15TH ASIA PACIFIC PROGRAMME FOR SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS (APPSMO)

The Future of War

S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

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Contents

SUMMARY OF APPSMO 2013

The 15th Asia Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO), organised by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), was held at the Sentosa Resort & Spa from 5 to 11 August 2013. Since its inception in 1999, APPSMO has provided a unique and important forum for military officers and defence analysts to network and exchange views on a broad range of subjects related to regional and international security. APPSMO 2013 maintained the objective of the annual series by facilitating defence diplomacy with the participation of 54 military officers and defence planners from 25 countries representing Asia, Oceania, North America and Europe.

During the week-long programme, the participants attended a series of seminars and discussions that featured experts from both the academic and policy communities. The theme for APPSMO 2013 was *The Future of War*. Some of the key topics discussed included emerging dimensions of war and strategy, the definition of war in the 21st century, warfare in new domains, civil-military cooperation in a coalition environment, modern challenges to the military profession and Sino-U.S. nuclear policy.

The participants also went on several trips including visits to the Information Fusion Centre at the Changi Naval Base and the Army Museum of Singapore, as well as a city tour of Singapore. The participants and speakers also attended Singapore's National Day Parade on 9 August. APPSMO 2013 fulfilled an important role in defence diplomacy by facilitating interaction and a better understanding among senior military officers from the Asia Pacific and beyond.

WELCOME REMARKS

Ambassador Barry Desker

Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS);
Director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)

Ambassador Barry Desker, Dean of RSIS and Director of IDSS, noted that APPSMO, now in its 15th year, had grown markedly from its modest start in 1999. While APPSMO had in the past addressed wide-ranging themes such as the promises and perils of globalisation or the emergence of non-traditional security threats, Dean Desker noted that the focus of APPSMO this year was squarely on an issue that was exclusive to the military vocation: *The Future of War*.

Dean Desker noted that the theme was much more pertinent in that it sought to address a subject that the military profession was constantly preparing for, but because of immediate operational demands, it did not have the luxury to ponder on. APPSMO was an excellent opportunity to do so. Although Dean Desker hoped this year's event would pique the interest of participants in the changing character, if not the nature of war in the near future, he also stressed the need for caution when engaging in such intellectual voyages of trying to forecast future horizons.

"There is no crystal ball that can readily predict or determine what the future of war or conflict will look like, but there are certain questions that we can ask to point us in the right direction," he said. Some relevant questions might include the changes that will significantly affect the character of war in the twenty-first century, and how to better manage civil-military cooperation in complex operations at the small-unit level.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Mr Chan Chun Sing

Acting Minister for Social and Family Development;
Senior Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, Singapore

Mr Chan Chun Sing, Acting Minister for Social and Family Development, and Senior Minister of State for Defence, recalled his own experiences as a former APPSMO participant, and noted that one of the most important things APPSMO provided, beyond engaging in intellectual discussions, was the network of officers that have been built within such forums.

Mr Chan described this year's APPSMO theme as ambitious because it was difficult to predict the future. The only thing that could be predicted with certainty was that history would not end, and thus there would be no end to war too. While the week's discussions could be inconclusive, the process of examining the factors that would affect what the future of war and warfare would be, and how they were constantly evolving, would be important.

Mr Chan suggested if one were to examine the types of conflicts within the region over the past century, these factors could be classified by 3 'R's - resources, race and religion, and rights. On resources, he noted that such contests would become more acute, in particular when there was an imbalance in their allocation, especially amongst countries that have them and those countries that needed them. He observed that the Asia Pacific region was growing rapidly, and the kind and quantum of resources needed were tremendous. Ultimately, friction between states could arise because of an inability to meet these rising demands satisfactorily. He hoped that future generations could learn to manage these inevitable tensions because letting them fester could be a trigger for war.

With regards to race and religion, while the region has unquestionably progressed economically, Mr Chan cautioned that ethnic and religious concerns could still be present regardless of the degree of economic development. He cited the example of the fall of Suharto and the civil unrest along racial and religious lines that ensued despite the great economic progress Indonesia had made since independence. This reaction was visceral and could not be logically explained because it was perpetrated by people who adhered to a centuries-old tradition of primarily identifying themselves by race and religion. He pointed out that many people still continued to do so, and that constructive and amicable mechanisms were needed for people to resolve any tension along racial and religious lines before they erupt into full-blown conflict.

Elaborating on rights, Mr Chan separated them into two types – the right to national sovereignty of land and space, and rights to a particular system of governance in a particular country. He argued that wars had long been fought for these two reasons, and were not likely to disappear with future generations. He observed that there was perhaps more similarity than difference between conflicts then and now. He hoped future generations would develop mechanisms to address such tensions before they escalated into war.

Mr Chan then examined how, and if, war had changed in the terms used for war. The dichotomy of "conventional" and "unconventional" warfare familiar to those trained in the Western school of military thought, was artificial, he argued. War was still war, and was simply a clash of wills, in which, to many the dichotomy did not exist. Similarly, the notion of the "front-line," one that separated an environment into two distinct realms, one at war, and the other at peace, did not exist anymore. Mr Chan concluded that war in the present affected all of society.

Turning to the non-tangible aspects of war, Mr Chan suggested that a nuanced appreciation of new spheres of war and warfare, for instance, the cyber, informational and psychological dimensions, was needed. He argued that success in conflict had increasingly less to do with the tangible aspects of conventional weapons military platforms, and more to do with victory in those other domains.

The third characteristic of warfare that has changed, Mr Chan noted, was whether war existed as a distinct phase, or a long drawn-out contest. Even classic conflicts like the Napoleonic and American Civil Wars did not start and end neatly. Instead, they were arguably a simmering struggle of competition between ideas and forces. As such, wars should be seen on a spectrum from the high intensity to the prolonged and sustained.

Owing to the dynamic nature of war and warfare, Mr Chan then highlighted the importance of training that increased the adaptability of personnel. Besides training, agility in mind and spirit, he argued, was what the contemporary operating environment demanded. In his view, future contests could be won not by those who had the best technical training, but by those who could adapt to change, and therefore had the ability to stay the course.

Additionally, society at large, and not just the military, had to learn to be adaptable amidst such challenges. Mr Chan cited Singapore's concept of Total Defence as one instrument of fostering such adaptability by assigning the responsibility of defence on multiple aspects of society as a whole, and not just on the military. In that way, he observed, Singapore had greater flexibility in responding to contemporary threats.

Additionally, Mr Chan stressed that technology merely complemented the human spirit but could not fully replace it in war. In his opinion, there was too much focus on technology and its impact on future wars. While acknowledging technology's increasing importance in armed conflict, he advocated equal attention to be paid to the human dimension in such contests. At its root, he noted, conflict was still a contest of wills and resilience, characteristics that were arguably timeless. As such, in returning to this year's APPSMO theme, Mr Chan posited that amidst all this change, the underlying elements of war and warfare might not have actually changed at all.

In conclusion, Mr Chan hoped that the participants would build bonds and foster relationships that would hopefully lead to greater trust in the region. Mr Chan noted that defence diplomacy has always been central to the region, and just as their predecessors had utilised the institutions and forums of their time to form meaningful relationships and deepen their mutual understanding, so too must current and future generations. The creation of trust based on personal and professional relationships, Mr Chan believed, would greatly help to resolve many of the security challenges in the region.

DISTINGUISHED LUNCH TALK

LESSONS LEARNED FROM STABILITY AND SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC

Dr Wayne Mapp

Commissioner, New Zealand Law Commission;
Former Minister of Defence, New Zealand

Dr Wayne Mapp began his presentation by first highlighting the growing involvement of Asia Pacific militaries in stability and security operations, and used the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) as an example. He noted that the challenges that confronted the NZDF in the aftermath of the Christchurch earthquake were daunting, and would not have been easily surmountable without the assistance rendered by external partners. The NZDF's stability and security operations worldwide, which ranged from the South Pacific to Bosnia, had generally been successful, but there have also been notable failures. The question was whether the NZDF's experience over the past 25 years would provide a useful guide for stability and security operations in the foreseeable future.

Dr Mapp pointed out that militaries were primarily configured for conventional warfighting operations. Their involvement in stability and security operations is therefore guided by national interest. Dr Mapp said that as far as the NZDF is concerned, participation in stability and security operations serves the immediate security interests of New Zealand, especially in the immediate environment of the South Pacific. By collaborating closely with its Australian counterpart, the NZDF could showcase its ability to work together with its allies and partners in safeguarding regional stability. Consequently, Dr Mapp argued that the NZDF's involvement in stability and security operations in the Asia Pacific played an important role in preserving external partners' confidence in peace and prosperity in the region.

The NZDF has learnt useful lessons from participating in stability and security operations. The first lesson learnt was that such operations often take a long time to bear fruits. Dr Mapp cited the case of Timor-Leste as an example of how newly sovereign states required considerable amount

of time to regain stability after a conflict. The second lesson learnt was that there are usually no quick fixes to local problems encountered as a result of local societal, political and ethnic complexities. The NZDF had frequently encountered such problems not just in Timor-Leste, but in numerous other stability and security operations it had undertaken in the South Pacific, such as in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands.

Dr Mapp outlined the various phases of such operations, starting with the insertion of forces into the theatre of operations, followed by the second phase of restoring peace and order by dealing directly with the security threats within the theatre. Thereafter, stability and security operations transit into the third phase of building local institutions' capacities, such as law enforcement. This leads to the final phase of withdrawal of foreign forces from the theatre. The NZDF's participation in stability and security operations in Afghanistan illuminated further useful lessons. For instance, the second phase of restoring law and order might not yield the desired results as quickly as planned and could require more time than what was allocated. As operations drag on, participating countries may begin to lose focus, affecting efforts to build the host country's institutional capacities that could also be hindered by challenging local conditions.

Dr Mapp noted that while it is hard for militaries to prepare themselves for every type of conceivable operation scenario, the ability to anticipate likely theatres where stability and security operations may occur will help militaries prepare themselves to better cope with any contingencies. The Asia Pacific has so far enjoyed relative stability compared to other regions such as the Middle East. With a major armed conflict in the Asia Pacific being deemed a remote possibility, due in no small part to the nuclear weapon balance in the region, Dr Mapp suggested that stability and security operations in the region could instead take the form of humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) operations, as well as other constabulary missions, for instance, in counter-piracy and counter-terrorism.

Finally, Dr Mapp stressed the need for continued dialogue to build a climate of interstate trust and mutual understanding in the Asia Pacific. He suggested that potential avenues for such dialogue and practical security cooperation in the region included the ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM+) that comprised Expert Working Groups focused on specific areas such as HADR and maritime security. He concluded that small states such as New Zealand would not only have to closely follow the ever-evolving geopolitical dynamics in the Asia Pacific neighbourhood, but also constantly seek avenues where they can help build peace and stability in both the regional and international milieu.



DISTINGUISHED DINNER TALK

WIELDING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN COMPLEX OPERATIONS

General (Ret.) John Allen

Distinguished Fellow of Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution;
Former Commander, International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces - Afghanistan

General (GEN) (Retired) John Allen began his talk by noting the importance of the U.S.-Singapore bilateral relationship, citing the example of his experiences working with soldiers from the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) during the aftermath of the 2004 South Asia Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. He also expressed his appreciation to Singaporean soldiers who had served alongside the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

On strategic communications, GEN Allen said it existed in a wide spectrum of activities that ranged from public affairs and diplomacy, to cyber security. Noting the increased complexity and sophistication of military operations, he added that there was extensive reliance on information, and dominating these spaces was essential to the success of these operations.

On information operations, GEN Allen highlighted five key principles: (i) all effective leaders are effective communicators; (ii) leaders owe their organisations a clear vision and focused mission statements; (iii) leaders have to understand the information space in which they operate; (iv) organisations with the best strategic communications are organised for speed and agility; and (v) leaders of complex organisations must give their subordinates access to information.

GEN Allen also spoke on the importance of understanding one's audience as part of ensuring success in information operations. Citing examples from his experience in Afghanistan, he emphasised that the presentation of information would need to account for differences in the manner the same information would be perceived by different recipients. Stressing the need to "be first with the truth and the truth always", he noted that strategic communications was all the more necessary, especially in a theatre like Afghanistan, where the war was winding down.

GEN Allen subsequently narrated the use of strategic communications in times of opportunities, crisis and emergencies. All three instances required the need for strong leadership in coordinating multi-agency responses to a rapidly evolving situation. There was also a need to manage the information space, particularly the media, so that false information would not be propagated.

Reiterating the need for strong and responsible leadership, GEN Allen added that the need to own the narrative in information operations was extremely important. Four principles – immediacy, proximity, voice and composition – were critical in ensuring the success of information operations. The best leaders, he said, understood the information space. The truth cannot be compromised in the quest for speed.

Session 1
Dimensions of War and Strategy

Professor Pascal Vennesson
Professor, RSIS

Professor Pascal Vennesson began with his thesis that warfare in the 21st century had to take into consideration the "Global Village," a community that provides the key constraints and enablers on the use of force. He stated that this "Global Village" does not affect every aspect of warfare, but rather the general freedom of action in war. Such freedom has increasingly been reshaped by the rising presence of transnational actors, ideas, norms, and practices that are distinct yet not always immediately visible. This could lead to an under-appreciation of their influence on the way wars are planned, fought, and justified.

Prof Vennesson suggested that rather than being abrupt and discontinuous, the changes in the character of war often result in gradual and incremental adjustments in the logic of military action, forming distinctive patterns where both transformation and continuity are intertwined. Furthermore, he added that in his own conceptualisation, and contrary to many globalisation theories, neither globalisation nor the global society negated or replaced anarchy, defined as the absence of central authority to enforce order. Globalisation has not resulted in a greater acceptance of the rule of law, or respect of central authorities. Transnational processes are still taking place within an international environment of anarchy.

In essence, by using the expression "war in the Global Village," Prof Vennesson suggested political and military leaders now face a complex and confusing world populated by a large cast of old and new characters guided by both old and new ideas. War and warfare now defy easy characterisation, and have become multi-faceted. For example, the "Naming and Shaming" campaigns by transnational actors such as Human Rights Watch, Green Peace, and other NGOs, could now be construed as a weapon against larger forces.

Prof Vennesson said political and military leaders could respond to the challenges of conducting operations in the "Global Village," by applying the principles of war to the ever-changing conditions which surround the forces. Doing so would allow the principal actors involved to transform, assist, or resist these conditions in such a way that would turn them into advantageous positions.
In closing, Prof Vennesson reminded the audience of Clausewitz's famous maxim that "every age has had its own peculiar forms of war, its own restrictive conditions, and its own prejudices." Similarly, he argued that the "Global Village" too has its own peculiar forms of war, its restrictive conditions and its prejudices. Ultimately, the character of war is likely to continue to be shaped not only by a system of rival states but by forces outside the state-centric systems.

Session 2

Defining War in the 21st Century

Dr Beatrice Heuser

Professor, Department of Politics and International Relations,
School of Politics & International Relations
University of Reading

Professor Beatrice Heuser argued that the definition of war as being conflict between two states within a defined period of time no longer holds true as war can continue well past its officially declared end. Furthermore, she noted war could now include the unilateral use of violence by a dominant party against a subordinate one, such as genocide.

Examining the ways some have tried to predict war, she noted different possible futures, and even the possibility of predicting unexpected "Black Swan" events. However, the details of these events cannot be precisely determined. One way to mitigate this uncertainty is to engage in scenario and contingency planning.

Prof Heuser cited Clausewitz's division of the factors of war into the eternal and changing, and noted that many often point to human and collective aggressiveness, leading to warfare, as an eternal factor of war. She, however, pointed out war has not consistently existed across human history, and only gained significance after the agriculture revolution. This, she posited, could indicate that profound cultural and social change can increase the occurrence of war. Conversely, war could decrease if humans organised themselves and interacted with each other differently.

Prof Heuser noted there are indeed factors of war that do appear eternal, pointing to individual psyche, learned inhibitions and learned aggressiveness. These factors, she noted, are more closely associated with the behavioural elements of war. For instance, human leadership and authority largely influences the occurrence of war and guides interactions between combatants and non-combatants. Other factors such as numeric superiority, the element of surprise, morale, perseverance and initiative also fall under the category of continuities of war. Although these factors may be dynamic in nature, they are still important determinants of the occurrence of war, and are hence eternal.

On the other hand, Prof Heuser outlined how war has changed. Apart from social structures, other drivers of change include values, the economic context as well as the political aims of war. More importantly, technology has also largely affected tactics and the very idea of war. To some extent, Prof Heuser argued, the qualities looked for in a soldier have also evolved through the years.

Prof Heuser also observed that amidst change in the factors of war there are still continuity in its causes. Prof Heuser agreed with Minister Chan that conflict would continue to be caused by tensions over rights, resources, and race and religion. She noted these timeless causes would remain important frames of reference for describing war in the future. Rights pertain to the perceived injustice or inequality that motivates people to take up arms.

Resources refer to a struggle for scarce resources which could worsen with population growth. Race and religion, Prof Heuser highlighted, was open to interpretation. Fully appreciating the basis of each interpretation, especially differing ones, was crucial to understanding conflict and war.

Given the complexity of war in the 21st century, Prof Heuser suggested Robert Cooper's mental model of the three categories of states and polities that coexist in the world today could help one make sense of it. The first category Cooper described comprises "Titans," states who resort to war to settle disputes and conflicts. The second, "Mars," claim the right to engage in wars for state sovereignty. The final category, "Venus," is made up of entities such as the European Union that believe conflicts and disputes can be settled peacefully rather than by unilateral violent acts. The challenge is that three types of states coexist in the world today. While "Venus" states may seek to avoid war, they coexist with others that may resort to force to achieve their goals.

Reflecting on Europe's experience with war, Prof Heuser observed Europe has transformed over many centuries from being a continent that has suffered much hardship and destruction from war to one that has experienced much peace and prosperity in recent times. This, she suggested, was largely the result of the embracing of new social and cultural values that promoted peace and economic growth. In comparison, many other parts of the world have not experienced this transformation. Prof Heuser therefore wondered if other countries have a choice of becoming a "Venus" like Europe, or remain as "Mars" or the "Titans." More importantly, she asked, could the European model be replicated elsewhere, especially in Asia?

Associate Professor Bernard Loo

Associate Professor, RSIS

Associate Professor Bernard Loo highlighted the importance of definitions in understanding the relationship between strategy, victory and narratives in the twenty-first century. He argued that the Clausewitzian definition of war was still a useful reference point – war is the clash of wills between two opposing forces, a dynamic entity of two competing end states. The real objective is therefore not battlefield victory per se, but success in breaking the enemy's will. Assoc Prof Loo then explored Colin Gray's definition of strategy, the bridge that relates power to political purpose. Here, strategy is the application of concrete actions or operations to target the enemy's centre of gravity, undermining its will to fight. This centre of gravity, according to Gray, could simply be its military power, or lie in the more complex combination of moral and psychological dimensions. Assoc Prof Loo opined that the success of an attack of an opponent's centre of gravity largely depends on the success of the articulation of one's narrative of victory. In that regard, victory, or for that matter, defeat, is more heavily dependent on the perception of

it, rather than raw facts alone. The interpretation of the state of conflict, expressed through a strategic narrative, is of critical importance.

Assoc Prof Loo observed information is an enabler that allows one to plan a strategy to dominate an opponent through carefully crafted narratives. He defined narratives as a coherent system of interrelated and sequentially organised stories. He argued that war can present itself as two competing narratives, with each party trying to impose their version on the other. He also pointed out that narratives do not necessarily have to be textual in form, but have historically also been conveyed through the use of items such as uniform, armour and war paint.

Assoc Prof Loo concluded that war in today's context is mostly about the application of emotional, psychological and moral forces against one's opponent, rather than raw military power. This is partly the result of other trends, such as globalisation, that have resulted in an amorphous enemy where separating the combatant from the non-combatant is difficult, making the traditional application of military power in the first place difficult. Above all, if war is a battle of narratives, advances in information technology resulting in lower barriers of entry have allowed individuals to enter the fray and become strategic actors in war. War is therefore no longer the activity of competing states, as historically understood, and this must now factor into a state's strategic calculus.

Session 3

Warfare in New Domains: The Future of Asymmetric Operations and Information Warfare

Associate Professor Ahmed Hashim

Associate Professor, RSIS

Associate Professor Ahmed Hashim began with a discussion on the pitfalls of predicting human activities or events such as war. He cited two historical anecdotes: first when French General Ferdinand Foch had prior to World War One observed, aviation as an instrument of war, was worthless, but its utility as a military platform was unequivocally proven during the conflict, and France emerged from the war at the forefront of military aviation. Second, when an Italian general had asserted with certainty that aerial warfare would be the most important

element in future wars. Assoc Prof Hashim noted both generals had made predictions they thought were right, but hindsight had proven them wrong.

Sharing another example of the difficulty in crystal ball gazing, Assoc Prof Hashim cited Håvard Hegre's statistical model using historical data that suggested war was on the decline. The model predicted a steady fall in the number of conflicts in the next four decades, specifically arguing that the number will fall to 7 per cent by 2015 due to higher education, lower infant mortality rates and other factors. Yet recent data suggests that even in 2010, approximately 15 to 20 per cent of the world's countries were still involved in armed conflict, hardly the decline the mathematical model had suggested. Assoc Prof Hashim argued this example showed that even more scientific approaches to prediction could still be wrong, or at the very least, inaccurate. Predicting asymmetric warfare was described by a strategist Colin Gray as an "awesome problem" because war comprised too many variables to make any significant prediction based on statistics alone. However, even Gray could not resist making his own prediction that war would eventually disappear in a world of emerging global values, or because of the rise of a hegemonic world power, such as the United States. Assoc Prof Hashim argued that if predictions had to be made, those that reference the past are generally sounder than those based on mere statistics alone, as war is the unfortunate product of tensions in competing ideological belief systems.

Assoc Prof Hashim suggested one way of understanding asymmetric war and warfare was by first understanding what symmetric war and warfare are. He defined symmetrical war and warfare as conflict between two warring parties that is conducted similarly by both. Symmetrical war is thus a force-on-force match where opponents with similar technologies, capabilities and vulnerabilities contest each other. Assoc Prof Hashim observed that in essence, opponents engaged in such wars are military equals. He argued that although such mirror-imaging is plausible in theory, actual wars have never been truly symmetric, where warring parties were identical in form and function. As such, Assoc Prof Hashim suggested that conventional war, which many have equated with symmetric war, has historically included many asymmetric elements in tactics, organisation and technology. Furthermore, asymmetry is assured when a conventional superpower like the United States goes to war because it is the world's strongest conventional power that does not have a peer competitor yet. Asymmetry in war and warfare, Assoc Prof Hashim concluded, can thus be defined as the methods and techniques adopted to address this inherent inequity in military capabilities between opponents. He argued that in such instances, strategy is primarily about exploiting one's strengths and exposing the enemies' weaknesses. For example, in asymmetric warfare, the weaker side recognises the military superiority of its enemy and will avoid open confrontation while seeking instead to attain victory by adopting novel compensatory methods.

Assoc Prof Hashim explored asymmetric war in the context of three types of conflict – terrorism, insurgencies and conventional war - all of which asymmetric warfare dominates. Terrorism was fundamentally asymmetric warfare because it was a systematic and structured deviation from the established law, suggesting both opponents are inherently not mirror-images of each other. Terrorists do not adhere to the same rules and norms. Instead, they seek to dismantle and dissect the social or democratic infrastructure that is in place.

Assoc Prof Hashim used the American invasion of Iraq as an example of insurgency as a form of asymmetric war. He argued that when a small state is powerless against a larger, more powerful and technologically superior state occupying them, they often resort to unconventional, asymmetric means of warfare known as 'area denial'. The objective is to impede or disrupt the U.S. military's ability to operate in a theatre far from U.S. territory. Although this may be applied by conventional forces, such asymmetrical warfare was largely carried out by insurgents in Iraq.

Assoc Prof Hashim concluded with four general observations about how weaker entities could undertake asymmetric war and warfare in the face of a stronger opponent. First, asymmetry in conflict must now also include robust defence diplomacy to undermine the stronger powers' alliances, as well as the development of an effective strategic narrative that the weaker power can use against the stronger one. Second, smaller entities would do well to avoid direct confrontation with the stronger forces and instead seek to exploit their vulnerabilities through access or area denial. Third, the weaker power needs to seize the initiative early to prevent the stronger power from destroying its system of systems—a hybrid of conventional and irregular warfare—that is in place. Finally, the weaker side must achieve military surprise before the stronger side has a chance to apply the full strength of its power in the conflict.

Dr Michael Raska

Research Fellow, RSIS

Dr Michael Raska began his presentation with the observation that information and cyber warfare, typically characterised as cyber threats, cyber attacks, cyber terrorism, cyber weapons, and cyber espionage, is now the subject of considerable attention worldwide in both the popular media and policy realms. He noted this interest is sustained by the numerous manifestations of such warfare, offering examples ranging from limited hacker incursions by politically motivated "hacktivists," corporate and military intelligence agencies, organised crime and terrorist groups, to advanced information warfare programs of nation-states. Collectively, he surmised, cyber and information warfare is changing the character of conflicts because it is so multi-faceted.

Nevertheless Dr Raska argued that for many, information warfare is still an enigma. He suggested this is due to the multidimensional character of the on-going information revolution that is constantly evolving, developing advanced information and communications technologies whose dual-use blurs distinctions between the civil and

military domains. In this regard, information warfare comprises a disparate range of conflict, targets, modes and magnitude of attacks that defies easy categorisation. He gave several examples of cyber warfare to illustrate this difficulty – attacks on aircraft navigation system, spoofing air traffic control system, and attacks on specialised digital devices that control electrical power and dam floodgates. More general attacks included denial-of-service attacks, and worm and logic bombs inserted into information systems. Adding to the difficulty in classifying cyber attacks was the non-specificity of some of them. He cited the example of the Terra AM-1 and Landsat-7 satellites that were "interfered with" in 2007 and 2008, and attacks on the General Positioning Satellites (GPS).

Despite this difficulty in determining what constitutes an attack, Dr Raska said that many countries are acutely aware of the damage they can cause, and are earnestly developing their cyber security policies and integrating them into defence strategies, command structures, and operational plans.

Dr Raska observed that understanding the strategic significance of information and cyber warfare is a key preoccupation of military organisations. The answers, he said, lie largely in recognising the nature of contemporary warfare, and how cyber warfare can affect it. He posited that modern militaries now have the ability to operate quickly, against enemies located far away, without risking the lives of their own combat personnel. Furthermore, they also have the ability to act in secret, minimising exposure, attribution, and risks of counter-attacks. In all these areas, technology has been the key enabler. Yet, Dr Raska also pointed out it too can be an Achilles Heel as it has its own vulnerabilities. He cited the example of using technology to override or hack into the enemy's defence system such as drones or even aircrafts and manipulate the intended motives. Even if cyber technology is not used to interfere with the operations of conventional platforms, it can be used to gather intelligence about them. Furthermore, given the networked nature of cyber warfare, he observed tracking and pin-pointing a cyber perpetrator is extremely difficult, if not nearly impossible. Above all, given the global reliance on technology, no country is immune to cyber attacks.

Dr Raska thus concluded that technology, in particular, information technology, will simultaneously become both the target of attack, as well as a principal weapon to attack with. He predicted future technology would be used to control an opponent through strategic information dominance – controlling its understanding of the situation, ideally without his awareness.

Dr Raska also noted because cyber warfare is continuously evolving and the difficulty of identifying its threat, formulating a one-size-fits-all response or countermeasure is difficult. Different priorities in the development of cyber warfare capabilities, as well as perceived threats from them, may lead to new balances of power between nation-states and non-state actors.

In closing, Dr Raska offered three suggestions. First, given the damage cyber attacks can cause, countries have to stay ahead of the curve. Inherent organisational and resource constraints in prioritising cyber defence have to be overcome. Second, all information technology infrastructure, both civilian and military, have to be defended. They should be accorded equal importance. Finally, nations should have trained and ready cyber forces, as well as an effective readiness policy in place in case of an attack.



Session 4

Civil-Military Cooperation in a Coalition Environment

Colonel (COL) Melvyn Ong

Deputy Chief Executive,
Early Childhood Development Agency

Colonel (COL) Melvyn Ong began by describing the Singaporean Armed Forces' (SAF) earthquake relief operation in Christchurch, New Zealand in February 2011. He noted that the SAF contingent's working relationship with its New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) counterpart before the earthquake allowed the SAF to contribute its assistance quickly and effectively.

COL Ong outlined the challenges faced during this particular relief operation, and SAF's previous ones. In Christchurch, one challenge was geographical - Singapore and New Zealand are far apart, and have different climates. The SAF also had to operate in an urban terrain with a well-developed urban infrastructure and society, which the SAF had not experienced in its previous relief operations. This, however, was an advantage as New Zealand's well-developed urban infrastructure, as well as its efficient bureaucracy and government institutions, allowed for a more efficient deployment, more so than during previous Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations.

COL Ong then discussed the decision-making process behind Singapore's deployment to New Zealand. He noted the importance of the "whole-of-government" approach that the SAF adopted. Although the SAF took the lead in the operation, its success rested on the successful quick and effective coordination of resources that other agencies also contributed.

He then explored the tactical and operational conduct of the SAF's relief mission. COL Ong noted that as civil-military relations were already excellent between the NZDF and its civilian counterparts, the SAF decided to work within that effective structure and attach itself to a NZDF unit on the ground, the Third Land Force Group. By leveraging on existing coordinating structures in place, and not creating a new separate chain of command, the SAF contingent could therefore focus all its energies exclusively on actual relief efforts.

COL Ong also shared some of the operational lessons from the SAF's relief efforts in Christchurch. First, he noted that although it may not happen all the time, a clear mandate is crucial, i.e. agreement by all that a country should participate in the mission in the first place. Second, it is essential to respect the host nation and its requests, and not make unilateral decisions. According to COL Ong, the host nation is in a better position to understand and assess its needs in the aftermath of natural disasters like the earthquake in Christchurch. A third lesson is the importance of building and maintaining inter-agency cooperation within the government. This should be routine. COL Ong noted the NZDF's liaison officers were so efficient in working with their civilian counterparts that the groundwork had already been laid prior to the crisis. A fourth lesson was the importance of keeping the mission objective simple for the troops on the ground.

Above all, basic core values had to guide the behaviour and actions of the relief force. COL Ong said the SAF's mission in Christchurch was guided by the values of "discipline", "humility" and "professionalism", and that these principles stood the contingent in good stead despite the numerous different challenges faced. Related to this, a fifth lesson COL Ong noted was that how Singapore acts in such missions could be interpreted at many levels: by acting promptly and professionally, HADR missions not only bring quick relief to human suffering, but also act as a conduit for defence diplomacy. While of secondary importance, one cannot ignore the symbolic value of these missions as they will inevitably acquire them.

COL Ong concluded his presentation by reiterating the importance of decisively establishing clarity in the mission, and the importance of good civil-military relations in HADR. A large part of the SAF's success in Christchurch was a result of it doing both well.

Mr Larry Maybee

Delegate to Armed and Security Forces;
Southeast Asia and the Pacific
International Committee of the Red Cross

Mr Larry Maybee from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) addressed the topic of civil-military cooperation from the other side of the partnership. He focused on his observations gleaned from his experience in the ICRC working with coalition partners, including the military, in contested environments. He stressed that it is essential for militaries around the world to understand and respect how international humanitarian organisations operate in such contested environments.

In the last few decades, Mr Maybee noted that civil-military cooperation has increased in prominence due to developments and trends in international relief operations. He further argued that it has become an important component of military training, even for conventional operations. The humanitarian aspect of war-fighting cannot be a secondary consideration for military commanders. In his view, the humanitarian consequences of armed conflicts or crises are real, and

the success of an operation is now largely dependent on militaries addressing them effectively. That said, militaries can only do so with the assistance of non-government humanitarian organisations, such as the ICRC. Mr Maybee therefore pointed out that establishing a good relationship between civilian and military organisations in the field is crucial for overall success.

Mr Maybee argued civil-military cooperation is a product of political-military objectives. Be that as it may, humanitarian organisations often do not share the same culture or organisational principles, and therefore often interpret these objectives, or the means to achieve them, differently. For example, the principles of humanitarian groups, particularly those of the ICRC, are humanity, impartiality and neutrality. Militaries may not always be able to adhere to these principles, or agree to a common interpretation of them. Compounding the challenge of civil-military cooperation is the need for humanitarian organisations to at times, intentionally distance themselves from the military so as to maintain their neutrality and ensure they are seen as working for humanitarian reasons above any other.

As such, what humanitarian groups ultimately look for in their engagements with militaries around the world is less complete integration, but more an understanding of how they operate by military organisations, and what it will be doing on the ground. The emphasis is on obtaining access, possibly through the military, to do their work, and an acceptance by the military of the work they do. Achieving such awareness requires humanitarian organisations to engage their military counterparts at every level.

Unfortunately, Mr Maybee pointed out that humanitarian organisations are often threatened in the field. An obvious manifestation of this is the risk aid workers face on the ground. A less obvious but increasing threat is the encroachment of aid work done by humanitarian organisations by militaries. Increasingly, for reasons discussed earlier, militaries are now attempting to do the work that has traditionally and historically been done by humanitarian organisations. The involvement of militaries in these areas, part of the "whole-of-government" approach that is adopted by various militaries, has in some instances undermined humanitarian groups' institutional reputations of neutrality.

According to Mr Maybee, the danger is that humanitarian actions undertaken by humanitarian organisations will become politicised. More importantly, humanitarian actions will be subordinated to political and military objectives. If this continues, he argued that humanitarian groups will face difficulty in obtaining access to conflict areas. If perceptions of the military are unfavourable, humanitarian organisations will be tarred by the same brush and be deemed guilty by association, with the perception that their efforts are no longer altruistic but part of a wider political or military objective. Humanitarian groups therefore are no longer seen as impartial organisations that relieve the hardship caused by political violence, but a party to that violence in the first place. Thus, it is absolutely critical for humanitarian groups to uphold and preserve the ideas of humanity, impartiality and neutrality.

Mr Maybee concluded with some key recommendations. First, it is essential for both militaries and humanitarian organisations to understand and respect each other's roles, needs and capacities. Second, there should be a clear separation between the aims, activities and objectives of militaries and those of humanitarian actors. Finally, humanitarian objectives cannot be subordinate to political-objectives. To that end, both sides must continuously engage each other in order to carefully coordinate their efforts and prevent duplication or worse still, misconstruance of the intentions of humanitarian organisations.

Session 5

Modern Challenges to the Military Profession and Sino-U.S. Nuclear Policy

Dr John Nagl

Headmaster, The Haverford School

Dr John Nagl began his lecture by stating that military organisations have always faced the challenge of being more adaptive to unpredictable changes in the security environment. These unpredictable changes, such as the collapse of the Berlin War in 1989 and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, caught the world unprepared and taught the military that adapting its organisation to such unexpected events was like "teaching dinosaurs how to dance".

He noted that the military struggles with being adaptable because it is a conservative institution that is typically resistant to change. He presented the example of the U.S. Army in 2007 where the then Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, observed it was unprepared for counter-insurgency (COIN) wars taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite having fought in Vietnam three decades earlier. That war, a COIN campaign in its own right, should have offered numerous useful lessons for the Army's present involvement in the Middle East, but the Army had not absorbed them.

Dr Nagl referred to Richard Downey's *Learning from Conflict* on how a military should learn. It does so by adjusting its norms, doctrine and standard operating procedures through a benchmarking process, learning from history and institutionalising the lessons learnt. He explained the characteristics of a learning institution are its ability to accept bottom-up input and the ability to think and question critically in an unfolding situation and uncertain environment.

Adapting the Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action (OODA) loop first developed by John Boyd in the context of winning air-to-air combat, Dr Nagl proposed an organisation learning cycle through similar steps: firstly, observing situational change; secondly, giving it attention leading to action; thirdly, orientating organisational performance accordingly; fourthly, searching for an alternative; fifthly, sustaining consensus for alternative action, and; lastly, transmitting interpretation and establishing new doctrine.

Dr Nagl illustrated this with the U.S. Army's response to its dismal performance in COIN. He noted that the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have produced a "Counterinsurgency Field Manual" in 2006, containing six effective information operations. Those operations involved combat and civil security operations, host-nation security forces, essential services, governance, as well as economic development. He explained that success in these information operations influenced the attitude of the local population to support U.S. forces in COIN.

Dr Nagl then explained how U.S. forces built a learning organisation in Iraq. It first adopted a bottom-up feedback system, making individual input matter. Secondly, it

focused on security and intelligence. Thirdly, it provided the stakeholders what they needed to achieve success. Fourthly, it ensured everyone bought into the overall aims and objectives, and were all on the same page. Finally, it mastered the strategic narrative. He reiterated the importance for the military to be proficient in strategic communication. This is because human society has been dramatically affected by the information revolution, much like how it was by the earlier agricultural and industrial revolutions. This has complicated the character of conflict in the present age. Other factors include more countries pursuing nuclear weapons, challenges to U.S. conventional military superiority by rising powers, as well as other trends in globalisation and urbanisation that have made the character of war less conventional. Dr Nagl predicted the numerous instances of violence witnessed in the present age would make peace unlikely. While these instances would probably not escalate to the extent of general war, insurgencies, and therefore the need for effective COIN tactics and strategies, would become increasingly important.

Dr Nagl concluded that a military organisation can be a true learning institution if it is aware of the changing environment and respects individual input that allows it to adapt. As an organisation engaged in the risky and costly business of war, the military must effectively and quickly adapt to the changes it encounters, with a sincere and honest commitment to a balanced analysis of them.

Major General (MG) Yao Yunzhu

Director, Center for China-Amercian Defense Relations
Academy of Military Science
People's Liberation Army

Major General (MG) Yao Yunzhu spoke on Sino-U.S. nuclear policy. She began by explaining the differences between China's and the United States' nuclear weapon policies. She noted that militaries continuously think about war as a matter of defence policy, and that includes thinking about nuclear war for those countries that have such weapons. A country's nuclear policy is always determined well before the actual use of the weapon. For example when the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the country's nuclear policy had already been well-established. Therefore, it is important to study countries' existing nuclear policies to predict how countries might act when threatened.

MG Yao explained China's commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the country's pledge of No First Use (NFU) nuclear policy announced in August 1964. The pledge states China's position of not using nuclear

weapons in a pre-emptive first strike. It is also against using nuclear weapons in chemical and biological warfare, as well as using them against non-nuclear weapon states. For China, nuclear weapons are merely a political and strategic instrument of deterrence that will dissuade aggressors from attacking it.

MG Yao reiterated that China will only use nuclear weapons if there is a tactical necessity in a counter-attack. That being said, the use of nuclear weapons is always a last resort as China does not believe that nuclear war will ever produce an overall winner because of its high cost. She acknowledged that China has been criticised for not being transparent enough in publishing its nuclear weapon capability. However, she again stressed China's nuclear arsenal is for defence only, and China will never launch a first strike.

She contrasted China's nuclear policy with that of the United States. In her opinion, U.S. nuclear policy was first formulated with the intention of deterring and defeating a conventional attack in Europe where its larger allies are located, to ensure that the limited wars in Northeast Asia remained contained, as well as to deter chemical and biological attack by non-nuclear weapon states. She noted that even after the 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombings, the U.S. has not implemented a NFU policy like China's, and its nuclear forces are on constant high alert. She, however, acknowledged that the U.S.' decision to reduce warheads and launch training had correspondingly lowered the threat of nuclear war.
MG Yao noted that China has a comparatively leaner nuclear arsenal compared to the United States. China modernised its nuclear weapons in three ways. First, it focused on achieving a fast strike capability. Second, it developed an accurate and longer range arsenal. Finally, it sought weapons of greater penetrability. On the other hand, the U.S. nuclear arsenal had 30,000 weapons at its peak, but it has since substantially reduced it to a third. She applauded President Obama's recent announcement to further cut the number to 1,550 warheads and 700 delivery systems by 2018.

Regarding disarmament, MG Yao believed that the process should be done through complete elimination. She gave the example of the Korean peninsula disarmament approach, where ideally the region should be nuclear-free with a withdrawal of US forces from South Korea. However, she was aware that the U.S. might not be willing to do so. She acknowledged that there was some uncertainty over the intentions of China's nuclear policy because it was less open than that of the U.S.'. The U.S. approached nuclear diplomacy by being transparent about the number of weapons in its possession, forcing a potential enemy to confront unfavourable odds should it decide to attack the United States. Some small powers recognise the power of such a nuclear umbrella and seek to ally themselves with the United States. Conversely, instead of declaring the size of its nuclear arsenal, China's NFU nuclear policy is premised on "deterrence based on uncertainty". It intentionally masks the actual size of its nuclear arsenal as the ambiguity will dissuade an enemy from attacking it.
In conclusion, MG Yao noted two challenges China is currently facing. First, the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence System that has begun to be deployed in East Asia as well as the U.S.' development of the Conventional Prompt Global Strike and newer long-range ballistic missiles, could upset the nuclear balance of power in the region, especially since the U.S. considers Taiwan its ally. Second, the nuclear proliferation in China's periphery has increased, with Japan, South Korea and North Korea all demonstrating interest in nuclear weapons.

PROGRAMME

Monday, 5 August 2013 – Arrival

11:00 onwards

Arrival and Registration of Participants
Venue: Conference Secretariat,
Kusu Room (Conference Centre),
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

16:00–18:00

Ice-breakers
Venue: Tanjong Beach
(gather at hotel poolside)
Attire: Sports Wear (t-shirt, shorts or track pants, and comfortable sports shoes)

19:00 **Welcome Dinner**
Venue: Poolside, The Sentosa Resort & Spa
Attire: Smart Casual
(short-sleeved shirt or polo and slacks)

Tuesday, 6 August 2013

07:30 - 08:45

Breakfast
Venue: The Terrace Restaurant,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

09:30–09:35

Welcome Remarks

Ambassador Barry Desker
Dean
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Director
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)

Venue: The Straits Ballroom,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa
Attire: Service Dress
(Jacket with tie and head-dress)

09:35–10:20

Keynote Address

Mr Chan Chun Sing
Acting Minister for Social and Family Development and Senior Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, Singapore

10:20–10:45

Group Photo Taking
Venue: Ballroom II, The Sentosa Resort & Spa
Attire: Service Dress

11:00–12:00

Session 1

Dimensions of War and Strategy

Speaker:
Professor Pascal Vennesson
Professor
Military Studies Programme
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Chairperson:
Professor Joseph Liow
Associate Dean
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Venue: The Straits Ballroom,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa
Attire: Service Dress

12:15–14:00

Lunch
Venue: The Straits Ballroom Terrace,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

14:00–15:30

Session 2

Defining War in the 21st Century

Speaker:
Dr Beatrice Heuser
Professor
Department of Politics and International Relations
School of Politics & International Relations
University of Reading

Associate Professor Bernard Loo
Coordinator
Military Studies Programme
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Chairperson:
Assistant Professor Emrys Chew
Coordinator
MSc (Strategic Studies)
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Venue: The Straits Ballroom,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa
Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

19:30 **Dinner**

Guest of Honour:
Mr S R Nathan
6th President of the Republic of Singapore

Venue: The Straits Ballroom,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa
Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

Wednesday, 7 August 2013

07:30 - 08:30

Breakfast

Venue: The Terrace Restaurant,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

08:30–09:30

Introduction by Participants

(Australia / Brunei / Cambodia / Canada / China)

Venue: The Straits Ballroom,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

09:30–11:00

Session 3

Warfare in New Domains: The Future of Asymmetric Operations and Information Warfare

Speaker:
Associate Professor Ahmed Hashim
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Dr Michael Raska
Research Fellow
Military Transformation Programme
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Chairperson:
Associate Professor Kumar Ramakrishna
Associate Professor
Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Venue: The Straits Ballroom,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

11:15–14:00

Syndicated Discussion/Working Lunch

Syndicates 1, 2 & 3

Venue: Straits Ballroom I, Nutmeg and Ginger Rooms, The Sentosa Resort & Spa

Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

14:00–18:00

Visit to Information Fusion Centre

Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

18:00 onwards

Free and Easy

Thursday, 8 August 2013

07:30 - 08:30

Breakfast

Venue: The Terrace Restaurant,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

08:30–09:30

Introduction by Participants

(France / Germany / India / Japan / Laos)

Venue: The Straits Ballroom,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

09:30–12:00

Plenary Session 1

Chairperson:
Professor Pascal Vennesson
Military Studies Programme
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Venue: The Straits Ballroom,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

12:00–14:00

Lunch

Venue: The Straits Ballroom Terrace,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

14:00–16:00

Visit to Army Museum/Singapore Discovery Centre

Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

19:00 **Distinguished Dinner Talk**

Wielding Strategic Communications in Complex Operations

Speaker:
General (Ret.) John R. Allen, U.S. Marine Corps
RSIS Distinguished Speaker
Distinguished Fellow of Foreign Policy,
The Brookings Institution
Former Commander
International Security Assistance Force and US Forces – Afghanistan

Chairperson:
Ambassador Barry Desker
Dean
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Director
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)

Venue: Raffles Hotel Singapore

Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

Friday, 9 August 2013

07:30 - 08:30

Breakfast
Venue: The Terrace Restaurant,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

08:30–09:30

Introduction by Participants
(Malaysia / Myanmar / New Zealand / Pakistan / Philippines)

Venue: The Straits Ballroom,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa
Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

09:30–11:00

Session 4

Civil-Military Cooperation in a Coalition Environment

Speaker:
Col Melvyn Ong
Deputy Chief Executive
Early Childhood Development Agency

Mr Larry Maybee
Delegate to Armed and Security Forces Southeast Asia and the Pacific
International Committee of the Red Cross

Chairperson:
Associate Professor Tan See Seng
Associate Professor, Deputy Director
Head of Research
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
Head
Centre for Multilateralism Studies
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Venue: The Straits Ballroom,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa
Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

11:15–12:15

Syndicated Discussion
Syndicates 1, 2 & 3

Venue: Straits Ballroom I, Nutmeg and Ginger Rooms, The Sentosa Resort & Spa
Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

12:15–14:15

Distinguished Lunch Talk

Lessons Learned from Stability and Security Operations in the Asia Pacific

Speaker:
Hon Dr Wayne Mapp
RSIS Distinguished Visiting Fellow
Commissioner, Law Commission
Former Minister of Defence, New Zealand

Chairperson:
Professor Ron Matthews
Head
Graduate and Doctoral Studies
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Venue: The Beaufort Ballroom,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa
Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

16:30 **National Day Parade**
Venue: Marina Bay
Attire: Sports T-shirt (RSIS-issued) and slacks

Late Dinner
Venue: The Terrace Restaurant,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

Saturday, 10 August 2013

07:30 - 08:30

Breakfast

Venue: The Terrace Restaurant,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

08:30–09:30

Introduction by Participants

(Russia / Saudi Arabia / Singapore / South Korea / Thailand)

Venue: The Straits Ballroom,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

09:30–11:00

Session 5

Modern Challenges to the Military Profession and Sino-U.S. Nuclear Policy

Speaker:
Dr John Nagl
Headmaster
The Haverford School

MG Yao Yunzhu
Director
Center for China-American Defense Relations
Academy of Military Science, People's Liberation Army

Chairperson:
Mr Richard Bitzinger
Coordinator
Military Transformations Programme
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Venue: The Straits Ballroom,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

11:15–14:00

Syndicated Discussion/Working Lunch

Syndicates 1, 2 & 3

Venue: Straits Ballroom I, Nutmeg and Ginger Rooms, The Sentosa Resort & Spa

Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

14:00–17:00

Tour of Singapore

Syndicates 1, 2 & 3

Attire: Casual
(short-sleeved shirt or polo and slacks)

17:00 onwards

Free and Easy

Sunday, 11 August 2013

07:30 - 08:30

Breakfast

Venue: The Terrace Restaurant,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

08:30–09:30

Introduction by Participants

(Timor-Leste / United Arab Emirates / United Kingdom / United States of America / Vietnam)

Venue: The Straits Ballroom,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

09:30–12:00

Plenary Session 2

Chairperson:
Dr Alan Chong
Associate Professor
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Venue: The Straits Ballroom,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

12:00–14:00

Presentation of Certificates followed by Farewell Lunch

Venue: The Beaufort Ballroom,
The Sentosa Resort & Spa

Attire: Long-sleeved shirt and slacks without necktie

14:00 **Departures**

Speakers

General (Ret.) John R. Allen, U.S. Marine Corps
RSIS Distinguished Speaker;
Distinguished Fellow of Foreign Policy,
The Brookings Institution;
Former Commander, International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces – Afghanistan

Dr Ahmed Salah Hashim
Associate Professor
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Dr Beatrice Heuser
Professor
Department of Politics and International Relations
School of Politics & International Relations
University of Reading

Dr Bernard Loo Fook Weng
Associate Professor
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Hon Dr Wayne Mapp
Commissioner, Law Commission;
Former Minister of Defence, New Zealand

Mr Larry Maybee
Delegate to Armed and Security Forces;
Southeast Asia and the Pacific International Committee of the Red Cross

Dr John A. Nagl
Headmaster
The Haverford School

COL Melvyn Ong
Deputy Chief Executive
Early Childhood Development Agency

Dr Michael Raska
Research Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Dr Pascal Vennesson
Professor
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Major General Yao Yunzhu
Director
Center for China-American Defense Relations
Academy of Military Science
People's Liberation Army

Chairpersons

Professor Ron Matthews
Head, Graduate and Doctoral Studies
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Professor Joseph Liow
Associate Dean
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Dr Kumar Ramakrishna
Associate Professor
Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Mr Richard Bitzinger
Senior Fellow
Coordinator, Military Transformations Programme,
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Dr Tan See Seng
Associate Professor
Deputy Director
Head of Research, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS)
Head, Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS)
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Dr Alan Chong
Associate Professor
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Dr Ong Weichong
Assistant Professor
Coordinator, APPSMO
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Dr Emrys Chew
Assistant Professor
Coordinator, MSc (Strategic Studies)
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

Participants

AUSTRALIA

Colonel Mitchell Kent
Colonel
Director, International Engagement – Army

BRUNEI

Mr Jolkipli Hidop
Senior Academic Adviser
Defence Academy Headquarters
Royal Brunei Armed Forces

Lieutenant Colonel Norshahrinizam Haji Talib
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer
Royal Brunei Malay Reserve Regiment

CAMBODIA

Lieutenant Colonel Phan Dararith
Lieutenant Colonel
Chief of Office of History and Cooperation

Lieutenant Colonel Sam Sophea
Lieutenant Colonel
Chief of Office of Human Resource Development
Department of ASEAN Affairs

CANADA

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Barton
Lieutenant Colonel
Director of Foreign Liaison - 2 (DFL-2)

CHINA

Captain Hu Dehai
Captain (Navy)
Chief of Staff
1st Marine Brigade
PLA Navy

Captain Xu Manshu
Captain (Navy), Associate Professor
Strategic Studies Department
National Defence University
PLA

Colonel Zhu Nanyan
Colonel
Director of Intelligence
Nanjing Military Regional Air Force

FRANCE

Captain Yves Postec
Captain (Navy)
Naval Attaché
Embassy of France in Washington, DC

GERMANY

Colonel René Leitgen
Colonel (GS)
Head of Section
Strategic Guidelines for the Bundeswehr
Ministry of Defence

Colonel Torsten Squarr
Colonel (GS)
Chief of Staff
Planning Office of the Bundeswehr
Berlin

INDIA

Colonel Zubin Adi Minwalla
Colonel
General Staff (Infantry)
Army War College

Captain Prachet Panda
Captain (Navy)
Director (Training & Policy)
HQ IDS

JAPAN

Captain Yoshiyasu Ishimaki
Captain
Deputy Chief of the Plans & Policy Section
Maritime Staff Office
JMSDF

Colonel Shoji Sagawa
Colonel
Defense Plans/Policies & Programs Div,
Air Staff Office
JASDF

LAOS

Lieutenant Colonel Chanthaphomma Phayvanh
Lieutenant Colonel
Director of Research and Planning Division
Department of Foreign Relations
Ministry of National Defence

Lieutenant Colonel Simmalivong Sisavay
Lieutenant Colonel
Director of Foreign Relation Division
General Staff Department
Ministry of National Defence

MALAYSIA

Colonel Mohd Azmi Mohd Yusoff
Colonel
Head of Strategic Studies & International Relations
Malaysian Armed Forces Defence College

Captain Yee Tai Peng
Captain (Navy)
Chief Directing Staff
Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College

MYANMAR

Colonel Than Htaik
Colonel
Assistant Chief of Armed Forces Training (Army)

Colonel San Lwin
Colonel
Head of Administrative and Economic Department
National Defence College

PAKISTAN

Captain Munawwar Ahmad
Captain (Navy)
Deputy Director
Joint Intelligence
Pakistan Navy

Colonel Muhammad Sadiq Khan
Colonel
Deputy Director
Electronic Warfare
Joint Staff Headquarters

PHILIPPINES

Captain Rafael G Mariano
Captain (Navy)
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans
J5, General Headquarters
Armed Forces of the Philippines

Colonel Henry A Robinson
Colonel
Chief, Strategy and Policy Division
J5, General Headquarters
Armed Forces of the Philippines

RUSSIA

Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Batyushenkov
Lieutenant Colonel
Senior Officer
Armed Forces General Staff Main Communication Center

SAUDI ARABIA

Colonel Abdullah Alasker
Colonel
Instructor, Saudi War College
Director of Exercises, Military Strategy Department

SINGAPORE

Senior Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Choo
Senior Lieutenant Colonel
Deputy Director (Personnel Policy)
Singapore Armed Forces

Senior Lieutenant Colonel Lek Seng Khoon
Senior Lieutenant Colonel
Head General Staff
Headquarters Singapore Artillery
Singapore Armed Forces

Senior Lieutenant Colonel Low Chuen-Wei Desmond
Senior Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer
RSS STALWART and RSS SUPREME (concurrent)
Republic of Singapore Navy

Colonel Ng Boon Heong
Colonel
Commander, Imagery Support Group
Singapore Armed Forces

ME6 Jerediah Ong
Military Expert 6
Head, Joint Logistics Plans and Resource Branch
Joint Logistics Department
Singapore Armed Forces

Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Ong Sher Meng
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer
125 Squadron
Republic of Singapore Air Force

Colonel Seah Poh Yeen
Colonel
Senior Directing Staff (Navy)
Goh Keng Swee Command and Staff College
Republic of Singapore Navy

Lieutenant Colonel Jason See
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer
41st Battalion Singapore Armoured Regiment
Singapore Armed Forces

Lieutenant Colonel Sim Ken Yi Gerald
Lieutenant Colonel
Head, Plans and Development Branch
National Service Affairs Department
Ministry of Defence

Lieutenant Colonel Tan Eng Keong, Ian
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding Officer
112 Squadron
Republic of Singapore Air Force

ME6 Eric Gregory Wong Wen Wei
Military Expert 6
Branch Head, Joint Intelligence Directorate
Singapore Armed Forces

Lieutenant Colonel Yong Wei Hsiung
Lieutenant Colonel
Deputy Director
Defence Policy Office
Republic of Singapore Navy

SOUTH KOREA

Commander Kim Daesung
Commander (Navy)
Ministry of National Defense

Lieutenant Colonel Kim Jong Sung
Lieutenant Colonel
Assistant Manager
Military Education and Training Department
Ministry of National Defense

THAILAND

Group Captain Padermchai Goonpiboon
Group Captain
Deputy Director, Policy and Strategy Division

Colonel Petcharat Limprasert
Colonel
Director, Conference Division
Office of Policy and Planning

TIMOR-LESTE

Colonel Calisto Santos Coli
Colonel
Chief of Cabinet for the Chief of Defence Force

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Colonel Mohammed Hamad Al Kaabi
Colonel
Head of Naval Educational Branch
Joint Command & Staff College

UNITED KINGDOM

Air Commodore Nick Bray CBE MA
Air Commodore
Head of International Policy and Plans (Military)
Ministry of Defence

Brigadier Duncan Francis OBE
Brigadier
Defence Attaché
British Embassy in Beijing

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Brigadier General Michael Compton
Brigadier General
Deputy Director for Strategic Planning and Policy
U.S. Pacific Command

Brigadier General Richard Simcock
Brigadier General
Deputy Commanding General
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific

VIETNAM

Senior Colonel Nguyen Van Sinh
Senior Colonel
Head of Department
Institute for Defence International Relations
Ministry of Defence

Colonel Tran Tuan Anh
Colonel
Staff Officer
Institute for Defence International Relations
Ministry of Defence

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S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
TEL 65 6790 6982 | FAX 65 6793 2991 | EMAIL wwwrsis@ntu.edu.sg | WEBSITE www.rsis.edu.sg