**APPSNO**

# 3rd ASIA-PACIFIC PROGRAMME

## FOR SENIOR NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICERS (APPSNO)
### 12–17 APRIL 2009, SINGAPORE

## Thinking Intelligently about Risk

**S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**
A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

**NATIONAL SECURITY COORDINATION SECRETARIAT**

# 3<sup>RD</sup> ASIA-PACIFIC PROGRAMME FOR SENIOR NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICERS (APPSNO)

REPORT ON A CONFERENCE ORGANIZED BY
THE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY (CENS)
AT THE S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (RSIS),
NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, SINGAPORE
AND
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COORDINATION SECRETARIAT (NSCS)
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*This report summarizes the proceedings of the conference as interpreted by the assigned rapporteurs and editors of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.*

*This conference adheres to a variation of the Chatham House Rule. Accordingly, beyond the speakers and paper presenters cited, no other attributions have been included in this report.*

# Executive Summary

The Third Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO) was held from 12 – 17 April 2009 at The Sentosa Resort & Spa, Singapore. Jointly organised by the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) – a centre within the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) – and the National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS) of the Prime Minister's Office, Singapore, one of the aims of APPSNO is to bring together senior national security officers from the Asia-Pacific and beyond to network and work collectively to develop a better understanding of each other's national security perspectives.

This year's theme was "Thinking Intelligently about Risk." To this end, a number of leading global security experts with experience in fields broadly related to national security shared their experiences and spoke on a number of topics related to the theme. The six sessions were framed around some of the following risk-related questions: (i) why is risk prominent today?; (ii) who are the parties addressing it?; and (iii) how can we respond proportionately to risk?; and (iv) what lessons are there to engage the public?

In his opening remarks Ambassador Barry Desker noted that proper risk management requires us to not just assess a risk but also review or take stock of the risk mitigation measures that were previously introduced. He also noted that without a sense of strategic direction, risk management can become more of a problem than a solution.

Professor S. Jayakumar delivered the opening address and stressed that, given the current threats and risks that exist in an inter-dependent and inter-linked global society, the whole of society must be engaged. To foster such engagement the National Resilience Proficiency Badge programme was recently launched as an outreach to youth as well as to encourage students – through the Singapore Scout Troops – to learn the concept of resilience and appreciate the security challenges that confront Singapore. It is hoped that the national resilience badge and other national security education programmes will serve to raise awareness and help protect youths against radicalisation.

The first session saw Lee Ark Boon discuss Singapore's National Security Framework within the context of the programme's theme of risk. Singapore has developed a three-pronged strategic framework to tackle terrorism that includes: (i) a whole-of-government approach that leverages both local and international linkages; (ii) a physical hardening of Singapore's infrastructure; and (iii) enhancing awareness and cohesion of Singapore's people – building resilience against radical ideology. This approach stems from the realization that government agencies cannot work alone to tackle the issue of radicalization.

The second session focused on the concepts of risk and uncertainty with Bruce Schneier providing a re-evaluation of the notion of security given the common heuristics and biases that can lead us to exaggerate spectacular risks while downplaying more common ones. As our biases and reality can be out of sync, this can lead to false senses of security and paranoia. Frank Furedi examined the concept of uncertainty and its relationship with risk. A focus on uncertainty inevitably emphasizes what we do not know over what we do know. This encourages worst-case thinking and a debilitating focus on possibilities instead of probabilities. He also noted a gap between official concerns, such as those over terrorism and pandemics, with what the public appear to worry about.

Frank Furedi also delivered the Distinguished Dinner Lecture where the topic was "Addressing Radicalization." In it, Furedi examined what he saw were four myths of radicalization that have sprung up over recent years namely that: (i) radicalization could be identified with a form of ideology; (ii) radicalized individuals were psychologically deficient in some form; (iii) radicalization is linked to either economic deprivation or discrimination; and (iv) radicalization as a response to perceived Western "oppression."

The third session looked at the differences in counter-radicalization efforts between the UK and Singapore. Munira Mirza argued that the labelling by the British government of young Muslims as a vulnerable community

at risk of being radicalized has obscured deeper cultural and political trends in British society. Moreover, singling them out as a group requiring special treatment may unwittingly lead to their further alienation and radicalization. Alami Musa argued that the causes for local radicalization are not found in Islam but are due to the manipulation of individuals who have turned to religion in search of identity and meaning of life.

Two of the sessions examined dealing both with disasters as well as their consequences. Richard Flax stated that while the Balinese authorities had not prepared for such a scenario as the first Bali bombing, their willingness to accept the assistance of the spontaneous team which Flax coordinated led to a positive resolution of some of the complexities of dealing with the immediate victims of the attack. Colonel Anwar Abdullah examined how lessons learnt from the collapses of the Hotel New World and Nicoll Highway, as well as Singapore's experiences during the SARS crisis, were integrated into Singapore's Homefront Crisis Management Framework. LTC Yazid Abdullah discussed the importance of engaging in disaster exercises in order to be better prepared for the actual event and gave an overview to participants of the Northstar V exercise.

In the fifth panel, Baroness Neville-Jones presented on the current challenges confronting the application of risk analysis to national security and its implications on security agencies and the public. Highlighting the critical role – and limitations – of intelligence in policy-making, Baroness Neville-Jones identified some of the key problems in validating information and sifting out the vital from the peripheral.

# Opening Remarks



**Ambassador Barry Desker**, Dean of the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), welcomed guests and participants to the Third Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO). Jointly organised by the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) – a centre within RSIS – and the National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS) of the Prime Minister's Office, APPSNO brings together senior national security officers from the Asia-Pacific and beyond to network and work collectively to develop a better understanding of each other's national security perspectives.

Ambassador Desker noted that the focus of this year's APPSNO is on risk. He mentioned that risk analysis is both an objective attempt to measure the scale of threats we confront and a set of policy prescriptions as to what should be done about them. Proper risk management requires us to not just assess a risk but also to review or take stock of the risk mitigation measures that were previously introduced. It serves as a reminder of the broader objectives we have for societies. Risk management without a sense of purpose of what we are for, rather than merely what we are against, can be a dangerous path to follow.

It was also articulated that 'decisiveness' should not be confused with 'effectiveness'. Action should be grounded in evidence and framed in such a way that would allow us to have an appropriate appreciation of current threats. This ensures that the measures taken are proportionate and win the support of the public.

Hence, Ambassador Desker hoped that by examining and discussing ways to think intelligently about risk, APPSNO would provide participants with the opportunity to expand their understanding of the issues at hand as well as contribute to discussions on risk management.

# Opening Address



**Professor S. Jayakumar**, Senior Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security, delivered the opening address. Despite the economic slowdown, Professor Jayakumar noted that the 3rd APPSNO was well represented by participants from the region and beyond. He mentioned that this was an important signal of the participants' continued resolve and commitment towards regional security through information exchange and joint collaboration.

The current global financial crisis has shown that the world is more inter-dependent and inter-linked than generally assumed. The threat of trans-national terrorism not only has ideological roots but also a global reach. Professor Jayakumar mentioned that the threat remains and recent tragic events highlight its persistent and dynamic nature. Terrorist cells are still in existence and ready to mount attacks. The terrorist attacks in Mumbai last year and, recently, Pakistan demonstrated that the risks we face are asymmetrical and evolving. Therefore, the challenge for national security agencies is to stay ahead of these threats.

It was also articulated that it would not be possible for the authorities to anticipate and plan for all contingencies and scenarios. Professor Jayakumar thus stressed that the whole of society must be engaged. The Mumbai attacks also underscore the balance between the need to give public information and the need to ensure effectiveness of security operations. It is imperative that national security agencies develop strategies and plans for media management without jeopardizing the success of operations and placing lives at further risk.

Singapore has taken a range of measures to counter security fatigue and complacency. This includes full-scale multi-agency emergency exercises (e.g. Exercise NorthStar) and the Community Engagement Programme (CEP), which aims to foster better inter-ethnic relations through regular briefings and activities. The National Resilience Proficiency Badge programme was recently launched as an outreach to youth as well as to encourage students – through the Singapore Scout Troops – to learn the concept of resilience and appreciate the security challenges that confront Singapore. It is hoped that the national resilience badge and other national security education programmes will serve to raise awareness and help protect youths against radicalisation.

In conclusion, Professor Jayakumar emphasized the need for the constant exchange of ideas, cooperation and learning with like-minded partners. To this end, APPSNO is designed to provide participants with networking opportunities, to raise collective intellectual capital and to stay ahead of a persistent and evolving threat.

# Singapore's National Security Framework



**Lee Ark Boon** gave an overview of Singapore's National Security Framework. Singapore is a small city-state, comprising a multi-ethnic community that sits at a shipping transportation hub. As such Singapore is a target for terrorism – a problem that will not be going away anytime soon. Following the tragic events of 9/11, Singaporean authorities found Jemaah Islamiyah cells in the country and have worked successfully to disrupt their activity. However there have been cases of self-radicalization via the Internet in Singapore, including the cases of Abdul Basheer, a Singaporean lawyer, who was arrested in February 2007, as well as Muhammad Zamri Abdullah and Maksham Mohd Shah who were arrested for experimenting with explosives in December 2007.

Singapore has developed a three-pronged strategic framework to tackle terrorism that includes: (i) a whole-of-government approach that leverages both local and international linkages; (ii) a physical hardening of Singapore's infrastructure; and (iii) enhancing awareness and cohesion of Singapore's people – building resilience against radical ideology. This approach stems from the realization that government agencies cannot work alone to tackle the issue of radicalization.

Within this framework, Singapore has put in place various networking and hardening measures that will be continually enhanced and reviewed. All of this is done to stay ahead of the terrorists who will exploit any opportunity that arises to do Singapore harm. But the fight against terrorism cannot be done by the government alone. Communities and businesses alike need to do their part. All Singaporeans need to remain united as one people in the face of terror and together as one. Singapore will meet the terrorist threat with confidence.

## Discussion

Several participants noted during the discussion session that society was failing to win the "hearts and minds" of youth and this was the reason why they would surf the Web looking for specific websites. A second participant stated that with the relatively large amount of radical websites, combined with the ease of information dissemination on the internet making them difficult to manage, that a more reasonable approach would be to increase resilience in the face of radical ideology. In this sense, it is not about "winning" hearts and minds, but rather denying to the other side hearts and minds.

# Risk and Uncertainty



**Bruce Schneier** provided a re-evaluation of security and explored the disjuncture between feelings and reality. He provided several examples based on his new study, on the common biases and misperceptions of security that need to be dealt with. These include: (i) how we exaggerate spectacular risks but downplay the common ones; (ii) how the unknown is always perceived to be riskier than the known; and (iii) involuntary risks are overestimated as compared to voluntary risks. These were pointers he used to illustrate how our biases and reality are often out of sync, compelling us to swing between a false sense of security and one of paranoia.

He provided several reasons why we fail to notice the disconnection between biases and reality. First, it stems from a poor understanding of risk and security. Second, poor and weak examples are often used to illustrate security threats. Moreover, he added, when feelings and emotions begin to cloud judgment, it inadvertently leads to an inadequate comprehension of security. As a measure to deal with these factors, one suggested method would be to provide enough real-world examples – both positive and negative in nature – to provide a more accurate picture of reality.

Following that, Schneier delved into the importance of models in shaping our attitudes. He argued that models, largely crafted by the media and politicians in his view, are critical in how we comprehend reality. In particular, the more comfortable we are with a model, the closer we grow towards it, until it is transformed into an intuitive feeling. One example is how the marketing and education model for seatbelts has so psychologically engrained

within us its necessity that we no longer question it. However, he brought attention to the ability of "flashball moments" where significant events of intense emotions like 9/11 will create new models and, consequently, new security attitudes.

He also commented on the roles that different stakeholders and their unique agendas play in shaping these models. Most importantly, he emphasised that it is crucial to understand the agenda behind security decisions, as they are often made for non-security reasons due to the manipulative hand of stakeholders.

Schneier concluded his presentation by reiterating how feelings need to match reality in order to ensure better security trade-offs. He regarded this as a critical issue that security practitioners need to address instead of indulging in "security theatre", i.e. measures concentrated on allaying fears, as opposed to focusing efforts to deal effectively with actual threats.



**Frank Furedi** concentrated on the concept of uncertainty as opposed to 'security'. To him, it is a concept that remains unclear and under explored. He is particularly interested in the strong negativity associated with the term and especially the perpetual failure to embrace uncertainty as a promising or positive entity.

He then outlined the relationship between risk and uncertainty. As opposed to risk, uncertainty has an infinite amount of unknown possibilities which are therefore not calculable. He argues it is only through the expansion of knowledge that uncertainty can be translated into

calculable risks. However, with this arises the fundamental doubt about knowledge we have today. This exposes our inability to harness its transformative power.

Furedi also asserted that the indulgence in "unknown unknowns" or what he terms as "1% thinking" is classic worst-case scenario thinking. It is a dramatization of imagination, or a "dramatization of uncertainty," which elevates threats like terrorism into the existential threat sphere. This to him makes no sense, as it normalizes worst-case thinking, pathologizes risk and dramatically, yet powerfully, influences the political elites and their anxieties. Ultimately, this only feeds into a ritual of insecurity that cultivates background fear.

He provided several pointers to bring some clarity to public security. The first is to ascertain the comprehensibility of the threat, i.e. to concentrate on what we do know as opposed to the unknown, or what we do not know. Secondly, he argues that a shift in concern towards existential security is needed. Lastly, instead of a narrowly determined security policy, he advocates one that emphasizes social capital. This would be more beneficial for allaying existential insecurities, primarily because social capital increases in the face of threats, making 'real' communities and more resilient social bonds.

Furedi illustrated the importance of cultivating social capital with two dominant models: (i) the vulnerability paradigm which he said is the official, commonly used model; and (ii) the resilience paradigm. Both determine different responses to insecurity. However, despite the popularity of the vulnerability paradigm's "help-seeking" approach, he argues that it is a fatalistic, passive model that defers to helplessness and uncertainty. The resilience paradigm on the other hand, focuses on community

bonds and self-help and transforms uncertainties into probabilities. He believes that through the resilience method, a greater clarity and ability to deal with public insecurity and uncertainty will be achieved.

## Discussion

The discussion began with a query on "1% thinking", in particular, what the correct attitude towards the unknown should be, and how information can be shared between the elites and the public. In response, Furedi explained that fear changes according to cultural contexts and uncertainty is not a uniform feeling. Hence, possessing knowledge does not lessen fear as fear is a cultural phenomenon based purely on the unknown. Thus, concentrating on "1% thinking" will only promote policy paralysis which justifies his advocacy of the resilience paradigm i.e. a model that concentrates on dealing positively with the future rather than trying to prevent uncertainty. Schneier added that the 1% threat is a matter of perception, and is not as novel as we think. He suggested that we should look into the discourses of fear rather than the intricate details that may obscure the larger picture. He similarly also rejected the elite-public information sharing idea, simply because knowing the unknown will not alleviate fear.

A participant asked if there was a false dichotomy between the resilience and vulnerability paradigms proposed during the presentation. To that, both speakers were in agreement that people are perfectly capable of dealing with risk but suffer from 'risk ignorance' because of our reliance on being governed and protected. For example, Schneier cited the inane protocols and procedures that govern airplane security today and encouraged participants to remember how normal risk is in society.

# Addressing Communities



By assessing the British government's counter-radicalization efforts vis-à-vis the Muslim community after the July London Bombing incident, **Munira Mirza** argued that the labelling by the British government of young Muslims as a vulnerable community at risk of being radicalized has obscured deeper cultural and political trends in British society. Moreover, singling them out as a group requiring special treatment may unwittingly lead to their further alienation and radicalization.

Mirza posited that the profiling of potential terrorists as a form of risk analysis is a difficult endeavour as many studies on the profiles of terrorists have shown that most assumptions, such as poverty or low educational attainment, do not hold. As such, understanding why people become radicalized requires examining why radical ideas have greater resonance for the terrorists than the common values and ideals that British society supposedly stands for. Drawing on some findings from her study, *Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the Paradox of Multiculturalism*, Mirza argued that Muslim youths attracted to radical ideology tend not to be co-opted or indoctrinated by terrorists cells but are in fact driven to search for an identity that they can relate to as a result of feeling alienated by the dominant culture in British society.

Her study also demonstrated that the general Muslim population is in itself a very diverse group and that the stereotype of Muslims as very religious in the puritanical sense and the belief that the majority are sympathetic towards extremist ideology is unfounded. Moreover, the study also showed that the priorities of Muslims are very much the same as non-Muslims, such as their concern for employment and financial stability, and their attitude towards their British identity.

Mirza concluded by reflecting on why radical and "anti-West" ideas seem to appeal more to youths but not to the older generation. In view of similarities in the sense of a loathing towards "Western" values and the resurgent appeal of ethnic and religious identity among both Muslim and non-Muslim youths, it was suggested that the problem may lie in the reality that traditional forms of collective identity may not appeal to the younger generation as it did to their elders, thus pushing these youths towards finding alternative identities to engage with. With particular reference to the Muslim community, the government's efforts at singling out Muslims for scrutiny may have been borne out of good intentions but could inadvertently alienate the youths and drive them towards radicalization.



**Alami Musa** provided a perspective on the Singapore experience in countering radicalization. He argued that the causes for local radicalization are not found in Islam but are due to the manipulation of individuals who have turned to religion in search of identity and meaning of life.

On the motivation of radicals to reject the mainstream and peaceful interpretation of Islam and instead embrace deviant and extremist ideology, Musa noted evidence from terrorist instruction manuals that indicate the use of melding instructions to kill with verses from the Qu'ran quoted out of context; these give the mistaken impression that acts of violence are religious acts. As these acts of violence are perpetrated by a small deviant group rather than the majority mainstream adherents, he also underscored the need to refrain from labeling it as a "Muslim problem" which may inadvertently reinforce the terrorists' claims that their cause is legitimately religious in nature.

Secondly, Musa also pointed to the general trend of increasing religiosity not just among Muslim Singaporeans but also with non-Muslims. This suggested that the appeal of religion may also be triggered by the search for a way to cope with rapid changes brought about by modernity. An important implication for religious groups is to ensure that there are enough bona-fide religious leaders to meet this growing demand to guard against adherents turning to deviant strands for spiritual guidance. This trend also forces society to critically reflect on their collective values which seem to resonate less than radical ideology with vulnerable individuals.

Musa concluded by underscoring the fact that the risk of Singaporean Muslims indulging in religious militancy in Singapore is low. This is supported by studies on the perceptions of Singaporean Muslims indicating comfort in practicing their religion in Singapore and also in their status as a minority group in the country. He stressed that such views are not conducive to attempts to indoctrinate deviant violent ideology that target individuals who feel persecuted and are not able to reconcile with living in a secular state. In this respect, the arrests of Singaporean members of Jemaah Islamiyah were an aberration in the otherwise peaceful mainstream practice of Islam in Singapore.

## Discussion

A key point of discussion centred on the merits and problems of engaging with the community along ethnic and religious lines. A participant sought clarification from Mirza if an implication of her presentation was to suggest that there is no value in engaging Muslims as a community and should thus abandon all efforts of doing so. Another participant noted that all countries have different cultural minorities who face alienation within their ranks but not all minorities respond to their plight the same way. This raises the following question for governments: How should they choose which minority groups to focus on? Bearing in mind not just finite state resources but also that the tendency to give attention to groups perceived as a threat to stability may be misconstrued as legitimating their method of resorting to violence and at the same time penalizing other minority groups for using non-violent means of negotiation. In response, Mirza observed that there is a natural tendency to respond to claims of Muslim

victimization by treating them with more patience and attention in the short term. However, the downside of it is that in the long term, this inadvertently perpetuates the narrative of the Muslims as a community at risk and thus in constant need of help and special attention, reinforcing the sense of victimization.

Mirza was further asked to clarify with whom the state should engage, if not Muslims, and examples of alternative forms of engagement to be adopted. Mirza reiterated the point that it is not just Muslim youths but also non-Muslim youths who are alienated. Hence the approach adopted should reflect the wider problem of how youths in general are increasingly feeling disconnected from mainstream society. Admittedly, there are no easy answers to achieving this. Nevertheless, there is a need to guard against finding easy solutions that may exacerbate rather than alleviate the problem at hand.

Musa was asked to elaborate on the sources of alienation among Muslims in Singapore. Musa pointed out that, unlike the British Muslim population, Muslims in Singapore generally do not face such a large degree of alienation as there are many strategies already in place to ensure that all ethnic and religious groups are well-integrated. However, as Singaporeans are not immune to external influences, including radical and misguided interpretations of Islam, there is a need to constantly counter such ideas with more accurate interpretation of the religious teachings.

Another salient point that was raised pertained to the impact of US foreign policy on the fight against terrorism. With regards to the claims of a belligerent posture in US foreign policy in abetting the threat of terrorism, a question was raised as to whether a more moderate stance would reduce the threat. Moreover, with the change in recent US foreign policy under the current Obama administration vis-à-vis Muslim states, a participant wanted to know how Muslim states were responding to it. Mirza was of the opinion that if the problem of radicalization is one of a sense of alienation from mainstream society, a change in US foreign policy would not have much of an impact on reducing the threat of terrorism. Musa was of the opinion that it is too premature to assess the impact of the new approach in US foreign policy on Muslim states as it has only been implemented very recently.

# Addressing Radicalization



**Frank Furedi** spoke on radicalization as a social phenomenon at the Distinguished Dinner Lecture of the Third Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO).

Furedi reminded the audience of the need to see the war on terror not in terms of what we are against, but what we are for. Furedi noted the irony in the term "home-grown terrorism" in his speech as well. The term "home-grown" usually has positive connotation of familiarity. However, in contrast its use associated with terrorism changes the meaning to one of strangeness and thus hints at the unknown.

Furedi highlighted what he saw as four myths of radicalization in his speech. The first was whereby radicalization could be identified with a form of ideology. The tendency to do so is strong in many official publications in different European societies. However, none of the publications managed to provide an answer as to the actual form of ideology that radicalization represented. Furedi's personal opinion, however, was that such ideology did not exist in the first place. Identifying radicalization with some kind of ideology also denoted a lack of imagination as many forms of behaviour in society did not differ from expressions of having been radicalized. Furedi saw terrorists as being inarticulate as to what they stand for when ideologically keen people are usually vocal and clear about what they stand for. Thus radicalization could not be identified with any form of ideology.

Secondly, radicalized individuals are usually seen as being psychologically deficient. However, Furedi asserted that radicalized people tend to be idealistic, well-read individuals who are able to deal with the challenges of everyday life and who possess a good sense of self-esteem. Therefore, the claim of radicalization being a by-product of emotional trauma and mental disturbance does not hold. Furedi believed terrorists to be individuals who tend to go out and look for opportunities.

The third misconception about radicalization is that it is linked to economic deprivation or discrimination. Furedi acknowledged that the assertion does indeed apply to some Muslim communities. However, he saw no causal link or direct link between radicalization and economic deprivation. This was because individuals have suffered from deprivation and discrimination since time immemorial, but not all are drawn towards radicalization as a result.

Fourthly, was the myth about radicalization as a response to "oppressive" actions that the West has undertaken. Furedi countered the argument by citing examples that dated far back in history – such as the Crusades – which meant that there was nothing new about the perceived Western oppression that was cited to be the root cause of radicalization in recent years.

Furedi also refuted the misconception that radicalization is directly related or caused by Islam. He argued that those who turn to terrorism had already distanced themselves from society and had been radicalized in the first place.

Furedi saw alienation and moral distancing as characteristics of most incidents of radicalization, at least from the cases observed in the European Union (EU). Those who are radicalized distance themselves from their family and the society they live in. Radicalization also appeared to be a generational reaction, as it appeared that the ones vulnerable are young. The old appear immune to its impact. Furedi observed that young people who are radicalized tend to want to create their own brand of Islam and regard their parents as having sold out on the faith.

He also saw radicalized individuals as being in total hostility to the society that they are in. They regard society as morally corrupt and degraded. Furedi observed that radicals distanced themselves morally from the society in which they live. He put forth the argument that radicalization must be seen as part of a generational identity; it must be examined in terms of how the current generation think and position themselves. He concluded by stating that the reason for terrorism's current state is due to the fact that it is uncontained. Globalization, the rise in information technology and the borderlessness of the current world have all contributed to the inability to contain terrorism.

## Discussion

A participant raised historical parallels between the current form of radicalization and those in the past such as the case of the Red Brigades in Europe in the 1970s. Furedi concurred with the observation and noted that many of the cases of radicalized individuals both past and present found them estranged from their families. They often went to great lengths in attempting to be different from their families. In contrast to cases in the past, though, today's radicalized individuals are no longer marginal and insignificant. He pointed to the 1960s as an example of an era where radicalization became a destructive force.

A discussant pointed out that it appeared that the collective network that used to provide people with an identity in the past has been eroded. Identity has become individualized. Destructive behaviour is now excused based on the individual's perception of what is "right". It appeared to the discussant that contemporary society celebrates individual action but finds it an issue when individualism leads people to conduct violence such as acts of terrorism. Furedi responded by pointing out the difference between being individualistic and self-absorbed. He described the radicalization process as being individualistic in form but anti-individualistic in content. The example of radical websites was used by Furedi to highlight his point. To Furedi, the content of radical websites is similar to that of "secular" blogs and websites maintained by non-radicalized youths in their passivity and call for others to notice them.

The issue of confining the study of radicalization to Islam was also brought out during the discussion. Furedi concurred with the observation that radicalization is only peripherally linked to a particular religion.

Furedi concluded the discussion session by highlighting what he saw as the honourable tradition that was previously associated with radicalization. Radicalized individuals have, throughout the course of history, played an important role in sharing new possibilities, he said. However, the current form of radicalization appeared to Furedi to have reached an impasse, as it finds meaning in destruction rather than creativity.

# Dealing with Disaster



**Richard Flax** gave a detailed account of the spontaneous community-led response to the first Bali bombing in 2002 and how his team of volunteers provided significant logistical support and assistance during the first critical 12 hours after the bombing.

The Balinese authorities were unprepared for an event of the magnitude of the Bali bombing and lacked the capacity to deal with a large number of victims suffering from serious injuries, including severe burn cases. This, along with the mobile communications network being overloaded during the first 12 hours of the crisis, provided both the volunteer team and Balinese authorities with a number of challenges that had to be overcome in order to save as many people as possible.

Using his home as a makeshift office, Flax and a number of volunteers set up a system using whiteboards, colour codes and computers to try and systematically organize the voluminous information that was arriving about the situation at the bomb site as well as the numbers and types of casualties that were arriving in the hospital. This information could then be relayed to authorities both in Indonesia and in a number of countries to aid in logistical support, such as sourcing adequate airplanes to transport the burn victims to a specialist hospital in Australia as well as ensuring these transports were stocked with sufficient medical supplies both for the transported victims as well as for those in Bali hospitals.

Flax noted that a few consulates and parts of overseas governments lacked both a relevant response and the ability to effectively improvise. However, a number of countries either in the region or those with consulates

in Jakarta or Bali provided generous logistical support. In addition, he highlighted the response of both the local Bali government and the central government in Jakarta in reacting positively to the local community assistance. This improvisation and cooperation between government agencies and local community volunteers led to a number of positive outcomes and the saving of lives.

In conclusion, Flax stated that while the Balinese authorities had not prepared for such a scenario, their willingness to accept the assistance of the spontaneous team which Flax coordinated led to a positive resolution of dealing with the immediate victims of the attack. After the bombings, a number of NGOs started up to help deal with the aftermath of the attacks. These NGOs, coordinated under a single umbrella, established an effective quick response model for responding to similar emergencies. This was put to the test in the province of Bantul, south of Jogyakarta in Java which was devastated by a severe earthquake in 2006.



**Colonel Anwar Abdullah**, in contrast to the model of a community-led response in the Balinese context, discussed the Singapore government's framework for dealing with disaster. Outlining in detail the structure of the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) and the general incident response management framework, Colonel Anwar then gave a case study of the Nichol Highway collapse to show how this framework was put in place, and how lessons learned were incorporated into future responses.

Colonel Anwar told participants that the mission of the Singapore Civil Defence Force is "to protect and save lives and property for a safe and secure Singapore". Its main roles are to provide fire-fighting, rescue and emergency

ambulance services, as well as to formulate, implement and enforce regulations on fire safety and civil-defence shelter matters.

In 1997, the Singapore Civil Defence Force was appointed by the Ministry of Home Affairs to be the Incident Manager for civil emergencies. Correspondingly, the Ops Civil Emergency Plan was promulgated to organize a multi-agency response to any major disaster in Singapore. The plan gives the Singapore Civil Defence Force the mandate to coordinate with the Joint Planning Staff and representatives from related agencies to spearhead the overall mitigation and intervention efforts. It is regularly updated and tested through exercises so that operational principles and tactics can be continually validated and operational gaps identified.

The main drivers of the economy, Colonel Anwar noted, are manufacturing and services. Manufacturing is centred on oil refining, semi-conductors, electronics, chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Some of these industries handle very flammable and toxic substances that, if not handled carefully, can give rise to incidents with major off-site impact on nearby population centres. The rapid economic growth has also brought about vast changes to the physical landscape of Singapore. Taller and bigger buildings have sprung up to accommodate more homes, more offices, more hotel rooms and more shops.

While Singapore is fortunate to be spared from natural disasters such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, typhoons and tsunamis, the same cannot be said of man-made disasters. Just like any developed cities, Singapore has seen its fair share of major man-made incidents. In 1972, 9 people lost their lives in a major fire in a major shopping centre at Robinsons Road. In 1986, a 6-storey hotel collapsed, resulting in the loss of 33 lives. In 2004, a major underground tunnel under construction collapsed, causing 4 deaths and an adjacent highway to slide.

The 9/11 incident in the United States in 2001 and the subsequent terrorist attacks in Bali, Jakarta, London and, most recently, in Mumbai have presented a new operating environment for the Singapore Civil Defence Force. The failed attempt on carrying out an attack in Singapore by Jemaah Islamiah and the subsequent arrest of their members in Singapore is a clear indication of the threat

that Singapore is facing today, Colonel Anwar added. In light of these new developments, it is imperative for the Singapore Civil Defence Force to continuously reorganize and re-invent itself to meet these challenges.

## Discussion

A number of questions revolved around the key ingredients of an effective response force that involves coordinating and dealing with multiple agencies, both governmental and non-governmental, as well as perhaps international organizations, and how they would be able to work together in a coherent manner. Another participant commented that while the looser form of contingency management that was adopted in the aftermath of the first Bali bombing may have been an effective and appropriate one at the time, this may not be the case for urban Singapore. In addition, the participant noted, while the SARS crisis of 2003 was not as 'kinetic' as the Bali bombing, it was a crisis which required adaptation and flexibility. During this period, Singapore was grappling with many unknowns (similar to the first 12 hours of the Bali bombing), with an overwhelmed medical service, and in a situation where, while some systems were in place, there wasn't necessarily a "rulebook" to go by. In that sense, the participant noted, it is important not to set a false dichotomy between the two cases presented, in that one approach to dealing with a crisis is better than the other.

Flax concurred with the latter comment and noted the great resources and organizational abilities Singapore has at its disposal that make it able to deal more effectively with potential crisis situations than perhaps countries with fewer resources. Colonel Anwar informed participants that while Singapore has a framework for dealing with crises, there is flexibility built into it. Indeed, it is this notion of flexibility and adaptation within a framework which both Flax and Colonel Anwar concurred was a crucial aspect of a valuable crisis management response. Flax discussed how some of the frustrations that arose during the Bali bombing revolved around this key point. Training and experience allow an individual to fill a role which they fully understand the parameters of. At the same time, this training and experience should give an individual the ability to know when they should use their initiative in a situation where perhaps the framework does not provide an answer to a particular problem at a particular moment that needs resolving.

# Risk and Security



**Baroness Neville-Jones** presented on the current challenges of the application of risk analysis to national security and its implications for security agencies and the public. She began by highlighting the critical role of intelligence in policy-making. A key problem identified in the process of assessing intelligence was the challenge of objectivity in validating the information and sifting out the vital from the peripheral. Hence policy-makers are advised to be mindful of the limitations of intelligence, especially when adopting a risk-based approach to decision-making.

In view of the current proliferation of non-traditional security threats, Neville-Jones noted that the more diffuse the range of risk to security, the less easy it is to acquire the requisite intelligence to make good policy decisions. Moreover, unlike threats, the risks involve the management of uncertainty and probabilities as the anticipated consequences may or may not materialize. As such, policymakers and security practitioners need to have a clear understanding of the security priorities when deciding on the course of action to take.

On the dilemma of when and how to act in the absence of absolute certainty, two criteria identified were: (i) considerations of how likely the event is to occur and (ii) how severe the damage will be should it materialise. Nevertheless, any decision taken would still be subjective and potentially controversial. Hence security agencies have to be prepared to justify their actions to the public, especially in the event of a mistake due to an error of judgement or faulty intelligence. Neville-Jones therefore

advocated the cultivation of public confidence and trust in the government through more public engagement and transparency regarding the aims of security agencies and how, in broad terms, they are to be achieved.

Regarding the role of society and individuals in mitigating security risks, Neville-Jones was of the opinion that the public is aware of the impossibility of the state to provide protection against all possible threats. Moreover, should state authorities be expected to do so, the cost for individual and collective freedoms would be high. Nevertheless, candid information on the shortcomings of the security apparatus and training should be made available to not only prepare communities to respond and recover from a crisis but also to build trust between the government and the people.

Neville-Jones summed up by underscoring that intelligence used to make security policy decisions today is imperfect and hence there is a need for governments and the public alike to understand this and its implications. However, imperfect knowledge should not be an excuse for inaction and security agencies have to come to terms with the inevitability of public scrutiny and criticisms of their work. Moreover, the public have to realise that the state cannot provide total security and thus should not demand for it as it would inevitably infringe on their right to freedom and privacy.

## Discussion

A participant picked up on Neville-Jones' points about the interpretation of intelligence, and asked whether the scale of the course of action adopted by security practitioners was informed by their mental framework of the threat they face rather than any objective assessment of it. In response, Neville-Jones reiterated that every decision made requires some form of a judgement call on the part of security officers. Nevertheless, she was sceptical that security practitioners act on a generalized mental model. Instead she observed that the tendency is to vary their response based on specific information they have on each individual case.

A concern was voiced over the involvement of the private sector in security. Such a course leads to the outsourcing of authority which may in turn diminish state authority over security matters and possibly result in the state relinquishing its responsibility to the people. Acknowledging this dilemma, Neville-Jones pointed out the practical imperative for such an approach namely, the need for a range of expertise and also to share the cost of security in the face of a diffuse spectrum of security challenges. Nevertheless, most governments generally do practise discretion as to the involvement of the private sector and due diligence is observed to ensure that the requisite level of security services provided is maintained by the state.

A participant highlighted the tendency of intelligence agencies to believe that threat evaluation reports which highlight a whole spectrum of threats are poor and unfocused assessments that are less useful for policy purposes. In contrast, one that only highlights a few for policymakers to focus on is encouraged although the excluded information may actually be critical. When asked for her views on reconciling this dilemma, she was of the opinion that a good risk analysis does not just highlight threats for attention but more importantly justifies why the highlighted threats should receive more attention than others. Two suggested criteria for such an assessment were the likelihood of the event occurring and its impact. Such a process requires constant review and update, she said.

In light of the current political rhetoric on sharing information among countries, a participant asked for assessment guidelines to differentiate information that should be shared from sensitive ones that should remain secret. In response, Neville-Jones maintained that unless there are legitimate grounds to believe that a country's security would be compromised, information should as far as possible be shared and made available within a "trusted circle" of states.

Neville-Jones was asked to share her views on mitigating the problem of security fatigue in addressing long-term threats. She asserted that firstly, security agencies have to be clear on what the minimum level of investment in security infrastructure they are willing to make to harden the state as a target in the long run. Secondly, governments have to be mindful of how to keep the public alert but not alarmed by deciding when and how often to communicate the threat faced. This in turn is determined by the government's assessment of the level of awareness and preparedness among the civilian population for the identified crisis.

# Dealing with Consequences



**LTC Yazid Abdullah** discussed the importance of engaging in disaster exercises in order to be better prepared for the actual event. The speaker's presentation focused on *Northstar V*, an exercise conducted by the Singapore Civil Defence Force. The exercise lasted for three hours, involved 22 agencies, and was designed to mimic the London bombings in order to test the response to an incident involving multiple attacks. The exercise employed five simultaneous bomb blasts, including one chemical attack. The exercise was large and involved more than 2,000 personnel and tested the country's defence response and healthcare systems as well as the community's resilience in the face of such an attack. By conducting the exercise at the national level, the government was able to see and address gaps in their response and to confirm the roles and responses of the different agencies involved, making sure that everyone is up to par.

LTC Yazid went on to detail the lessons learnt during the exercise and emphasized how the exercise provided the opportunity to engage with key stakeholders. The exercises confirmed that the government was able to handle a single incident well but when there are multiple incidents, the response effort becomes more difficult. In the case of multiple incidents, the government came to realize that there is a need for media officers to be deployed to each location instead of having a centralized media centre as had been done in previous exercises.

## Discussion

The discussion focused on two areas. First, there was a question as to when the Singapore government would decide to re-open transport services after an attack, given that the amount of time out of operation would send a message to both terrorists and the public alike. In response LTC Yazid stated that for any major incident, it is the goal of the Singapore government to try to return to normalcy as quickly as possible given the need – in an open economy – to maintain or restore confidence. The speaker summed up this sentiment by stating that there is a need not to allow a situation to paralyse the country.

The second question shifted the discussion to the positives and negatives associated with conducting exercises. It was explained by the speaker that companies do not like such exercises because they feel that they will impact on their businesses by scaring away the public for fear of an actual event taking place. However, while the government does not want to scare the public, the speaker argued that it is necessary to engage in such exercises to better prepare for such possibilities. However it was noted that the choice of timing and place of an exercise must be right and balanced. LTC Yazid also noted that there must be attention paid to not allowing volunteers in the exercise to get injured. In the end however, it is worth the effort to get all the ministries' plans incorporated with one another in case of an actual emergency.

# Presentation on Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS)

**Patrick Nathan**, Deputy Director (Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning) of the National Security Co-ordination Centre, gave a talk to participants on Singapore's Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) programme. RAHS was formed out of the recognition that, in an increasingly complex and uncertain environment, policymakers and analysts need to be able to better anticipate strategic surprises and asymmetric threats. Nathan explained that it was the outbreak of SARS that gave an impetus to Singapore thinking seriously about the RAHS programme. RAHS aims to improve on strategic anticipation by tackling three key areas: (i) risk assessment, which includes environmental scanning and intelligence analysis; (ii) scenario planning; and (iii) horizon scanning. Combined, these elements seek to improve early indicators to government of both risk and opportunity.

Analysts who use RAHS are able to take advantage of the software to do the tedious work associated with research. They are also able to build better scenarios, which can be digitized, facilitating perspective sharing. This process was demonstrated in a video showing how the RAHS programme was used in a maritime security exercise that was designed to determine how analysts were able to piece information together and identify potential threats.

RAHS has both unclassified and classified networks that have enabled the government to engage in an outreach strategy that extends to the local universities. In fact the Ministry of Education has the largest number of users, with students and faculty using the software system for their research. At the same time, it also seeks to establish a trusted network of domain experts on whom the government can tap for better detection and "sense-making" of weak signals. Finally, the outreach strategy aims to extend horizon scanning beyond Singapore's national border by building links with like-minded agencies at the international level.

In conclusion, Nathan emphasized that it is the collective effort of the network of agencies that makes RAHS effective. This collective effort will help Singapore to be better equipped to seize opportunities, and be better prepared for strategic shocks that may lie ahead on the horizon.

## Discussion

The discussion session focused on how people can get involved with the programme. Nathan replied that the programme is open, but that it relies on reciprocity, the sharing of ideas and information. This builds on the foundational idea that the security community needs to change its traditional mindset and break outside of their individual silos in order to better anticipate possible events. It was reiterated here that RAHS and the tools associated with it are about anticipation and are not to be confused with "prediction".

# Workshop Programme

**Sunday, 12 April 2009**

1900 hrs Welcome Dinner
Hosted by: Ambassador Barry Desker
Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies (RSIS) & Lee Ark Boon
Director, National Security
Coordination Centre (NSCC), NSCS

**Monday, 13 April 2009**

0930 – 1000 hrs Opening Remarks
Ambassador Barry Desker
Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies (RSIS)

Opening Address
Prof. S Jayakumar
Senior Minister and Coordinating
Minister for National Security,
Singapore

1000 – 1040hrs Reception / Coffee Break

1040 – 1100 hrs Group Photo-taking

1100 – 1130 hrs Local Participants Briefing
Sean Lee
Deputy Director (Policy & International
Relations), National Security
Coordination Centre, NSCS

1130 – 1200hrs Introduction to CENS and APPSNO
Kumar Ramakrishna
Head, Centre of Excellence for
National Security (CENS), RSIS

1200 – 1315 hrs Session I
Topic: Singapore's National Security
Strategic Framework
Speaker: Lee Ark Boon

Chairperson: Joseph Liow,
Associate Dean, RSIS

1315 – 1430 hrs Lunch
Venue: Grand Salon Terrace,
Sentosa Resort and Spa

1430 – 1500 hrs Syndicates Briefing
Speaker: Bill Durodié
Senior Fellow and Coordinator,
CENS, RSIS

1500 – 1800 hrs "In Search of the Singha" –
A Fort Canning Hill /
Singapore River Walk + Bum Boat Ride

1800 hrs Free and Easy

| **Tuesday, 14 April 2009** | | **Wednesday, 15 April** | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0900- 1015 hrs | Foreign Participants Presentation on Homeland Security Management (HSM) | 0900 – 1015 hrs | Foreign Participants Presentation on Homeland Security Management (HSM) |
| 1015 – 1045 hrs | Coffee Break | 1015 -1045 hrs | Coffee Break |
| 1045 – 1300 hrs | Session II<br>Topic: Risk and Uncertainty<br>Speakers: Bruce Schneier,<br>Chief Security Technology Officer, BT<br>Frank Furedi, Professor, School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research, University of Kent<br><br>Chairperson: Bill Durodié,<br>Senior Fellow and Coordinator,<br>CENS, RSIS | 1045 – 1300 hrs | Session III<br>Topic: Addressing Communities<br>Speaker: Munira Mirza<br>Director of Arts and Culture Policy, Mayor's Office (London)<br>Alami Musa<br>President, Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS)<br><br>Chairperson: Norman Vasu<br>Assistant Professor, CENS, RSIS |
| 1300 – 1415 hrs | Lunch | 1300 – 1415 hrs | Lunch |
| 1415 – 1515 hrs | Discussion - Syndicates 1,2 & 3 | 1415 – 1545 hrs | Discussion- Syndicates 1,2 & 3 |
| 1515 – 1545 hrs | Coffee Break | 1545 – 1800 hrs | Free and Easy |
| 1545 – 1645 hrs | Foreign Participants Presentation on Homeland Security Management (HSM) | 1800 – 2130hrs | Cocktails followed by Distinguished Dinner Lecture<br>Topic: Addressing Radicalization<br>Speaker: Frank Furedi |
| 1645 hrs | Free and Easy | | Chairperson: Barry Desker<br>Dean, RSIS |

## WORKSHOP PROGRAMME

**Thursday, 16 April 2009**

0900 – 1015 hrs  Foreign Participants Presentation on Homeland Security Management (HSM)

1015 -1045 hrs  Coffee Break

1045 – 1300 hrs  Session IV
Topic: Dealing with Disaster
Speaker: Richard Flax
Head, Bali Emergency Response Team

Anwar Abdullah
Director (Operations),
Singapore Civil Defence Force

Chairperson: Mely Anthony
Associate Professor,
Head of NTS Studies, RSIS

1300 -1415 hrs  Lunch

1415 – 1515hrs  Discussion - Syndicates 1,2 & 3

1545 – 1715 hrs  Session V
Topic: Risk and Security
Speaker: The Baroness Neville-Jones of
Hutton Roof DCMG
Shadow Security Minister and National
Security Adviser to the Leader of
the Opposition
Chairperson: Barry Desker

1800 hrs  Free and Easy

**Friday, 17 April 2009**

1000 – 1030 hrs  Travel to Home Team Academy

1030 – 1300 hrs  Session VI
Topic: Dealing with Consequences
Speakers: Yazid Abdullah
Director (Training),
Singapore Civil Defence Force

1300 – 1415 hrs  Lunch

1415 – 1545 hrs  Tour of Home Team Academy
Training Village & Gallery

1545 – 1645 hrs  RAHS Presentation
Speaker: Patrick Nathan
Deputy Director,
National Security Coordination Centre

1645 – 1700hrs  Course Evaluation

1700 – 1900 hrs  Return to Sentosa from Home Team
Academy / Free and Easy

1900 hrs  Certificate Presentation Ceremony and
Closing Dinner
Hosted by Peter Ho
Permanent Secretary (National Security
and Intelligence Co-ordination),
Singapore

# About The Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)

**The Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)** is a research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Established on 1 April 2006, CENS is devoted to rigorous policy-relevant analysis of a range of national security issues. The CENS team is multinational in composition, comprising both Singaporean and foreign analysts who are specialists in various aspects of national and homeland security affairs.

## Why CENS?

In August 2004 the Strategic Framework for National Security outlined the key structures, security measures and capability development programmes that would help Singapore deal with transnational terrorism in the near and long term.

However, strategizing national security policies requires greater research and understanding of the evolving security landscape. This is why CENS was established to increase the intellectual capital invested in strategizing national security. To this end, CENS works closely with not just other RSIS research programmes, but also national security agencies such as the National Security Coordination Secretariat within the Prime Minister's Office.

## What Research Does CENS Do?

CENS aspires to be an international research leader in the multi-disciplinary study of the concept of Resilience in all its aspects, and in the policy-relevant application of such research in order to promote Security within and beyond Singapore.

To this end, CENS conducts research in four main domains:

• Radicalization Studies
  The multi-disciplinary study of the indicators and causes of violent radicalization, the promotion of community immunity to extremist ideas and best practices in individual rehabilitation. The assumption being that neutralizing violent radicalism presupposes individual and community resilience.

• Social Resilience
  The systematic study of the sources of - and ways of promoting - the capacity of globalized, multicultural societies to hold together in the face of systemic shocks such as diseases and terrorist strikes.

# About The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

The **S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)** was established in January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological University. RSIS' mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia-Pacific. To accomplish this mission, RSIS will:

- Provide a rigorous professional graduate education in international affairs with a strong practical and area emphasis
- Conduct policy-relevant research in national security, defence and strategic studies, diplomacy and international relations
- Collaborate with like-minded schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence

## Graduate Training in International Affairs

RSIS offers an exacting graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. The teaching programme consists of the Master of Science (MSc) degrees in Strategic Studies, International Relations, International Political Economy and Asian Studies as well as The Nanyang MBA (International Studies) offered jointly with the Nanyang Business School. The graduate teaching is distinguished by their focus on the Asia-Pacific region, the professional practice of international affairs and the cultivation of academic depth. Over 150 students, the majority from abroad, are enrolled with the School. A small and select Ph.D. programme caters to students whose interests match those of specific faculty members.

## Research

Research at RSIS is conducted by five constituent Institutes and Centres: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, and the Temasek Foundation Centre for Trade & Negotiations (TFCTN). The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. The School has three professorships that bring distinguished scholars and practitioners to teach and do research at the School. They are the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies, the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professorship in International Relations, and the NTUC Professorship in International Economic Relations.

## International Collaboration

Collaboration with other Professional Schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence is a RSIS priority. RSIS will initiate links with other like-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as well as adopt the best practices of successful schools.

For more information on the School, visit **www.rsis.edu.sg**

# About The National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS)

The **National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS)** was set up in the Prime Minister's Office in July 2004 to facilitate national security policy coordination from a Whole-Of-Government perspective. NSCS reports to the Prime Minister through the Coordinating Minister for National Security (CMNS). The current CMNS is the Deputy Prime Minister Professor S. Jayakumar, who is also Minister for Law.

NSCS is headed by Permanent Secretary (National Security and Intelligence Coordination). The current PS(NSIC) is Mr Peter Ho, who is concurrently Head of Civil Service and Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

NSCS provides support to the ministerial-level Security Policy Review Committee (SPRC) and Senior official-level National Security Coordination Committee (NSCCom) and Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ICC). It organises and manages national security programmes, one example being the Asia-Pacific Programme for National Security Officers. NSCS also funds experimental, research or start-up projects that contribute to our national security.

NSCS is made up of two components: the National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC) and the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (JCTC). Each centre is headed by a director.

NSCC performs three vital roles in Singapore's national security: national security planning, policy coordination, and anticipating strategic threats. As a coordinating body, NSCC ensures that government agencies complement each other, and do not duplicate or perform competing tasks.

JCTC is a strategic analysis unit that compiles a holistic picture of terrorist threat. It studies the levels of preparedness in areas such as maritime terrorism and chemical, biological and radiological terrorist threats. It also maps out the consequences should an attack in that domain take place.

More information on NSCS can be found at **www.nscs.gov.sg**

- Homeland Defence
A broad domain encompassing risk perception, management and communication; and the study of best practices in societal engagement, dialogue and strategic communication in crises. The underlying theme is psychological resilience, as both a response and antidote to, societal stresses and perceptions of vulnerability.

- Futures Studies
The study of various theoretical and conceptual approaches to the systematic and rigorous study of emerging threats, as well as global trends and opportunities – on the assumption that Resilience also encompasses robust visions of the future.

## How Does CENS Help Influence National Security Policy?

Through policy-oriented analytical commentaries and other research output directed at the national security policy community in Singapore and beyond, CENS staff members promote greater awareness of emerging threats as well as global best practices in responding to those threats. In addition, CENS organizes courses, seminars and workshops for local and foreign national security officials to facilitate networking and exposure to leading-edge thinking on the prevention of, and response to, national and homeland security threats.

## How Does CENS Help Raise Public Awareness of National Security Issues?

To educate the wider public, CENS staff members regularly author articles in a number of security and intelligence-related publications, as well as write op-ed analyses in leading newspapers. Radio and television interviews have allowed CENS staff to participate in and shape the public debate on critical issues such as radicalization and counter-terrorism, multiculturalism and social resilience, as well as the perception, management and mitigation of risk.

## How Does CENS Keep Abreast of Cutting Edge National Security Research?

The lean organizational structure of CENS permits a constant and regular influx of Visiting Fellows of international calibre through the Distinguished CENS Visitors Programme. This enables CENS to keep abreast of cutting edge global trends in national security research.

### For More on CENS
Log on to www.rsis.edu.sg and follow the links to "Centre of Excellence for National Security".