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Operations Other Than War in a Coalition Environment: Opportunities and Challenges for Modern Armed Forces

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THE GOH KENG SWEE COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
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NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY

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This report summarises the proceedings of the seminar as interpreted by the assigned rapportuers and editors appointed by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.

This conference adheres to a variation of the Chatham House Rule. Accordingly, beyond the speakers and paper presenters cited, no other attributions have been included in this report.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

If the increased participation of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) in international missions in recent years is anything to go by, it indicates that the modern armed forces of small states are taking on a greater if not more visible role — often within a coalition environment and the confines of the same theatre of operations. These missions span the whole Operations Other Than War (OOTW) spectrum to include Peace Support Operations (PSO); Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Maritime Support Operations (MSO) and Stability Operations (SO). This phenomenon glaringly highlights the inherent complexities and changing character if not nature of international missions that modern armed forces find themselves progressively engaged in.

To date, the SAF is currently committed to international efforts in bringing stability to Afghanistan and the Gulf of Aden. At the grand strategic level, the objectives of such operations are often amorphous and shifting and primarily dictated by the requirements of the lead coalition partners. In the context of small states such as Singapore, their limited contributions in operational terms suggest that at the political level, small states are also restricted by those same limits. Nevertheless, it would be useful to re-examine the political roles and contributions of small states removed from the traditional "hub and spokes" model dominated by first-rate powers. A similar re-examination of the operational contributions of small states' militaries away from the perceived necessity to keep up with paradigmatic military power is also timely at this juncture.

At the small unit and personal level, contemporary OOTW demand that uniformed individuals represent the core values of their respective armed forces and the coalition as well as conduct themselves in an ethically justified manner. The clash between these three requirements often manifests in the moral dilemma of doing what is legally required or following your moral imperative as a human peer. Although not all unique, issues of professional military ethics for small state armed forces involved in a similar operational environment (in terms of role, scale and type) can be quite different from those faced by larger powers. This in turn suggests a redefinition or re-examination of the core values and obligations of uniformed personnel serving in such deployments.

As a corollary, this seminar jointly organised by the Goh Keng Swee Command and Staff College, the SAF-NTU Academy and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies seeks to draw upon the expertise, experience and perspectives of small states such as the Nordic and Baltic states, Singapore, New Zealand and the Netherlands to provide a forum of discourse for military officers on the role of small states and their armed forces in OOTW within a coalition environment. Representatives from key coalition partners such as Australia, India the United Kingdom and the United States will also be included to provide a more holistic picture. In order to lend a more focused scope to the forum and encourage discussion, the seminar will conclude with an examination of SO — a significant contemporary issue of the day for many armed forces.

The seminar will be of an exploratory and sense-making character. The seminar is meant to be more than an academic discussion of social science approaches and research questions. It will also be a platform for practitioners to engage in sense making and problem solving. In short, the workshop is intended as an inclusive discourse that bridges the gap between academics and practitioners. More importantly, the seminar will bring to the fore issues that are important in defining the SO roles of small states and their militaries in today's contemporary operating environment.

The seminar will scrutinise the following three key questions that have yet to be addressed in any coherent manner by both academics and policy makers: (i) Does a greater role in OOTW serve the national security agendas of small states; (ii) What are the conditions and considerations unique to small states in OOTW and finally; (iii) In a era of limited defence resources, what and how can the militaries of small states contribute and achieve beyond mere statements of ambition. These three big questions will set the rubric for subsequent thematic panels on: Specific Case Studies; Interoperability; Civil, Military and Media Engagement; and International Security, International Law and Ethics.

KEYNOTE SPEECH

BG Tung Yui Fai began his keynote speech by running through a chronology of the phases of the SAF's transformation. He said that when Singapore first gained independence, she had no real defence force to speak of. Essentially, the first-generation SAF was to provide basic defence for Singapore. The SAF had to be built from scratch. The second-generation SAF thus endeavoured to build up its combined arms warfighting capabilities by acquiring necessary military hardware to provide for a credible defence force for Singapore. Finally, the current third-generation SAF now leverages upon advanced technologies in order to adapt to changing demographics and evolving security threats to enable full spectrum operations. BG Tung pointed out that this transformation is necessary for an increasingly complex international security environment. The threat of global major armed conflict in the post-Cold War environment has been replaced by low intensity ones involving non-state actors. The terror attacks on the United States in September 2001 and in Mumbai in 2008 highlighted the need for vigilance against newly emergent security threats.

In a highly globalised world, increased interdependence among nation states also means that security problems outside Singapore can have ramifications on the country's national security. As such, SAF missions have expanded from conventional defence to include operations other than war (OOTW) including humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) and peace support operations (PSO). From traditionally operating independently at the national level, the SAF has also grown accustomed to operating under the rubric of a multinational coalition.

Therefore, it comes as no surprise that most armed forces worldwide have also expanded their roles to include OOTW and participation in distant international security operations. However, preparing and being ready for new security threats constitute key challenges for the armed forces. Due to the transnational, complex nature of contemporary security threats, no single country can act alone and therefore will have to cooperate with international counterparts.

The traditional alliance structures of the Cold War era, BG Tung pointed out, have largely given way to new modes of cooperation in the form of strategic partnerships to cope with newly-emergent security threats in the post-Cold War. Small states such as Singapore also find themselves increasingly involved and given responsibilities in global-scale security operations. Therefore, the challenge faced by militaries of small states will be a need to ensure relevance while coping with inherent constraints. To do so, these militaries should seek niche areas in order to provide meaningful contributions to international security operations. The SAF is one such example, by offering niche capabilities in areas of project management, unmanned aerial vehicle and imagery analysis, training for instance.

However, to perform optimally, small states' militaries may also need to leverage upon the comparatively greater administrative and logistical capacities of coalition partners, in particular militaries of the major states. Cooperation with coalition partners helps to enhance interoperability and builds trust. The key challenge in multilateral operations, BG Tung pointed out, is the need to exercise sensitivity towards the cultures of those partners and host nation states. Bond-building is therefore essential in times of peace between countries with a view of facilitating inter-military cooperation in times of crisis. Such bond-building initiatives include bilateral and multilateral joint military education and training, an area in which the SAF has been active. Building of trust through such activities with international counterparts will enable militaries to evolve and build capacities in order to cope with newly emergent security threats.

PANEL 1

CASE STUDIES IN THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF SMALL STATES AND REGIONAL PARTNERS

Singapore

BG (Ret) Eric Tan Huck Gim, addressed Singapore's contributions in OOTW using the example of the UN Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISET), in which the SAF played an active role. In fact, he pointed out, Singapore's involvement in Timor-Leste dated back to 1999 during the Intervention Force for East Timor. UNMISET was chiefly responsible for ensuring the security of Timor-Leste, in support of its newly installed civilian government since the nascent Timor-Leste military had yet to become a credible defence force. A total of 26 countries participated in UNMISET and the contribution from every participant, BG Tan said, is equally crucial to the mission regardless of their magnitude.

Timor-Leste faced internal and external security threats; the former due to civil unrest while the latter perpetuated by overseas-trained, pro-Jakarta Timorese armed groups. One of the key challenges UNMISET faced had been to discover arms caches horded by armed militant groups which sought to destabilise the new government. The peacekeepers' missions were to back up the Timorese police force, help restore law and order as well as apprehend armed groups. The latter mission had been particularly challenging due to the rough terrain on which the peacekeepers operated. Nonetheless, UNMISET peacekeepers performed well especially in the aftermath of the Atsabe killings in January 2003 and Atabae killings in February-March 2003 carried out by the armed groups.

UNMISET's intervention after the killing incidents proved decisive as that helped ensure that no subsequent armed incursions were carried out by the armed groups across the East-West Timor borders. Help from the Indonesian military, which also had an interest in ensuring a stable Timor-Leste, was also crucial to stop the armed groups' activities in Timor-Leste. Altogether, the UNMISET-Indonesian joint effort helped deter the armed groups. The incidents also brought about a pause in the downsizing of UNMISET, whose deployment was crucial to ensure security along the porous borders. BG Tan finally pointed out that the decisive action carried out by UNMISET helped restore the population's trust and confidence in the country's future, which constituted the center of gravity of the mission in the first place.

Baltic States

Prof James Corum noted that the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been involved in a host of international peacekeeping operations (PKO) such as those in Bosnia. Their contributions are typically small; in terms of company-sized units and slightly larger task forces which provided niche capabilities to those UN missions.

Military cooperation amongst the three Baltic States has been a longstanding affair, with the countries' military chiefs and defence ministers engaging in regular

meetings. The Baltic States adopt a comprehensive approach to military operations, particularly OOTW which involves civilian personnel in certain niche areas of contributions such as provision of training for the host country's security forces. The Baltic Armed Forces took 20 years to build relatively credible defence capabilities that suited their needs. The Baltic States' raison d'etre of joining PKO, according to Prof Corum, is to demonstrate commitments to their NATO allies and also to allow their young military forces to gain operational experience.

Over the years of participation in international PKO, the Baltic Armed Forces have become increasingly well-versed in counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lithuania, in a notable instance, has since come to play a lead role in central Afghanistan's provincial reconstruction teams. However, interoperability issues still present a problem for small countries, typified by the experience of the Baltic Armed Forces. One key interoperability problem is related to the legal issues; as small states, the Baltic contributors provide small contingents and do not find it easy to negotiate with the host nation states, while having to contend with different caveats and standard operating procedures of the larger contributing states. Due to their small sizes, the Baltic contingents also lack experience in higher level operations.

To mitigate those problems, Prof Corum highlighted, the Baltic approach emphasises flexibility to adapt force structures to suit the prescribed needs of different PKO missions. Such flexibility, he argued, is the key to mitigate frictions that could be encountered in the Baltic Armed Forces' cooperation with other international partners. However, the Baltic contingents continue to rely on their larger counterparts for administrative and logistical support. Yet at the same time, the Baltic Armed Forces strive to attain some self-reliance in its equipment and logistical needs, such as modifying their equipment themselves to suit local needs of the missions. In sum, Prof Corum stressed that as the Baltic case study shows, smallness may create sources of friction in military cooperation with partners abroad, yet at the same time allowing for flexibility and adaptability.

Scandinavia

Mr Anders Karlsson referred to Sweden as a prime reference in the Scandinavian case study. Sweden, he said, has been a neutral country during the Cold War partly due to cognisance of its geographical size and geostrategic position in Northern Europe. However, in the post-Cold War period, the Swedish military has deployed forces to international PKO. The country's involvement in international security operations in recent years even expanded to include participation in the anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, as well as the latest involvement in Libya.

The Swedish military is in the process of transforming from a conscript to fully professional force, with an eye on coping with possible security challenges brought about by geopolitical uncertainty in contemporary times. Mr Karlsson underlined the experience of Swedish peacekeepers through a video clip of actual ground experience in Bosnia, demonstrating the difficulties faced by Swedish peacekeepers with respect to ethical issues related to the protection of non-combatants from warring parties as well as the rigors of service faced by young Swedish troops in war-torn zones.

South Asia

Prof S. D. Muni noted that South Asia has traditionally been involved in PKO at two levels: global and regional. In the latter case, South Asian states have been participating in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, even though no examples of coalition-type cooperation exist. The region contributes over 40 per cent of the manpower for UN PKO, with prime contributors being Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan. Despite such sizeable contributions, however, South Asian governments play no role in mandating and strategising PKO at the strategic-political UN level. Yet despite their contributions to UN PKO, these South Asian countries lack any well-defined policies which outline their roles in those international missions.

The driving considerations behind their active participation, Prof Muni argued, are primarily monetary in nature. Other reasons include the desire to maintain a global profile, which is an especially important point for small countries such as Nepal; the establishment of diplomatic and economic links with host countries; supplementing financial and political support for the maintenance of large domestic armies; opportunities to acquire new military hardware; as well as training and gaining of operational experience.

South Asian contributor states also encounter a host of problems in UN PKO, for instance a lack of clear political direction and mandate of mission. They also encounter tensions over command and control matters such as those between Indian and Pakistani contingents. In addition, procurement problems have plagued the South Asian contributor states, since they have to acquire needed material for PKO from elsewhere other than the contributor states themselves. Finally, slow reimbursements as well as internal pressures over political control and human rights issues, particularly in Bangladesh and Nepal present additional problems.

In regional PKO, India has been the largest player of all. Its missions encompass military, humanitarian assistance, developmental as well as political/diplomatic roles. New Delhi has had a long history of involvement in South Asian PKO as early as the 1950s (in Nepal), and played a significant role during the Sri Lankan civil war, such as the deployment of the Indian Peacekeeping Force in 1987. It has also supported recent international efforts in Afghanistan, wherein Pakistan has also emerged as another major regional PKO player since 2001.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SESSION

One participant asked about the extent of inter-agency collaboration between UNMISET and the Timor-Leste government in local socioeconomic development. BG Tan stressed that security and development must go hand in hand. However, UNMISET was primarily tasked to ensure security while the onus of local socioeconomic development lies on the Timor-Leste government. Unfortunately, he pointed out, the newly installed government lacked sufficient human resources to build up their socioeconomic capacities. Nonetheless, the UN does provide assistance to the Timor-Leste government in the area of developmental and governance issues.

One participant wondered why have the Baltic States not participated in the Afghanistan mission as a singular, unified contingent. To this question, Prof Corum emphasised that despite the extensive military cooperation amongst the three Baltic States, their governments have different political agendas and processes which may not be aligned. Besides such political expediency, Baltic States participated in separate national contingents in Afghanistan for practical reasons, he pointed out. For instance, the Estonians specifically worked with the Danish contingent due to the pre-existing and longstanding bilateral military cooperation. At the technical level, Prof Corum added, the three Baltic militaries have differing equipment inventories and therefore entering Afghanistan as a singular contingent may create logistical problems.

On another question posed by the audience on differences between conscript and professional forces in their proficiency in PKO, Prof Corum pointed out that conscription was not a problem in Baltic States' participation in international PKO. For instance, the Estonians did not deploy conscripts to overseas PKO despite having conscript armed forces; only professional soldiers were sent abroad. The same applied to Lithuania, which had just only recently abolished military conscription. By and large, he argued, considerations regarding professional efficiency, rather than domestic issues related to the deployment of conscripts, tended to drive policy decisions to send professional troops to international PKO.

One participant pointed out that small states' contribution to international OOTW has traditionally been viewed in the Western-centric context, but wondered whether there could be any effect on small states' involvement as a result of shifts in global geopolitics. The panel had diverse opinions on this. Prof Muni felt that there is a possibility of changes in small states' contributions to PKO, largely due to changes at the strategic-political UN level largely driven by major world powers whose perspectives may diverge with respect to sensitive issues related to Responsibility to Protect (R2P). BG Tan disagreed that there could be any changes in the way small states contribute to UN PKO, opining that small states have increasingly gained roles of influence at the strategic-political UN level.

The final question posed by the participants relates to ethical issues faced by militaries of small states in OOTW, with particular respect to how the Swedish military prepare its troops before, during and after the deployments. To this question, Mr Karlsson said that the Swedish military provided full-scale training for its troops in preparation for the worst-case scenarios, like the example he had earlier shown on video about the Swedish peacekeeper contingent's actual experience with ethical issues over the protection of non-combatants in Bosnia. He cautioned, however, that no amount of preparation can allow peacekeepers to be versed in all scenarios since the ground situations can be unpredictable and ever-changing. Prof Muni added to Mr Karlsson's comments by pointing out that ethical questions related to the conduct of operations by peacekeepers usually operate at the UN and national political-strategic levels, not at the lower operational and tactical levels.

PANEL 2

INTEROPERABILITY IN A COALITION ENVIRONMENT

Interoperability and Innovation

Commodore Richard Menhinick used the multinational Combined Task Force 150 (CTF150), a component of the Combined Maritime Forces operating in the Middle Eastern area of operations, as a case study for examining interoperability and innovation. He pointed out that CTF150 has a very large area to cover, roughly 3.3 million square miles in total, while having to contend with a diversity of security challenges ranging from the lack of clear maritime boundaries to the regional states' differing obligations under international law. The legal and strategic context of CTF150's area of responsibility is shaped by the complexity of sea lines of communications, maritime chokepoints, regional extremist activities and the nature of governance. As such, these presented challenges to coalition OOTW in the case of interoperability within CTF150.

While the technical level of interoperability has been well known and studied, Commodore Menhinick pointed out, the personal level of interoperability is at least equally if not more important especially in OOTW. Failure to understand this personal level of interoperability could have deleterious effects on coalition OOTW, he stressed. Personal animus could potentially destroy any strategic aims a participant country may have. Therefore, for interoperability to be effective, mutual trust and respect are essential ingredients. Leadership failure at this personal level of interoperability may result in strategic and operational failures in OOTW missions.

Commodore Menhinick argued that in reality, allies and coalitions do not have identical objectives due to differing national interests. In OOTW, the legal framework of coalition cooperation is often ambiguous, especially in the maritime milieu where UN mandates are often lacking. The first step to achieve interoperability should be to establish a command culture that fosters the building of mutual trust and respect amongst coalition partners. At the strategic level, interactions amongst the partners are crucial to build personal level of interoperability, which will ensure the alignment of strategic objectives. In addition, competent legal advice is required due to the propensity for differences over such issues.

To foster the personal level of interoperability, Commodore Menhinick proposed that education and training constitute the critical tools. There is a need to conduct common courses and international exchanges amongst international military partners in order to generate a command culture that underpins effective interoperability. This requisite to "Talk the Walk", as he pointed out, is necessary since interoperability in a coalition environment will have to be educated to officers right at the start.

Commodore Menhinick raised a few questions on the future of OOTW and the roles of small states with respect to interoperability and innovation. Firstly, does the greater role played by small states in OOTW serve their respective national agendas. To this, he opined that small states' national security interests are served by participating in OOTW since their strengths can be leveraged upon together with the gaining of benefits in areas of operational experience. Secondly, are there conditions and circumstances unique only to small states in OOTW. To this, Commodore Menhinick pointed out that small states do have advantages over their larger counterparts by appearing much less threatening to host governments which perceive the small states to possess no ulterior political motives for intervention.

Lastly, despite inherent constraints what can small states contribute to coalition OOTW. Commodore Menhinick stressed that despite the limitations faced by small states such as in areas of expertise and resources, the one key valuable asset small states can provide is people — proficient manpower at that.

Concerns and Dimensions of Interoperability

Mr Michael Codner posited that interoperability in the traditional sense is defined in three phases: firstly cooperation, followed by coordination and finally integration. Mr Codner incorporated two additional elements within this traditional paradigm: firstly, there is a need for "disambiguation" and then "de-confliction" of differing political-military goals amongst the coalition partners, before cooperation, coordination and then ultimately integration.

Maritime and air forces in the context of coalition operations often enjoy high levels of interoperability since they generally operate at the more manageable middle echelon (i.e. battalion-level: air squadron and ship levels for air and maritime forces respectively). For land forces, however, the ease of interoperability declined below battalion level, since disparities can be complex down to the lower tactical levels such as platoons and even individual troops. The dimensions of interoperability, Mr Codner pointed out, comprise the technical and behavioural. The technical dimension of interoperability comprises information, systems and logistical connectivity. Nonetheless, this dimension is comparatively much easier to address, he argued, due to a range of influencing factors such as differences in constitutions and laws, culture, military doctrine as well as tactics and techniques of operation that impinge upon the behavioural dimension.

For disambiguation and de-confliction issues, Mr Codner suggested that the establishment of effective communications is important to address those problems. Nonetheless, technical approaches aside, he stressed the need to pay attention to other conditions for the degrees of effectiveness in interoperability. Firstly, there has to be a significant overlap of military and political purpose and objectives amongst the partners for a particular coalition mission. Secondly, there has to be sufficient political will in the participant governments. Thirdly, behavioural coherence is necessary. Fourthly, familiarity and mutual understanding amongst the partners are essential. Lastly, intellectual sharing should be a culture to be fostered.

Coalition partners traditionally approach disambiguation and de-confliction issues via geographical and role separation methods. While these methods constitute straightforward "fixes", they possess certain drawbacks and they are not panaceas. In conclusion, Mr Codner emphasised the importance of paying attention to the following concerns and challenges which future coalition partners may face: purpose of commitment; durability of intra-coalition relationships; information security related to the sharing of classified data; development and ossification of procedures; role of alliances; command structures; comprehensive approaches and commonality of purpose as well as mutual trust and respect.

Partnerships in Local Training/IMET

Assoc Prof Ahmed Hashim used the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme of the U.S. military as a case study on partnerships in local training within a coalition OOTW setting. He focused on three main themes: establishment of host country's security forces in the context of colonial pacification; fostering of democratic values in civil-military relations; and security sector reforms in host countries in the context of low-intensity conflicts.

Using the Roman Empire as a historical example, Assoc Prof Hashim compared it with IMET by pointing out certain similarities. The Romans built auxiliary military forces from local tribes which they subjugated in conquered territories so that these troops could ensure security in those colonised regions through taking advantage of their own local knowledge and cultures. In the process of building up those indigenous forces auxiliary to the Roman Legions, he pointed out; Rome also sought to assimilate the conquered peoples to the Roman culture and value system. On the whole, the aim of this approach was to allow Rome to run its empire effectively. Yet history had also shown that this approach was flawed and at least partially resulted in the eventual decline of the Roman Empire.

IMET appears to mirror the approach taken by the Romans. Besides the primary goal of providing military education and training for local security forces, IMET also endeavours to inculcate the American democratic and human right values to participant militaries. However, in this regard, IMET has enjoyed at best mixed success. Foreign governments which are supportive of Washington and participated actively in IMET do not necessarily adopt the culture and value system espoused by the programme. In some cases, IMET failed to achieve the objectives of propagating those espoused American democratic civil-military culture.

Pakistan is a case in point. A history of bilateral animosities with the United States, marked by sanctions imposed by Washington on the country in the earlier decade after Islamabad tested its first nuclear weapon device, had fostered a generation of mid and senior-ranking Pakistani military officers who harbour anti-American sentiments. The recent new tensions between the two governments will only serve to exacerbate this animosity further. As such, IMET continues to lack success in inculcating its espoused civil-military relations culture and value system to the Pakistani officers.

Egypt is another interesting case study underlining the dismal performance of IMET. Senior Egyptian military officers are generally not pro-Washington despite the huge amounts of support the United States provided for then President Mubarak's government. These officers do not view the U.S. role in the Middle East as constructive, and the Egyptian military continues to see itself as the ultimate guardian of the country, falling short of embracing the democratic civil-military relations culture and value system espoused by IMET.

Assoc Prof Hashim pointed out that at present, IMET is doomed to failure in the case of Afghanistan. The ability for Washington to withdraw from Afghanistan is primarily dependent on the success of Afghan security sector reforms, which pose a significant challenge for a country which is backward in terms of modern institutions of governance. Attempts to build the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) have been plagued with difficulties, yet Washington continues to view success in Afghan security sector reforms largely in terms of recruitment quotas which do not reflect the quality of personnel in ANA and ANP. To compound the difficulties, members of the Taliban have already infiltrated the ranks of these two security institutions.

Washington has long stressed quantity over quality in the security sector reforms of foreign countries. During the Vietnam War, Washington provided enormous amounts of support for the South Vietnamese government. However, the traditional focus then was on building the South Vietnamese military, a process which preceded the importance of building credible political institutions of governance in Saigon. This error resulted in the eventual downfall of South Vietnam after the final North Vietnamese invasion. In conclusion, Assoc Prof Hashim cautioned that the same history could potentially repeat itself in Afghanistan.

Interoperability in the Maritime Commons

Mr Bernard Miranda based on his operational command experience with Combined Task Force 151 (CTF151) in the Gulf of Aden, spoke about interoperability in the maritime commons. He first highlighted the strategic importance of the Gulf of Aden to global economic well-being. Due to the huge expanse of water space that constitutes CTF151's area of responsibility, and the complexity of security threats facing coalition partner navies and maritime shipping industries alike, no country can single-handedly secure the Gulf of Aden. There is therefore a need for cooperation amongst all partners with a stake in the area's security.

The key threat originates from seaborne Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden. Over the years, Somali pirates have evolved according to changing circumstances. For instance, in order to threaten shipping further out at sea off the coast, they deploy mother ships in the guise of harmless dhows which themselves can operate pirate skiffs some 1400 nautical miles offshore. While CTF151 has already operated in earnest against the pirate threat, Mr Miranda emphasised that this only constitutes a short-term solution. In the long run, the threat of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden has to be addressed by restoration of stability and proper governance in Somalia.

Nonetheless, since its inception, CTF151 has made considerable progress in the way this coalition of partner navies operate in the Gulf of Aden. Despite its small size compared to the major partners such as the EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) and NATO components, the SAF has played an active role. Lately, the SAF facilitated the smooth inclusion of Thailand as the 25th partner in CTF151 by leveraging upon its experience to assist the Thais in developing their operational concepts prior to deployment. The SAF's experience with CTF151 also demonstrated the crucial need for constant and regular communication at all levels within and without CTF151. Cooperation is a necessity with major players such as EUNAVFOR and NATO, while independent players such as China, India and Russia should also be engaged. As part of the Combined Maritime Forces, CTF151 also interacts with its sister task forces — CTF150 and CTF152 — to ensure its smooth operations in the Gulf of Aden.

To ensure effective interoperability within the coalition maritime task force, Mr Miranda pointed out, building goodwill and friendship is crucial in order for partners to transcend and mitigate differences and frictions during cooperation. Animosities amongst coalition partners will only doom the mission to eventual failure. Small states participating in maritime coalition forces, as the Singapore experience shows, can play an active and crucial role. Smallness is an advantage since it facilitates trust, unlike larger powers which are often perceived by the host government as harbouring an ulterior political motive for intervention. Small states can also facilitate engagement, such as the case of the SAF in CTF151. Joint training goes a long way in fostering interoperability. A good instance has been Exercise Rat Trap which was carried out amongst CTF151 partners on a regular basis.

Ultimately, Mr Miranda stressed, political will amongst the participant governments is a requisite factor driving effective interoperability within a maritime coalition in OOTW scenarios. However, success of OOTW does not simply rest merely on military forces. Besides military partners, present and future maritime coalition OOTW will have to incorporate civilian agencies as well. In the case of CTF151, he pointed out; the maritime shipping industries are important partners to the coalition, since they also play a pivotal role in ensuring the safety of the maritime commons in the Gulf of Aden.

PANEL 2

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SESSION

One participant sought opinions from the panel regarding the role and prospects of commercial armed security teams deployed aboard ships transiting the Gulf of Aden. Mr Miranda addressed this issue by pointing out that currently, commercial armed security teams are popular within the maritime shipping industries, due to statistical findings which showed that merchant ships which deploy such teams tend to suffer a low incidence of pirate attacks or even when attacks were attempted, their success rates were low. He opined that the trend of such armed teams to be deployed aboard merchant ships will continue. However, Mr Miranda cautioned that with the entry of such teams, the pirates may evolve correspondingly as well. One particular risk is that the Somali pirates may up the ante in the level of violence by employing even more sophisticated tactics and weaponry in an attempt to counter the armed security teams.

With the panel largely discussing about technical and personal levels of interoperability, one participant pointed out that there may be a need to pay attention to "risk interoperability", which particularly applies to small states which need to consider the risks of participating in coalition OOTW. Commodore Menhinick responded to this comment by stressing that such issues continue to remain tricky and difficult to resolve. To mitigate this, however, there is a need to communicate those risks to the small states' governments in order to establish a preliminary level of mutual understanding about the risks which accrue to their participation prior to their policy deliberations. Mr Codner added to Commodore Menhinick's comments by pointing out that a clear strategic political purpose and objective is always a requisite for small and big states alike in the context of participating in coalition OOTW.

In response to Assoc Prof Hashim's earlier views of the outcome of security sector reforms in Afghanistan, one participant sought his insights on measures to ensure the eventual success of IMET. Assoc Prof Hashim clarified that given its unique context, Afghanistan may not necessarily reflect upon the overall effectiveness of IMET worldwide. In the case of Afghanistan, IMET encounters an especially tricky problem due to the prevailing context of that country. The programme has to struggle in order to build an industrial-age security force in a country of which socioeconomic and political institutions are largely backward and "medieval" in nature. There is a need to emphasise not just security sector reforms but to ensure that the Afghan government builds a sound and functioning political institution to ensure success.

PANEL 3

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHICS

Armed Forces and the Comprehensive Approach

Prof Cynthia Watson spoke on the comprehensive approach to operations other than war. She highlighted the dramatic shift in the United States' perception of warfare as an instrument of statecraft. The shift has affected both the nature and implementation of operations other than war. According to Prof Watson, operations other than war must not be viewed as ends in and of themselves, but rather as a component of a larger national security strategy.

Throughout its history, the United States has engaged in nation-building operations, however recently there has been a change in the means by which goals are reached. The military was increasingly relied upon to engage in operations with less clearly defined operations. Dating from the 1980s, a clear decision was made to reallocate resources for such operations from tools of statecraft to the military. The military has become the overwhelmingly dominant tool used in these operations.

Prof Watson noted the difficulties and setbacks that have occurred under these policies, using the Iraq War as an example. The military was being asked to perform a range of operations, some of which it was unaccustomed to fulfilling. In 2005, the Bush administration introduced SSRTO to indicate a shift to a joint civilian and military approach, drawing from both public and private sectors.

Prof Watson raised the question of whether the U.S. military would be able to reconfigure its forces to effectively meet the requirements posed by both traditional warfare and operations other than war. The inevitability of significant defense spending cuts further compounds this problem.

Prof Watson believes there will be a great deal of debate across all nations and societies on responsibility to protect. The United States will have to come to grips with a public policy debate over how to reform the national security community.

Small States as Builders of Regional Security (Asia Pacific)

Assoc Prof Alan Chong spoke on the role of small states in building regional security. As small states cannot ignore or effectively impede the influence of great powers in their regions, the best alternative is to encourage the presence of all major players. The involvement of multiple great powers gives minor states a higher degree of freedom and positively influences the stability of the region.

According to Assoc Prof Chong, the debate over the role small states play in regional security is hampered by the semantic debate over what constitutes "small." Assoc Prof Chong suggested an elastic and relativistic definition for small states. Although, some of their defining characteristics include a lack of veto powers in international institutions and an obsession with small shifts in the regional balance of power. He added that small states are not necessarily helpless in regards to regional concerns.

In the Asia Pacific, small states often try to overcome their disadvantages through soft-power and estrangement of their rivals. In many cases, although states are technically at peace, the peace is a "cold" one.

Assoc Prof Chong noted that many small states attempt to establish a special relationship with intrusive great powers. By socialising the great power, they are potentially able to rely upon it for support while mitigating the threat it poses to their interests.

According to Assoc Prof Chong, ASEAN is a club for militarily weak states, formed to facilitate the integration of their forces into something which can attempt to balance the strength of larger states. While from a traditional cost-benefit analysis, ASEAN may appear ineffective, it provides an important socialising role relating to great powers active in the region.

Finally, Assoc Prof Chong opined that ASEAN provides a confidence building forum between small states and large ones. ASEAN nations do not openly name the problematic states in issues such as the South China Sea dispute, but rather attempt to make clear to the states involved that a dialogue and compromise will be necessary. This is ASEAN's strategy of threat obfuscation.

Small states rely upon socialisation amongst themselves and with great powers to build a soft regional community.

Ethical Realism: Why Small States Should Have Ethical Foreign Policies

Prof Christopher Coker argued for the importance of ethical foreign policies for small states. According to Coker, ethics is a survival mechanism, founded upon prudence and prudentialism. Small powers in particular must take steps to maintain ethical foreign policies, in order to maximise their long term chances of success.

Prof Coker cited the famous quotation "the strong do what they can, the weak do what they must." He argued that small states, constrained by their limited power and influence, must behave ethically in order to set a precedent for such behavior. Essentially, small states cannot expect to be treated fairly by larger states unless they themselves demonstrate a commitment to ethical foreign policy. In this way, small states can convince great powers to do what they "should" rather than what they "can."

Prof Coker submitted the relations between the smaller nations of the EU and Africa as an example of this behavior. According to Prof Coker, in doing this the European nations are attempting to socialise China by setting precedent for ethical behavior. These actions stress ethics, a global outlook, and long-term consequences.

Human rights exist only as a societal construct. In the 21st century ethical behavior has no more objective reality than witches did in the 17th. Rather, ethical foreign policy is a narrative people construct for themselves, one which could change and must consciously maintained. The possibility of a regression back to balance of power politics and national interest as seen in previous centuries must be acknowledged and countered.

Regional Initiatives: A Way for Small States to Uphold and Shape International Law

Mr Alvin Tan spoke on a method by which small states could uphold and take an active role in international

law. States create international law via bilateral treaties, legal disputes resolved by international institutions, and multilateral treaties. Additionally, Mr Tan noted States may create customary international law and establish norms of international behaviour.

Mr Tan argued that the means by which international law is produced also creates a number of problems. International law is often broad and vague. Furthermore as states are the primary actors, law will never be anything other than what they want it to be. International law is not based upon morality or ethics. Enforcement of international law is another major issue.

According to Mr Tan, these problems can be an opportunity for small states to shape and uphold international law through regional initiatives. Regional initiatives allow for the incorporation of local values and special circumstances, as well as local enforcement. Regional initiatives also reduce the theoretical and physical gap between those who are victims of atrocities and those providing justice.

In short, regional initiatives offer numerous potential advantages over enforcement at the global international level. Regional efforts are more responsive to the specific needs of each unique situation, and ensure the problem is being handled by individuals with a proper grounding in the circumstances. Mr Tan suggested that it is at the regional level that small states will most effectively be able to deal with problems and let their voice be heard.

PANEL 3
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SESSION

A member of the audience asked a question pertaining to "fragmegration:" the combination of integration and fragmentation faced states today. He asked what the impact is upon small states evolving towards fragmegration. Assoc Prof Chong responded that fragmegration has provided small states with maneuverable space, but also fundamentally alters their sovereignty in ways yet to be fully understood. Assoc Prof Chong stated because small states are already by nature more open than large states, they will have to work to maintain their internal integrity. Although the issue is by no means settled, Assoc Prof Chong suggested that small states will thrive in this new environment.

A member of the audience asked Prof Watson about whether she saw America reaching the endgame in Afghanistan in terms of terrorist activity, and whether this would determine the withdrawal timeframe. Prof Watson responded that she did not the question of reaching an end to the threat of terrorism will have much to do with the timing of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Instead, the endgame will be dependent upon a lack of public support for American involvement. She further stated that U.S. concerns have shifted from terrorism to the domestic and international economic situation. According to Prof Watson, it is not practical to assume that it will be an answer to that question that will determine the continuation or end of U.S. action of Afghanistan.

A member of the audience asked how effective the soft-power policies advocated by ASEAN will be, considering the differences between Western and Eastern Culture. Prof Christopher Coker responded that numerous differences must be recognised between Western and Eastern governments and democracies. He acknowledged that Western political culture is more confrontational. Furthermore, there is a vast difference in the treatment of history between the West and East.

PANEL 4

CIVIL, MILITARY AND MEDIA ENGAGEMENT

Reassessing the Role of Small States as Shapers of International Security and International Missions

Dr Jim Rolfe suggested that when studying small state interventions, each case should be explored in its unique circumstances instead of taking a broad brush approach. Smaller states have the advantage of flexibility, and unlike larger states, can adjust their posture readily. Moreover, small states often have to work with other agencies to compensate for their lack of resources.

Dr Rolfe asserted that one of the biggest issues with interventions is the civil-military disconnect — the military often fails to recognise the drivers behind civilian involvement in interventions while the civilians often do not understand the military adequately. They are also separated by their culture, language, and their tasks. He noted that words often used by the military can have completely different meanings for civilians, and both stakeholders should seek to understand each other.

The military is often regarded highly in interventions as it is well-organised and equipped, thus able to respond speedily. However, Dr Rolfe noted that some civilian organisations also boast impressive resources. For example, the World Food Organisation operates a vast global logistics network that comprises 30 ships, 70 aircraft, and 5,000 vehicles moving food around the world.

Such humanitarian agencies see themselves as leaders in interventions such as HADR operations, and expect the military to conform to their ways. Small states therefore need to nurture cooperation between their civilian agencies and military. Dr Rolfe impressed upon the importance of understanding the capabilities and limitations of both parties.

Finally, small states can shape the security mission in interventions. When a mission is being planned, small states with an understanding of civil-military operations should be promoting such knowledge to help larger states with integrating civilian agencies and their military assets. While this is often difficult in practice, Dr Rolfe believes this is a goal worth pursuing for future interventions.

Conceptualising Civil-Military Relations

Prof Franz Kernic explored some theoretical approaches in examining civil-military relations in his presentation. According to him, it is difficult to make a clear distinction between the civil-military and military-political spheres. As a result, different systems emerge. But according to Prof Kernic there are also similarities, as some of today's political systems are developed from military roots from the past.

Prof Kernic also referred to the work of political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, who wrote about the professionalisation of the armed forces. Huntington explored the idea of civilian control that exists when there is subordination of the military profession to the ends of policy, which in essence recognise both as separate approaches. In contrast, sociologist Morris Janowitz presented the citizen-soldier concept, which tries to synergise those different approaches.

He emphasised the need to conceptualise and understand civil-military relations in today's context. The world has moved on from the classical military versus military type of conflicts where uniformed soldiers fight again similarly equipped and trained adversaries. He noted that non-military personnel are playing increasingly important roles in contemporary conflict. For example, "military-like" organisations such as private military companies are also present on the field, which makes operations more complex.

Finally, Prof Kernic asserted that the manner in which civil-military relations are communicated will have an impact on how it develops. Civil-military relations present a unification of the civil-political and military spheres. He acknowledged that there continues to be a tension between the two spheres and there is potential for organisational conflict. However, as long as planners have an awareness of this issue, then the problem can be better managed.

Small States as Drivers of Civil-Military Cooperation: Experiences from the Netherlands' Task Force Uruzgan (2006-2010)

Asst Prof Martijin Kitzen explored civil-military relations through the lens of his country's experience in peacekeeping and stabilisation operations since the Cold War, and its four year involvement in Afghanistan. He highlighted the Dutch contribution in Kampuchea in 1993, the former Yugoslavia, in Iraq, and in monitoring the Eritrea-Ethiopia border.

Asst Prof Kitzen noted that the Dutch defence, foreign affairs, and economic affairs ministries published a white paper on civil-military cooperation in 2005 based on these experiences. These ministries asserted that there four domains — military, political, economic, and social — which have to be influenced in order to restore order to destabilised regions.

When Dutch forces began their intervention in the Uruzgan province in Afghanistan in 2006, they formulated their strategy in theatre based on the 2005 white paper which was adapted to suit the current circumstances. The strategy continued to evolve over the following years as the task force conducted its operations. By 2008, the security situation had improved, signalling a shift from kinetic to non-kinetic military operations. This also heralded a change in the ranks of the task force, with a surge in civilian advisors as well as the appointment of a civilian co-commander.

In addition to maintaining security, the military must put effort into developing indigenous forces so that the local populace can eventually take over security responsibilities. Diplomats are also required to assist in building institutions of governance and sustainable development.

Asst Prof Kitzen concluded by sharing his main insights from the Dutch experience. He asserted that planners should have a conceptual framework for civil-military operations and consider the intricacies of civil-military cooperation before deployment. He also emphasised the need to deploy a balanced organisation of military and civilian personnel on the ground. Finally, NGOs are likely to be involved in such interventions and while these agencies are not part of the formal chain of command, they can still be influenced by the military.

The Media and the Armed Forces

Mr James Dorsey explored the often testy but nevertheless symbiotic relationship between the media and the military. At first glance the military and media have a mutually beneficial relationship, but only if the two parties understand what their roles are. He asserted the media-military relationship cannot be divorced, although there will be prejudices from both parties — journalists think the military will not be truthful and will try to control them, instead of recognising their independence and impartiality.

Mr Dorsey shared how he discovered the dividing lines between the military and media as a journalist covering the U.S. invasion of Grenada in the early 1980s. According to him, the U.S. military had set up an exclusion zone around the island nation which prevented journalists from entering. The denial of access for journalists resulted in resulted in a serious deterioration in relations between the then Reagan government and the media.

Consequently, a commission was formed in an attempt to improve the way the government and military interact with the domestic and foreign media without jeopardising national and operational security. The solution was embedment. The commission created the "Pentagon Pool", a group of six-eight journalists whose identities were secret and were attached to military units during operations. These journalists — one of whom was Mr Dorsey himself — were for the first time deployed during the Iran-Iraq War.

From his experience, Mr Dorsey noted two main issues with media-military relations. First was the military's hierarchical structure which enforces discipline and respect for authority. This is in stark contrast with the seemingly free-roaming nature of the media. Second was the issue of national and operational security. The military organisation often functions under the veil of secrecy. This is at odds with the media's desire to report events as witnessed, which has the potential to compromise military secrecy.

Despite these issues, Mr Dorsey believes that the free-roaming nature of the media offers the military some advantages. The fact that they are seen as an independent entity, rather than part of the mission, could have strategic utility for the military. He cited the example of Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989 when information discovered by a journalist on deposed dictator Manuel Noriega's whereabouts allowed the U.S. military to speed up his capture.

PANEL 4

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SESSION

A participant posed two questions to the panel. First, he commented that the involvement of small states in international operations have almost always been a case of coalitions with other nations. If one were to take a cynical view of small state involvement, it seems that such nations contribute to gain international recognition.

For his second question, he noted that Task Force Uruzgan evolved from enemy-centric intelligence in the earlier stages of the intervention to population-centric intelligence, and wondered how prepared was the task force in making this paradigm shift in operations. He also queried whether civilian assets would be more useful than their military counterpart in stabilisation operations. For the first question, Dr Jim Rolfe suggested that the capabilities of small states should not be underestimated. Smaller nations can offer niche capabilities of their own to contribute to the overall effort. He noted that small states can also give legitimacy to larger states during interventions with their involvement.

Asst Prof Kitzen replied that the most important asset that the task force had for the shift in the nature of operations was their human resource — civilians and soldiers. The people serving in the task force adapted their mindset to suit the evolving situation. For example, he noted that in 2008 the task force military leaders utilised information compiled by civilian researchers two years ago. He also suggested that there needs to be a balance between the kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities in an intervention effort. The military component will have to provide the necessary security and the civilians are an important force multiplier.

Another participant noted that disaster management is not the primary task of the military and he would prefer civilian agencies take greater responsibility for such operations. However, he asserted that civilian agencies are unable to handle such contingencies by themselves, and thus military involvement is required. While civilian agencies can provide some measure of aid, they are often inadequately lead and staffed to take charge of the situation on their own.

In response to the question, Dr Rolfe pointed out that successful disaster management operations often feature a bottom-up response. In other words, local agencies with the right equipment and training, coupled with familiarity of the terrain and populace, were found to be critical to success. While military forces are without doubt better equipped and funded, he asserted that instead of dismissing the capabilities of civilian agencies, it would be far more effective for both parties to synergise their efforts in order to maximise their manpower and resources.

PANEL 5

THE FUTURE OF STABILITY OPERATIONS AND DISCUSSANT SESSION

The Future of Stability Operations

Dr Thomas Hammes touched on the issues associated with contemporary stabilisation operations. First, he noted that there has been a failure to adequately define stability operations due to the vast number of perspectives on such operations in the world. For example, he pointed out that even in the United States stability operations are also known as counter-insurgency (COIN), counter-terrorism, policing, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and others. All of these definitions have their own unique characteristics. Another issue that he noted was that the end-state of the operation was often premised upon Western models of stability, which may not be suitable for the particular intervention.

Contemporary stabilisation thought has been fixated on creating stability through intervention by external forces in the affected areas. Dr Hammes asserted that for these operations to be truly successful, the affected areas must also develop their own stability. He noted the multitude of unsuccessful interventions throughout history — such as Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, and Chechnya — and contrasted those failures to the rare successes such as the Balkan intervention, drawing the audience to their differences. For example, he suggested that there might be prerequisite factors which contribute to success, such as the national identity or the local populace, the historical narrative between the government and people, as well as the extent of democracy in the affected areas.

Dr Hammes also suggested that the status of conflict is also another key factor. According to him, the responses required for intervention in a conflict where fighting is ongoing will be different from a situation where the belligerents are exhausted and seeking an end to the fighting. He also noted that it is less favourable for interventions to proceed during ongoing fighting, while there is a higher likelihood of success on the other spectrum where there is less inclination to continue struggle or resist.

Finally, Dr Hammes asserted that small states also have more to offer than just niche capabilities and legitimacy to coalition operations. He pointed out that small states may also contribute valuable knowledge to the overall effort. These states also make the planning process more robust by providing their own unique perspectives to the table.

Discussant Session

Commodore Richard Menhinick remarked that stability operations are too often studied from the land perspective, and for his segment he explored the maritime aspects of stability operations. As one of the global commons, the sea is vital to the survivability of many nations. He noted that stability operations on the sea have been prevalent throughout history. For example, anti-piracy was an important activity for 16th and 17th century navies. In more recent times, the world has seen international efforts like the CTF-151 maritime task force contributing to stability operations at sea.

Commodore Menhinick noted that national sensitivities affection stability operations on land do not apply at sea, due to the fact that the sea is a global "highway" without geographical obstacles. Thus, he encouraged the participants not to neglect the sea when considering the future of stability operations.

From Australia's perspective, it is likely that its military will continue to be involved in stability operations both at sea and on land for the foreseeable future. Commodore Menhinick pointed out that the increasing frequent and high profile coverage of disasters on national primetime news broadcasts in Australia has prompted greater commitment by the government for such operations, particularly in the Southwest Pacific.

Finally, he highlighted Australia's unique approach to stability operations. He noted that the military has had a positive experience in working with civilian agencies and has no reservations about civilian leadership in operations. Moreover, the ADF is structured and equipped in a manner that allows speedy deployment to affected areas.

Dr Tim Huxley discussed the implications of stability operations for the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). He began by exploring the terminology that is being used, noting that this conference revolved around military operations other than war (OOTW). He asserted that stability and peace support operations are actually key parts of warfare, not "other than war" as is commonly described. For the SAF, these operations gain particular salience as they are part and parcel of modern conflict.

There are two main reasons why such operations should be seen as important for the SAF. First is Singapore's relationship with the United States in the regional security. Over the past 20 years Singapore has developed an increasingly close security relationship with the United States. While this is not a formal alliance, he noted that this special cooperation has benefited both nations. Singapore gained access to high-grade military equipment and training facilities from the United States, and perhaps more importantly, an implicit message to the region and wider world that the small city-state has a powerful friend. This cooperation helps to bolster Singapore's deterrence, and allows the United States to maintain important logistics facilities for regional operations. U.S. defence firms also benefit from major defence contracts awarded by the Singapore government.

Another aspect of this bilateral security relationship which benefits the United States is Singapore's tentative willingness to join coalition operations. This was demonstrated in recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Dr Huxley asserted that it will be likely that Singapore will be requested to take part in future U.S.-led coalitions in the region or beyond.

The second reason relates to the nature of Singapore's region and the security challenges that arise from it. Dr Huxley noted that Southeast Asia is characterised by increasing political dynamism, and while that is not an unfavourable trend, he is concerned about some developments such as politicised religion and border disputes. There is also a growing disparity in wealth and material expectations which may not be met by regional governments. Finally, he voiced his doubts about the ability of existing regional security mechanisms to provide adequate structures for managing conflict in Southeast Asia.

As a result of these developments, Singapore's immediate environment will likely continue to pose a significant security challenge. Thus the SAF will be required to maintain its capability to deter and respond to potential challenges. The nature of potential conflict in the region is unpredictable, but he is certain that it would not simply be a case of conventional operations against well-defined military targets that would bring a decisive victory. Regional conflict, he concludes, will be likely to be complex and protracted affairs against military, militia and civil organisations. The importance of stability and peace support operations is only going to gain importance in the future.

Assoc Prof Bernard Loo began by noting the difficulty in defining stability operations. One of the key reasons for this issue is that stability operations are accepted as an activity under the umbrella of OOTW. In contrast, he asserted that stability operations are by itself a myriad variety of missions. Moreover, stability operations are

a multifaceted phenomenon, which suggests that no operation is the same — each has its own unique characteristics based on the current circumstances.

Assoc Prof Loo warned that a strategy is a requirement for success, but acknowledged that the multifaceted nature of stability operations presents a challenge in defining a coherent strategy. This issue is compounded by the fact that such operations tend to be drawn-out and costly affairs, which is seemingly anathema to the 21st century warrior expecting speedy and decisive results.

If military forces do embark on stability operations, Assoc Prof Loo suggested that they have to recognise that such operations will be inherently difficult. Cooperation between the military and civilian agencies may be difficult as a result of mutual distrust. Finally, he warned that stability operations have been part and parcel of military operations throughout history and will continue to be an enduring activity. Therefore is important to formulate a coherent strategy to allow military organisations to undertake stability operations with a reasonable degree of success.

PANEL 5
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SESSION

A participant enquired whether democracy is the form of governance that is necessary for stability operations. He noted that some non-democratic rising powers could also be leaders in such operations in the future. In response to this question, Dr Thomas Hammes replied that democracy is not a requirement. He noted that despite their differences compared to liberal democracies, many non-democratic states nevertheless are interested in stability. Commodore Menhinick referred to the 2006 intervention in Tonga by Australian and New Zealand forces which was motivated by the necessity to restore order rather than imposing democratic reform to the people.

Another participant noted that the SAF mission is to achieve a swift and decisive victory. While it is widely recognised that the SAF will likely undertake an increasing number of such missions in the future, stability operations are neither swift nor decisive. Does that suggest that the SAF's mission statement is losing relevance?

In response, Dr Tim Huxley believes that there is a strong case for the mission statement to evolve over time in light of prevailing circumstances, particularly given the dissonance between the ideal of a speedy conclusion to what has proven by history to be extended affairs. A "swift and decisive victory" may not necessarily be the case for such operations.

CLOSING REMARKS

BG Mark Tan Ming Yiak noted that coalition operations are tricky affairs with a host of strategic, operational and tactical challenges. To succeed, allies have to share a common strategic vision and cooperate in theatre often under difficult conditions. The speakers and discussants have pointed out the complex nature of OOTW, and he noted that the quality of the leadership involved in such operations is critical for success.

However, he warned that no matter how well-trained the personnel are and how seamless the interoperability between coalition partners are, personality clashes between commanders could jeopardise the mission and even put deployed forces at risk. To illustrate this point, he cited the friction between American WWII European theatre commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower and his British counterpart General Bernard Montgomery.

He said that the seminar would not have been possible without the partnership of the Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and the SAF-NTU Academy (SNA). In particular, he underscored the important partnership with the SNA. Despite having been formally established for less than two years, SNA has been running important programmes for the SAF in the GKS CSC and also the Undergraduate Professional Military Education and Training programme. He further emphasised the hope to achieve much more with the SNA.

In closing, he noted the range of topics discussed over the past two days — from law, ethics, the engagement of the media, as well as the wide geographical coverage of international operations. The seminar has given participants a valuable opportunity to tap into a global network of experts, and strengthened their ability to wrestle with pertinent concerns in coalition operations in future OOTW missions.

SEMINAR PROGRAMME

Day One: 6 October 2011 (Thursday)

0900 – 0905 **Opening Remarks**
Col Ng Kin Yi, Commandant GKS CSC

0905 – 0915 **Keynote Speech:**
BG Tung Yui Fai, COS-GS, SAF

0915 – 1045 **Panel 1: Case Studies in the Contributions of Small States & Regional Partners**
Chair: Assoc Prof Alan Chong

Singapore
BG (RET) Eric Tan Huck Gim, Director, National Archives of Singapore

Baltic States
Prof James Corum, Dean, Baltic Defence College

Scandinavia
Mr Anders Karlsson, Project Leader, Gothenburg Research Institute

South Asia
Prof S. D. Muni, Institute of South Asian Studies, NUS

1045 – 1100 **Coffee Break**
Venue: Outside Auditorium

1100 – 1230 **Panel 2: Interoperability in a Coalition Environment**
Chair: Dr Emrys Chew

Interoperability and Innovation
Commodore Richard Menhinick, Commandant, ACSC

Concerns and Dimensions of Interoperability
Mr Michael Codner, Director Military Sciences, RUSI

Partnerships in Local Training/IMET
Assoc Prof Ahmed Hashim, RSIS

Interoperability in the Maritime Commons
Mr Bernard Miranda, Director, National Maritime Operations Group, SAF

1230 – 1330 **Lunch**
Venue: GKS Gallery

1330 - 1500 **Panel 3: International Security, International Law and Ethics**
Chair: Assoc Prof Bernard Loo

Armed Forces and the Comprehensive Approach
Prof Cynthia Watson, National Defense University

Small States as Builders of Regional Security (Asia Pacific)
Assoc Prof Alan Chong, RSIS

Ethical Realism: Why Small States Should Have Ethical Foreign Policies
Prof Christopher Coker, London School of Economics

Regional Initiatives: A Way for Small States to Uphold and Shape International Law
Mr Alvin Tan, Associate Research Fellow, RSIS

1500 – 1515 **Coffee Break**
Venue: Outside Auditorium

1730 – 1830 **Army Museum and SAFTI MI Tour**
(for Speakers and Discussants)

1830 – 2000 **Cocktails and Dinner**
Venue: Officers' Mess, SAFTI MI

Day Two: 7 October 2011 (Friday)

0900 – 1030 **Panel 4: Civil, Military and Media Engagement**

Chair: Dr Ong Weichong

Reassessing the Role of Small States as Shapers of International Security and International Missions

Dr Jim Rolfe, Deputy Director, Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence

Conceptualising the Civil-Military Nexus

Prof Franz Kernic, Swedish National Defence College

Small States as Drivers of Civil-Military Cooperation

Asst Prof Martijn Kitzen, Netherlands Defence Academy

The Media and the Armed Forces

Mr James Dorsey, Senior Fellow, RSIS

1045 – 1100 **Coffee Break**

Venue: Outside Auditorium

1045 – 1215 **The Future of Stability Operations**

Dr (Col) Thomas Hammes, National Defense University

Discussants

Mr Bernard Miranda
Director,
National Maritime Operations Group, SAF

Dr Tim Huxley
Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies – Asia

Assoc Prof Bernard Loo
RSIS

1230 – 1330 **Lunch**

Venue: GKS Gallery

1315 – 1430 **Syndicated Group Discussion for Participants**

Venue: Syndicate Rooms

1500 – 1515 **Coffee Break**

Venue: Outside Auditorium

1500 – 1530 **Plenary Presentation**

1530 – 1545 **Closing Remarks**

BG Mark Tan Ming Yiak, Commandant, SAFTI
(Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence)
Leonard Sebastian (RSIS)
James Dorsey (RSIS)

Chairperson:
Richard Bitzinger

1200 – 1400 **Presentation of Certificates followed by Farewell Lunch**

1400 **Departures**

LIST OF SPEAKERS, CHAIRS AND DISCUSSANTS

1. **Dr Ahmed Hashim**
   Associate Professor
   S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

2. **Dr Alan Chong**
   Associate Professor
   S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

3. **Mr Alvin Tan**
   Associate Research Fellow
   S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

4. **Mr Anders Karlsson**
   Project Leader
   Gothenburg Research Institute,
   University of Gothenburg, Sweden

5. **Dr Bernard Loo**
   Associate Professor
   S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

6. **Mr Bernard Miranda**
   Director,
   National Maritime Operations Group
   Republic of Singapore Navy

7. **Prof Cynthia Watson**
   Professor of Strategy
   The National War College
   The National Defense University

8. **Prof Christopher Coker**
   Professor
   London School of Economics

9. **BG (RET) Eric Tan Huck Gim**
   Director
   National Archives of Singapore

10. **Prof Franz Kernic**
    Professor
    Swedish National Defence College

11. **Prof James Corum**
    Dean
    Baltic Defence College

12. **Mr James Michael Dorsey**
    Senior Fellow
    S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

13. **Dr Jim Rolfe**
    Senior Fellow
    Centre for Strategic Studies, New Zealand

14. **Dr Martijn Kitzen**
    Assistant Professor
    Netherlands Defence Academy

15. **Mr Michael Codner**
    Senior Research Fellow / Director, Military Sciences
    Royal United Services Institute for Defence and
    Security Studies

16. **Dr Ong Weichong**
    Research Fellow
    S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

17. **Commodore Richard Menhinick**
    Commandant
    Australian Command and Staff College

18. **Prof Sukh Deo Muni**
    Visiting Research Professor Institute of
    South Asian Studies,
    National University of Singapore

19. **Dr Thomas Hammes**
    Distinguished Research Fellow
    Centre for Strategic Research,
    Institute for National Strategic Studies

20. **Dr Tim Huxley**
    Executive Director
    International Institute for Strategic Studies-Asia

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