




NORTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM WORKSHOP

**IS NORTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM THE CENTRE
FOR EAST ASIAN REGIONALISM?**

**6 JULY 2012
SINGAPORE**



**S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**
A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

NORTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM WORKSHOP

IS NORTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM
THE CENTRE FOR EAST ASIAN REGIONALISM?

REPORT OF A WORKSHOP ORGANISED BY
THE CENTRE FOR MULTILATERALISM STUDIES,
S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, SINGAPORE

6 JULY 2012
TRADERS HOTEL
SINGAPORE

S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY

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Editors: Catherine Samaniego and Joann Saw

This report summarises the proceedings of the workshop as interpreted by the assigned rapporteurs and editors of the RSIS Centre for Multilateralism Studies. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.

The workshop adheres to a variation of the Chatham House rule. Accordingly, beyond the points expressed in the prepared papers, no other attributions have been included in this workshop report.

OPENING SESSION

The discussion on Northeast Asian regionalism was timely given the current rapid growth of the region. Alongside this growth, there has also been a gradual strengthening and institutionalisation of cooperation, such as the annual summit involving China, Japan and South Korea.

Several factors influence the development of multilateral frameworks in Northeast Asia. First, no common cause exists among the Northeast Asian states to provide a rallying point for joint action. Second, historical animosity colours current relations among the Northeast Asian states. Third, there is a fundamental shift in the balance of power driven by China's rise which could not only lead to greater economic interdependence among Northeast Asian states, but also to concerns about China's long-term aims. Fourth, Japan and South Korea are able to rely on

the United States for security assurances. Fifth, member states in the Six Party Talks have different interests with regard to stability on the Korean peninsula.

Due to the slow progress of Northeast Asian regionalism, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is likely to retain its centrality in East Asia. Furthermore, instead of a single platform for multilateral cooperation, a number of overlapping structures could ultimately materialise in the region.

Bringing together experts from China, Japan and South Korea, the workshop aimed to address the topic of Northeast Asian regionalism from the policy and academic perspectives. Discussions would focus on the frameworks and issues that define Northeast Asian regionalism.

SESSION I: IS THERE NORTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM?

Northeast Asian Economic Regionalism: Internal Adjustment and External Dynamism

Two characteristics of cooperative economic frameworks in Northeast Asia were highlighted in the presentation. The first feature was the measured and informal approach taken by China, Japan and South Korea towards trilateral cooperation. Despite the strong economic interdependence among the three Northeast Asian states, they have yet to sign any bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) among themselves. The series of historical and territorial disputes plaguing Northeast Asia was cited as one obstacle to economic rationalism in the region. Prior to governmental-level negotiations on a trilateral FTA, the Northeast Asian states were involved in Track II discussions to sustain momentum on the issue. This informal approach was useful in giving more time for leaders to make the final decision on the pact.

The second feature of Northeast Asian economic regionalism was the Trans-Pacific Partnership's (TPP) role as an external catalyst for economic cooperation. U.S. participation in the TPP negotiations had arguably hastened the pace of economic cooperation among Northeast Asian states. In response to U.S. involvement in the TPP, China had become more active in encouraging the conclusion of a trilateral FTA with Japan and South Korea. China had also been spurred to negotiate a separate FTA with South Korea, using the bilateral deal to motivate Japan's participation in a trilateral FTA. In this sense, the United States, particularly its commitment to the TPP, acts as a key external force in the process of Northeast Asian economic regionalism.

Trilateral Cooperation and Northeast Asian Regionalism

It is worth noting that regional cooperation in Northeast Asia is markedly different from that in Southeast Asia, the larger East Asia, or the Asia Pacific region. Although regional integration in Northeast Asia lags behind Southeast Asia and Europe, cooperation among China, Japan and South Korea has entered a new phase with the institutionalisation of the annual Northeast Asia trilateral summit. The summit, which sees all three states

represented at the highest level, provides an avenue for functional cooperation in areas such as tourism, finance, as well as science and technology.

At best, the tasks that lie ahead for Northeast Asian states in pursuit of stronger regional cooperation are daunting. First, China, Japan and South Korea must manage their bilateral conflicts, such as historical and territorial disputes, to minimise their adverse impact on interstate relations. Second, they must ensure the effectiveness of functional cooperation in economic and social issues. Third, they should seek regional security cooperation, a process which could be kick-started by discussing common security issues. Fourth, a positive relationship must be cultivated between Northeast Asian groups and other cooperative forums in Asia. Fifth, Northeast Asian trilateral cooperation could boost ASEAN centrality as the leaders of China, Japan and South Korea have acknowledged the importance of ASEAN and its associated platforms.

Shanghai Cooperation Dialogue and Northeast Asian Regionalism

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has yet to overcome a number of challenges in order to help maintain stability in Northeast Asia. First, although SCO member states generally agreed that the organisation should and could expand, they had different stances on when this should occur, as well as which countries should be included. Second, with SCO member states bordering Afghanistan, the planned withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from the country, which may lead to volatility in the region, would be an issue of concern to the organisation. Third, the SCO should remain committed to take joint economic and diplomatic measures to counter instability in the region. Fourth, economic cooperation for SCO member states is traditionally more difficult to achieve than security cooperation. On the latter issue, member states have arrived at a consensus and are able to pursue common rules and regulations. However, due to the different economic performances of the member states, they have different interests in this area, posing an obstacle to economic integration projects.

The SCO experience could provide some lessons for Northeast Asian regionalism. First, the different political regimes and cultures of individual countries could be overcome if mutual respect exists among the member states. Second, the SCO was formed only after territorial disputes among member states were resolved. Third, political consensus and common interests are necessary to sustain regional cooperation.

Discussion

Concerns were raised over the lack of support from the United States over trilateral cooperation in the region and the effectiveness of Northeast Asian regionalism without U.S. support. This observation is consistent with the dual-track policy adopted by the United States towards the region: beefing up its military alliances with Japan and South Korea, while promoting the TPP, which excluded China from participation. In addition, it was remarked that the United States-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) would hinder South Korea's trilateral cooperation with China and Japan. In responding to these issues, it was argued that Northeast

Asian trilateralism might have caused some tensions between the United States and Northeast Asian states, but U.S. approach towards regional cooperation was largely dependent on the ruling administration.

Japan's official stance on the TPP was also put into question. As Japan awaits its general elections in 2013, it remains uncertain as to whether Japan would have to make an exclusive choice between joining the TPP or Northeast Asian trilateralism. Nevertheless, it has been opined that Japan could carry on with both the TPP and Northeast Asian trilateral cooperation. By doing so, it could employ the trilateral framework to pressure the United States to ease potentially tough conditions of the TPP.

As for Northeast Asian regionalism vis-à-vis that in ASEAN, it would be beneficial for Northeast Asian cooperation to retain a narrow and effective focus—remaining within the larger East Asian regionalism centred on ASEAN. ASEAN has refrained from being provocative in the past decade, and this approach could help reduce tensions arising from historical issues in Northeast Asia.

SESSION II: SECURITY DIMENSION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM

Alliances, Trilateralism and Northeast Asian Regionalism

The security architecture in Asia has been described as a “complex patchwork” of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, which promotes cooperation across many different combinations and patterns, particularly in Northeast Asia. Central to this patchwork is the U.S. alliance system that serves as a “thread” which stitches the patchwork together. Despite the interlinked and flexible nature of the structures within this patchwork, it may be argued that Asian regionalism is more accurately characterised as a “fraying fabric”. Regionalism efforts are hindered due to the lingering sense of distrust among Asian states. Four explanations can be put forward to explain this phenomenon.

Firstly, Chinese sensitivities contribute to a climate of uncertainty as to how the region’s states behave and react to one another within the ambit of China-related issues. Secondly, the prevailing historical animosity continues to hamper the reduction of tension and reconciliation process among countries in the region. Thirdly, leaders encounter a great deal of domestic political pressure to steer away from Asian regionalism. Some instances include Seoul’s domestically driven retreat from Northeast Asian regionalism, and Shinzo Abe’s failure to forge a regional “alliance of democracies” due to lack of support. Finally, the strong strategic culture among Asian states serves as a barrier towards the realisation of Northeast Asian regionalism, as seen in China’s and India’s behaviour as rising powers.

Further, as the U.S.-China-Japan trilateral relations remain a large question mark, it remains difficult to assess whether this strategic culture reflects Asian states hedging their bets, or whether it is symptomatic of an Asian “alliance allergy”. To conclude, deep-seated barriers continue to hinder progress on Northeast Asian regionalism. The present alliances in place are unlikely to make strong building blocks for a robust regional architecture. Ultimately, the future prospects of the existing “patchwork” architecture are bleak.

Six-Party Talks: A Phoenix Waits for Reincarnation

The Six-Party Talks (SPT) was borne from the ashes of the unsuccessful U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Whereas the aforementioned agreements were unable to reach the desired outcome, it is simply too early to make conclusions with respect to the SPT’s success. Nevertheless, there is some value in highlighting the accomplishments of the SPT. Apart from achieving diplomatic breakthrough by attempting to bring all six of the region’s major players to talk about a common issue, it was also able to improve interaction between its members. It did so by successfully formulating a set of principles, which encouraged participating states to form a framework for cooperation.

The disappointments, however, are not to be ignored. The SPT’s failure can be attributed to three main problems. Firstly, member states’ failure to achieve its objectives in the denuclearisation field automatically led to failure in resolving other commonly-faced regional issues. Secondly, other participating member states remain concerned about what they perceived as China’s ambiguous role in the SPT. Thirdly, domestic politics in some of the member states, including Japan’s domestic instability and the push and pull between the conservative and liberal parties in South Korea, impacted the progress of the SPT.

Is the SPT still the only viable mechanism to address the issue of denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula? This remains to be seen, as prospects of China persuading North Korea to discontinue its nuclear programme remain slim to none. The SPT is, however, a way to manage the denuclearisation issue for the time being by keeping North Korea engaged in conversation with other regional powers. In this regard, the SPT would, therefore, need to undergo numerous changes in its structural, procedural and fundamental objectives in order to reassert its utility in helping ensure a more secure Northeast Asia.

Seeking a New Maritime Order in Northeast Asia: Between Sovereignty and Boundary Disputes

Five key characteristics give light to East Asian maritime disputes. Firstly, many of them are rooted in colonial times, exacerbated by the arbitrary map-making of colonial powers and exploited by postcolonial nationalists. Secondly, the San Francisco Peace Treaty left their sovereignties undefined. Thirdly, the 1994 United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) complicated the situation by heightening the material importance of maritime zones. Fourth, very few target states recognise the existence of disputes at all, thereby preventing claimant countries from engaging in negotiations. Finally, maritime disputes have tended to rear their head across the region simultaneously. This is attributable to the rise of China and the U.S. pivot towards maritime East Asia.

In contrast to Europe, effective regional institutions aimed at addressing issues on sovereignty, resource sharing, maritime delimitation and environmental protection have yet to be put in place in East Asia. The mainly bilateral approach employed in East Asia has several limitations, namely: (i) its uncoordinated web of bilateral agreements on resource development, which can adversely affect third parties; (ii) the absence of a regulatory entity for fishing in the region to address overfishing; (iii) the complexities involved in the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and continental shelf boundaries; and (iv) the duality of the concerned parties as targets and claimants with regard to sovereignty and sovereign rights issues.

A suggested way forward is to establish a regional multilateral regime embedded within UNCLOS in the form of a Maritime Six-Party Talks or ASEAN Plus Four arrangement, which would include South Korea, Japan, China, the United States, Russia and ASEAN. Accordingly, a sequential scheme for multilateral delimitation of maritime boundaries can be adopted. This code of conduct would include a, consensus-based code of conduct, which shall enable states to resolve issues without prejudice to each party's sovereign claims in favour of joint development.

Discussion

With respect to maritime territorial disputes, it was argued that it is perhaps time to think about directly addressing issues on sovereignty instead of attempting to separate sovereignty and sovereign rights issues. In response, it was remarked that it would be difficult to separate or divide sovereignty and sovereign rights issues as both are deeply interlinked. In this case, the more logical approach would be to first resolve "soft" issues before addressing the "hard" ones.

Negotiating territorial issues is rather problematic in East Asia where realist frameworks dominate. Although the notion of a shift from realism to a more liberal or constructivist framework among East Asian countries remains a far-off idea, it may, however, be possible to at least reach a consensus on what kind of delimitation principles can and should be adopted, as the possibility of working on mutually acceptable or trilaterally acceptable principles still exists.

U.S. military rebalancing to Asia would affect the emerging Northeast Asian security architecture in various ways. For one, this act of rebalancing would reinforce the existing security architecture. In the short to medium term, this would strengthen U.S.-led bilateral alliances, particularly U.S.-South Korea, U.S.-Australia and U.S.-Japan. Arguably, the importance of U.S.-led alliances would increase especially in the context of balancing the United States and China in the region.

Although the United States is also forging new strategic partnerships with emerging regional powers such as Vietnam, Indonesia and India, it remains focused on a bilateral mindset and uses this to approach all strategic relationships. The United States is diversifying beyond traditional alliances because of China's growing power and strategic weight in the region, concerns of gradual decline of Japanese economic and strategic importance, growing U.S. financial and budgetary pressures, and a desire to share the burden of regional security. The TPP has also been touted as a major signifier of U.S. economic rebalancing towards Asia.

Regarding China's ambiguous role in the SPT, it was mentioned that China often struggles with its dual role in relation to North Korea. Despite China and North Korea being traditional allies, China does not really have many tools to constrain North Korea's provocative behaviour, which is frustrating for China as it also tries to fulfil its duties as a responsible global actor. Also, there is ongoing and unresolved debate over whether a unified Korean peninsula would be good or bad for China, with conventional wisdom arguing that a divided peninsula is better.

Despite China and North Korea's amicable relationship, North Korea's provocations, such as the country's hasty withdrawal from the Leap Day deal and the subsequent failed satellite launch, remain a cause for concern. In the near future, if China wants to play a major role in Northeast Asia and restart the SPT, it needs to come to terms with the duality of its identity in relation to North Korea and figure out methods to balance both its roles more effectively.

SESSION III: ASEAN'S RESPONSE

ASEAN's Centrality and Northeast Asian Regionalism

ASEAN's ability to exercise some form of leadership within the regional security architecture is predominantly due to its institutional experience and the absence of alternate source of leadership within the region. Because ASEAN's leadership style was based on a loose consensus, informality and the pandering towards the lowest common denominator, the existing mistrust between ASEAN member states and domestic conflicts continue to limit the extent to which the ASEAN community is able to exercise collective leadership of regional affairs. On the other hand, Northeast Asian regionalism can be characterised as "strong on economics, but less so in security". This is evidenced in the lack of response from the Republic of Korea's neighbours, China and Japan, in relation to the Cheonan sinking in March 2010. In addition, this indicates the prevailing tensions between the three states. Despite unease with each other, the three states had largely exhibited a favourable disposition towards the notion of ASEAN centrality.

ASEAN centrality has both positive and negative implications on Northeast Asian regionalism. On the positive note, ASEAN states have played a key role in bringing the leaders of China, Republic of Korea and Japan together. It has also served as a platform for these three states to engage other great and middle powers. However, on the negative side, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has yet to demonstrate success in moving

towards preventive diplomacy as seen in the ongoing stalemate over the Korean peninsula.

This brings the realisation that the "ASEAN Way" might not be the appropriate model to address regional security issues in Northeast Asia, given the differences in terms of priority. Hence, regional security in Northeast Asia is still best maintained through bilateralism and engagement with the United States.

ASEAN and "Northeast Asian Regionalism"

Geographically speaking, Northeast Asia is not only comprised of China, North and South Korea, and Japan, but Taiwan, Russia and Mongolia as well. More often than not, however, the term "Northeast Asia" is used to refer only to the first four of the aforementioned countries. Given the strong American presence in the region, it is almost impossible to discuss regionalism and security issues in Northeast Asia without alluding to U.S. hegemony. The three potential flashpoints that continue to hurdle regionalism in the region are as follows: (i) the South China Sea disputes; (ii) the Taiwan Straits and; (iii) the Korean Peninsula.

With the absence of a formal regional organisation, Northeast Asian regionalism is embodied in the Northeast Asia trilateral summit, ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the Chiang Mai Initiative on Multilateralism (CMIM), and

the proposed China-Japan-South Korea free trade agreement, among others. The existing arrangement between ASEAN and its Northeast Asian partners is sustained for two reasons: (i) the lack of a unified agenda among ASEAN states, which makes it a less hostile environment for dialogue; and (ii) the persisting and unresolved historical antagonisms between China, Japan, and the Koreans. As a result, this creates conditions that allow ASEAN centrality to stay in place in view of East Asian integration. In order to ensure proper development of the regional architecture, ASEAN, for its part, must develop a more active stance.

Ultimately, integration between ASEAN and Northeast Asia can be enhanced by increasing information dissemination and improving relations between states. This can be attained through the following measures: (i) China, Japan, South Korea and the United States should keep ASEAN well-informed about developments on pressing security issues such as stability on the Korean Peninsula, instead of only choosing to provide updates at the ARF; and (ii) reconciliation must be promoted in order to help states overcome sentiments of historical animosity.

ASEAN's Role in Northeast Asian Regionalism: A Southeast Asian Perspective

ASEAN's involvement with respect to the evolution of Northeast Asian regionalism can be divided into three phases. The first phase, which lasted from 1997 until 2007, saw an ASEAN performing the role of both host and catalyst. This was seen in the initiation of the APT summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1997, in which leaders from China, Republic of Korea and Japan have since taken part. These summits have resulted in the staging of an official trilateral summit among the three states in 2002, which was subsequently held along with annual APT meetings. The second phase, which spans from 2008 until present, saw Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian states moving as "tandem partners" within the broader East Asia regionalism process. For the third phase, ASEAN's role in the foreseeable future is likely to be that of a "back-up facilitator".

The factors affecting the role of ASEAN are political, institutional and economic in nature—all of which could mutually interact and reinforce one another in order to overcome the negative effects that may arise from such regional arrangements. The extent to which ASEAN centrality prevails would rely on the level of cohesion, prosperity and stability the ASEAN community is able to achieve.

Discussion

The possibility of realistically achieving Northeast Asian aspirations of establishing a regional organisation remains in question. This is attributable to the fact that, at present, there exists little to no collective consciousness among the member states, which will be unlikely to change in the future.

On the issue regarding the role of ASEAN in Northeast Asia, it was posited that ASEAN's impact on Northeast Asian regionalism has been minimal, and that the role of ASEAN in the global balance of power is relatively passive. In light of the negative implications brought about by the weak sense of region between Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian states, it has been argued that the notion of ASEAN centrality poses a threat to ASEAN's own credibility. This dynamic makes U.S. involvement in the region crucial, as it is an independent variable which influences how the region chooses to respond.

Attention was also drawn to the nature of the relationship between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Although these two regions are considered to be "tandem partners", cooperation between them is not always assured. Nevertheless, their futures have become deeply interconnected.





WORKSHOP PROGRAMME

Friday, 6 July 2012

8:30 - 9:00 Registration The Gallery, Level 2 9:00 - 9:10 Opening Remarks <i>Professor Joseph Liow, Associate Dean, RSIS, NTU</i> 9:10 - 10:00 Keynote Speech <i>BG (NS) Chee Wee Kiong, Second Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore</i> Open floor discussion 10:00 - 10:30 Coffee Break 10:30 - 12:00 Session I: Is There Northeast Asian Regionalism? <i>Moderator: Ralf Emmers, Coordinator, Multilateralism & Regionalism Programme, RSIS, NTU</i> Northeast Asian Economic Regionalism: Internal Adjustment and External Dynamism <i>Takashi Terada, Doshisha University</i> Trilateral Cooperation and Northeast Asian Regionalism <i>Jo Yanghyeon, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS)</i> Shanghai Cooperation Dialogue and Northeast Asian Regionalism <i>Zhao Huasheng, Fudan University</i> Open floor discussion 12:00 - 13:30 Lunch Ah Hoi's Kitchen, Poolside, Level 4	13:30 - 15:00 Session II: Security Dimension of Northeast Asian Regionalism <i>Moderator: Bhubhindar Singh, Assistant Professor, Multilateralism & Regionalism Programme, RSIS, NTU</i> Alliances, Trilateralism and Northeast Asian Regionalism <i>Brendan Taylor, Australian National University (ANU)</i> Six Party Talks: A Phoenix Waits for Reincarnation <i>Cheng Xiaohu, Renmin University of China</i> Seeking a New Maritime Order in Northeast Asia: Between Sovereignty and Boundary Disputes <i>Koo Min Gyo, Seoul National University</i> Open floor discussion 15:00 - 15:20 Coffee Break 15:20 - 16:50 Session III: ASEAN's Response <i>Moderator: Tan Seng Chye, Senior Fellow, RSIS, NTU</i> ASEAN's Centrality and Northeast Asian Regionalism <i>Ralf Emmers, Multilateralism & Regionalism Programme, RSIS</i> ASEAN and 'Northeast Asian Regionalism' <i>Rodolfo Severino, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)</i>
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**ASEAN's Role in Northeast Asian
Regionalism: A Southeast
Asian Perspective**
*Kuik Cheng-Chwee,
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Open floor discussion

16:50 - 17:00 Concluding Session
*Bhubhindar Singh, Assistant Professor,
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ABOUT THE CENTRE FOR MULTILATERALISM STUDIES

The Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS) is a research entity within the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. The CMS team conducts cutting-edge research, teaching/training, and networking on cooperative multilateralism in the Asia Pacific region. The Centre aims to contribute to international academic and public discourses on regional architecture and order in Asia Pacific. It aspires to be an international knowledge hub for multilateral and regional cooperation.

Our Objectives

- To conduct scholarly and policy research on multilateral and regional issues.
- To facilitate policy dialogue and academic debate on regional cooperation and integration.
- To enhance the capacity of current and future leaders, officials, professionals, and students through executive and graduate education.
- To network and collaborate with other academic and research institutions.

Our Activities

In meeting its objectives, the Centre works through the following scope of activities:

- Annual conferences and workshops
- Research Fellow programme
- Curriculum development
- Policy-relevant research outputs

CMS is committed to generate a regular stream of high-impact scholarly and policy-oriented research as well as to disseminate them through myriad formats, media and outlets – targeted at policymakers, think-tanks and academic audiences.

Our Research

The Centre's research agenda includes international and global forms as well as expressions of cooperative multilateralism:

- **Economic multilateralism**

Research areas include trade, monetary, and financial integration in ASEAN, ASEAN+3, South Asia, and Central Asia; evolving linkages between various Asian sub-regions and with countries/sub-regions outside the region (such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC and Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP); and developments in the global economic architecture (including the Group of Twenty, G20) to ensure complementarity between global and regional initiatives.

- **Diplomatic and security multilateralism**

Research areas include intergovernmental and non official arrangements such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN+3, East Asia Summit (EAS), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Six-Party Talks, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), and the like. Initiatives in defence diplomacy include the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM Plus, the Shangri-la Dialogue, and alliances.

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ABOUT THE S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

RSIS is a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia Pacific region.

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) is a professional graduate school of international affairs at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. RSIS' mission is to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of security studies and international affairs. Its core functions are research, graduate teaching and networking. It produces cutting-edge research on Asia Pacific Security, Multilateralism and Regionalism, Conflict Studies, Non-Traditional Security, International Political Economy, and Country and Area Studies. RSIS' activities are aimed at assisting policymakers to develop comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking on issues related to security and stability in the Asia Pacific.

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