

13th ASIA PACIFIC PROGRAMME

FOR SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS (APPSMO)

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4 – 10 August 2011, Singapore



**S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**
A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

13th Asia Pacific Programme For Senior Military Officers (APPSMO)

INSTITUTE OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES
S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY

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CONTENTS PAGE

1. Summary of APPSMO 2011	3
2. Welcoming Remarks	4
3. Keynote Address	5
4. Distinguished Lunch Lecture: Indonesia's Defence Outlook: Prospects and Challenges	6
5. ST Engineering Distinguished Dinner Lecture: Managing a 21st Century Security Agenda: US Foreign Policy beyond Iraq and Afghanistan	8
6. Session 1: New Dimensions in International Security	9
7. Session 2: Sino-US Relationship: Source of Stability or Instability?	10
8. Session 3: Defence Diplomacy	12
9. Session 4: Terrorism in South and Southeast Asia	13
10. Session 5: New Vulnerabilities for Power, Politics and Systems in the New Public Information and Media Space	16
11. Session 6: Post-Conflict Stabilisation Operations	20
12. Session 7: Centres of Power and Influence in the Evolving Regional Order	21
13. Session 8: Energy Security in the Asia Pacific Region: The Rising Security Challenges in the Multi-Polar International System	23
14. Session 9: Civil-Military Relations	24
15. Conference Programme	27
16. Speakers, Participants & Chairpersons	30
17. About the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies	36

Rapporteurs: Afif Pasuni, Bommakati Kartik, Choong Pui Yee, Collin Koh, Ginja Elbel Eve, Iftekharul Bashar, Irene Chan, Joel Ng, Kelvin Wong, Kyaw San Wai, Manpavan Joth Kaur, Nah Liang Tuang, P. K. K. Hangzo, Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, Mohamed Redzuan Salleh, Sofia Jamil, Sophie Ng and Zbigniew Dumienksi
Editors: Mushahid Ali and Bhubhindar Singh

This report summarises the proceedings of the conference as interpreted by the assigned rapporteurs and editors from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.

This conference adheres to a variation of the Chatham House Rule. Accordingly, beyond the speakers and paper presenters cited, no other attributions have been included in this report.

SUMMARY OF APPSMO 2011

The 13th Asia Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO), organised by the RSIS Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), was held at the Sentosa Resort and Spa from 4-10 August 2011. Since its inception in 1999, APPSMO has provided a unique and important forum for military officers and defence analysts to network and exchange views on a broad range of subjects related to regional and international security. The 13th APPSMO continued to facilitate defence diplomacy with the attendance of 58 military officers from 28 countries representing Asia, Oceania, North America, Europe and Africa.

During the week-long programme the participants attended a series of seminars and discussions that featured experts from the academic, policy and media communities. Some key topics discussed in this year's APPSMO were *Sino-US Relationship: Source of Stability*

or Instability?; Defence Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific; Post-Conflict Stabilisation Operations; Energy Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and Terrorism in South and Southeast Asia.

The participants also engaged in a variety of excursions including visits to the Changi Naval Base, SAFTI Military Institute, the Night Safari at the Singapore Zoological gardens, and a city tour. The international military officers and defence analysts attended the National Day Parade on 9 August 2011 with the Singaporeans participants. The 13th APPSMO reinforced its important role in facilitating interaction and better understanding among senior military officers and defence analysts from around the Asia Pacific, thereby contributing to the development of mutually beneficial ties among the defence establishments and peoples of the world.

WELCOMING REMARKS



Ambassador Barry Desker

Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

In his welcoming remarks, **Ambassador Barry Desker**, Dean of RSIS and Director, IDSS, announced that the 13th round of APPSMO has evolved significantly since the first round in 1999 when 20 countries participated in the inaugural conference. In the 13th APPSMO, 58 officers from 28 countries were attending from the Asia-Pacific and beyond. Additionally, APPSMO has incorporated foreign sponsors and internalised both traditional as well as non-traditional security programmes while giving participants the opportunity to analyse both the practical and theoretical aspects of policy.

Dean Desker proceeded to highlight the difference between the modern and post-modern military, noting that differences between the military and civilian sector in post-modern militaries are less pronounced. Also more functions are demanded of the latter including peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, disaster relief and coalition operations. These new roles placed considerable pressure on contemporary militaries. Gatherings like APPSMO enable military officers to share their experiences and collectively address the challenges related to the new role of the military.

Dean Desker touched on a few key issues which were to be discussed at APPSMO including the change in the balance of power from the end of global US preponderance to the rise of China together with how other major powers like India, Russian and Japan will respond. Other topics of note include the changing nature of civil-military relations in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East, defence diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific and the transnational terrorist threat.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS



Dr Ng Eng Hen

Minister for Defence, Republic of Singapore

Dr Ng Eng Hen started by alluding to the implications of domestic economics for local and international security. The Greek case, where austerity measures prevented a sovereign debt default but triggered local strife, and the case of the US straining to provide military resources for NATO missions while dealing with rising debts were two examples provided. This could well be a foretaste of a new multi-polar and uncertain international order.

Discussing the theme of instability and uncertainty, Dr Ng mentioned three cases. These were the upheavals occurring throughout North Africa and the Middle East which could lead to economic disruptions due to global dependence on the region's oil and gas; the latent conflict between North and South Korea sustaining tension on the Korean peninsula; and the unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea between the littoral states and China which threatens to erupt into conflict despite mediation efforts at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

Amid this milieu, the continued strengthening of the Asian economies vis-a-vis the West cannot be ignored as the former is predicted by the Asian Development Bank to increase its share of global GDP from 27% in 2010 to 51% in 2050. With greater economic clout, rising states like China and India have started to flex their military muscles, backing up their newfound regional and global assertiveness with large increases in defence spending.

Dr Ng touched on the relationship between the US and a rising China with China striving to prevent the US from interfering in the former's territorial disputes with littoral states in the South China Sea (SCS). In as much as the US wishes to maintain navigational freedom in the South China Sea and honour its defence treaty with one of the littoral states, the Philippines, this becomes a potential point of contention between the US and China.

The greater complexity and uncertainty in the international environment with terrorism, piracy, nature based threats, cyber attacks and even the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), force state militaries to expand their response capabilities, improve information-sharing and exchange best practices so as to better manage transnational security challenges. Also, with Chinese and Indian ascendancy and the future primacy of the Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN would do well to modify its security architecture to accommodate these changes and maintain stability.

Dr Ng noted that ASEAN has managed to maintain regional stability by being committed to inclusive dialogue, cooperation based on mutual respect and confidence-building and peaceful resolution of differences. These principles help to promote trust, cooperation and transparency. ASEAN has developed a security architecture that comprises multilateral fora such as the East Asian Summit (EAS), informal meetings such as the Shangri-La Dialogue and formal mechanisms like the Malacca Strait Patrols.

Dr Ng pointed out that ASEAN's security architecture has achieved tangible benefits. For instance, the ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) established working groups to improve practical cooperation in security areas including disaster relief, counter-terrorism and maritime security among others. He cited the example of defeating maritime threats such as piracy by sharing information across countries to improve maritime awareness and early warning. For instance, Singapore

established the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) within the Changi Command and Control Centre in 2009 to combine information shared by partner navies and agencies. To date, 10 countries had deployed liaison officers to the IFC. The Singaporean Navy has also restructured its Coastal Command into the Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF) so that the Singapore Armed Forces, Police Coast Guard, Maritime Port Authority and other organisations can better coordinate to ensure maritime security.

Concluding, Dr Ng highlighted the emergence of on-line social networks and their potential to rally people and disseminate ideas besides being the interactive media the youth are most comfortable with. While acknowledging the fear that social networks can compromise operational security for the military, the SAF has used them to educate Singaporean youth about National Service. Additionally, social networks can also be used to instil resilience in the population and counter virulent ideologies in cyberspace.

DISTINGUISHED LUNCH LECTURE INDONESIA'S DEFENCE OUTLOOK: PROSPECT AND CHALLENGES



Minister of Defence Professor. Ir. Purnomo Yusgiantoro

Professor. Ir. Purnomo Yusgiantoro presented an update on Indonesia's defence and security outlook, which encapsulates a vast archipelagic territory. He provided highlights of Indonesia's defence and security engagements and activities at the global, regional and national levels.

He began by recognising a geo-strategic gravitational shift in international security towards the Southeast Asian region. This was based on the analysis that the unipolar global strategic environment is increasingly being replaced by a multipolar international security structure, through the influences of newly emerging economies, including those in Asia. Furthermore, increased multilateralism at the global level has reduced the use of hard power, and shifted the balance towards the use of soft and smart power. Accompanying this change in global power dynamics is the growing prominence of non-traditional threats to security. These include asymmetric warfare and violent conflicts between state and non-state actors, cyberwarfare, piracy, maritime border disputes, illegal logging, illegal fishing, human trafficking and natural disasters. Significantly, these threats are transnational and require international cooperation to deal with them. He emphasised that confronting these threats needed coordination among states in conducting military operations other than war.

Discussing Indonesia's defense and security engagements and activities at the global level, Minister Yusgiantoro stated that Indonesia's role reflects its international position as a non-aligned country. Indonesia continues to support the United Nations (UN) through troop contributions, which it considers the most legitimate authority to conduct military operations at the global level. Indonesia will persist in its role as a UN troop contributing country. In line with this global commitment, the Minister disclosed Indonesia's 'Four-in-One Project', which is the establishment of an integrated training centre for peace-keeping operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), counter terrorism and standby forces for rapid deployment to prepare Indonesian contingents for UN missions. The centre is open to other countries as well.

Professor Yusgiantoro highlighted that Indonesia's global role is linked to its regional presence. It is imperative that Indonesia participates at the regional level concurrently with the international sphere because of inter-linkages between the two levels. Accordingly, at the regional level, Indonesia has participated in a number of bilateral and multilateral defence and security cooperation schemes or agreements. As chair of ASEAN in 2011, Indonesia is trying its best to advance ASEAN by strengthening its defence and security infrastructure, through forums such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM), ADMM-Plus and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It is intended that these will in turn strengthen ASEAN's Political-Security Community (APSC).

During the recent ADMM Meeting in May 2011, ASEAN countries reached an agreement on a three-year programme. This agreement is to constitute the road map towards strengthening ASEAN defence and security cooperation, which would then complement the APSC's blueprint. The ASEAN Defence Senior Officials Meeting (ADSOM)-Plus has also completed the terms of reference

for the five Working Groups for practical cooperation, namely maritime security hosted by Malaysia and Australia; counter-terrorism hosted by Indonesia and the United States; peacekeeping operations hosted by the Philippines and New Zealand; military medicine hosted by Singapore and Japan; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) hosted by Vietnam and China. In the framework of ARF, Indonesia and Japan co-hosted the successful Disaster Relief Exercise (DIREX) in Manado, Indonesia. Furthermore, Indonesia's involvement as ASEAN's chair in the Thai-Cambodia border conflict, led to encouraging progress towards a solution. Lastly the issuance of Guidelines for the Declaration of Conduct (DoC) pertaining to the South China Sea disputes represents a significant breakthrough. The DoC paves the way towards negotiations to derive a Code of Conduct (CoC) to deal with the matter.

Finally, touching upon Indonesia's defence and security outlook at the national level, Professor Yusgiantoro revealed that Indonesia intends to encourage a symbiotic relationship between its defence and economic development. Indonesia plans to develop its defence and military industries by 2024 so as to reduce undue strategic dependency on external supplies. Also, the need to better equip military forces to enable them to defend the country from new security threats like separatism, terrorism and a whole range of non-traditional ones, has re-emerged and needs to be addressed.

In conclusion, Minister Yusgiantoro stressed that the global and regional security and defence environments continue to change rapidly. For individual states, this entails a regular reassessment of national security strategies and military capabilities. At the same time, multilateral cooperation and coordination of states in the region and beyond is now an important feature of the strategic environment.

ST ENGINEERING DISTINGUISHED DINNER LECTURE
**MANAGING A 21ST CENTURY SECURITY AGENDA:
US FOREIGN POLICY BEYOND IRAQ & AFGHANISTAN**

Ambassador Christopher Hill began by outlining US perception of the world from historic times, its aversion to involvement in foreign wars, its transactional approach to international relations rather than long-term partnerships except for those in the diplomatic community who felt the US must engage with the rest of the world.



Ambassador Christopher Hill

Although the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were a watershed moment, the US still took on a transactional approach to combat 'terrorism with a global reach' and mobilising the military to fight wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite their validity being contentious, the US felt those wars were necessary because of the inherent threats in the two countries. After years of fighting, with varying degrees of success, those wars were winding down and the US would soon be less involved.

When US troops began withdrawing from Iraq in July 2009, the Iraqi Prime Minister had hailed it as a 'great victory for Iraq', meaning that it was time the Iraqi people stood up to take charge of their own security. The US is legally obliged to withdraw all its forces from Iraq by December 2011, though Iraqi commitment to purchase American military equipment demonstrated a positive and potentially long-term relationship between the two countries.

Ambassador Hill said Iraq was well on the path to recovery. Its oilfields were producing around 2.2 million barrels of oil per day. New oil terminals under development will see Iraq surpass Iran's daily oil output. Ambassador Hill pointed out only one US firm was involved in the extraction of oil

in Iraq. That should alleviate cynicism that US interest was motivated by Iraq's oil reserves.

Ambassador Hill, however, expressed less confidence about Afghanistan. Despite years of stabilisation efforts there are still numerous problems and there seems to be no military solutions for them. He noted that the military surge that was successful in Iraq's cities failed in the largely rural geography of Afghanistan. The problems in Iraq stem from the weaknesses in its governance and economy. Despite the difficult situation there, the US is not going to stay in Afghanistan in the long-term. President Barack Obama has announced a troop withdrawal starting from mid-2011, with the eventual exit of all American forces by 2014.

As the US concludes its decade-long involvement in two major conflicts, Ambassador Hill said it has come to a crossroads for US international relations. He noted that the US has historically reduced certain interest in the world as its military forces disengaged from its overseas commitments. This is further compounded by the domestic economic problems in the US, which will lead to a reassessment of American international engagement.

Asking whether the US will be able to remain engaged in the world amid military cutbacks, Ambassador Hill argues that the US has to, particularly with regard to nuclear proliferation. He asserted that the foremost issue that the US has to be fully engaged in is dealing with the nuclear aspirations of some states, such as North Korea, Iran and Pakistan. Iran's nuclear programme is particularly worrisome to the US as it is actively attempting to create a nuclear capability from its research, and the secrecy surrounding Iran's nuclear ambition introduces uncertainty into the environment. Pakistan's nuclear programme continues to be an enduring concern for the US.

Ambassador Hill noted that the US has existing military alliances around the world, but questioned whether its allies are doing what they can to sustain military readiness. For example, he said in the current Libyan conflict NATO

military commanders had reportedly complained about the lack of ammunition. Thus, he feels that the US should be concerned about the ability of its partners to contribute to global security, since it is in a period where it cannot sustain the kind of military expenditures it used to in the past. There will be domestic pressure to reduce military spending, which in turn will affect US military readiness and impact on its ability to provide foreign assistance.

Finally, he noted that the Obama Administration has demonstrated a willingness to work in multilateral frameworks, and it has placed emphasis on enhancing

Sino-American ties. He believes that a good relationship with China will help to solve some of the enduring issues in the Asia-Pacific. But that would require some adjustments in how Beijing and Washington deal with each other. The agendas that have driven US policy in the past will have to evolve to deal with the increasingly complex global security environment. Ambassador Hill believed that with the right policies and willingness to leverage on multilateral approaches to problem-solving, the US will remain engaged with the world as it winds down its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

SESSION 1 NEW DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY



Sir Steve Smith

Sir Steve Smith began by questioning the basis of policy-making and affirming the need for policy decisions to be informed by evidence. Highlighting the need to constantly question one's assumptions about the world, he pointed out that our assumptions about how the world works shape our understanding of its mechanisms. Reflecting on how accurate they are would help increase evidence-based policy decisions rather policy-based evidence.

Smith cited the example of cliques – that form around similar-minded people – as one reason why they are content to live within their knowledge perimeters rather than question it, thereby increasing the difficulty of accepting evidence that proves contrary to their views. He attributes this to the role that theories play in our lives.

Smith argued that in the real world, most practitioners tended to ignore the assumptions and theories that they held about the world. They regard theories as too academic. In his opinion theories were useful. Theories could actually help them, especially the military, to understand international security better. He noted that evidence alone – data and facts – were insufficient to speak for themselves alone. What needed to be changed was the re-evaluation of the types of theories used to understand the issues.

Smith stated that theories were a 'device' that helped us to make sense of the world. They relied on pre-set assumptions, both implicit and explicit, about how the world worked. To a certain extent, theories do not always reflect the reality on the ground. He cited the example of the civil war in Libya and the United Nations' Responsibility to Protect (RTP) clause, which had been adopted by the General Assembly in 2009. When the fighting broke out in Libya early this year, the UN cited the need to help end the violence there and protect the civilians from abuses. Questions regarding the weaknesses of the UN abounded as a result, bringing the focus back onto theories of sovereignty and power, all seeking to explain why this was the case. Smith noted that theories forced one into thinking along pre-dictated lines and boxing one's thought processes into a conformist position.

Smith said that realism was the current dominant theory in the field of international relations. Realism stated that states are the main actors in the international system; preoccupied with self-interest, survival, security and power. Realists assumed that the international system is natively anarchic, and this context in turn, shapes the way states act.

However, there are some criticisms of such an insular stance. Smith offers alternatives to realism in the form of constructivism, human security studies and critical security studies. Firstly, constructivism argues that the foundation of human relations is determined by shared ideas rather than material forces. Once you change the way you think, the world becomes different. Human security studies focuses on the individual rather than the state; preferring to deal with the economic, environmental, food, health, personal, community and social aspects of

security. Critical security studies deals with the security of the individual, assuming that economic and political freedom is of pivotal importance first, before the rest may be achieved.

Smith concluded his talk by cautioning against the danger of attempting to comprehend the existing world order by merely accepting theories unconditionally. Furthermore, he stated that theory still has a long way to go, especially with regard to emerging discourses such as climate change, with people still unable to conceive of environmental concerns, for example, as a threat to security. A key problem is what Smith highlights as the mind needing to seek consistency, not truth. It thus seeks to explain away evidence that may point contrary to the theory in order to reconcile with it. Thus people need to embrace alternative forms of explanations in order to have a better understanding of international security.

SESSION 2

SINO-US RELATIONSHIP: SOURCE OF STABILITY OR INSTABILITY?

Shen Dingli began with an overview of Sino-US relations, which, he said, is characterised by both stability and instability. Among the sources of instability that represent China's core interest are the issues of Taiwan and Tibet. Shen noted that the US' conflicting policies towards Taiwan is a major source of instability. While the US believes in peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue it continues to supply arms to Taiwan on the pretext of protecting the country. This, according to Shen, is a violation of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity because it is China's responsibility, not the US', to protect Taiwan. And since Taiwan represents China's core interests, the future of Sino-US relations will be decided by how well or how badly the US handles the issue.

The continued support extended by the US to the Dalai Lama is another source of tension. US' acceptance of the Dalai Lama, according to Shen, is unacceptable to China because the Dalai Lama is a religious leader and not a political leader and should be treated as such. The continued presence of the US military in the Korean Peninsula and Japan also contributed to instability in Sino-US relations as it hinders China's efforts at peace building in Northeast Asia.



Shen Dingli

Despite these issues, there are potential sources of stability such as economic cooperation. China owes its economic success in no small measure to the US. American investment and the American market have greatly benefitted the Chinese economy. China is now a major driver of global growth and has become a major trading partner with almost of all its neighbours. The continued success of the Chinese economy therefore is a source of stability as it helps other countries to also achieve development. Still, there are huge challenges ahead. China's per capita GDP is still lower than that of Japan and South Korea and is more on par with that of

Algeria and Albania and it is experiencing a widening income inequality. More Sino-US economic cooperation is therefore the surest way to achieve stability.

Sean Lynn-Jones applied the power transition theory on the understanding of Sino-US relationship. This theory states that the probability of conflict between a rising challenger and the dominant state peaks near the point of power transition between them could befall Sino-US relations. He said China's increasing assertiveness over its territorial claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea vindicates the realist arguments. The other source of instability is ideological. As China's legitimacy is not based on democracy, there is a real possibility of the country resorting to nationalism. Its memory of humiliation suffered at the hands of foreign powers centuries ago could further fuel an assertive behaviour.



Sean Lynn-Jones

Despite these tensions, he noted that a competitive Sino-US relationship need not necessarily be destructive but could benefit both countries. Economic interdependence and competitiveness actually benefit both countries as the prospect of a full-blown conflict is greatly reduced. Besides economic interdependence, the possession by both countries of nuclear weapons further diminishes the likelihood of a conflict. This is because a conflict between China and the US could potentially escalate into a nuclear war which is detrimental for both countries. As a way forward, Lynn-Jones suggested that China should refrain from labelling every US action as an effort to encircle the country. The US should also avoid the temptation to force countries to make choices and hedge against China. In order to strengthen trust, China and the US should undertake confidence building measures through military exchanges and high-level strategic dialogues.

L-G VR Raghavan gave an overview of the perspectives of the US and China of each other. The US acknowledged the risks posed by emerging powers like China in various areas and feels the need to respond appropriately should challenges arise. The continued expansion of the Chinese navy in particular is viewed by the US as potentially detrimental to its dominance. The US also sees China as a deeply conflicted rising power with its foreign policy often exhibiting diverse and contradictory emphases. China on the other hand sees the global financial turmoil as an end to US unipolarity and is now preoccupied with how it should position itself in the new era. Of particular concern to China is the continued presence of the US in Asia. Washington's shift of military focus from the Atlantic to the Pacific and the strengthening of military alliances with its Asian allies are seen as a strategic attempt to contain China. Recent announcement by the US that the South China Sea constitutes its national interests further heightens mistrust between the two powers.



Lieutenant-General V. R. Raghavan

India on the other hand perceives the emerging power equations as "strategic ambiguities". As the weakest link in the Sino-US-India triangle, India is wary of being used as a geopolitical leverage against China by the US and is interested in maintaining an independent foreign policy. Raghavan observes that for India to become a source of stability in the Asia-Pacific region, it should continue to prioritise economic development even as it modernises its military capabilities. In doing so, India will become a valuable partner for developing countries in Asia and beyond.

SESSION 3

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

Michael Wesley noted that historically, soldiers and diplomats were the two facets of the state. He observed that the soldier would step in when and if the diplomat failed to achieve some of the state's geopolitical goals. Recently, however, the role of the soldier has significantly expanded, and today soldiers – in many cases – have overtaken the role of diplomats.



Michael Wesley

He remarked that the emergence of pragmatic defence diplomacy in recent years had six rationales: firstly, to build interoperability and capacity among allies; secondly, to build strategic depth in difficult neighbourhoods; thirdly, to gain influence in political systems where the military plays an important role; fourthly, to gain an understanding about the strategic cultures of other states, thus allowing a better understanding of other states; fifthly, to build crisis-proof bilateral relationships and build bilateral networks and understandings, leading to better response to crises; and finally, to support the capacity of other countries to contribute to shared tasks. He opined that pragmatic defence diplomacy has a good track record in this part of the world.

Explaining the development of defence diplomacy, he iterated that by the end of the Cold War it was believed that a new world order was emerging, one which would reconcile the world through interests and beliefs. Thus the role of the military significantly changed to that of peacekeepers and humanitarian assistants, paving the way for the so-called Transformative Defence Diplomacy.

Among its objectives were building trust and relations with former enemies, dispel hostility, and assist the development of democratically accountable armed forces, in addition to developing capacity for humanitarian actions, similar to what transformed a post-Cold War Europe when the West reached out to the former Eastern Bloc countries.

This diplomatic effort was largely facilitated by a number of factors, namely democratic transformation were already taking place in Eastern Europe, a huge pool of experience coming from the European integration processes in Western Europe, and the attraction towards the idea of the European Union. Thus transformative diplomacy succeeded in Europe largely due to factors mentioned, which contrasts with the situation in Asia-Pacific. Unlike in Europe, there are many factors that may pose as obstacles to transformative defence diplomacy in this region. Among them are unresolved Cold War problems, great level of distrust amongst states, rising nationalism in the region, and geopolitical challenges to cooperation.

The speaker also questioned the dilemmas facing the notion of transformative defence diplomacy in the region, such as “soft-balancing” against China as countries in Asia seem to be constructing informal “strategic partnerships,” as a counterbalance to China's economic rise. Issues raised include trust building versus transformation, transparency versus reciprocity, and the “individual mind” factor – whether changing individual minds can really transform the entire military culture.

In conclusion, historical baggage, in addition to a complex strategic terrain faced by Asia-Pacific, indicates an uphill task in moving towards a Transformative Defence Diplomacy.

Focusing on the ADMM and ADMM-Plus, **Tan See Seng**, noted that the two institutions have provided new ways to conduct defence diplomacy in the region. Yet their efficacy is also questioned, reflecting on the haphazard manner in which the security initiatives and institutions are formed in Asia-Pacific.



Tan See Seng

He made five observations on defence diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific: firstly, the military-to-military exchanges do not automatically mirror the state of government-to-government relations; secondly, regional security cooperation in Asia has traditionally been the near-exclusive preserve of the statesman rather than the soldier; thirdly, cooperation occurs largely on a bilateral and low-key basis, being the informal channel between countries; fourthly, bilateral relations notwithstanding, multilateral diplomacy is also gaining fluency as evident with the formations of multilateral defence

institutions; and fifthly, the success of the Shangri-La Dialogue has proven that Asia-Pacific is ready for regular defence ministerial.

Further, Tan asserted that the ADMM's formation constituted one of the final pieces of the organizational puzzle that set ASEAN on course towards becoming a single community. Addressing the apprehension of ASEAN's ill-preparedness to deal with transnational or non-traditional challenges – such as natural and environment disasters – he posited that such events furnished a logical focal point for cooperation. Should ASEAN prove inadequate in their capacity, this is where their dialogue partners (through ADMM+8) play a part.

In conclusion, comparing the ADMM-Plus vis-a-vis other regional arrangements, he argued that each of them serve a different purpose and will therefore be unlikely to compete with each other. Praising ARF for the progress made in the recent Bali meeting, he conceded that potential inter-agency rivalry could, however, hurt rather than help the regional cause in the long run.

SESSION 4 TERRORISM IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA



Bruce Hoffman

Bruce Hoffman said that although the threat of Al Qaida (AQ) has greatly diminished, AQ has expanded its networks, especially in the past three years. In addition to its senior core leadership, AQ networks now exist in Afghanistan,

Pakistan, Iraq, North Africa, Europe, East Asia, East Africa, Sudan, Yemen and the US. Currently AQ affiliates pose more threat than the parent body. In the last three years, major AQ theatres of operation have increased from 7 to 11. Most importantly, AQ has access to more sanctuaries caused by an increase of failing states. Due to the unique circumstance of each AQ branch and "host" nation, the US will have to tailor individual approaches in tackling AQ.

The dismal state of US-Pakistan relations, especially after Osama bin Laden's killing, raises questions on the continuation of counter-terrorism activities. Instability in sub-Saharan Africa and the Libyan civil war has strengthened and invigorated Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Hoffman stressed the need to understand Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), such as Yemen. Its presence there has rapidly transformed into a significant threat though attempts to carry out major attacks. AQAP has been innovative and has experimented with Surgically Implanted Improvised Explosive Devices (SIIEDs).

Recent developments proved that AQ was still an operational entity with an intact command structure. Ayman al Zawahiri's influence within AQ has been grossly underestimated. However, he has turned out to be more competent than imagined.

The fragmentation of jihadi movements has created smaller entities which are using social network tools to plan attacks and cooperate with others. There is a proliferation of lone wolves and individuals who have no contact or training, but are motivated by AQ. These groups could distract and overwhelm law enforcement agencies, allowing serious AQ attempts to sneak through undetected. In South Asia Lashkar-e-Taiba has become more ambitious, seeking to fill the vacuum left by AQ-Core by launching attacks against India.

Concerning the Arab Spring, while its events have not touched AQ strongholds, AQ has benefitted from events in Yemen. AQ would be able to draw the losers of the revolutions, and those frustrated at the lack of progress afterwards, especially the youth, to create new opportunities for terrorism.

The drawdown of US forces in Afghanistan provides opportunities for AQ to regroup. The lull in AQ terrorist activities since 2005 has created a false sense of security which could render future AQ attacks more psychologically potent. Terrorism was constantly evolving, meaning that counter-terrorism measures need to evolve similarly. Decapitation strategies have rarely been successful. The fragmentations of the jihadi movement will likely present new, different and greater challenges. The international community should take terrorism as a permanent fixture of conflict in the 21st century.

Rohan Gunaratna identified three developments which characterise the international terrorism landscape.

Firstly, despite significant investment by the US, Europe and other countries since 9/11, terrorism and its precursor ideological extremism had steadfastly increased. Especially after the US invasion of Iraq, the number and support base of terrorist organizations have significantly increased. The anger and suffering of the population in the Middle East has generated more sympathy and support for terrorist organisations. In parallel with counter-terrorism measures, it is important to address geopolitical challenges that fuel terrorism, and counter extremist propaganda.

The second development was that the capacity to respond to terrorism and insurgency is diminishing especially if compared to the rapid increase of threats. Although AQ-Core is now numerically depleted (from 3000 members around 9/11 to 1000 today), many AQ affiliated and inspired groups have proliferated across various regions. Several groups also emulate the ideology and methodology of AQ.

Thirdly, several groups continue to emulate the ideology and methodology of AQ. For example the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Xinjiang, China, has shifted operations into Afghanistan. Its leader Hassan Makhsun was killed on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border by Pakistani security forces while another ETIM leader Haji Ali was killed a year ago in a US drone strike while meeting AQ leaders.



Rohan Gunaratna

According to Gunaratna, AQ's ideology is for regional terrorist groups to fight local battles and simultaneously global battles, by targeting the US and its European allies. AQ rhetoric has caused the local groups, which traditionally targeted local governments, to attack Western targets. The AQ-Core has become an ideological organization which inspires other groups to emulate it. AQ has shifted from an operational organization into an ideological and training organization, carrying out a few model attacks.

AQ has inspired many groups to do suicide attacks by crafting an attractive narrative of martyrdom. AQ-inspired and associated groups have spread all over South Asia, Middle East, Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The outermost rings, made up of homegrown self-radicalised groups, were also becoming dominant threats. In tackling these evolving threats, there should be a three pronged response.

Firstly, correcting the reality on the ground by addressing legitimate grievances. Secondly, in countering terrorist propaganda, information operations capability is crucial. Thirdly, it is crucial to develop soft power capabilities such as terrorism prevention and terrorist rehabilitation.

Combat capability remains significant, especially intelligence-led tactical counter-terrorism operations. The ability of the military to work with the intelligence community is crucial. In addition to upstream prevention, downstream de-radicalization initiatives through terrorist rehabilitation are also important. The detention facilities should become schools to help educate and counter radicalisation.

In conclusion, Gunaratna said ten years of US-led counter-terrorism strategy has not resulted in the decline in terrorism. Although governments certainly now have more capabilities to respond to terrorism, the threat itself has grown. He urged governments to use the right mixture of strategies to combat terrorism and to use soft power alongside kinetic approaches, for effective and long

lasting countering of terrorism. Addressing perceived or real injustices alongside the abovementioned approaches are crucial in combating terrorism in the next decade.

Greg Fealy, talked on emerging trends of terrorism in Indonesian. Citing the examples of Abubakar Ba'asyir and Pepi Fernando, he focused on the latter who represented a new breed of terrorists. While Ba'asyir was a product of a well-studied path towards radicalization, Fernando was an example of the changing face of extremism.

Unlike Ba'asyir, Fernando grew up in a cosmopolitan atmosphere – he attended a liberal Islamic university and worked for a magazine, and had no involvement with extremist groups. Fernando also lacked political and socio-economic motives for his radicalisation and displayed great naiveté.



Greg Fealy

The past two years have seen major blows against terrorism in Indonesia, with many key persons and better established leaders arrested or killed, leaving most jihadist groups in disarray. The organisational decapitation of the established extremist outfits has caused fragmentation and diffusion in the terror groups - such as debates on where and when to carry out attacks. Fealy assessed that most groups were now incapable - perpetrating small, low-tech and usually unsuccessful terrorist attempts. However, terrorist recruitment and attacks continue to be carried out mainly by small unknown groups which are mentored by a few veterans. The groups have also

changed targets, focusing now on members of the local and national government instead of foreigners or Western targets. There has also been an accelerated absorption of new concepts and methods from Middle Eastern terrorist groups, mainly via the internet.

The Indonesian groups have undergone a dramatic organisational change: old groups were noted to be very hierarchical, militarised and accentuated on religion,

while the new groups, comprising of 3rd and 4th generation terrorists, have become less layered, more secretive, de-emphasised religious knowledge and focused on “near”, that is, Indonesian targets. The groups mainly wish to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia and regarded the secular government and functionaries as legitimate targets. Fealy concluded that there was a dramatic shift in identity of the Indonesian terror groups and that research on why people like Pepi Fernando resorted to terrorism remain insufficient.

SESSION 5

NEW VULNERABILITIES FOR POWER, POLITICS AND SYSTEM IN THE NEW PUBLIC INFORMATION AND MEDIA SPACE

Nik Gowing discussed the changing role of the media in times of international crisis, the increasing democratisation of the media and the increasing challenges that new media posed to those in power as well as to military and security operations. Gowing also addressed the implications of information transparency, the battle of public perceptions, the tensions between new technologies and new security realities and the efforts expended by government and militaries to keep up with the new media technologies.



Nik Gowing

Gowing highlighted the profound changes brought about by the proliferation of media technology. They included cell-phone cameras and video cameras, which are easily obtained by ordinary citizens and pose asymmetric challenge to the traditional media. The collection, processing and distribution of news reports have quickened considerably. Events could be captured instantaneously on a mobile phone camera and immediately transferred to other media for public broadcast. However, as anyone can be a citizen journalist, this might compromise the accuracy of their stories. He cited the example of the Norway massacre in July 2011 with ordinary citizens reporting and capturing pictures faster than the traditional media. They called into question the credibility and efficiency of traditional media as well as the preparedness of the Norway government in handling the massacre.

Gowing discussed the implications of democratisation of the media. Firstly, it has created new vulnerabilities for governments as people have alternative sources of information. Secondly, these forced accountability from

institutions that governments do not have the power to control anymore. Thirdly, this also means that there will be deficit in legitimacy of governments as anyone is now a medium or witness. In this new real time environment, institutions of power - be they the government, security organisations or corporations - can be vulnerable. He cited the Arab Spring Revolution as an example where reports were based on pictures and micro-blogs from ordinary citizens who were eye witnesses and participants in the revolution. This also means there is a gap between the speed at which information is being disseminated and the ability of the institutions of power to respond.

Citing social networking sites and micro-blogging sites like Twitter and Facebook, Gowing said they reinforced the empowerment of ordinary citizens in providing information in the public space. This also meant that the traditional mode of media and institutions no longer hold the moral high ground. Calling these a new reality, Gowing said there are eyes and ears everywhere.

After addressing the vulnerabilities posed by the new public information and media space, Gowing addressed the question of mitigation. He asserted that sometimes instantaneous information comes with flawed

information. The call is for institutions like government or security organisations to think carefully how to use the information to provide greater clarity. Going public to apologise on issues where institutional powers are mishandled can be an option when faced with such vulnerabilities. In this way, the public may be able to comprehend the dilemma the institutions faced. Therefore, engaging the public rather than maintaining elegant silence is the way forward to face such vulnerabilities.

In sum, the media and government officials have their work cut out for them - they have to determine the accuracy of the information that is broadcasted and received. In the race of providing information in the public space, accurate media reports are extremely vital. While established and respected television channels and newspapers have their internal vetting system, media channels eager to broadcast the latest news to enhance their ratings might gloss over inaccuracies and transmit false information. Inaccurate media reports could undermine social stability and affect government decision-making adversely. Most importantly, the media and the government need to face this new reality with preparedness, agility and a cautious strategy.





SESSION 6

POST-CONFLICT STABILISATION OPERATIONS

Stephen Biddle focused on the new American counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, to illuminate lessons on post-conflict stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The new strategy revolves around two main assumptions. First, there is a powerful alignment of interests between the host government and foreign forces. Second, COIN campaigns are a form of violent contest between the government and insurgents for political allegiance of the general populace. Three pillars constitute the new strategy: security, governance reform and economic development.



Stephen Biddle

Instead of traditionally offensive use of foreign troops, the new strategy emphasised the role of indigenous forces which are more suited for COIN operations due to their local cultural knowledge. Instead of centralization, it also called for decentralization of military forces in localised outposts throughout the host country to bolster popular confidence in the authorities. Governance reform and economic development give the populace direct stake in the country's governance. The objective is to win the political allegiance of a 'sitting on the fence' populace. However, the new strategy suffers from some flawed assumptions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The new strategy drew lessons from past experience in Malaya and Vietnam, in which COIN campaigns were regarded as wars of ideology. In the case of Iraq, however, it was an identity war instead, wherein ethnicity constituted the major fault line. Wrestling for political allegiance by dangling economic incentives could fuel

inter-sectarian rivalry. The decline of inter-sectarian violence from 2006 to 2007, Biddle argued, was an example. A confluence of sectarian factors, such as the Sunni defeat by the Shiite militia and Al-Qaeda atrocities, compelled the Sunnis to rethink their strategy of expelling foreign troops who they realised were crucial for restraining the Shiites and guaranteeing Sunni security. This led to a Sunni-Shiite ceasefire and gradual marginalization of the Al-Qaeda.

While the Iraqi COIN campaign was an identity war, Biddle highlighted, in Afghanistan's case it is an ideological war. The Afghan political system is radically decentralised wherein the central authorities draw their power from the local power brokers, many of whom desire continued foreign troop presence and influx of foreign reconstruction funds, to serve their self-interests. The Afghan commoners associate the excesses of the 'corruptocrats' with the foreign forces, thus compelling them to turn to the Taliban who are perceived to be honest at least. As a result, the Afghan COIN campaign is fraught with difficulties. The lesson learnt is that interests between the host government and the foreign forces are not necessarily aligned as assumed by the new strategy.

Biddle concluded that lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan illuminated the need to contextually adapt the new COIN strategy for country-specific circumstances. The subsequent discussion focused on Afghanistan. It was suggested that political reconciliation, rather than reintegration, might be the way forward. Biddle pointed out that a political settlement might eventually be reached between Kabul and the Taliban, with concessions such as participation in the new government being offered to the latter. A reinvigorated approach to bolster governance reform in Afghanistan is needed to attain such an outcome.

However, Biddle cautioned that governance reform may not totally eradicate bureaucratic malpractices, and a careful study is needed in this regard in order to prioritise actions. One malpractice which needs to be urgently addressed, he felt, is the non-judicial confiscation of

Afghan peasants' land by the local authorities for self-serving purposes. Finally, foreign troops' involvement in governance reform is thought to be unrealistic. Biddle pointed out that, in the case of the United States, military

units have to perform such roles since only they, not the civilian agencies as desired, are able to obtain Congress approval for reconstruction funding.

SESSION 7 CENTRES OF POWER AND INFLUENCE IN THE EVOLVING REGIONAL ORDER

Ambassador Kazuhiko Togo began the panel session by presenting a view from Japan. He said the two most pressing geopolitical issues were the rise of China and the dominance of the US. However, the problem from a Japanese perspective was "Where is Japan?" in this context. Japan's foreign policy position was not clear, and seemed to have drifted during the post-Cold War period. Until 1989, Japan had a clear direction in its foreign policy. Having achieved its goals, Japan had failed to set new objectives since the onset of the post-Cold War period. The recent tsunami disaster potentially provided a new occasion to overcome the drift and set a new direction for Japan and respond to changes in the region.



Ambassador Kazuhiko Togo

Togo flagged seven important issues. The first was in defense and security, where Japan had released a National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) in December 2010 that would increase its flexibility and ability to cope with contemporary security challenges. Pacifism had hurt Japan and had led to occasions where it had been "irresponsibly" pacifist in avoiding situations where it should have intervened because it was forbidden under Japanese law.

The second point was that it was important to maintain a stable relationship with the US. Relations have strained recently due to the relocation of the Futenma base in Okinawa despite a reasonably stable relationship over the last 25 years. Both countries have to work together to ensure this issue is amicably resolved and preclude further strain on the bilateral relationship.

Thirdly on China, Japan had taken a position of not isolating China after Tiananmen Square and this had been appreciated by Beijing, especially after the Emperor's visit in 1992. However, rifts had emerged over their clashing stances about World War II, and high-level talks had become impossible in these conditions. Re-opening dialogue between these two countries was essential.

On the fourth point Togo observed that Japan's territorial issues with Russia, South Korea and China were also important. He proposed three principles in addressing these territorial disputes: firstly, countries seeking a change of status quo should refrain from using physical force (including fishing) in contested areas; secondly, countries in a position of actual command should be prepared to talk; and thirdly, they should learn the lessons from diplomatic efforts that were successful.

On the fifth point Togo noted that Japan's World War II legacy had been questioned by both the Left and the Right camps in its political system. The Murayama statement of 1995 was the clearest statement of remorse and negotiations should continue to focus around this statement to recognise and resolve issues related to Japan's World War II legacy.

Togo's final two points were that regional cooperation should be strengthened, and that Japan should revive its foreign aid policy, where it had been the leader in the 1990s.

Kanti Bajpai opened by noting that like Japan, India seemed to have disappeared but was gradually re-emerging. Rapid growth had allowed it to play a greater role, but critics had accused its foreign policy of being like a "bumbling elephant". Bajpai however disagreed and sought to explain how India had done relatively well given its difficult neighbourhood.



Kanti Bajpai

The rise of China had become a concern and this was leading India to contest China's increasing influence in Africa, Latin America and Europe. It has also developed a tacit alliance with the US. The strategy was similar to Deng Xiaoping's vision to not alarm other powers but focus on the consolidation of its economy. This approach allows India to progress from a position of strength.

Regionally, relations with smaller South Asian countries had been difficult because of structural problems. India was the biggest country in the region and this had in the past led to some misgivings. However, its diplomacy can be described increasingly as being sensible. Previously, India had kept other great powers out of South Asia and had treaties with smaller countries that constrained them. These had been loosened in recent years and it had not intervened when other powers started to venture into the region. Bajpai noted India had played a major role in the integration of South Asia. All countries in South Asia were democratic today and this, Bajpai argued, was influenced by India's democracy.

Pakistan is a difficult country with a larger nuclear arsenal than India and plagued by terrorism within its borders. Despite Pakistan's recent provocations India has shown restraint. With China, India had a robust programme of engagement that includes border talks, summit meetings, military exercises, a strategic dialogue and growing trade. India is taking its expanding power seriously, entering special trade agreements and providing aid outside the sub-continent. With the US, it had a tacit alliance and there was no strategic divide on major issues, instead both hold many common interests such as regional stability, an open economy, and a commitment stronger engagement. In Africa and Latin America, India was involved particularly in the minerals and energy sectors, but this was largely private sector driven, unlike China's state-led investments.

In conclusion, India was returning to the global stage having pacified its neighbourhood. It has a more mature and patient attitude towards Pakistan, stable diplomatic engagement with China, and a tacit alliance with the US. These three factors have contributed to a stable order in the region.

Oleg Barabanov said that Russia had been engaged in official dialogue with ASEAN for 15 years, especially beginning during the period of Russia's serious economic decline. It too had disappeared from many world issues after the Cold War, but was content to be "seated, listened and loved," a description Ambassador Christopher Hill had used previously. Russia's position was minimal and passive, but keen to contribute.



Oleg Barabanov

Russia's participation followed a "multi-format" and multi-institution approach, particularly in the ASEAN-centred formats such as the East Asian Summit and APEC. Moscow formally proposed its economic agenda at such summits, but two areas in particular were significant - food security and transport infrastructure.

The transport infrastructure in the Siberian and far eastern parts of Russia would open its connections with the Asia-Pacific. Currently most trade was with the EU, but Russia was seeking a transport corridor between Asia and Europe. These would be through the use of the pan-Russian railway system and the Arctic maritime route.

The railroad from Vladivostok to European Russia needed international cooperation to succeed, especially with China. It had special agreements with China to build new bridges and transport goods from Pacific ports to Europe. Russia was also building pipelines that would open the region to Asian markets, as well as reaching an agreement on a homogenous customs union with former Soviet states.

On multi-format diplomacy, it was important that the inclusion of South Africa into the BRICS had created a globally-represented forum. These countries are in the second tier of rapidly-developing countries, and would provide a more equal and inclusive approach to world affairs.

Finally, Barabanov touched on Putin's "sovereign democracy" concept, relating to Russian disappointment with excessive pressure on Russian domestic politics by the West. Russia had fully cooperated with the West after 9/11, and had allowed US bases in Central Asia as well as the enlargement of NATO. However, Moscow was disappointed with the campaign on human rights issues because they felt that there were no universal or global values and countries should determine these according to their culture and civilization. Value-based policies were not neutral, and "sovereign democracy" was an answer to the unequal approach to all countries.

SESSION 8

ENERGY SECURITY IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION: THE RISING SECURITY CHALLENGES IN A MULTI-POLAR INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Hooman Peimani began by proposing a definition of energy security as the uninterrupted availability of energy in a form (or forms) appropriate for a given country to ensure the normal operation of its industries, agriculture, infrastructure and military. As energy security is a concern for all countries it will continue to shape the foreign policy of many countries.

Peimani set out the five factors affecting energy security as follow: adequate mix in the type of energy resources for countries that are high consumers of energy; in economic terms, the need to ensure that energy sources are affordable and sustainable over a long period; in environmental terms, the limitless consumption of fossil fuel resulted in the scarcity of energy resources that impacted the environment negatively; in political terms, there must be political stability in energy producing countries as well as consuming countries to ensure

adequate energy supply and demand; and in security terms, to ensure the security of supplying countries, supply routes and means of transportation to ensure uninterrupted supplies.

Addressing the emergence of a multi-polar international system, Peimani was of the view that the reconfiguration of the international system has seen the rise of regional powers, the weakening of traditional powers controlling energy resources and the weakening of international institutions such as the United Nations. A consequence of this reconfiguration is the rise of Asia, currently the largest consumer and producer of energy, which could be traced to the economic strength of Asia as an industrialised continent. Some Asian economies such as China and the ASEAN countries possessed strong investment capabilities making these countries politically influential. Peimani identified China and India as regional powers,

which have the potential to emerge as superpowers while countries like Iran and South Korea are playing key roles as regional powers.



Hooman Peimani

Peimani opined that the disparity between Asia's production and consumption of fossil fuel has created a pattern of regional dependency. For instance while Asia produced only 10% of world's oil supply in 2009, the region consumed 31% of oil produced in the same year. Asia's dependence on fossil fuel from Africa and the Persian Gulf have shaped Asia's foreign and defence policies towards these countries, while the Asian region

is becoming more important for West Asian and African countries as consumers of fossil energy.

Turning to challenges for energy security in Asia, Peimani said the first factor is concern about political developments in the oil producing regions. Central to this concern is the availability of Arab oil and gas supplies because of political instability caused by the Arab Spring and the fear that unrest will spread to the Persian Gulf states. The second factor is the growing cost of oil and gas while the final factor is the environment. Peimani predicted that a major consequence of the pursuit for energy security will be the growing competition between the major Asian energy consumers and importers and Western powers over access to the fossil energy-rich regions which will affect their conduct of foreign and defence policies towards Western powers. Growing competition between and among the Asian major powers is also likely to damage bilateral and multilateral ties between these countries. Peimani was also of the view that there will be an expansion of the Asian nuclear power sector and production of bio-fuels to decrease the region's heavy reliance on fossil energy to mitigate global warming.

SESSION 9 CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

M-G Michael G. Smith highlighted the need for multi-level cooperation and appreciation concerning the role of every actor among civilian and military factions (civil-military) in their effort towards disaster risk reduction (DRR). He also noted that the Asia-Pacific is the most disaster-prone region in the world. In order to accomplish a healthy spectrum of civil-military relations in the Asia-Pacific region, he suggested the following elements: a mutual understanding of goals desired from civil-military effectiveness; respect for various tiers of responsibility upon identifying strategy to enhance civil-military effectiveness; and knowledge concerning the nature of conflicts and disasters in the region.



Major-General Michael G. Smith

Some of the difficulties in attaining fluid civil-military relations in Asian Pacific states were the following: the lack of a national/regional or even global architecture; different tribal cultures; lack of civil-military guidelines; the need for civil-military doctrine and training; and the inevitable result of chaos from conflict and disasters. These dilemmas are prominent during engagements where civilian counterparts often do not comprehend military terminology, such as CIMIC which is the military abbreviation for a commander who engages civilian organizations. Furthermore, the lack of a distinct perspective of response among the many civilian agencies versus the constricted military response to most issues presents a controversy in itself.

Smith described the United Nations as the best model for disaster management. The under-utilization of the UN and scarce funds for the Asia-Pacific have hindered the resolution of many conflicts the region faces. He offered principles that could underpin the region's endeavor towards healthy and effective civil-military relations and diminish risk in respective regions. These included identifying civil-military capacity, and enhancing decision making and preparedness towards regional solutions.

Leonard Sebastian spoke on civilian control and military transformation, and lessons that can be learned from Southeast Asia. He noted that although military organizations in Southeast Asia have always played a key role in maintaining order and security, the literature on civil-military relations remains under-developed. Its primary focus has been the institutionalization of civilian control of the military as the necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy.



Leonard Sebastian

Sebastian then provided an analysis on civil-military relations in Southeast Asia. In this region, problems persist because largely three main problems: there is little done to deepen civilian expertise (such as in Indonesia); there is domination of the military over domestic security apparatus (such as in Thailand); and there is no major reform to increase civilian control in internal security operations (such as in Philippines). With regard to the redefinition of the political roles, Sebastian stated that this process is still primarily dominated by the military. According to him, this highlights the very critical point of acute lack of civilian specialists in defence affairs.

Sebastian noted that while there was an abundant literature on democratic consolidation and security sector reform, it was silent on how to go about building civilian expertise in defence matters. There is therefore a need for both military personnel and civilians to develop a high order of required expertise through a continuous process of education, training and operational experiences.

In this regard, Sebastian stressed the urgent need in promoting strategic effectiveness and innovation. Innovations should aim, over time, at downgrading the military's traditional missions including its involvement in the political realm. Without moving to the military transformation stage, military reform would remain stillborn. The defence forces will be unable to acquire a high degree of effectiveness and will continue to remain entrenched in areas beyond their military expertise.

Building on the above analysis, Sebastian further argued that military professionalism should not be based primarily on the ability of civilian elites to exercise effective control over the military, but more critically on the government's ability to transform the military establishment, keeping pace with strategic challenges and operational requirements.

Sebastian concluded with three observations. First, the rebuilding of a professional military organization, under conditions of democratic transitions, demands a sequenced process of civil military reform and military transformation. Second, significant backsliding can occur in the aftermath of a democratic transition, primarily

because legal and institutional improvements in the aftermath of the democratic transition are not matched with a move to the next stage of military reform. Finally, the best model, he argued, would be a hybrid of civil-military relations, allowing civilian leaders the option of a wide range of policy choices. This however can only happen if there is a significant body of civilian expertise in defence matters to develop sound competency in Defence Studies.

James Dorsey addressed the variety of civil-military relations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), to which the Arab Spring has drawn attention. His fundamental point was that Arab rulers in essence do not trust their armed forces. This fact has resulted in Arab monarchs shoving military forces aside one way or another in order to protect their regimes. To understand how Arab regimes have dealt with the distrust of its forces, Dorsey articulated six different models that have taken place in the MENA region that need separate consideration. The categories were divided into: (1) Tunisia; (2) Egypt; (3) Syria, Yemen and Libya; (4) Bahrain, (5) Iran and Saudi Arabia, and (6) UAE.

Tunisia's model was a unique exception due to the military's over-pronounced un-involvement in politics and economics. Thus, when the revolution began, the armed forces were not willing to respond aggressively because they had no interest in the outcome that followed. In contrast, the president of Egypt dealt with his mistrust of the military by offering it control over the country's rich economic enterprise and bilateral relations with the US. The Egyptian military had everything to gain from the uprising; hence it seeks to maintain supremacy amid current public disfavor. The third model emphasised "key units" with familial vested interest by the military in preserving the ruling system. This arrangement

possessed both strengths and vulnerabilities. On the one hand, the regime was well-protected. However when mistakes were made, as happened in the bombardment of Yemen's defecting unit, full protection for the regime was lost. In the fourth model, Dorsey claimed that Bahrain's demographics contribute towards the military's willingness to use extreme force on "non-nationals". An alternative model, the revolutionary and national guards of Iran and Saudi Arabia respectively were formed because the regime did not trust their military. Despite these parallel forces, the distrust of the military continues today. The last model, a phenomenon of today, comprised MENA rulers that hire a military force from external countries. The prince of UAE, for example, created a force comprising of Blackwater members, Columbians, Africans and others. This mercenary force then becomes available for domestic and regional conflict.



James Dorsey

Dorsey summed up that the MENA region was 'heading towards volatility, instability, and uncertainty'. He said with the exception of Tunisia, interests in the existing systems will cause participants to do what it takes to fight for it or against it. Dorsey predicted that the outcome from this will be widespread bloodshed.

13TH ASIA PACIFIC PROGRAMME FOR SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS (APPSMO) CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

Day 1 Thursday, 4 Aug

0900 – 0905	Welcome Remarks: Ambassador Barry Desker Dean, RSIS, & Director, IDSS
0905 – 0950	Keynote Address: Dr. Ng Eng Hen, Minister for Defence, Singapore
1020 – 1045	Group Photo - taking
1045 – 1200	Session I <i>New Dimensions in International Security</i> Speaker: Sir Steve Smith (Exeter) Chairperson: Alan Chong (RSIS)
1200 – 1330	Lunch
1330 – 1600	Session 2 <i>Sino-US Relationship: Source of Stability or Instability</i> Speakers: Shen Dingli (Fudan) Sean Lynn-Jones (Harvard) V. R. Raghavan (Delhi Policy Group) Chairperson: Khong Yuen Foong (Oxford)
1930	Dinner at Shangri-La's Rasa Sentosa Resort Guest of Honour: Mr. S. R. Nathan, President of the Republic of Singapore

Day 2 Friday, 5 Aug

0830 - 0930	Introduction by Participants
0930 - 1100	Session 3 <i>Defence Diplomacy</i> Speakers: Michael Wesley (Lowy Institute for International Policy) Tan See Seng (RSIS) Chairperson: Ralf Emmers (RSIS)
1100 - 1200	Syndicate Discussion
1200 - 1330	Lunch
1430	Visit to Changi Naval Base
1800	Free & Easy

Day 3 Saturday, 6 Aug

0830 – 0930	Introduction by Participants
0930 – 1200	Session 4 <i>Terrorism in South and Southeast Asia</i> Speakers: Bruce Hoffman (Georgetown) Rohan Gunaratna (RSIS) Greg Fealy (ANU) Chairperson: Ahmed Hashim (RSIS)
1200 – 1400	Distinguished Lunch Talk Title: <i>“Indonesia’s Defence Outlook: Prospects and Challenges”</i> Speaker: Professor. Ir. Purnomo Yusgiantoro, Minister of Defence, Republic of Indonesia
1500	Tour of Singapore
1830	Dinner

Day 4 Sunday, 7 Aug

0830 – 0930	Introduction by Participants
0930 – 1100	Session 5 <i>New Vulnerabilities for Power, Politics and Systems in the new Public Information and Media Space</i> Speakers: Nik Gowing (BBC) Chairperson: Kwa Chong Guan (RSIS)
1100 – 1200	Syndicate Discussion
1200 – 1400	Lunch
1400 – 1530	Session 6 <i>Post-Conflict Stabilization Operations</i> Speakers: Stephen Biddle (CFR) Chairperson: Bernard Loo
1800	ST Engineering Distinguished Dinner Lecture Title: <i>“Managing a 21st Century Security Agenda: US Foreign Policy Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan”</i> Speaker: Ambassador Christopher Hill, Dean, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver

Day 5 Monday, 8 Aug

0830 – 0930	Introduction by Participants
0930 – 1200	Session 7 <i>Centres of Power and Influence in the Evolving Regional Order</i> Speakers: Kazuhiko Togo (Kyoto Sangyo University) Kanti Bajpai (LKY School) Oleg Barabanov (MGIMO University) Chairperson: Tan See Seng (RSIS)
1200 – 1330	Lunch
1430	Visit to SAFTI Military Institute
1800	Dinner & Night Safari Tour

Day 6 Tuesday, 9 Aug

0830 – 0930	Introduction by Participants
0930 – 1045	Session 8 <i>Energy Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: The Rising Security Challenges in the Multipolar International System</i> Speakers: Hooman Peimani (Energy Studies Institute) Chairperson: Tan Seng Chye (RSIS)
1045 - 1145	Syndicate Discussion
1200 - 1400	Lunch
1630	National Day Parade Venue: Marina Bay

Day 7 Wednesday, 10 Aug

0830 – 0930	Introduction by Participants
0930 – 1200	Session 9 <i>Civil-Military Relations</i> Speakers: Michael G. Smith (Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence) Leonard Sebastian (RSIS) James Dorsey (RSIS) Chairperson: Richard Bitzinger
1200 – 1400	Presentation of Certificates followed by Farewell Lunch
1400	Departures

SPEAKERS, PARTICIPANTS & CHAIRPERSONS

Speakers and Chairpersons

1. **Dr Ng Eng Hen**
Minister for Defence
Gombak Drive off Upper Bukit Timah Road
MINDEF Building
Singapore 669645
2. **Ambassador Barry Desker**
Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
Nanyang Technological University
E-mail: isbdesker@ntu.edu.sg
3. **Professor Kanti Bajpai**
Visiting Professor
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
National University of Singapore
Email: sppkpb@nus.edu.sg
4. **Professor Oleg Barabanov**
Head of Department
European Studies Institute
MGIMO University of International Relations
Russia
Email: drolegbarabanov@gmail.com
5. **Dr Stephen Biddle**
Roger Hertog Senior Fellow
Defense Policy
Council on Foreign Relations
Email: sbiddle@cfr.org
6. **Professor Shen Dingli**
Executive Dean, Institute of International Studies
Director, Center for American Studies
China
Email: shendingli@yahoo.com
7. **Mr James Dorsey**
Senior Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Email: jmdorsey@questfze.com
8. **Associate Professor Gregory Fealy**
Associate Professor and Senior Fellow
College of Asia and the Pacific
The Australia National University
Australia
Email: greg.fealy@anu.edu.au
9. **Mr Nik Gowing**
Presenter, BBC World
British Broadcasting Corporation
United Kingdom
Email: 100523ng@googlemail.com
10. **Professor Rohan Gunaratna**
Head, International Center for Political Violence and
Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Nanyang Technological University
Email: isrkgunaratna@ntu.edu.sg
11. **Ambassador Christopher Hill**
Dean, Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver
United States of America
Email: louise.mendez@du.edu
12. **Professor Bruce Hoffman**
Director of Center for Peace and Security Studies
Director of Security Studies Program
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University
United States of America
Email: brh6@georgetown.edu
13. **Mr Sean Lynn-Jones**
Editor, International Security Program
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Harvard University
United Kingdom
Email: sean_lynn-jones@Harvard.Edu
14. **Professor. Ir. Purnomo Yusgiantoro**
Minister of Defence
Republic of Indonesia

15. Dr Hooman Peimani

Principal Fellow and Head
Energy Security Division
Energy Studies Institute
National University of Singapore
Email: esihp@nus.edu.sg

16. Lieutenant General (Retd) V R Raghavan

Director, Delhi Policy Group
President, Centre for Security Analysis
India
Email: office@delhipolicygroup.com

17. Dr Leonard Sebastian

Associate Professor
Head, Undergraduate Studies
Coordinator of the Indonesia Programme
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Nanyang Technological University
Email: ISLCSebastian@ntu.edu.sg

18. Major General (Retd) Michael Smith

Executive Director
Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence
Australia
Email: christine.holroyd@civmilcoe.gov.au

19. Professor Sir Steve Smith

Vice-Chancellor and Chief Executive
University of Exeter
United Kingdom
Email: Steve.Smith@exeter.ac.uk

20. Dr Tan See Seng

Associate Professor
Deputy Director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
Head, Centre for Multilateralism Studies
Coordinator, Multilateralism and Regionalism Programme
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Nanyang Technological University
Email: ISSSTan@ntu.edu.sg

21. Ambassador Kazuhiko Togo

Professor and Director of the Institute for World Affairs
Kyoto Sangyo University
Japan
Email: kazutogo@tkk.att.ne.jp

22. Dr Michael Wesley

Executive Director
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Australia
Email: MShaw@lowyinstitute.org

23. Dr Ahmed Salah Hashim

Associate Professor
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Nanyang Technological University
Email: isashashim@ntu.edu.sg

24. Mr Richard A. Bitzinger

Senior Fellow
Military Transformations Program
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Nanyang Technological University
Email: isrbitzinger@ntu.edu.sg

25. Dr Alan Chong

Associate Professor
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Nanyang Technological University
Email: iscschong@ntu.edu.sg

26. Dr Ralf Emmers

Associate Professor
Acting Head of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Nanyang Technological University
Email: ISREmmers@ntu.edu.sg

27. Professor Khong Yuen Foong

Professor of International Relations, Oxford University
Senior Research Adviser
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Nanyang Technological University
Email: ISYFKhong@ntu.edu.sg

28. Mr Kwa Chong Guan

Head, External Programmes
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Nanyang Technological University
Email: IScgkwa@ntu.edu.sg

29. Dr Joseph Liow

Associate Dean
Associate Professor
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Nanyang Technological University
Email: iscyliow@ntu.edu.sg

30. Dr Bernard Loo

Associate Professor
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Nanyang Technological University
Email: ISFWLoo@ntu.edu.sg

31. Mr Tan Seng Chye

Senior Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Nanyang Technological University
Email: issctan@ntu.edu.sg

Participants

32. Captain Andrew Dakin

Captain, Royal Australian Navy
Director of Coordination, HQJOC
Australia
Email: andrew.dakin@defence.gov.au

33. Group Captain Michael Gray

Director Combat Capability - AF
Australia

34. Brigadier General Md Abdur Razzaque

Commander 98 Composite Brigade
Bangladesh Army
Email: raz2660@yahoo.com

35. Captain Mohammed Mahbubul Islam

Director of Naval Plans Naval Headquarters
Bangladesh Navy
Email: ltcdmahbub@yahoo.com

36. Lieutenant Colonel Haji Abidin Haji Abd Hamid

SO1 Inspectorate, RBAF Inspectorate Office
Brunei Darussalam
Email: bidinyati@yahoo.com

37. Colonel Chy Tileng

Colonel
Cambodia
Email: chytileng@yahoo.com

38. Lieutenant Colonel Dul Sokun

Lieutenant Colonel
Cambodia
Email: sokundul@gmail.com

39. Captain Mike McGrath

Canadian Defence Attaché, China
Canada
Email: Mike.McGrath@international.gc.ca

40. Captain Bruce Walker

Canadian Defence Attaché, Japan
Canada
Email: bruce.WALKER@international.gc.ca

41. Major General Zhu Chenghu

Professor, National Defence
University of China
China
Email: chenghuzhu@vip.sina.com

42. Senior Colonel Zhao Bao

Head of Multilateral Cooperation
General Planning Bureau
Foreign Affairs Office
China
Email: zhaobao19@hotmail.com

43. Colonel Yves Rols

Colonel (Army)
Joint Defence Staff/International Del
SE Asia & Pacific
France
Email: yves.f.rols@hotmail.fr

44. **Colonel (GS) Franz J. Berger**
Head International Cooperation Dept Mt. MOD
Germany
Email: franz5berger@bundeswehr.org
45. **Colonel Ravi Patil**
Colonel General Staff
India
Email: colravipatil@gmail.com
46. **Group Captain Manohar Mahabala Rao**
Directing Staff
Defence Service Staff College
India
Email: didc@iaf.nic.in
47. **Colonel Bambang Eko Suhariyanto**
Chief of Legal Advice of Legal Bureau
Indonesia
Email: dfam87@yahoo.com
48. **Colonel Sigit Priyono**
Head of Sub Director for Policy and Strategy
Indonesia
Email: sigitpriyono@yahoo.com
49. **Captain Tamotsu Matsumoto**
Vice Chief of Plans and Programs Section
Maritime Staff Office
Japan
Email: mso-dppr@inet.msdf.mod.go.jp
50. **Colonel Hiroki Kobayashi**
Chief, Logistics Plans & Operations Section
Logistics Management Division, Logistics
Department, GSO
Japan
Email: hiromototakaakiko@softbank.ne.jp
51. **Major Viengxay Soulivong**
Deputy Chief of Research and Summary Division
Laos
Email: Viengxslv10@gmail.com
52. **Lieutenant Colonel Patthana Bouttichak**
Chief of Research and Summary Division
Laos
Email: patthanab@yahoo.com
53. **Dato Pahlawan Syed Zahiruddin Putra**
First Admiral, Commandant, Malaysian Armed
Forces Defence College
Malaysia
Email: syedzahirputra@yahoo.com
54. **Colonel Mohd Tahir Basiron**
Director, Strategic Planning
Defence Planning Division
Malaysia Armed Forces Headquarters
Malaysia
Email: mohdtahirbasiron@yahoo.com
55. **Colonel Vasco Vicente Magumane Gune**
Colonel
Mozambique
Email: lamush2003@yahoo.com.br
56. **Colonel San Win**
Senior Instructor
National Defence College
Myanmar
Email: win.san94@gmail.com
57. **Colonel Hla Than Maung**
Senior Instructor
National Defence College
Myanmar
58. **Commander Karl Woodhead**
Commanding Officer NZ Defence Support Unit (SEA)
New Zealand
Email: karl.woodhead@nzdf.mil.nz
59. **Group Captain Aziz ur Rehman**
DY Director Plans (Air) Joint Staff Headquarters
Pakistan
Email: azizpinky@yahoo.com

60. Colonel Khush Muhammad Khan

Deputy Director Libraries
Pakistan
Email: ndulibrary@ndu.edu.pk

61. Captain Alois Ur Tom

Captain (Navy)
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of
Papua New Guinea Defence Force
Papua New Guinea
Email: c.of.staff@defence.gov.pg

62. Colonel Herminigildo Aquino

Assistant Chief
Office of Strategic & Special Studies
Armed Forces
Philippines
Email: herryboyaquino@yahoo.com

63. Colonel Jaime Fernando Hidalgo

Chief, Strategy & Policy Division, OJ5
Philippines
Email: jimhidaly087@yahoo.com

64. Lieutenant Colonel Ang Chee Wee

Branch Head
Policy Office, Ministry of Defence Singapore
Singapore Armed Forces
Email: cheewang@alum.mit.edu

65. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Cheak

Senior Force Transformation Officer
Joint Plans and Transformation Department
Singapore Armed Forces
Email: cheak_seck_fai@starnet.gov.sg

66. Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Chin

G3 3 Division
Singapore Armed Forces
Email: kevinchin.sw@gmail.com

67. Colonel Foo Khee Loon

Chief Signal Officer
Singapore Armed Forces
Email: fkheeloo@starnet.gov.sg

68. Lieutenant Colonel Foong Kok Pun

Deputy Commander of OCS
CO of MIDSHIPMAN Wing
Singapore Armed Forces
Email: kokpunfoong@hotmail.com

69. Lieutenant Colonel Ho Jee Kien

Senior Project Officer
Singapore Armed Forces
Email: wynho@singnet.com.sg

70. Lieutenant Colonel James Liew

G4/Head of Logistics
Singapore Armed Forces
Email: liewys@starnet.gov.sg

71. Senior Lieutenant Colonel Lim Wei Lian

Branch Head
Headquarters Singapore Artillery
Singapore Armed Forces
Email: weilian@singapore.com

72. Lieutenant Colonel Mark Lim

Branch Head
Joint Operations Department
Singapore Armed Forces
Email: limyx@yahoo.com

73. Colonel Roland Ng

Deputy Director
Policy Office
Singapore Armed Forces
Email: NG_Kian_Huat_Roland@starnet.gov.sg

74. Military Expert 6 Jeffrey Sim

Head Logistics Planning Branch
Air Logistics Department
Singapore Armed Forces
Email: jsvm@pacific.net.sg

75. Military Expert 7 Gregory Tan

Special Projects Officer
Joint Intelligence Directorate
Singapore Armed Forces
Email: gregt@starnet.gov.sg

76. Senior Lieutenant Colonel Tan Leong Boon

Branch Head
General Staff (Operations)
Singapore Armed Forces
Email: tan_leong_boon@starnet.gov.sg

77. Lieutenant Colonel Yeo Soo Bin

Head Integrated Knowledge Command and
Control Architecture and Governance Office
Joint Communications and Information
Systems Department
Singapore Armed Forces
Email: yeosoobin@gmail.com

78. Commander Lee SeungJu

Commander (Navy) & US Policy Analysis South
South Korea
Email: leeprross@hanmail.net

79. Lieutenant Colonel Yoon Taegmyeong

Lieutenant Colonel (Airforce) & Security/Policy Officer
South Korea
Email: donghaeking@gmail.com

80. Colonel Kaluhath Wasantha Rathnayake De Abrew

Brigade Commander 553 Brigade
Army
Sri Lanka
Email: abrewwas@gmail.com

81. Captain Lennart Bengtsson

Swedish Defence Attache
Sweden
Email: lennart.bengtsson@mil.se

82. Colonel Apichart Ounon

Director, Strategy Development Division, Office of
Policy and Strategy, Office of Policy and Planning,
Ministry of Defence
Thailand
Email: ounon19@yahoo.com

83. Colonel Kanobsri Gesorn

Deputy Director, ASEAN Affairs Division
Office of Policy and Strategy
Office of Policy and Planning
Thailand
Email: kanobsri@hotmail.com

84. Commander Paul Tebbet

Commander Royal Navy
Commanding Officer Naval Party 1022
Royal Naval Liaison Officer/Assistant British
Defence Adviser
United Kingdom
Email: rnlo1@singnet.com.sg

85. Colonel Philip Thorpe

Defence Attaché Indonesia
Non-Residential Accreditation to Timor Leste
United Kingdom
Email: philip.thorpe@fco.gov.uk

86. Colonel Kevin Hendrick

Chief
Southeast Asia Policy Division (USPACOM J52)
United States of America
Email: john.k.hendrick@pacom.mil

87. Mr Norman Messinger

Chief of Staff, Strategic Planning & Policy
Directorate (USPACOM J5)
United States of America
Email: norman.messinger@pacom.mil

88. Senior Colonel Hoang Van Duc

Deputy Director, Foreign Intelligence
Ministry of Defense
Vietnam
Email: hoangducv@yahoo.com

89. Colonel Bui Xuan Mai

Army
Vietnam
Email: buimai_1963@yahoo.com

ABOUT S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was officially inaugurated on 1 January 2007. Before that, it was known as the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), which was established ten years earlier on 30 July 1996. Like its predecessor, RSIS was established as an autonomous entity within the Nanyang Technological University (NTU).


The School exists to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of Asia Pacific security studies and international affairs. Its three core functions are research, graduate teaching and networking activities

in the Asia Pacific region. It produces cutting-edge security related research in Asia Pacific Security, Conflict and Non-Traditional Security, International Political Economy, and Country and Area Studies.

The School's activities are aimed at assisting policymakers to develop comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking on issues related to security and stability in the Asia Pacific and their implications for Singapore.

For more information about RSIS, please visit <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/>.





S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University,
Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798

TEL 65-6790-6982 | FAX 65-6793-2991 | EMAIL wwwrsis@ntu.edu.sg | WEBSITE www.rsis.edu.sg