, links have different emotional significance to people. The idea that one can make all kinds of acquaintances as links is erroneous—there might be a problem with the entire network analysis approach. This led to the implication that the networks approach is not as abstractly appealing as it might seem.

Group One argued that a network might not be needed to start the radicalization process. Ultimately, the group argued that there was not one strategy in counter-terrorism that would be useful all the time. Given the importance of the Internet, more should be done to provide counter-radicalization on the Web.

Group Two

Group Two first argued that it is necessary to recognize the critical role of ideologies. Educational and religious institutions should counter ideologies that justify violence. Second, community outreach is critical in law enforcement operations that deal with terrorism offences. Third, efforts at regulating regional conflicts and good governance should deprive extremists of the pretexts for violence. It is important to realize that political conflict plays a role in the radicalization process.

Group Three

Group Three discussed local knowledge at length. Central governments should supply a guiding rather than a controlling hand when it comes to maximizing local knowledge. If the government controls too tightly, it eliminates the value of local knowledge. Agencies should cooperate and complement, not attempt to control, one another. Community outreach is very important but in order for it to be effective, it must be sincere. Authorities must also be willing to discuss with those with differing opinions. The discussion culminated with the participants arguing the benefit of policymaker feedback.

Group Four

Group Four started by defining the meaning of radicalization, concluding that it is a very normative term with negative connotations. However, it does not have to have such connotations. For example, the French population during the French Revolution was radicalized and led to positive changes. The group went on to discuss multiple pathways for radicalization, circumstances that would make an individual willing to die or kill, and the complex role Islam plays in the process. Other themes included the role of ideology, how it justifies violence and provides a worldview. More so, the group discussed why some groups that have been marginalized—such as Native Americans—do not radicalize, rise up and resist their oppressors. The group concluded that radicalization is a universal process.

Group Five

Group Five argued there is a multitude of causes for radicalization: social frustrations, the lack of opportunities and alienation, to name a few. The group ultimately decided that there is no universal process of radicalization; rather, there are some commonalities. First, good governance—providing social services, education, healthcare, for example—is a source of counter-radicalization. Second, social networks and social ties are a feature of the radicalization process. Third, ideology plays a central role in radicalization. Awareness building is an important policy takeaway; it is crucial to offer communities an alternative point of view.

Group Six

Group Six argued three policy takeaways. First, community engagement programmes are very important. It is crucial to get involved at a societal level to counter radicalization. Second, prevention from the beginning is central. Once an individual becomes a terrorist, it is extremely difficult to de-radicalize him or her. Third, more international research and comparative studies needs to be conducted to see if the are universal root causes and drivers to radicalization.

Rapporteurs:
Yolanda Chin, Michael Kabrin,
Youssef Zaki, Jolene Anne Jerard,
Nadeeka Prashadani Withana and Ng Sue Chia.

Editors:
Ng Sue Chia, Yolanda Chin,
Hoo Tiang Boon, Kumar Ramakrishna and
Beverly Neale Rush.

The conference adheres to a variation of the Chatham House rules. Accordingly, beyond the points expressed in the prepared papers, no attributions have been included in this conference report.

This report summarizes the proceedings of the conference as interpreted by the assigned rapporteurs and editor of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.

WORKSHOP PROGRAMME

Day 1: 3rd Feb 2008, Sunday

1700–1900 Arrival of Invited Foreign Participants and Speakers

1900–2100 Welcome Reception
Hosted by Lee Ark Boon,
Director, National Security Coordination Centre, National Security Coordination Secretariat

Day 2: 4th Feb 2008, Monday

0815–0845 Registration

0850–0900 Welcome Remarks by
Ambassador Barry Desker,
Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU

0900–0915 Welcome Remarks by
Ambassador Patricia L. Herbold,
US Embassy

0915–0925 Opening Remarks by Mr Peter Ho,
Permanent Secretary (National Security and Intelligence Co-ordination),
Singapore & Head of Civil Service

0925–1040 Panel One – The Threat and Process of Violent Radicalisation: Why Do Ordinary People Become Extremists?

Chairperson:
Mohammed Hafez,
Associate Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA

Speaker :
Clark McCauley,
Co-Director, The National Consortium for Study of Terrorism & Responses to Terrorism (NC-START), USA

Andrew Silke,
Professor, Criminology Field Leader,
School of Law,
University of East London

Question & Answer

1040–1100 Tea Break

1100–1230 Panel Two – Case Studies of Violent Radicalisation: The European and Asian Experiences

Chairperson :
Kumar Ramakrishna,
Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), RSIS, NTU

Speaker :
Fernando Reinares,
Professor of Political Science and Security Studies, King Juan Carlos University, Madrid, Spain
Director (Global Terrorism Programme), Elcano Royal Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Madrid, Spain

Muniruzzaman,
President, Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies

Tito Karnavian,
Head of Intelligence, Detachment 88,
Indonesian National Police

Question & Answer

1230–1330 Lunch – Network Time

1330–1500 Break-out Sessions –
6 Syndicates Facilitated by
Workshop Speakers

Syndicate Sessions Topics:
Issues covered in Panel 1 and 2.

1500–1530 Tea Break

1530–1600 Syndicate group presentation:
Issues covered in Panel 1 and 2.

1600–1700 Panel Three – Early Warning Methods and the Detection of Radicalisation: Putting Theory into Practice

Chairperson:
Mohammed Hafez,
Associate Professor of
National Security Affairs, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Speaker:
Arvin Bhatt,
Senior Intelligence Analyst,
New York Police Department,
Co-Author of "Radicalisation in the West:
The Home Grown Threat"

Hoo Tiang Boon,
Associate Research Fellow,
Centre of Excellence for National Security,
RSIS, NTU

Question & Answer

1700–1715 Wrap up

1715 End of Day One

1830–2100 Welcome Dinner hosted by
Mr Peter Ho,
Permanent Secretary (National Security and Intelligence
Co-ordination), Singapore & Head of Civil Service

Day 3: 5th Feb 2008, Tuesday

0845–0900 Review of Day 1
Kumar Ramakrishna,
Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), RSIS, NTU

0900–1030 Panel Four – Terrorism Cell Modelling: Systematically Studying How Extremist Cells Form

Chairperson:
Kumar Ramakrishna,
Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), RSIS, NTU

Speaker:
Jonathan Farley,
Expert on the application of Lattice Theory and Mathematical Modelling Tools to Counter-terrorism
Department of Mathematics,
California Institute of Technology
Harvard Foundation Distinguished Scientist Award Recipient and
Fulbright Distinguished Scholar to the United Kingdom

Nicholas O'Brien,
Associate Professor (Counter Terrorism),
Charles Sturt University, Australia
Former Head of International Counter
Terrorism Operations in Special Branch,
Scotland Yard, London, United Kingdom

Question & Answer

1030–1100 Tea Break – Network Time

1100–1230 Break-out Sessions –
6 Syndicates Facilitated by
Workshop Speakers

Syndicate Sessions Topics:
Issues covered in Panel 3 and 4

1230–1330 Lunch – Network Time

1330–1400 Syndicate group presentation:
Issues covered in Panel 1 and 2.

1400–1600 Panel Five – Putting It All Together:
Lessons Identified and
the Way Forward
(Roundtable Discussion / Closing Panel)

Chairperson:
Mohammed Hafez,
Associate Professor of National Security
Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA

Speaker :
Mohammed Hafez,
Associate Professor (National Security
Affairs), Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California, Author of
"Why Muslims Rebel"

Zamzamin Lumenda Ampatuan,
Undersecretary and General Manager
Human and Development Corporation,
Department of Agriculture
Former Executive Director,
Office of the Muslim Affairs, Southern
Philippines Development Authority (SPDA),
Makati, Metro Manila

Mohamed Bin Ali
Associate Research Fellow,
International Centre for Political Violence
and Terrorism Research, RSIS,
NTU and Member of Religious
Rehabilitation Group, Singapore

Question & Answer

1600–1630 Sum Up Session
Closing Remarks by
Kumar Ramakrishna
Closing Remarks by Douglas M. Doolittle

1630 Closing Tea Reception

1800 Network and Family Outing
(Optional – Family and Guests)
Night Safari

ABOUT THE GFF

What Is GFF?

The Global Futures Forum (GFF) is a multinational community that works at the open source level to identify and make sense of transnational threats. Its primary goal is to foster the collaborative development of insight and foresight through the exchange of different perspectives among its members.

Who Is GFF?

GFF seeks to involve a diverse population of officials and subject-matter experts to stimulate cross-cultural and interdisciplinary thinking, and to challenge prevailing assumptions. Members of the GFF include security officials, security-related experts from the academic and non-government industries and organizations respectively. There are currently more than 1,000 GFF members from over 40 countries.

How Does GFF Work?

Face-to-Face Meetings

General Meetings: Virginia in 11/2005, Prague in 12/2006, Vancouver in 4/2008

Community of Interest Workshops: Small, topic-based meetings held regularly

GFF operates a password-protected website that allows members to continue conversations begun at GFF events around the clock and across the globe. The website is the repository of GFF production, including hundreds of readings and resources on relevant topics, member blogs, discussion forums, and wikis.

What are GFF Areas of Interest?

Current GFF communities of interest include Radicalization, Practice and Organization of Intelligence, Global Disease, Social Networks, Illicit Trafficking, Foresight and Warning, Genocide Prevention, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism Studies, Proliferation, and Emerging Technologies. GFF membership is polled annually to review interest in these and alternative topics.

For more information on GFF, please write to: admin@globalfuturesforum.org

ABOUT CENS

The Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) is a research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of international Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Established on 1 April 2006, CENS is devoted to rigorous policy-relevant analysis of a range of national security issues. The CENS team is multinational in composition, comprising both Singaporean and foreign analysts who are specialists in various aspects of national and homeland security affairs.

Why CENS?

In August 2004 the Strategic Framework for National Security outlined the key structures, security measures and capability development programmes that would help Singapore deal with transnational terrorism in the near and long term.

However, strategizing national security policies requires greater research and understanding of the evolving security landscape. This is why CENS was established to increase the intellectual capital invested in strategizing national security. To this end, CENS works closely with not just other RSIS research programmes, but also national security agencies such as the National Security Coordination Secretariat within the Prime Minister's Office.

What Research Does CENS Do?

CENS currently conducts research in three key areas of national security:

- Risk Assessment/Horizon Scanning
  - The art and science of detecting "weak signals" emanating from the total security environment so as to forewarn policymakers, the private sector and the public about approaching "shocks" such as terrorism, pandemics, energy crises and other easy-to-miss trends and ostensibly distant events.
- Social Resilience
  - The capacity of globalized, multicultural societies to hold together in the face of systemic shocks such as diseases and terrorist strikes.
- Homeland Defence Programme
  - The security of land-based, aviation and maritime transport networks and increasingly, the total supply chain vital to Singapore's economic vitality.
  - Health, water and food security.
  - Crisis communications and management.

How Does CENS Help Influence National Security Policy?

Through policy-oriented analytical commentaries and other research output directed at the national security policy community in Singapore and beyond, CENS staff members promote greater awareness of emerging threats as well as global best practices in responding to those threats. In addition, CENS organizes courses, seminars and workshops for local and foreign national security officials to facilitate networking and exposure to leading-edge thinking on the prevention of, and response to, national and homeland security threats.

How Does CENS Help Raise Public Awareness of National Security Issues?

To educate the wider public, CENS staff members regularly author articles in a number of security and intelligence related publications, as well as write op-ed analyses in leading newspapers.Radio and television interviews have allowed CENS staff to participate in and shape the public debate on critical issues such as risk assessment and horizon scanning, multiculturalism and social resilience, intelligence reform and defending critical infrastructure against mass-casualty terrorist attacks.

How Does CENS Keep Abreast of Cutting Edge National Security Research?

The lean organizational structure of CENS permits a constant and regular influx of Visiting Fellows of international calibre through the Distinguished CENS Visitors Programme. This enables CENS to keep abreast of cutting edge global trends in national security research.

For More on CENS

Log on to http://www.rsis.edu.sg and follow the links to “Centre of Excellence for National Security”.

ABOUT RSIS

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was established in January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological University. RSIS's mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia Pacific. To accomplish this mission, it will:

- Provide a rigorous professional graduate education in international affairs with a strong practical and area emphasis
- Conduct policy-relevant research in national security, defence and strategic studies, diplomacy and international relations
- Collaborate with like-minded schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence

Graduate Training in International Affairs

RSIS offers an exacting graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. The teaching programme consists of the Master of Science (MSc) degrees in Strategic Studies, International Relations, International Political Economy, and Asian Studies as well as an MBA in International Studies taught jointly with the Nanyang Business School. The graduate teaching is distinguished by their focus on the Asia Pacific, the professional practice of international affairs, and the cultivation of academic depth. Over 150 students, the majority from abroad, are enrolled with the School. A small and select Ph.D. programme caters to advanced students whose interests match those of specific faculty members.

Research

RSIS research is conducted by five constituent Institutes and Centres: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS, founded 1996), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR, 2002), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS, 2006), the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in ASIA (NTS-Asia, 2007); and the Temasek Foundation Centre for Negotiations (2008). The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. The School has three professorships that bring distinguished scholars and practitioners to teach and to do research at the School. They are the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies, the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professorship in International Relations, and the NTUC Professorship in International Economic Relations.

International Collaboration

Collaboration with other professional Schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence is a RSIS priority. RSIS will initiate links with other like-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as well as adopt the best practices of successful schools.

ABOUT NSCS

The National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS) was set up in the Prime Minister's Office in Jul 2004 to facilitate national security policy coordination from a Whole-Of-Government perspective. NSCS reports to the Prime Minister through the Coordinating Minister for National Security (CMNS). The current CMNS is the Deputy Prime Minister Professor S. Jayakumar, who is also Minister for Law.

NSCS is headed by Permanent Secretary (National Security and Intelligence Coordination). The current PS(NSIC) is Mr Peter Ho, who is concurrently Head of Civil Service and Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

NSCS provides support to the ministerial-level Security Policy Review Committee (SPRC) and Senior official-level National Security Coordination Committee (NSCCom) and Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ICC). It organises and manages national security programmes, one example being the Asia-Pacific Programme for National Security Officers. NSCS also funds experimental, research or start-up projects that contribute to our national security.

NSCS is made up of two components: the National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC) and the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (JCTC). Each centre is headed by a director.

NSCC performs three vital roles in Singapore's national security: national security planning, policy coordination, and anticipating strategic threats. As a coordinating body, NSCC ensures that government agencies complement each other, and do not duplicate or perform competing tasks.

JCTC is a strategic analysis unit that compiles a holistic picture of terrorist threat. It studies the levels of preparedness in areas such as maritime terrorism and chemical, biological and radiological terrorist threats. It also maps out the consequences should an attack in that domain take place.

More information on NSCS can be found at www.nscs.gov.sg

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