11TH ASIA-PACIFIC PROGRAMME FOR SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS (APPSMO)

4 – 10 AUGUST 2009
SINGAPORE

PONDER THE IMPROBABLE

11TH ASIA-PACIFIC PROGRAMME FOR SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS (APPSMO)

CONFERENCE REPORT

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INSTITUTE OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES
S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
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Edited by: S.R. Joey Long

This report summarizes the proceedings of the conference as interpreted by the assigned rapporteurs and editors of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.

This conference adheres to a variation of the Chatham House Rule. Accordingly, beyond the speakers and paper presenters cited, no other attributions have been included in this report.

Background and Aims of the Conference

The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, has been organizing an annual Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO) every August since 1999. In 2009, the programme ran formally from 4 through 10 August, with a welcome dinner on 3 August. Fifty-one senior military officers from the Asia-Pacific and Europe participated in the programme, with Papua New Guinea sending its officer to APPSMO for the first time.

The academic aspect of the programme was designed to stimulate the participants to consider policy matters from both theoretical and practical perspectives. Distinguished speakers from Singapore and around the world were invited to address subjects such as terrorism and international security, post-war peacebuilding, the new dimensions in international security, the rise of China and India, the impact of the world economic crisis on Asia, military transformation, climate change and conflict, the media and international conflict, and maritime security.

Besides discussing policy-relevant issues, the officers also participated in a number of social activities. These included visits to the SAF Centre for Military Experimentation, Changi Naval Base, and places of interest in Singapore. These activities gave the officers opportunities to interact with one another and build relationships.

Opening Remarks

In his opening remarks, **Ambassador Barry Desker**, Dean of RSIS, and Director, IDSS, highlighted that over the years, since its inception in 1999, APPSMO has seen increasing numbers of country participants. For the 11th APPSMO, he welcomed Papua New Guinea's inaugural participation in APPSMO.

Ambassador Desker went on to note that military organizations should adapt to transformations in the security agenda. This ever-widening agenda would affect the shape, structure, and function of the military as an organization. Operations in counterterrorism, peacekeeping, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance were some of the new issues the military would find itself increasingly an active participant of, apart from its traditional duties in ensuring national security.

Facilitating exchanges and developing personal relationships among senior military officers in the region and beyond would thus be important in such a context. The role of APPSMO in providing that necessary platform for useful and thought-provoking discussions in an informal setting would serve to make discussions on security both candid and honest. Noting that interactions between and among militaries were often limited, Ambassador Desker said that this form of engagement should be encouraged throughout the region.

In closing, the Dean thanked the sponsors — the Singapore Totalisator Board and ST Engineering — the speakers, and the participants for making possible fruitful exchanges at APPSMO 2009.

Ambassador Barry Desker

Opening Speech

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean delivered the opening speech. He noted that APPSMO, established ten years ago, was the place for officers from the region and beyond to meet, get to know each other, and discuss issues openly and frankly, something otherwise not possible during official meetings.

Deputy Prime Minister Teo then discussed the broad strategic shifts in Asia, which were compounded by the global financial crisis. He said that a new security landscape was taking shape, with new powers such as China and India rising. The old ways of crisis management needed to change accordingly as inter-state relationships evolved in the region.

Deputy Prime Minister Teo elaborated that a country's interests were never static in a fast-changing world. Its interests would furthermore intersect with those of others. Even countries that were not physically contiguous to each other might find themselves sharing maritime borders — their Exclusive Economic Zones or their continental shelves — which might open them up to disputes over territory where previously there was none. While states have become increasingly more interdependent today, there remained areas for potential conflict.

Countries would cooperate in areas where they have mutual interests; yet there might also be areas where they would compete. Nevertheless, there was room for cooperation even in competitive relationships. There was a high degree of economic interdependence, for example, between China and the United States. But both have had disputes over the activities of their naval vessels in the South China Sea. Still, where there were common interests, like in North Korea, Beijing and Washington have collaborated to address the issue.

Deputy Prime Minister Teo said that a robust regional security architecture was crucial for peace and stability. Issues of concern should be resolved through open dialogue and multilateral cooperation should be developed. With a shared interest in combating piracy and securing sea lanes, for example, fourteen countries worked together and initiated the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, or ReCAAP. Another area where countries could collaborate

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean

and share information was in dealing with terrorism. Cooperation between the Malaysian Special Branch and Singapore's Internal Security Department was what led to the arrest of Singaporean Jemaah Islamiyah leader Mas Selamat Kastari earlier in April 2009. Still another area of cooperation was in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The importance and usefulness of such help was demonstrated when natural disasters struck Myanmar and China in 2008.

Shared interests have led to cooperation and it was therefore important to progressively expand this body of shared interests, something best done through open dialogue. Chances of conflict could accordingly be reduced. But if there were disputes, countries should resolve them peacefully through dialogue and based on international law.

Deputy Prime Minister Teo went on to say that the military should continue to adapt to changes in the strategic landscape. Senior military officers should possess the skills of a frontline diplomat because political savvy and an ability to build trust and consensus were crucial in defence diplomacy and peacebuilding. Servicemen must be able to work with everyone on the ground, have a keen sense of what constituted acceptable or unacceptable conduct, and possess an ability to make good decisions despite possessing imperfect information.

Finally, Deputy Prime Minister Teo wished everyone in attendance a productive week at APPSMO. The long-term value of APPSMO, he concluded, was the forum's ability to foster friendships and facilitate cooperation among military officers through lively and frank discussions.

PANEL DISCUSSION I

Terrorism and International Security

Rohan Gunaratna described how the terrorist threat has evolved since September 11. In his assessment, terrorism was currently the tier-one national security threat. Ideological extremism was also the parent of terrorism.

Gunaratna elaborated on three points. First, Afghanistan and Iraq have emerged as two epicentres of international terrorism. Today, most of the groups conducting terrorist attacks were those that have participated in the Afghan-Soviet war or those that have received training in Afghanistan from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Second, terrorist groups appeared ready to inflict fatalities and injuries to advance their objectives. Third, these groups have become increasingly networked. They shared expertise, material resources, finance, and technological know-how. Precisely for this reason, Gunaratna highlighted the importance of studying developments in the technological capabilities, tactics, and techniques of terrorist groups in other regions to understand the capability of the groups in this region.

Providing a detailed reconstruction of the two recent bombings of the Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Indonesia on 17 July 2009, Gunaratna attributed them to complacency and intelligence failure. He also added that terrorists now were more resilient, resourceful, and deceptive, making it more difficult to locate them.

Gunaratna ended his presentation by calling for international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. He stressed the need for governments to invest in developing the ability to fight terrorism in a comprehensive manner.

The second speaker, **Kumar Ramakrishna**, evaluated the wider ideological and conceptual terrain, which has enabled the rise of the kind of militants who perpetrated the recent bombings in Jakarta. In his analysis of the "new terrorism", Ramakrishna described the phenomenon as likely to involve mass casualties. It was extremely destructive and deliberately intended to be that way. There were four key features of the new terrorism: increased destructiveness, religiously motivated, networked structure, and flexible leadership.

The new terrorism was different from previous forms of terrorism. Terrorism then was a form of political communication. The use of violence was carefully calibrated to further political aims and was usually abandoned when some political outcome was achieved. The new terrorists were driven more by a virulent form of ideological religious logic. They seemed less restrained when it came to the use of violence against what they perceived to be "unclean" unbelievers. The fight appeared to be a cosmic battle between good versus evil, us and them. Their goal tended to be nebulous. The Internet has become their means of recruitment, communication, training, and coordination. With a well-educated leadership, they seemed capable of planning sophisticated operations and mounting them. The new terrorism was expedited by shared ideology and further enabled by a flexible leadership style.

The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has become by far the principal terrorist threat to Singapore and Southeast Asia. Although weakened, the JI has splintered into various cells, which

Rohan Gunaratna

Kumar Ramakrishna

operated relatively autonomously, each with its own leaders. One such cell was the Noordin Top network that had been fingered for the most recent bombing in Jakarta. Ramakrishna also said that terrorists have called for "Economic Jihad" against governments. They sought to destabilize societies and disrupt their industrial, economic, and business activities by directing attacks against the targeted countries' oil facilities, personnel, infrastructure, transportation links, and tourism and financial institutions. Since 2003, there has been a discernible increase in the number of attacks on oil and gas facilities in Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

In sum, while there have been important successes against Al Qaeda and JI, the terrorist threat still remained significant.

The third speaker, **Thitinan Pongsudhirak**, discussed the key drivers of terrorism, the non-state threats to international security, and the global, regional, and local responses to terrorism. He pointed out that terrorist organizations tended to flourish in failed states. In failed states, there were large ungovernable areas, ineffective central authorities, corruption, and criminality. These states also suffered from an inability to provide basic services and were beset by disease, internal conflict, internal displacement, and environmental degradation.

The key drivers of terrorism were religious, ethnic, and political extremism. Ethno-nationalism has provoked separatist insurgencies in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Chechnya, Georgia, Sri Lanka, and Xinjiang. Militant Islam has also fuelled terrorist activities. In sum, terrorism has become a leading source of insecurity in the international system. Nevertheless, Pongsudhirak said that the audience should not overlook other emerging and growing threats highlighted by those who study non-traditional security issues. Climate change, pandemics, energy security, food security, human trafficking, drugs, migration, piracy, transnational crime, and human security were equally important, and should not be neglected.

During the discussion, it was suggested that other than building the capability to fight terrorism at the operational level, more needed to be invested to counter the intellectual and ideological dimensions of terrorism. Religious leaders who imparted a more balanced view of their beliefs were needed to counter militant preachers. The emphasis during the early days of the "Global War on Terror" was on fighting the extremists. Now, the fight should be against extremism, which required a different approach.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak

LECTURE SESSION I
Post-War Peace Building

Fred Tanner noted that the post-Cold War era has witnessed a shift in conflict patterns from war to interventionism. Militaries were now moving away from territorial defence towards expeditionary and professional force postures. The recent increase in international military deployments in the form of humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping missions, and security and stabilization operations reflected this shift. Militaries have also been preoccupied with intra-state conflicts, and cross-border and regional spillovers involving irregular forces, armed guerrilla factions, and criminal gangs operating from failed states.

The multidimensional peacekeeping missions of today could be viewed as a response to the aforementioned "new wars". Moreover, such was the overlap among conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding that it was often difficult to tell when peacekeeping ended and when peacebuilding began. Peacebuilding refers to the longer-term processes of rebuilding a war-torn country while peacekeeping refers to the military and civilian operations deployed to keep and build the nascent peace. In brief, the multiple objectives of peacebuilding involved providing security in the aftermath of conflict, demilitarizing a society, restoring justice and

Fred Tanner

accountability, rebuilding the rule of law, governance, and institutions, increasing civic participation, and fostering socioeconomic development.

Tanner said that clear lines of authority were important in peacebuilding as they promoted unity of effort in post-conflict situations. For United Nations (UN) operations, all authority should be vested in the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). In practice, however, many agencies tended to refer to their mandate and independent governance structure for operational guidance. Tanner stated that SRSGs should be responsible for providing political guidance to the overall UN effort and for promoting a coordinated approach to the UN operation. Developing processes to enable integrated planning, programming, and effort in the field were crucial to peacebuilding.

Tanner commented that state-building was necessarily intrusive. The endeavour could provoke local resentment against the peacebuilding mission. Moreover, not all would benefit should peace result. Those who had fallen from power or those who had profited from criminal activities, illegal arms transactions, and violence could challenge the peacebuilding effort. To avert a return to conflict, a culture of dialogue and inclusiveness, good governance, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights should be strengthened. Socioeconomic development should also be hastened.

Tanner concluded by posing the question: "Can post-war peace building make a difference?" The liberal bias in peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts during the 1990s has now given way to more functional approaches. Today, peacebuilding would start in tandem with peacekeeping. Peacebuilders, nevertheless, have to confront a series of questions: How long should they stay in the conflict area? What is the nature of their intervention? How could the peacebuilding effort be better coordinated? The solutions to these issues were not clear-cut, but a careful balancing and management of competing needs and priorities would further the peacebuilding effort.

LECTURE SESSION II
New Dimensions in International Security

Steve Smith discussed the various theories that officials and analysts have deployed to understand international security. He argued that most practitioners tended to ignore the assumptions and theories that they held about the world. Theories were often regarded as too academic. Smith maintained, however, that theories about international security could help practitioners — especially military officers — to understand international security. He argued that data and facts did not speak for themselves; they were interpreted through theoretical lenses. It was important, therefore, for these theoretical lenses to be scrutinized.

Smith said that realism was the dominant theory in the field of international relations. Realism maintains that states are the main actors in the international system. States are preoccupied with survival, security, and power. Non-state actors are of limited importance and domestic actors are rarely important in determining the external behaviour of states. Furthermore, realists argue that the international system is anarchic and this anarchy shapes state behaviour. States also protect their vital interests using military force. The realist, in short, views the world as a self-help system.

Realism, however, has limitations. Smith offered three alternative paradigms to realism. These are constructivism, human security studies, and critical security studies. First, constructivism argues that the foundation of human relations is determined by shared ideas rather than material forces. Second, in contrast to realism, critical security studies focus on the security of the individual rather than the state, and that security can be obtained when people have economic and political freedom. Third, human security is also focused on the individual rather than the state. It further deals with the economic, environmental, food, health, personal, community, and social aspects of security.

In conclusion, Smith argued that the three alternatives to realism offer a more comprehensive appreciation of international security.

Steve Smith

LECTURE SESSION III

Asia-Pacific Security: The Rise of China and India

Harry Harding provided an assessment of the rise of China. First, China's economic power has been fuelled by unparalleled growth, averaging 9.5 percent over the past two decades. It has become the third largest economy (after the United States and Japan) and the second largest trading country (after Germany). Second, China's hard power was growing, demonstrated by its development of a new generation of conventional and nuclear missiles, its considerable investment in space programmes, and the enhancement of its long-range projection capacity. China's aims in enhancing its hard power were to preserve domestic political stability, maintain the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, defend its land and sea borders, and ensure its energy resource security. Third, China has been projecting its soft power. It has joined scores of international organizations. It has been active in the United Nations Security Council and the G20 Summit. It has, furthermore, helped form institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Besides, China has also exported its soft power through its Confucius Institutes. The development of China's soft power could legitimate its hard power.

Harding next assessed China's future capabilities. First, China would probably become the largest economy in aggregate terms eventually, yet its per capita GDP would be low. It would become a destination for global goods and services, and a major source of investment in the world. In addition, the Chinese yuan would probably be accepted as an international currency in the long run. Second, China would continue to increase its military expenditures and develop its subsurface capabilities. Finally, it would likely attain more prominent and powerful positions in international organizations, and contribute to the shaping of international norms. Although it was not likely to become a revisionist power and seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, China would rise to become a major global power.

In conclusion, Harding said that China has defensive intentions and has sought to legitimize its national power. In response, the Asia-Pacific countries have sought to enmesh China in a variety of economic and security institutions. At the same time, they have hedged against uncertainties by engaging other great powers to balance Chinese power.

Harry Harding

The second speaker, **C. Raja Mohan**, discussed the rise of India. He said that India was the fastest growing major economy in the world after China. Although the worldwide slump hit China and India, both countries have continued to grow. Given their booming economies, China and India would likely catch up and eventually overtake the developed countries in terms of the size of their economies. Mohan disagreed with experts who argued that China, rather than India, was in a better position to take advantage of the current crisis to expand its wealth and power, as well as its influence in global institutions. Both would emerge stronger from the crisis. The global distribution of power would shift as the Chinese and Indian economies developed, and as both continued to enhance their military power.

Finally, Mohan discussed ASEAN's role in Asian security affairs. He noted that ASEAN has played a significant role in enhancing the stability of the region. But for ASEAN to continue to be in the driver's seat, it had to continue to reform and to strengthen itself as a cohesive and vibrant institution.

C. Raja Mohan

DISTINGUISHED LUNCH TALK

Who Fights? Terrorists and Insurgents in the Twenty-First and Twentieth Centuries

Bruce Hoffman presented a profile of individuals involved in present-day terrorism and insurgencies. The individual would resort to violence for a number of reasons: grievance and frustration, religious piety or the desire for systematic socioeconomic change, and irredentist convictions or a commitment to revolution. The forces that impelled individuals to become terrorists and insurgents have not altered significantly.

Youths tended to be susceptible to ideological influence. The common denominator linking the Jewish men and women who challenged Britain's rule in Palestine in the 1940s and the individuals who joined the provisional Irish Republican Army was age — they were young. It was no different today. The average age of the 9/11 hijackers, for instance, was 24.2 years. The typical Palestinian suicide bomber was 21 years old. The leaders of terrorist groups were mostly in their late twenties and early thirties.

As regards the socioeconomic status and education of the terrorists and insurgents, Hoffman said that poverty, illiteracy, and the lack of education might not be the key factors fuelling terrorism. To a large extent, those who were attracted to terrorism and insurgency tended to be reasonably well-off, highly educated, financially comfortable, and often gainfully employed. A study by Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova has, for example, persuasively debunked the conventional wisdom that poverty and lack of education bred terrorism and insurgency. In fact, the study concluded that persons with higher incomes and who were educated were more, not less, likely to join terrorist and insurgent groups.

In conclusion, Hoffman said that the nature of terrorism has evidently changed. New adversaries with different motivations have emerged to challenge the prevailing order. Nonetheless, the fundamental causes of terrorism

and insurgency have remained remarkably constant over time. Terrorism and insurgency were thus enduring phenomena that could not be easily eradicated, decisively defeated in conventional military terms, or simplistically solved. Recognition of the complexities of terrorism and insurgency was thus the essential first step in managing them.

Bruce Hoffman

LECTURE SESSION IV

The World Economic Crisis and its Impact on Asia

Masahiro Kawai provided a detailed qualitative and quantitative analysis of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), its impact on Asia, the list of policy responses advanced by various Asian countries, and the policy recommendations for Asia's post-crisis agenda.

The first section delineated the impact of the crisis on international trade, financial markets, and economic growth. The adverse impact on these sectors was not limited to Asia, but all over the world. In Asia, due to the GFC, most of the ASEAN states — along with Japan, Korea and Taiwan — witnessed a decline in their exports and industrial production. Stock markets similarly performed negatively all over Asia. In the area of foreign exchange markets, India, Indonesia, and Korea witnessed the sharpest adjustments. The GDP growth rates in large parts of Asia also plummeted in 2009, with the economies of Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Thailand dropping more than seven percentage points. Growth rates in China, India, and Indonesia, however, were relatively stable. In line with the latter development, recent trade and market data, along with growth projections by various international agencies, indicated that there was cause for optimism that the other Asian economies would recover soon.

Kawai next listed the various global and Asian policy responses to the ongoing GFC. He highlighted the various G20 policy measures (announced on 2 April 2009) that were aimed at restoring confidence, repairing financial systems, strengthening the financial regulations, reforming international financial institutions, and promoting global trade and investment. He noted that the measures were also being undertaken to strengthen the International Monetary Fund, which included increasing its financial resources to US$750 billion and supporting new Special Drawing Rights with an additional allocation of US$250 billion.

Globally, major countries were performing commendably, implementing stimulus packages to revive the economy. For 2009, the G20 stimulus spending amounted to 1.8 percent of GDP (PPP measure) and around 1.3 percent for 2010. According to the PPP-GDP weighted average measure, China emerged as a major spender with a stimulus package of 3.2 percent of GDP in 2009 and 2.7 percent in 2010. Kawai further highlighted the regional measures that were agreed upon in Asia. These included the multilateralization of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), raising resources of the single regional pool to US$120 billion, establishing an independent regional surveillance unit, and creating a panel of experts to enhance the surveillance mechanism.

Kawai also briefly discussed the historical trends in U.S. household income, consumption, and savings rates. It was noted that consumption increased from 65 percent of GDP during the 1980s to 72 percent by 2007, an increase that was mostly driven by the housing bubble. This overconsumption was one of the main culprits of the GFC, necessitating an adjustment. The latest data from the United States showed a decrease in imports, a slight decrease in household debt and consumption, and an increase in the U.S. savings rate.

Analysing the impact of the decline in U.S. consumption on Asia, Kawai presented the results from the computable general equilibrium (CGE) simulation study. First, there would be a switch away from domestic demand-led growth to export-led growth in the United States and a switch away from export-led growth to domestic demand-led growth in non-U.S. (particularly East Asian) economies. Second, a decline in U.S. demand would lead to structural adjustments in production and trade in East Asia. Third, East Asia's manufacturing sectors would be major losers in the adjustment process while the agricultural and services sectors were likely to gain from the expanded domestic demand.

Kawai concluded his remarks by presenting a broad range of policy recommendations that should be on the post-crisis agenda in Asia. On the demand side, personal consumption in Asia should be encouraged along with an increase in infrastructure investment. Consumption could be enhanced by creating reliable social sector protections and by reforming the financial sector. In addition, corporate savings, especially in countries like China (where private consumption was low and corporate savings were high), could be channelled to implement social security schemes. Supply-side measures included reforms in the non-tradable sector. Emphasis was placed on a "green new deal", which referred to the development of an industry that would be efficient, employed clean energy, and was environmentally friendly. Finally, to further high and sustainable growth and to cushion against future shocks, regional market integration was crucial.

Following the speaker's remarks, it was noted that according to the Asian Development Bank and depending upon the rate of U.S. economic recovery, Asia could have a V-shaped recovery. It was also underlined that though economic growth in China and India had positive impacts on the world economic recovery, the United States would continue to be the critical economic player. Further, the world economies might require another round of stimulus spending to sustain the recovery. On the issue of an Asian currency, it was suggested that Asia was ready to pursue a currency arrangement with a basket of key Asian currencies that could be used for trade invoicing and the bond market.

Masahiro Kawai

PANEL DISCUSSION II
Military Transformation

Richard A. Bitzinger led off the discussion on military transformation — or the revolution in military affairs (RMA) — by first noting that this was the first self-conscious RMA in history. He argued that while the development of warfare throughout history has been characterized by technological, social, and organizational innovations, such innovations have typically been recognized ex post facto. By contrast, this present incarnation of military transformation, which has its genesis in developments in the U.S. Department of Defense in the early 1980s, was unique in the sense that the main players in the transformation programme remained acutely aware that they were in a "transformational environment".

Bitzinger proceeded to sketch out the general characteristics of the RMA as it was understood and practised today, namely the discontinuous and stochastic changes in the conduct of warfare (as opposed to continuous and predictable changes), and the reliance on new technologies and operational/organizational concepts. In the main, the theory behind the RMA was best understood as a shift in thinking from "platforms" to "networks". As such, a "transformed" military would possess and be capable of employing the following: a networked C4ISR, advanced weapons and platforms, increased battlespace awareness, enhanced accuracy and firepower, agility, speed, flexibility,

jointness (among the distinct services), and interoperability (with coalition partners). In short, a transformed military would essentially behave as a "system of systems".

However, Bitzinger warned against being overly optimistic about the promise of the RMA. First, the sheer cost of transformation was prohibitively high in terms of the hardware required, and the costs of changing deeply embedded structures and processes. Second, the military was an essentially conservative creature and this conservatism would manifest itself in a continuing preference for "legacy systems". Finally, there were limitations in what the defence and the broader industrial system could deliver on the promise of the RMA. Despite these potential pitfalls, Bitzinger concluded that the question of military transformation was a critical one for all governments and militaries to consider.

Richard A. Bitzinger

Bernard Loo focused on three questions confronting policymakers and military professionals regarding military transformation. First, he questioned if regional military organizations could avoid the RMA. Second, he focused on the viability of implementing the RMA. Finally, he raised the critical question of whether regional militaries actually needed the RMA.

By way of preamble, Loo pointed out that the pace of technological changes, especially in the domain of military technology, has resulted in the material obsolescence of many of the assets of the region's armed forces. Furthermore, the increasing adoption of civil technologies by militaries has resulted in a complex pattern of technological selection, adoption, and obsolescence. Accordingly, there was a need for militaries to retire old hardware and to acquire new equipment and systems. However, there was a critical difference between modernization and transformation. There was a difference between ad hoc, piece-meal upgrading, and systematic and universal overhaul of the military's inventory. Hence, while equipment and weapon systems upgrades were unavoidable, the RMA was not necessarily the only option for militaries.

Second, by locating the current RMA in historical perspective, it could be seen that the RMA was a particular U.S. and Western solution to a Cold War problem, namely, the problem of defeating Soviet heavy armour and overcoming the Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority in the Central European theatre without precipitating a nuclear exchange. The RMA posited a solution framed in terms of technology. In other words, the theory behind the RMA suggested substitution of numbers by technology. It was questionable whether the dominant U.S. model of the RMA was transferable and suitable for other geopolitical environments.

Finally, the RMA could not be uncritically adopted by the region's militaries without seriously considering the suitability of the transformational agenda for a country's unique set of geopolitical factors, cultural preferences, historical circumstances, and economic resources.

Bernard Loo

The final speaker, **Zhao Xiaozhuo**, juxtaposed the American RMA model to how other militaries were approaching military transformation and asked if the U.S. model could and should be copied. Zhao argued that if the RMA was defined in terms of the Pentagon's approach and practice, then the bar for transformation has been set so high that the only military that has transformed was the U.S. military. The transformation process undertaken by the U.S. military, particularly under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and the resources that have been brought to bear on the transformation project have essentially put the U.S. model out of reach of even the nearest peer competitor. Furthermore, Zhao reiterated the point that the strategic circumstances facing the United States were fundamentally unique and different from those facing small and medium states.

Zhao's main criticism of the U.S. model was that the U.S. military has traded depth for breadth. The implementation of the RMA has enhanced the U.S. military's capabilities in conventional military operations. But this enhanced capability has come at the expense of capabilities in unconventional operations and military operations other than war. In particular, Zhao highlighted the U.S. military's limited ability to fight terrorism. This divergence in capabilities between the two different operating environments was a crucial one since conventional military operations might prove to be the least likely scenario that the United States, as well as other militaries, would find themselves confronting.

Zhao Xiaozhuo

SINGAPORE TECHNOLOGIES ENGINEERING DISTINGUISHED DINNER LECTURE

China and North Korea: From Blood Allies to Strange Bedfellows?

Chung Chong Wook had originally planned to speak on the contemporary security relations between China and North Korea. However, former U.S. President Bill Clinton's recent trip to North Korea led him to change the focus of his speech. In Chung's view, Clinton went there in a private capacity. The general view was that Clinton's mission was focused on bringing home the two imprisoned American journalists, Euna Lee and Laura Ling. This analysis was unpersuasive. Since Clinton also met the North Korean leadership, other security issues were probably discussed. Clinton's visit might relieve the tensions stoked by North Korea's nuclear tests. Perhaps North Korea might resume negotiations over its nuclear weapons programme.

Chung next discussed the future of North Korea. The successor to President Kim Jong Il was the president's third son, Kim Jong Un. He is 26 years old and has no extensive experience in the military, government, or political party. In fact, little is known about him. He attended an elite school in Switzerland, and has certainly been chosen to ensure the continuity of his father and grandfather's political legacy.

China remained concerned about the succession and the stability of North Korean politics for two key reasons. First, if North Korea became unstable, vast numbers of North Korean refugees might migrate into China's northeastern territory. Second, if the Koreas were unified on South Korea's terms, Beijing would lose a strategic buffer. China, however, was also concerned about nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. If North Korea developed nuclear weapons, Japan and South Korea might consider acquiring them as well. Such a development would radically alter the strategic landscape in Northeast Asia. China, consequently, has sought to contain

North Korea's nuclear weapons programme and preserve the status quo on the Korean peninsula. Developments in North Korea, however, remained unpredictable.

In conclusion, Chung stated his hope that the next generation of leaders in Pyongyang would be committed to reform and open policies. Such a development would advance stability in Northeast Asia.

Chung Chong Wook

PANEL DISCUSSION III

Climate Change and Conflict

Lorraine Elliott started her talk by reframing the climate change and conflict nexus, emphasizing that climate exchange was a threat-multiplier, exacerbating existing tensions rather than simply creating them. As climate change contributed to decreases in natural resources, greater political instability could result as ethnic rivalries increased and the poverty gap widened. While much research has been devoted to the effects of climate change in the developed world, the reality was that the most affected countries were Asian and that the poor were the most directly affected. Elliott went on to discuss the triggers of conflict, the pathways of conflict, and the security consequences of conflict.

In summary, the triggers of conflict referred to conditions created by climate change that directly contributed to conflict. These included resource stress and scarcity in terms of water and energy resources, food insecurity as a result of reduced harvests and unstable food prices, and the loss of territory or newfound access to resources as a result of climate change. On the other hand, the pathways of conflict referred to a breakdown in social resilience that climate change could exacerbate. Among the pathways identified were the vulnerability of critical physical and human infrastructure, the over-extension of adaptive capacity in terms of material and institutional resources, migration pressures, and political tensions generated between those groups most responsible for climate change and those affected by it. Finally, the security consequences of conflict included possibilities such as the intensification of civil unrest, inter-communal violence, political and religious extremism, and state failure. In addition, climate change could also widen the geography of conflict by increasing the incidences of territorial disputes over resources, and shifting regional distributions of power as some countries end up with more energy and food resources than others.

Finally, Elliott identified several responses to avert potential climate conflicts. For the defence establishment, she recommended securing stable energy resources and ensuring that border control management was prepared to deal with the increase in climate refugees and other migrants. She also stressed the need for early action to limit or mitigate climate change. Key actors such as the European Union and the United States should take decisive action and deal with climate change. Elliott further proposed that governments implement effective monitoring and early warning systems to better understand the pathways of conflict. She concluded by emphasizing that social resilience and the protection of human security were important in addressing climate change.

Lorraine Elliott

The second speaker, **Shreekant Gupta**, focused his discussion on the framing of climate change as an equity issue rather than a conflict issue. Gupta explained that climate change itself arose and was exacerbated by the desire of both the First and Third Worlds to further advance and industrialize. Solutions consequently must involve the equitable sharing of global greenhouse gas emissions.

Gupta went on to examine the evidence for the phenomenon of climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an organization that he had chaired, had declared that available evidence indicated there was human influence on global climate. The main causes of climate change were the burning of fossil fuels and the cutting of forests. The systemic cause of climate change, however, lay in economics. Modern industrial economies have been able to profit without having to foot the costs of industrialization. Consequently, effective action has yet to be taken to reduce these costs.

Gupta stressed that the time for the world to act was now. Decisive action should be taken to reduce emissions by 2030 in order to avoid catastrophic temperature changes. The share of cutbacks in emissions by individual nations, however, remained contentious. To address this problem, it was recommended that a more effective strategy would be to focus on countries that emitted 80 percent of the greenhouse gases and to convince them to collectively reduce their emissions.

Shreekant Gupta

To deal with the effects of climate change, which included greater morbidity, greater water scarcity, and the emergence of a new geographical "tension belt" in the Arctic, he recommended that a three-pronged approach be adopted. The first, a preventive approach, would focus on curtailing the structural causes for conflict before they erupted. The second, a mitigating approach, would attempt to contain conflicts that have already broken out. The final prong, an uncoupling approach, would focus on the triggers of conflict and attempt to release the stresses these created before they resulted in conflict.

The final speaker, **Mely Caballero-Anthony**, spoke on the need to re-examine the causal link between climate change and conflict, and the pitfalls of securitizing climate change. In her speech, she questioned if it was necessary to frame the problem as a security threat. She stated that the securitization of environmental issues has led to an emphasis on resource scarcity as the security problem. Accordingly, resource scarcity has overshadowed other issues such as resource distribution and migration. It was pointed out that the link between climate change and conflict might be tenuous. In the case of water scarcity, for instance, there was regional cooperation on the sharing of resources in Asia. In the case of climate migrants, seen as a potential threat to state security, it was possible that these migrants might not have any political agendas and were not security threats. By overemphasizing the national security angle of these two cases, unintended consequences have resulted. Instead of better governance, the focus has been on military responses.

Caballero-Anthony proposed that the human security perspective be adopted to analyse the potential effects and risks of climate change. Governments could then better understand why people could be displaced by the effects of climate change and how they could mitigate or prevent this, rather than viewing the migrants as security threats. This approach could aid states in improving social resilience by examining the causes of high morbidity, food insecurity, and land loss, and by improving the health and

agricultural infrastructures. Further steps could involve the strengthening of institutions, public education, and the use of science and technology to create a holistic strategy to deal with climate change and to prevent climate change conflicts from arising. Financial aid and technology transfers to less developed countries could also decrease the vulnerability of these societies to environmental problems.

In the discussions, a key issue was how politicians and businessmen could be incentivized to act on what might seem like a long-term problem. The response was that poor responses to natural disasters could damage the legitimacy of governments; such considerations should induce governments to act. Even politicians would realize that countries have a shared but differentiated responsibility to address climate change, as the problem would affect the globe in the near future. Another question raised is the problem of equity: Should negotiators focus on technological responses to climate change rather than emissions? One reply was that technology's effectiveness in addressing climate change was still untested. Another was that fairness — not equality — was necessary in determining emission targets. Finally, what role should the military play in the context of climate change? It was suggested that militaries should be prepared to operate on the frontlines of natural disasters and that the concept of "national security" should be broadened to include the concerns of those who were directly affected by climate change.

Mely Caballero-Anthony

DISTINGUISHED LUNCH TALK II

Defence Security in South Asia

Jehangir Karamat challenged the notion that South Asian security was all about India and Pakistan. This was true to a certain degree because India and Pakistan are the largest and arguably the most important countries in the region. However, this Indo-Pakistan-centric view of South Asian security clouded the fact that there are other countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka that are equally important to South Asian security.

South Asia has been characterized by a complex security environment, with each country of the region confronting varying degrees of internal problems. India has been fighting multiple insurgencies in Kashmir and its northeast region, and a Maoist movement in central India. Similarly, Pakistan has been tackling a separatist movement in Baluchistan as well as meeting the increasing threat posed by the Taliban to the country's security. Nepal has recently undergone political change, but has yet to stabilize its domestic politics. The probability that political crises might afflict Bangladesh was high too. Sri Lanka recently defeated the LTTE, which brought an end to twenty-six years of civil war but there remained innumerable challenges in the form of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery.

Besides intra-state security issues, South Asia has also witnessed an enduring inter-state dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. This longstanding territorial row over Kashmir has led to violent confrontations between the two nuclear-armed states, rendering the security environment even more unpredictable and complicated.

Karamat, however, noted that South Asian countries have increasingly been promoting multilateral cooperation in areas that were beneficial to all. One such area was trade. Intra-regional trade in South Asia currently remained insignificant, but negotiations were underway to increase the volume of trade in the region. Another was energy

cooperation. There have been ongoing discussions on building the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline as well as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. Finally, South Asian states have banded together to confront the threat of terrorism.

In conclusion, Karamat stated that although the current South Asian security environment was complicated, outstanding issues could eventually be resolved through dialogue and negotiations. Regional governments should remain committed to peaceful processes in resolving the issues that complicated their relationships.

Jehangir Karamat

LECTURE SESSION V
Maritime Security

Sam Bateman reviewed the significant issues and trends in contemporary maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region with a particular focus on Southeast Asia. He first addressed the key features of regional maritime geography, and the contentions over maritime boundaries and sovereignty claims in the region. He then reviewed matters concerning piracy and armed robbery at sea, and naval developments in the region. He concluded with some observations about the outlook for maritime security in the region.

The maritime geography of East Asia is one of the most complicated in the world. As a consequence of the extended maritime jurisdiction defined by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), virtually all East Asian waters are regarded as territorial sea, exclusive economic zones (EEZ), or archipelagic waters.

Regional trade has expanded significantly and most of it was carried by sea. The global economic recession, however, has led to a marked downturn in international seaborne trade and the global maritime industry. This downturn in international shipping has implications for maritime security. Ships might become vulnerable to threats at sea if shipowners downgraded their security measures to reduce operating costs.

Bateman discussed the contentious issue of maritime boundaries in East Asia next. The geography of the region has made it such that the establishment of many boundaries (or at least their end points or "turning points") would require the agreement of three or even more countries. Maritime boundaries furthermore could not be settled until a state's sovereignty over disputed islands and other features has been established. In that connection, some maritime boundaries in the region have been resolved. There remained, however, many other boundaries that have yet to be decided. Consequently, problems have arisen over the effective management of regional seas, including good order at sea. There was also a lack of consensus on navigational rights and freedoms, and the interpretation of state rights in particular EEZs.

As for criminal activities against ships in the region, Bateman stated that the number of incidents had decreased significantly in recent years. Piracy and armed robbery against ships have also declined.

On naval developments, Bateman noted that most regional navies have been modernizing their fleets. There has been a focus on acquiring or building major surface combatants, submarines, and offshore patrol vessels. An interesting question was whether the naval strategies adopted by regional states have been cooperative or competitive. Navies have conducted exercises and cooperated to combat the threat of terrorism. But they have also acquired submarines, which tended to spur competition. The navies in the region, nevertheless, have stressed that their capabilities were being developed for defensive purposes. Still, since most weapon systems could be simultaneously offensive and defensive, differentiation between the two remained challenging.

In conclusion, Bateman stated that if trust and transparency were not developed, "security dilemmas" could result in the region. Measures to enhance the transparency of naval plans and build mutual trust among the regional states should be pursued.

Following Bateman's presentation, the following issues were discussed. On marine environmental issues, it was noted that the subject remained under-studied. Also needed in Asia was a regional approach to tackling marine environmental problems. This should be rectified since regional states would benefit in the long term if the marine environment was protected. On a different note, it was mentioned that UNCLOS provided for certain freedoms in the EEZs. But disagreement remained on what constituted permitted activities in the EEZs. Surveillance operations could be interpreted by different parties as either peaceful or threatening acts. Finally, it was suggested that the region could cooperate and enhance the safety of the seas. Regional states could collaborate and develop joint rescue capabilities.

Sam Bateman

LECTURE SESSION VI

The Media and International Conflict

Nik Gowing discussed the changing role of the media in times of international crisis, the information overload phenomenon, and the increasing democratization of the media. With the rise of information technology, the media have played an increasingly vital role in influencing those in power as well as military and security operations. Gowing also addressed the implications of information transparency, the battle for public perception, the tensions between new technologies versus new security realities, and the efforts expended by governments and militaries to keep up with the new media technologies.

The collection, processing, and distribution of news reports have quickened. When the Myanmar government suppressed protests in September – October 2007, reports and pictures of the crackdown were released on the Internet almost immediately, causing international outrage. The most recent pictures released by the BBC showing the random killing of a local by the Indian police in the northeastern town of Imphal in July 2009 also stirred adverse reactions. New forms of media technology have made information easily available and accessible. These new media technologies included cell-phone cameras and video cameras, which could easily be obtained by amateur reporters and ordinary citizens.

With the proliferation of mobile phones with built-in cameras and the Internet, ordinary civilians also have the power to be members of the media. Events could be captured instantaneously on a mobile phone's camera and immediately transferred to other media for public broadcast. The democratization of the media has consequences. The latest developments might be quickly covered, but in the rush to get a scoop journalists might compromise the accuracy of their stories. Furthermore, authorities might experience difficulty in dispelling rumours if inaccurate reports were unthinkingly carried and broadcasted by the media. Additionally, instant news could generate negative repercussions. As was seen in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, the terrorists' handler in Pakistan exploited the intelligence furnished by the media to plot the deaths of more people.

The impact of such developments was that governments have been put in an increasingly difficult position to swiftly address many of the pressing issues raised by the media. The failure to do so might undermine the standing of governments and their agencies. Another potential impact of the new media was that they could influence military activities. A case in point was the American military assault undertaken in September 2008 in Azizabad, Afghanistan. U.S. news released reports that seven civilians had died in the attack while a camera captured images of almost fifty-five killed. The result was that the U.S. military was called to account for the civilian deaths. A new tactical directive would also be issued to govern the behaviour of NATO forces in Afghanistan. The media, in short, had impacted on military operations.

In sum, the media and government officials have their work cut out for them—they have to determine the accuracy of the information they broadcasted and received. The process, however, could be time-consuming and could limit the media organizations' capacity to provide timely news. While established and respected television channels and newspapers have their internal vetting system, media channels eager to broadcast the latest news to enhance their ratings might gloss over inaccuracies and transmit false information. Inaccurate media reports could undermine social stability. Inaccurate media reports could also affect government decision-making adversely.

Nik Gowing

11th Asia-Pacific Programme For Senior Military Officers
4th –10th August 2009 Singapore

Monday, 3 August 2009

1900 hrs Welcome Dinner

Tuesday, 4 August 2009

0930hrs Opening Remarks
Ambassador Barry Desker
Dean, RSIS, and Director, IDSS

0935 hrs Keynote Address:
Mr. Teo Chee Hean
Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Defence, Singapore

1020 hrs Group Photography

1040 – 1100 hrs Group Photo-taking

1045 hrs Panel Discussion I:
Terrorism and International Security

Chair:
Associate Professor Joseph Liow
Associate Dean, RSIS

Speakers:
Professor Rohan Gunaratna
Head, ICPVTR, RSIS

Associate Professor Thitinan
Pongsudhirak
Chulalongkorn University

Associate Professor Kumar
Ramakrishna
Head, CENS, RSIS

1315 hrs Lunch

1430 hrs Session I: Post-war Peace Building

Chair:
Associate Professor Leonard Sebastian
Head, Indonesia Programme, RSIS

Speaker:
Ambassador Fred Tanner
Director, Geneva Centre for
Security Policy

1600 hrs Discussion:
Post-war Peace Building

1930 hrs Dinner:
Guest of Honour:
H.E. Mr. S R Nathan
President of the Republic of Singapore

Wednesday, 5 August 2009

0830 hrs	Introduction by Participants
0930 hrs	Session II: New Dimensions in International Security
	Chair: Associate Professor Tan See Seng Head, Research, RSIS
	Speaker: Professor Steve Smith Vice-Chancellor University of Exeter
1100 hrs	Discussion: New Dimensions in International Security
1200 hrs	Lunch
1330 hrs	Visit to Singapore Armed Forces Centre for Military Experimentation
1900 hrs	Free & Easy

Thursday, 6 August 2009

0830 hrs	Introduction by Participants
0930 hrs	Session III: Asia-Pacific Security: The Rise of China and India
	Chair: Professor Khong Yuen Foong Senior Research Advisor, RSIS
	Speakers: Professor Harry Harding Founding Dean Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy
	Professor C. Raja Mohan RSIS
1130 hrs	Discussion: Asia-Pacific Security: The Rise of China and India
1230 hrs	Distinguished Lunch Talk I: Who Fights? Terrorists and Insurgents in the 21st and 20th Centuries
	Chair: Ambassador Barry Desker Dean, RSIS, and Director, IDSS
	Speaker: Professor Bruce Hoffman S. Rajaratnam Professor of Strategic Studies, and Professor, Georgetown University

1430 hrs Session IV:
World Economic Crisis and its Impact on Asia

Chair:
Assistant Professor Richard Carney
RSIS

Speaker:
Dr. Masahiro Kawai
Dean and CEO
Asian Development Bank Institute

1600 hrs Discussion:
World Economic Crisis and its Impact on Asia

1700 hrs Free & Easy

Friday, 7 August 2009

0830 hrs Visit to Changi Naval Base

1230 hrs Lunch

1400 hrs Panel Discussion II:
Military Transformation

Chair:
Professor Ron Matthews
Deputy Director, IDSS, and
Head, Graduate Studies, RSIS

Speakers:
Mr. Richard Bitzinger
Senior Fellow, RSIS

Associate Professor Bernard Loo
RSIS

Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo
Academy of Military Science, China

1830 hrs Singapore Technologies Engineering Distinguished Dinner Lecture:
China and North Korea: From Blood Allies to Strange Bedfellows?

Chair:
Ambassador Barry Desker
Dean, RSIS, and Director, IDSS

Speaker:
Professor Chung Chong Wook
Former National Security Advisor and Korean Ambassador to China

Saturday, 8 August 2009

0830 hrs Introduction by Participants

0930 hrs Panel Discussion III:
Climate Change and Conflict

Chair:
Assistant Professor Chang Youngho
RSIS

Speakers:
Dr. Lorraine Elliott
Senior Fellow
Australian National University

Associate Professor Shreekant Gupta
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Associate Professor Mely Caballero-Anthony
Head, Centre for NTS Studies
RSIS

1200 hrs	Distinguished Lunch Talk II: Defence Security in South Asia Chair: Mr. Tan Seng Chye Senior Fellow, RSIS Speaker: General Jehangir Karamat Founder and Director Spearhead Research
1400 hrs	Social Excursion

Sunday, 9 August 2009

0830 hrs	Introduction by Participants
0930 hrs	Session V: Maritime Security Chair: LTC Joshua Ho Senior Fellow, RSIS Speaker: Dr. Sam Bateman Senior Fellow, RSIS
1100 hrs	Discussion: Maritime Security
1200 hrs	Lunch
1630 hrs	National Day Parade

Monday, 10 August 2009

0830 hrs	Introduction by Participants
0930 hrs	Session VI: The Media and International Conflict Chair: Mr. Kwa Chong Guan Head, External Programmes, RSIS Speaker: Mr. Nik Gowing Presenter, BBC World
1100 hrs	Course Evaluation:
1200 hrs	Presentation of Certificates followed by Farewell Lunch
1400 hrs	Departures

Participants

List of Speakers and Chairpersons

1. **Mr. Teo Chee Hean**
   Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence
   Gombak Drive off Upper Bukit Timah Road
   MINDEF Building
   Singapore 669645

2. **Ambassador Barry Desker**
   Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
   Director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
   Nanyang Technological University

3. **Dr. Sam Bateman**
   Senior Fellow and Adviser to the
   Maritime Security Program
   S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
   Nanyang Technological University
   Professorial Research Fellow
   Australian National Centre for
   Ocean Resources and Security
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4. **Mr. Richard Bitzinger**
   Senior Fellow
   S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
   Nanyang Technological University

5. **Associate Professor Mely Caballero-Anthony**
   Head of Centre for Non-Traditional
   Security (NTS) Studies
   Secretary General, Consortium on
   Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia (NTS-Asia)
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   Nanyang Technological University

6. **Assistant Professor Richard Carney**
   S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
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7. **Assistant Professor Chang Youngho**
   S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
   Nanyang Technological University

8. **Professor Chung Chong Wook**
   Former National Security Adviser and Korean
   Ambassador to China
   Visiting Professor
   S. Rajaratnam School Of International Studies
   Nanyang Technological University

9. **Dr. Lorraine Elliott**
   Senior Fellow in International Relations
   Department of International Relations
   Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies
   The Australian National University
   Canberra, Australia

10. **Mr. Nik Gowing**
Presenter, BBC World
British Broadcasting Corporation
United Kingdom

11. **Professor Rohan Gunaratna**
Head, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University

12. **Associate Professor Shreekant Gupta**
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
National University of Singapore

13. **Professor Harry Harding**
Founding Dean
Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy

14. **Lieutenant Colonel Joshua Ho**
Senior Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University

15. **Professor Bruce Hoffman**
Professor of Security Studies Program,
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University

16. **General Jehangir Karamat**
Founder and Director
Spearhead Research, Lahore, Pakistan
Commissioner
International Non Proliferation and Disarmament Commission

17. **Mr. Masahiro Kawai**
Dean and CEO
Asian Development Bank Institute
Tokyo, Japan

18. **Professor Khong Yuen Foong**
Senior Research Advisor
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University

19. **Mr. Kwa Chong Guan**
Head of External Programmes
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20. **Associate Professor Joseph Liow**
Associate Dean
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21. **Associate Professor Bernard Loo**
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22. **Professor Ron Matthews**
Professor, Head of Graduate Studies and Deputy Director of IDSS
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23. **Professor C. Raja Mohan**
Professor
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24. **Associate Professor Thitinan Pongsudhirak**
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25. **Associate Professor Kumar Ramakrishna**
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26. **Associate Professor Leonard Sebastian**
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27. **Professor Steve Smith**
Vice-Chancellor
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28. **Associate Professor Tan See Seng**
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29. **Mr. Tan Seng Chye**
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30. **Ambassador Fred Tanner**
Director
Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

31. **Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo**
Research Fellow
Department of World Military Studies
Academy of Military Science, PLA, China

Participants

32. **Group Captain Brian J. Edwards**
Officer Commanding Air Training Wing (OCATW)
Australia

33. **Colonel Peter John Short**
Director of Army Plans
Australia

34. **Brigadier General Md Sharafat Hossain**
Acting Commander, Independent Engineer Brigade
Bangladesh

35. **Captain Mohammad Nurul Absar**
BN Drafting Commander
Bangladesh

36. **Lieutenant Colonel Ken Kettyarath**
National Defense of Cambodia
Cambodia

37. **Lieutenant Colonel Lok Smith Samdy**
Chief of Administration Office
Cambodia

38. **Captain (Navy) Martin Teft**
Assistant Chief of Staff – Personnel
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39. **Captain Anne Cullerre**
Chief of the Joint Staff of the Admiral (ALINDIEN)
France

40. **Colonel (Armament) Thomas Lorne**
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41. **Colonel Hans-Jűrgen Wőhlermann**
Oberst i.G., Lecturer, German Armed Forces
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42. **Colonel Raju Chauhan**
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43. **Colonel Chuji Ando**
The National Institute for Defense Studies
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Personnel Department
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45. **Lieutenant Colonel Jung, Jaewook**
North Korea Division
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46. **Major Seol, Kwang-Yun**
Legal Officer
International Military Agreements
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47. **Lieutenant Colonel Phetsavang Lavongkham**
Deputy of Training Department
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48. **Colonel Viengxay Somvichith**
Deputy Director of Military Science and
History Department
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49. **Colonel Hj Anuar bin Rijaludin**
Commandant Army Institute of Management
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50. **Colonel Shamsuri Bin Alias RMAF**
Base Commander, Gong Kedak Air Base
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51. **Captain (Navy) Myint Thein**
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Office of the Chief of the
Armed Forces Training, MOD
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52. **Colonel Soe Win**
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53. **Captain Dean James Rugby McDougall, MNZM**
Royal New Zealand Navy
New Zealand

54. **Wing Commander Darryn R. Webb**
Commanding Officer No. 40 SQN, RNZAF
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55. **Colonel Anas Asad**
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Head of Strategic Studies and International Relations
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56. **Colonel Tokam Kanene**
Defence Attache Jakarta RI
Papua New Guinea

57. **Colonel Raymundo Elefante**
Director, Air Force Safety Office
Philippines

58. **Colonel Lorenzo Rubio Sumicad**
Deputy Commander
NCRCOM, AFP
Philippines

59. **Brigadier General Ahmed Bin**
Abdullah Al-Hassoun
Director of Admin Affair Directorates J2
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60. **Lieutenant Colonel David Foo**
Branch Head, Navel Operations Department
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61. **Lieutenant Colonel Goh Tiong Cheng, Edwin**
Commanding Officer 1st Commando Battalion
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62. **Lieutenant Colonel Goh Han Thong**
Head General Staff, HQ Armour
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63. **Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Goh**
Head System Development, OSDG,
HQ UAV Command
Singapore

64. **Mr. Jackson Koh**
Branch Head
Defence Policy Office, MINDEF HQ
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65. **Colonel Lim Tuang Liang**
Commander UAV Command
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66. **Lieutenant Colonel Nalpon Patrick Selvan**
Branch Head
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67. **Colonel Neo Hong Keat**
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Assistant Chief of General Staff (Training)
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69. Colonel Ngong Boon Kheng
Dy HNO (Ops & Ex), NOD
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70. Lieutenant Colonel Poh Seng Wee, Patrick
Senior Force Transformation Officer —
Force Structure (Maritime)
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71. Lieutenant Colonel Francis Tan
CO 6 DA BN
Singapore

72. Lieutenant Colonel Tan Leong Beng
Commanding Officer
Imagery & Geospatial School
Head, Project Office, Joint Plans & Transformation Department (Designate)
Head, Plans Branch, Imagery Support Group (Covering)
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73. Lieutenant Colonel Teo Cheng Hang
Branch Head
Singapore

74. Lieutenant Colonel Tjhin Poi Chung
Head System Development Branch, HQ Supply
Singapore

75. Major General Kamal Gunaratne
Sri Lanka

76. Colonel (GS) Urs Gerber
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Swiss Armed Forces,
Deputy Head
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77. Colonel Veerachai Boocha-oom
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82. Senior Colonel Nguyen Xuan Thanh
Deputy Head, Department of Political and Party Affairs, Institute of National Defence
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About the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)

The **Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS**) is a key research component of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). It focuses on security research to serve national needs. IDSS' faculty and research staff conduct both academic and policy-oriented research on security-related issues and developments affecting Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific. Its research agenda presently comprises the following programmes: Military Transformations, Civil and Internal Conflict, Maritime Security, Multilateralism and Regionalism, Contemporary Islam, China, Indonesia, South Asia and United States.

For more details, please visit
www.rsis.edu.sg/idss/

About the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

The **S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)** was inaugurated on 1 January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological University (NTU), upgraded from its previous incarnation as the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), which was established in 1996.

The School exists to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of Asia-Pacific security studies and international affairs. Its three core functions are research, graduate teaching and networking activities in the Asia-Pacific region. It produces cutting-edge security related research in Asia-Pacific Security, Conflict and Non-Traditional Security, International Political Economy, and Country and Area Studies.

The School's activities are aimed at assisting policymakers to develop comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking on issues related to security and stability in the Asia-Pacific and their implications for Singapore.

For more information about RSIS, please visit
www.rsis.edu.sg

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