CENTRE FOR NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY STUDIES

S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

MacArthur Asia Security Initiative Interim Report 2010

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http://www.ASICluster3.com

Preface

This interactive report summarises the first year of the Asia Security Initiative (ASI) project of the RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies titled '**Responding to Internal Crises and their Cross Border Effects**'. The report covers the period May 2009, when the ASI was launched in Singapore, to June 2010.

The report provides a snapshot of the Inaugural ASI Grantees' Meeting and Official Launch which was co-organised by the Centre and the MacArthur Foundation, followed by an overview of the project, and an in-depth discussion of the project's achievements and outcomes of key activities convened under the three research programmes supported by the ASI – Internal and Cross-Border Conflict Programme; Climate Change, Environmental Security and Natural Disasters Programme; and Energy and Human Security Programme.

As we arrive at the halfway mark of the ASI project, we are pleased to report that all planned activities for the three research programmes are well underway. Key activities are as follows:

- Creation of the ASI Cluster 3 website, blog and resource database as vehicles for knowledge exchange and dissemination of research output

- Organisation of a number of workshops and study groups in the following areas:

  Internal and Cross-Border Conflict Programme
  i) Protection of Civilians in Asia
  ii) The Responsibility to Protect
  iii) Security Sector Governance
  iv) The Dynamics for Resolving Internal Conflicts in Southeast Asia.

  Climate Change, Environmental Security and Natural Disasters Programme
  i) Human Security and Climate Change in Southeast Asia: Managing Risk and Resilience
  ii) Climate Change and Food Security: Securing Asia Pacific's Food Futures

  Energy and Human Security
  i) Nuclear Energy and Human Security: Critical Debates
  ii) Dealing with Energy Vulnerabilities: Case Studies of Cooperation and Collaboration in East Asia

- Production and dissemination of research output arising from the above activities

We are therefore enthusiastic to share with you our findings and progress thus far and trust that you will find this report an interesting and stimulating read. We hope you will enjoy exploring the numerous interactive features that offer comprehensive insights into our research.

BARRY DESKER
Dean, RSIS

MELY CABALLERO-ANTHONY
Head, Centre for NTS Studies, RSIS

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Inaugural Grantees' Meeting And Official Launch

The MacArthur Foundation selected the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), through the leadership of the RSIS Centre for NTS Studies, as the core institution to lead the **Asia Security Initiative Cluster 3 – Internal Challenges**. The Centre received US$2.2 million from the MacArthur Foundation to conduct research in the area of non-traditional security (NTS) from 2009 to 2011. It leads a cluster of seven research institutes and spearheads research on NTS issues facing Asia. These issues include climate change, environment and human security, energy security, as well as internal conflicts. The grant given to the Centre is the largest among the 27 research institutes under the ASI.

The Centre had the distinct honour of co-organising the Asia Security Initiative Inaugural Grantees' Meeting and Official Launch that was held on 28 and 29 May 2009 at the Four Seasons

Hotel in Singapore. Among the invited guests were ASEAN Secretary-General, Dr Surin Pitsuwan; Minister of State for Law and Home Affairs, Singapore, Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee; representatives of the diplomatic corps, heads of research institutions in Asia; and the media. The ASI was launched by former President of the MacArthur Foundation, Dr Jonathan Fanton. This was followed by an animation clip that encapsulates the strategic objectives of the ASI. The heads of the three core institutions: Professor Wang Jisi from Peking University, Dr Kim Byung-Kook from the East Asia Institute in Seoul, and co-host, Ambassador Barry Desker from RSIS spoke about their respective institute's research projects and potential plans for collaboration within each cluster.

From top to bottom: Dr Jonathan Fanton, Former President of MacArthur Foundation; Amb. Barry Desker, Dean of RSIS; and Dr Surin Pitsuwan, ASEAN Secretary-General.

The Inaugural ASI Grantees' Meeting brought together the representatives and principal investigators of the 27 research institutions and provided a platform for a get-to-know session and an opportunity to brief one another about their respective research projects. Concurrent roundtable discussions were also organised with the aim of facilitating in-depth discussion and potential collaboration among the institutes. Among the issues discussed in the one-and-half day meeting were: the possibility of creating an epistemic community around the notion of an 'Asian security perspective'; the need to study the role of Japan in Northeast Asian Security; possible approaches towards bridging the gap between academic knowledge and policy; and ways forward in nurturing a future generation of security experts, journalists and policymakers.

At the institutional level, the Inaugural ASI Grantees' Meeting was significant in laying the groundwork for collaboration within the ASI Cluster 3 and generating publicity for the Centre, with the ultimate aim of advancing research on NTS studies in Asia.

Project Overview

As the core institution of MacArthur ASI Cluster 3 – Internal Challenges, the RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies embarked on its three-year project on *Responding to Internal Crises and their Cross-Border Effects* by moving forward simultaneously on all three thematic areas of research i) internal and cross-border conflict, ii) climate change and environmental security and iii) energy and human security.

The project aims to foster creative and innovative analysis of multi-level governance of cross-border challenges from the global to the national and the local, strengthen social science research with scientific and empirically-based findings, broaden the community of individuals and institutions involved in the shaping of the security architecture and provide a platform to connect researchers, policy analysts, civil society organisations, practitioners, and corporate actors.

Research Activities and Deliverables

We are pleased to report that all planned activities are moving ahead at full steam. Shortly after receipt of the ASI grant, principal investigator Associate Professor Mely Caballero-Anthony began to identify suitable lead researchers for the individual research programmes under the ASI umbrella. Following fruitful discussions during visiting fellowships in July and August 2009, Associate Professor Lorraine Elliott from the Australian National University and Professor Zha Daojiong from Peking University came on board as lead researchers for the climate change and environmental security programme, and the energy and human security programme, respectively. Associate Professor Rajesh Basrur from RSIS also joined the team subsequently as the second lead researcher for the latter programme. The Internal and Cross-Border Conflict programme is led by Associate Professor Mely Caballero-Anthony. Dr Alistair Cook joined the team as ASI Post-Doctoral Fellow in July 2009.

Vehicles for Knowledge Dissemination

As knowledge exchange and wide dissemination of research is integral in achieving the overall objectives of the ASI project, the Centre for NTS

Studies launched the ASI Cluster 3 website, resource database and Cluster 3 blog in the third-quarter of 2009 to provide a platform for partner institutes to disseminate their research products and facilitate knowledge exchange within the Cluster and among the online Internet community.

Through the website, Cluster 3 institutes, the broader ASI network and other interested parties can easily access information on the projects of individual institutes, the expertise of the researchers involved, as well as keep abreast of the Cluster's progress through publications such as conference reports and policy briefs. In this regard, the Centre has published three working papers under the ASI Policy Series, four conference reports based on key activities that have been held, and several short articles and opinion pieces.

In addition, the website promotes the sharing of knowledge and research material through a resource database that houses more than 1,000 publications on NTS studies and is updated on a weekly basis. In doing so, the Centre aims to broaden the NTS discourse beyond the academic audience to policymakers, the private sector and members of civil society. In relation to this objective, the Centre has produced a number of multimedia products to capture a wider audience. The 'In-Conversation' series features interviews with experts on various NTS topics, ranging from climate change to energy security, and are available as vodcasts on the website.

The Cluster 3 blog draws comment on significant research areas from various positions of interest and expertise. Under the umbrella theme of 'Internal Challenges', pertinent issues that are covered include, but are not limited to, climate change, human security, natural disasters, conflict, and health. The objective behind the blog is to create a serious and lively intellectual space for opinions, shared knowledge, commentary and an exchange of ideas, which will also serve as an opportunity for individuals from various relevant backgrounds to engage on issues.

In the following section, this interactive report will provide descriptions of the three research programmes, corresponding discussions of the achievements and outcomes of the key activities that have been convened thus far, and their related research output.

A) Internal and Cross-Border Conflict Programme: *Bridging Multi-level and Multilateral Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Resolution*

Asia is a region where internal conflicts continue to plague state and human security, despite the decline of inter-state conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, studies on the patterns of internal conflicts have also been confined to armed insurgencies, secessionism and civil conflicts, while less attention has been given to other forms of internal conflicts such as religious and/or ethnically-motivated communal violence, violent political clashes among competing political forces, and political uprisings. In recent years, the dimensions of internal conflict in Asia have also become more complex due to the growing challenges posed by religious radicalism and terrorism.

To be sure, the multiplicity of patterns of internal conflicts in Asia has dramatically increased the human costs of conflicts and violent threats faced by people within states. These have also resulted in an array of human insecurities, from poverty and human deprivation, mass population displacement, worsening human rights abuses – particularly among women and children, marginalisation, threats of infectious diseases, and forced migration to a host of transnational crimes. In Southeast Asia for example, internal conflicts within individual member states have had actual and potential cross-border implications. The secessionist and insurgency problems in the Philippines, the violence in the Muslim provinces in southern Thailand, the ethnic tensions in Myanmar, and restive provinces in Indonesia could all affect regional security and stability.

Against this background, the project investigates the dynamics of internal conflicts, human security and multi-level and multilateral approaches to conflict management in East Asia. Among the questions we want to examine include:

- What are the emerging patterns of internal conflicts in the region and what are the cross-border security challenges?
- What are the existing frameworks, if any, for conflict prevention and resolution, and how do we build effective regional and multilateral mechanisms for conflict management?
- How do we navigate between the zealousness of protecting state sovereignty and the compelling need for regional security cooperation?
- What role should sub-national entities and civil society play in conflict prevention and management?
- How do we promote multi-level and multilateral engagement for conflict prevention and resolution?

The core research areas examined by the Internal and Cross-Border Conflict programme include:

- **Analysis of the Dynamics of Internal Conflicts**: The objective of conflict analysis is to provide suitable explanations of the sources of conflict and the actors that drive it. Detailed analysis will allow for stronger and better informed programme designs and interventions by various stakeholders. This will provide the tools with which to develop effective measures to prevent conflict.
- **Protection of Civilians (POC)**: Refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), asylum seekers, and stateless persons often lose everything – their families, communities, houses, jobs, and their sense of security and belonging. It is important to understand the insecurities they face so that effective policies can be designed in order to help mitigate against them.
- **Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) in Asia**: In the 2005 UN World Summit, 191 heads of state and government representatives unanimously endorsed RtoP. Since 2005, there have been various responses to RtoP and so it is important to evaluate the ongoing discussion to map the traction RtoP has with actors in Asia. This will assist in the dissemination of its principles as laid down in the 2005 Outcome Document.
- **Security Sector Governance (SSG)**: The security sector includes armed and police forces, intelligence agencies, as well as institutions that oversee internal and external security. As such, these organisations have a significant role in managing internal conflict. An unprofessional security sector can trigger or exacerbate a conflict. In light of this, an evaluation of security sector governance in the region and an investigation into possible avenues for reform is needed.

Programme Activities

First Year, 2009

- **Seminar on the Humanitarian Work of the Red Cross, 19 August 2009**

Speaker: Col. (Retd) Christopher Chua, Secretary-General of Singapore Red Cross.

On 11 December 2008, the United Nations General Assembly designated 19 August as World Humanitarian Day in recognition of the work carried out by humanitarian personnel worldwide. To commemorate the first World Humanitarian Day, Secretary-General of the Singapore Red Cross, Col. (Retd) Christopher Chua introduced the Red Cross as an international movement and spoke about the local and overseas work carried out by the Singapore Red Cross. Finally, he addressed the challenges facing humanitarian work.

An audio recording and write-up of the seminar can be found here.

Second and Third Years, 2010 and 2011

- **Protection of Civilians in Asia Policy Roundtable, 9 February 2010**

The Centre hosted a one-day, closed-door, policy roundtable discussion comprising legal experts and regional CSOs working on civilian protection. With the recent creation of AICHR, a space for dialogue has been created to discuss the definition and implementation of civilian protection. The policy roundtable provided a platform for the presentation of viewpoints and recommendations for discussion and debate on the issue of the protection of civilians within Southeast Asia and explored opportunities on how this can be promoted and achieved within the ASEAN region.

A full conference report can be found here.



- **Responsibility to Protect Study Group, 23 October 2009 and 7 April 2010**

From left to right: Prof. Herman Kraft, ISDS Phillippines; and Dr Rizal Sukma, CSIS Jakarta.

The study group was convened with the specific focus to 1) examine the thinking and perspectives of Asian governments and societies on RtoP, particularly in Southeast Asia; 2) assess current mechanisms and initiatives in Southeast Asia that can be potential platforms for promoting RtoP principles in the region such as the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) and the ASEAN Human Rights Body; 3) assess the role of major powers, China and Japan, in the advancement of RtoP in Asia; and 4) examine the role of CSOs and social movements in internal conflicts, and how they can contribute to operationalising RtoP in Asia.

A total of nine papers are envisaged from the study group:

i. RtoP in Asia: Issues and Challenges (Mely Caballero-Anthony)

Abstract:

With the introduction and growing awareness of the RtoP principle in Asia, the region stands at the threshold of a new paradigm of governance, international relations, and state-society relations – one that could lead to the further advancement of human security and addressing important NTS issues in Asia. Mindful of the arguments that dismiss or downplay the need for RtoP in Asia because RtoP-type crimes could not happen in the region, the paper argues for more investigation in order to explore the different perspectives and thinking of RtoP in the region. Given the numerous threats to state and human security and the history of armed conflicts in the region, the paper also argues that the time is ripe to push for the operationalisation of RtoP, particularly in Southeast Asia.

ii. RtoP and the Regional Order: Ideational vs Material Factors (David Capie)

Abstract:

Over the last decade, there has been an explosion of scholarship on the role and influence of norms in international relations. Scholars have explored where norms come from, who presses for their acceptance and how ideational variables redefine the interests and identities of actors. Clear lines of debate have emerged between materialist theorists who argue that norms merely reflect the views of the most powerful states, and constructivists and some liberals who accord independent influence to ideas and stress the crucial role of agents (including non-state actors) in ensuring norm dissemination and change in state preferences. This paper will explore the diffusion of the nascent RtoP norm in Southeast Asia against the backdrop of this literature. It will examine how the material and ideational features of the Asia-Pacific regional order are influencing the spread of the RtoP norm; how it is being accepted, contested, debated and rejected.

iii. The ASEAN Security Community and RtoP (Rizal Sukma)

Abstract:

Suggestions have been made that the APSC could provide a logical place to begin the operationalisation of RtoP. As agreed in Bali during the 9th ASEAN Summit in October 2003, the APSC serves as the umbrella for bringing ASEAN's political and security cooperation onto a higher plane. The agreement was also meant to consolidate existing political and security cooperation and explore new venues for future collaboration in the area. Through such deepening and broadening of political and security cooperation, the APSC seeks to ensure that 'the peoples and Member States of ASEAN live in peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment.' In other words, the APSC obliges ASEAN member states to create 'a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security.' That responsibility should certainly include safeguarding their own citizens against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The question is, to what extent does the APSC provide the basis for implementing RtoP in Southeast Asia? In that context, this paper attempts to explore the relevance of APSC to the RtoP principle, and examines the challenges and opportunities for greater acceptance and implementation of the principle in Southeast Asia.

iv. ASEAN Human Rights Commission and the RtoP (Herman Kraft)

Abstract:

There are a number of opportunities that have emerged as possible entry points by which RtoP could be promoted in ASEAN. The first is the strength of what has become a very vocal and active civil society working on regional issues. The networks of NGOs working on these issues have become more sophisticated about their strategies of engagement with ASEAN. Without being less critical, they have been able to enter into alliances with sympathetic governments and ASEAN officials in the promotion of specific advocacies. The second is the projected establishment of an ASEAN Community with its constituent elements. Of particular importance is the establishment of AICHR. The question that relates these regional developments to the project at hand is

whether AICHR can provide the platform whereby RtoP could be promoted, and eventually advanced as a regional norm. If there are questions about its institutional capacity to address the human rights situation in Southeast Asia, what more when the issues involve sovereignty and the possibility of international intervention? In other words, does AICHR provide institutional opportunities that would allow the mainstreaming of RtoP in Southeast Asia?

v. Japan and the RtoP (Jun Honna)

Abstract:

Broadly speaking, there are three schools of thought among academics and policymaking circles in Japan with regard to RtoP. The first is the 'conservative' view which sees no room for integrating Japan's traditional human security thinking and RtoP. The second is the 'revisionist' view presented by apologists for the Self Defense Forces' international activism. The third is the silent majority that seemingly supports principles and visions of RtoP but is concerned about its fuzzy basis in international law and its political nature of identifying the target of intervention in the name of the responsibility to respond. This paper argues that it is this third group of opinion which needs to be empowered for the successful embracement of the RtoP doctrine within the scope of human security diplomacy. This means preventing 'revisionists' from hijacking the new doctrine to pursue different agendas, and enlightening 'conservatives' about the prospect that RtoP may in fact strengthen Japan's human security initiatives rather than undermine them. First, the paper will focus on how Japan has seen the emergence of the RtoP concept in the international community. Second, it will identify how the three components of RtoP — namely, responsibilities to prevent, react and rebuild, which were discussed in detail in the ICISS Report and developed into RtoP's three pillars in the 2005 World Summit Outcome — can be contextualised in Japan's human security framework. Third, the paper will assess possible reflections of Japan's incorporation of the RtoP doctrine into its human security foreign diplomacy in Southeast Asia.

vi. China and the RtoP (Liu Tiewa)

Abstract:

Being a major power and one of the permanent member states in the UN Security Council, China is expected to play a critical role in maintaining international peace and security. As a rising power, China is willing and has the capacity to bear heavier responsibilities in dealing with international conflicts. Hence, it is necessary to examine Chinese foreign policies on the Responsibility to Protect. This paper will address the following questions: how does the Chinese government re-evaluate the principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention in order to balance the protection of human rights, survival rights or development rights? What is the government's position on the use of force and how does it make a choice between military and peaceful means? What is the Chinese government's perspective on multilateral operations under the UN umbrella as opposed to unilateral action? Lastly, how does the Chinese government perceive the utility of international organisations and regional or sub-regional organisations?

vii. Thailand and the RtoP (Keokam Kraisoraphong)

Abstract:

The paper attempts to explore Thailand's position on RtoP since the time of the 2005 World Summit through in-depth interviews with those currently working most closely with RtoP-related issues: those within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Human Rights Commission and the Armed Forces. Interview results are discussed in relation to Thailand's political context and the challenges posed by separatist insurgents in southern Thailand, a case viewed by some as an RtoP-type situation.

viii. Malaysia and the RtoP (Elina Noor)

Abstract:

This paper seeks to analyse Malaysia's position on RtoP by drawing on statements made by official representatives at international forums. It will examine the country's thread of arguments supporting its position and consider those in light of broader legal and political ones. The paper will first, of all, provide an overview of the conditions that have warranted debate on RtoP. Further discussion will then be structured in line with the three pillars of the current UN Secretary-General's report on 'Implementing the Responsibility to Protect': first, protection responsibilities of the state; second, international assistance and capacity-building; and finally, timely and decisive response. Rather than consider the three pillars wholesale as they appear in the report, this paper focuses on the major areas of concern for Malaysia within each of those pillars.

ix. Indonesian civil society and the RtoP (Lina Alexandra)

Abstract:

This paper aims to describe Indonesia's position so far in responding to the RtoP principle. It tries to go beyond the government's position, to also delineate civil society's standpoint, which is an important element, particularly, to provide a more comprehensive overview. Based on the latest elaboration of RtoP within the UN Outcome Document (2005) into three strategic pillars, it is interesting to observe whether both sides – the government and civil society – are comfortable in taking the three pillars as a whole or more inclined towards Pillars one and two only. In doing so, the paper will examine to what extent has the Indonesian government understood the RtoP definition and incorporated the elements of RtoP in relevant national regulations on human rights. It will also look at how civil society in Indonesia, particularly NGOs working on human rights, view the RtoP principle and their attempts, if any, to apply elements of the RtoP principle in response to human rights issues.

- **Regional Consultation on the Responsibility to Protect, 8–9 April 2010**

A gathering of policy experts and analysts from leading CSOs and think tanks in the Asia-Pacific held the consensus that the doctrine of RtoP should be implemented in the region particularly in Southeast Asia. However, the greater concern among them is in addressing the impediments surrounding the implementation of the RtoP doctrine in the region. Three issues repeatedly emerged as core concerns on the feasibility of implementing RtoP. First, is whether Southeast Asian states could actually choose to adopt either one of the three RtoP pillars or if they should embrace the doctrine in its entirety; highlighting the need to raise awareness surrounding the RtoP pillars. Second, is how these states could be persuaded into institutionalising RtoP norms and finally, how the RtoP doctrine could be institutionalised within the larger regional framework.

A conference report will be available online. Video interviews conducted during the conference can be found here. As a follow up to the conference, Alistair D. B. Cook and Priyanka Bhalla published an Asia Security Initiative blog entry titled 'Forget Them Not: Preventing Mass Atrocities in Southeast Asia'; and Yang Razali Kassim and Nur Azha Putra published an RSIS commentary titled 'Responsibility to Protect: How should Southeast Asia respond?'



- **Seminar on Misrepresenting Norms and RtoP: An Alternative Norm Cascade?, 12 April 2010**

Speaker: Thomas G. Weiss, Presidential Professor of Political Science, The City University of New York (CUNY) Graduate Center; and Director of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies.

This seminar inspected the development of RtoP and determined its relevance in international affairs. It investigated three cases of states' misuse of RtoP to justify actual or potential military intervention. These cases occurred even though most in the international community questioned its invocation — except for the state citing it. The cases examined were the US and UK invasion of Iraq, the Russian invasion of South Ossetia in Georgia, and the French invocation of RtoP in Myanmar in the wake of Cyclone Nargis. This seminar contended that these cases suggest that norm misuse can assist in clarifying the concept of RtoP. Its use in these cases was contested and prompted debate, denial, and tactical concessions on RtoP. This seminar drew on the early stages of two theoretical models: the 'spiral' of human rights change and the 'cascade' of norm development, to further explain the development of RtoP.

An audio recording and write-up of the seminar can be found here.

- **Published works and media interviews under the programme**

i. Mely Caballero-Anthony, *Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect in Asia*, (forthcoming 2010)

ii. Mely Caballero-Anthony, *Political Change, Democratic Transitions and Security in Southeast Asia*, (ed.) (London and New York: Routledge, 2010).

iii. Mely Caballero-Anthony, 'Political Change and Political Development in Southeast Asia: Transitology Revisited', in Mely Caballero-Anthony, *Political Change, Democratic Transitions and Security in Southeast Asia*, (ed.) (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 1-16.

iv. Mely Caballero-Anthony, 'Non-traditional Security Issues in Asia: Imperatives for Deepening Regional Security Cooperation', in *Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region: A CSCAP Reader,* Desmond Ball and Kwa Chong Guan, (eds), (Singapore: RSIS and Australian National University, 2010), pp. 202-216.

v. Mely Caballero-Anthony, 'The New Security Agenda in Asia: Making Spaces for Non-Traditional Security Formulations of Emerging Security Challenges', in Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell and Joseph Liow, (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies* (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 311-325.

vi. Mely Caballero-Anthony, 'Cyclones and Humanitarian Crises: Pushing the Limits of R2P in Southeast Asia', in *Global Responsibility to Protect*, Vol. 1, No. 2, March 2009, pp. 135-155 (21).

vii. Mely Caballero-Anthony, 'Non-Traditional Security and Multilateralism in Asia: Reshaping the Contours of Regional Security Architecture', in Bates Gill and Michael Green, (eds), *Asia's Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition and the Search for Community* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 306-328.

viii. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Belinda Chng and Roderick Chia, 'The ICC Verdict: Whose Responsibility?', RSIS Commentary 33/2009, 31 March 2009.

ix. Mely Caballero-Anthony, 'Responding to Non-Traditional Security Challenges in Asia', RSIS Commentary 58/2009, 16 June 2009.

x. Alistair D. B. Cook and Mely Caballero-Anthony, 'Aung San Suu Kyi's Verdict: Implications for ASEAN', RSIS Commentary 79/2009, 12 August 2009, reprinted in PACNET no. 57.

xi. Alistair D. B. Cook and Priyanka Bhalla, 'Preventing mass atrocities in Southeast Asia', *The Jakarta Post*, 15 June 2010.

xii. Alistair D. B. Cook and Priyanka Bhalla, 'Preventing crimes in SE Asia', *The Brunei Times*, 1 June 2010.

xiii. Alistair D. B. Cook, 'Operationalising Regimes and Recognising Actors: Responding to Crises in Southeast Asia', Asia Security Initiative Policy Series, Working Paper No. 3, March 2010.

xiv. Alistair D. B. Cook, 'The US and Myanmar – Moving into a New Phase', RSIS Commentary 102/2009, 20 October 2009, reprinted in *The Nation* (Bangkok).

xv. Alistair D. B. Cook, 'The Obama Doctrine and Southeast Asia', RSIS Commentary 127/2009, 18 December 2009

xvi. Alistair D. B. Cook, 'Positions of Responsibility: A Comparison of ASEAN and EU approaches towards Myanmar', *International Politics,* Vol. 47 Issue 3 (2010).

xvii. Interview of Alistair D. B. Cook by Radio 938LIVE on the US Signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, 28 July 2009, available here.

xviii. Interview of Alistair D.B. Cook by Swiss National TV on the US, Myanmar and APEC Summit, 12 November 2009, available here.

Please click here to access the Centre's other publications.

- **Project on Security Sector Governance and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia (in collaboration with the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, the Philippines)**

SSG is important to Asia given the challenges posed by political transitions and democratisation in the region. One can argue that while some states in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia have already been through political transitions from authoritarian, military-led regimes, state and human security remain fragile. A comparative study on SSG in Southeast Asia is timely given the goals of the states in the region to establish a security community. Instituting SSG, understanding its limitations, and the problems of implementation will be critical to ASEAN if it were to succeed in its goals to promote peace and security in the region. This two-year project looks at case studies of security sector governance in Southeast Asia

and examines how this has affected conditions of intra-state conflict.

A total of five papers are envisaged from the project:

i. Security Governance and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia: The Case of Aceh in Indonesia (Rizal Sukma)

Abstract:

The paper examines the extent to which peaceful conflict management in Indonesia, with special reference to Aceh, has been made possible by the Security Sector Reform programme in the country. Areas of focus include the military's use of force as an instrument of conflict management in the period before democratisation, the impact of SSR on the way the military dealt with the secessionist conflict in Aceh, and the changing attitudes of the Indonesian military towards the Aceh peace process.

ii. Security Challenge for Thailand's Security Sector Reform (Keokam Kraisoraphong)

Abstract:

This paper will seek to examine whether the security sector reform which has often been criticised as a Western agenda and irrelevant to Thailand's existing security problems could be modified to suit the Thai context. Instead of beginning with the core assumptions of the Western reform path that encompass Western experiences on issues of transparency, civilian control and supremacy as related to standards of civilian and democratic oversight, the paper will take an empirical approach to examine Thailand's security problems and reverse the process of analysis.

iii. Security Governance and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Philippines (Maria Anna Rowena Layador)

Abstract:

The Philippines is faced with twin armed conflicts with the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army in the northern and southern Luzon parts of the country and the Moro secessionist movement in the south. State responses to these conflicts have been characterised as a compromise between civilian and military interpretations and a mix of government and armed responses. The armed forces have been actively involved in the provision of internal security and given a major role in maintaining law and order, which has brought about accusations of human rights violations. It has therefore been argued that the counter-insurgency has not only strengthened the position of the military vis-à-vis the civilian government but also worsened the twin insurgencies. This paper will focus on looking at whether security sector governance has contributed to managing conflicts or aggravated conflicts by using the security sector reform index developed by the Institute of Strategic and Development Studies.

iv. Security Governance and Conflict Management in Vietnam (Pham Quoc Tru)

Abstract:

A number of potential conflict situations have been brought about in Vietnam as a result of a long period of colonisation and successive wars. Among these are ethnic conflicts in the north-western mountain region and the highlands of the central region and conflict caused by dissidents within the Communist Party. The paper will look at the structures of SSG in Vietnam and how they contribute to managing the conflict situation through case studies; whether or how SSG could change and be adapted to fit into the changing local contexts; and propose policy recommendations to improve conflict management and strengthen international and regional cooperation in response to intra-state conflict management.

v. Security Sector Governance in Malaysia (Tang Siew Mun)

Abstract:

Malaysia is a strong state where the security sector is part of the establishment. The government and the Malay-dominant security sector manage state security through the depoliticisation of politics and the maintenance of a calibrated ethnic ratio in the security sector and the political arena. The paper will examine Malaysia's internal and external security imperatives, how the security sector maintains security and manages conflict, and assess the likelihood for continuity and change in the security sector.

- **Project on the Dynamics for Resolving Internal Conflicts in Southeast Asia (in collaboration with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia)**

Within Southeast Asia, the occurrence of internal conflicts has been a persistent problem that poses a serious challenge not only to sovereignty and territorial integrity of states but also to regional stability. Most internal conflicts in the region have taken the form of armed struggle between ethnic nationalist groups against the central government in a protracted battle for either autonomy or independence. The two-year project will investigate the dynamics of resolving intra-state conflicts in the Southeast Asian region. More specifically, the project will investigate the circumstances that resulted in the relapse, deadlock or success in resolving internal conflicts in four case studies, namely Indonesia, the Philippines, Myanmar and Thailand. Questions of interest include the following: Why did the peace agreements in Aceh, Moro Philippines, and Myanmar collapse and lead to a relapse? Why has the conflict in southern Thailand never achieved a peace agreement and attempts at peace-making have continued to stagnate? Why has the Aceh conflict finally come to a close and what had sustained the peace process thus far?

A total of five papers are envisaged from this project:

i. Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines: A Case of Relapse (Amado M. Mendoza, Jr.)

Abstract:

This case study of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) seeks to understand why the peace agreement between it and the Philippine government has not been successfully implemented. Among other weaknesses, the MNLF has failed to maintain or recreate itself whether as a politico-military liberation organisation or as a political party. Concessions, co-optation, divide-and-rule, demobilisation, and worse, political defeat or marginalisation through its own mismanagement of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (and its funds) have diminished the organisation. The paper will blend detailed contextual understandings of the situation with explicit, context-specific modelling, using historical accounts to develop empirically verifiable conjectures regarding the system of rules, beliefs, norms and their manifestations in organisations that together prompt regular patterns of behaviour.

ii. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front – Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Process (Herman Kraft)

Abstract:

The prospects of establishing lasting peace in Mindanao was diminished following the suspension of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). The MoU would have provided the basis for autonomous governance in the areas populated by Muslims via the establishment of a Bangsa Moro Juridicial Entity. As a result, the people are engendered by a weak state dealing with an insurgency situation and the likelihood of a peace process backsliding into conflict. Thus, the paper seeks to explore the circumstances that have led to both sides to backslide on the peace process, the question of good faith in the process of negotiating a

political settlement, the international dimension of the process, and the aspect of terrorism involved.

iii. Thailand's Malay-Muslim Insurgency (Thitinan Pongsudhirak)

Abstract:

The ongoing Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand's southernmost border provinces has seemingly become intractable in the past six years with violence flaring in the predominantly Muslim provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat from 2004. While the intensifying spate of violence has been well-publicised, its nature, dynamics, direction and near-term ramifications have remained murky. This paper seeks to contextualise the prolonged and protracted violence in the broader literature. The insurgents' aims which range from greater administrative autonomy to outright separatism in southern Thailand will be triangulated between historiography, domestic politics and external involvement.

iv. Explaining the Rise and Fall of the Aceh Peace Process (Evan Laksmana)

Abstract:

This paper seeks to explain the success and failure of the post-Suharto peace process in Aceh. Specifically, it seeks to assess why the Humanitarian Pause facilitated by the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) in 2000 and the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in 2002 failed, while the 2005 Helsinki process was successful in bringing an eventual peace accord that lasts till today. The paper will also explain a larger puzzle regarding the post-Suharto Aceh conflict that saw both the largest military insurgency faced by Indonesia in recent times and yet achieved sustainable peace within a short period from 1998 to 2006.

v. Ethnic Minorities in Myanmar/Burma (Tin Maung Maung Than)

Abstract:

There are seven major ethnic minority groups in Myanmar comprising more than one-third of the country's population. While there is a long history of ethnic tension in its state-building trajectory, an artificial peace is kept in Myanmar as the junta accepts that certain parts of the country are under the control of the major ethnic minority groups such as the Karen and the Shan. This paper seeks to examine the key question: why is there no need for a peace process in Myanmar and whether there is a point of equilibrium in managing internal conflicts within a state.

Quick Glance at Upcoming Activities

- Regional Workshop on the Protection of Civilians, 15– 16 July 2010
  (in collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross)
- Follow-up Meeting on the Dynamics for Resolving Internal Conflicts in Southeast Asia, January 2011
  (in collaboration with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia)
- Follow-up Meeting on the Security Sector Governance and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia, 9 March 2011
  (in collaboration with the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, the Philippines)

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B) Climate Change, Environmental Security and Natural Disasters Programme

Climate Insecurities, Human Security and Social Resilience

As the largest and most populous continent, Asia is expected to bear the brunt of the effects of climate change. In more traditional security literature, climate change has increasingly been documented as a threat multiplier, with the potential to overstretch societies' adaptive capacity and create or exacerbate political instability and violence. The expectations have been that governments should work cooperatively to avoid the kinds of tensions that might result, particularly in the face of alleged competition for resources and the cross-border challenges associated with the emerging phenomenon of 'climate refugees'. Consequently, there has been more focus on climate mitigation as a preventive strategy while less attention has been paid to the importance of adaptation and building social resilience for

those communities and countries most affected by climate change.

However, adaptation is key to minimising vulnerabilities and building social resilience to the impact of climate change, which in turn will contribute to shaping regional security and stability. The emphasis on social resilience, as opposed to a focus on climate change as a threat multiplier, reflects a non-traditional security approach to the issue. Building social resilience is pertinent for communities that aim to cope with the changes caused by climate change. It also means that strategies for climate adaptation will require multi-level as well as multilateral approaches, involving not only governments but also regional institutions, local communities and non-governmental actors.

From left to right: Mr Kwa Chong Guan, RSIS; Prof. Emil Salim, Indonesia Presidential Advisory Board; and Prof. Koh Kheng Lian, NUS.

Objectives and Approach

An important component in the Climate Change, Environmental Security and Natural Disasters Programme is the emphasis on a human security approach in examining current and projected risks as well as identifying ways to address them. This programme is looking at the significant linkages between state and social resilience, on the one hand, and regional climate security on the other. Integral to this analysis is examining regional 'lessons learned' in building social resilience in the face of climate change.

While scientific reports by the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) have shown how various regions will be affected by climate change, there is a need to pursue a better understanding of the specific implications for the region so that targeted measures can be formulated. The complexities that come into play in these environmental insecurities are found in Southeast Asia. The region is comprised mostly of developing economies. Many countries are characterised by low lying coastal areas. Southeast Asia has also been regularly and adversely affected by natural disasters brought on by torrential rains and large-scale floods, and irregular weather patterns that increasingly bring on long periods of drought. Further, climate change is projected to create more 'immediate' risks for food, water and health security in the region.

The urgency of dealing with climate change has been highlighted by a number of scientists, research institutions, international bodies as well as policymakers. Yet, the global consensus on the gravity of the human security challenges posed by climate change is not matched by a consensus on how best to address this problem. Against the sharpening contours of Asian geopolitics, it is imperative to better understand the nature of social and human vulnerability and resilience. It is also imperative to examine state interactions in the region and the role of regional institutions in developing an effective approach to climate and environmental security, and disaster management.

Programme Activities

First year, 2009

- **Conference on Climate Insecurities, Human Security and Social Resilience**

To kick-start the programme, the Centre organised a conference on Climate Insecurities, Human Security and Social Resilience in Singapore from 27 to 28 August 2009. The conference aimed to come to a better understanding of the implications of climate change for Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia so that specific 'climate security' measures could be formulated. The objectives of this conference were to (1) introduce the project to an academic and policy audience; and (2) identify and explore the key themes that 'set the scene' for work to come, over the duration of the project.

Bringing together reputable security and political analysts, economists and environmentalists, it examined climate change from a human security perspective at both national and regional levels.

A full report of concept papers and slide presentations presented at, as well as video interviews conducted during the conference, can be found here. As a follow-up to the conference, Associate Professor Lorraine Elliott published an RSIS commentary titled 'Human Security: A Response to the Climate Security Debates'.

Please click here to access the Centre's other publications.

- **Working paper on 'Human Securitising' the Climate Security Debate**

As part of the Asia Security Initiative Policy Series, Associate Professor Lorraine Elliott explores in her working paper the human insecurities that are generated by climate change, with a particular focus on the Asia-Pacific. The paper also examines how human security models provide (1) different ways of interpreting climate conflict 'triggers' and (2) different and more effective strategies for responding to climate insecurity.

- **Edited book with the proposed title of 'Human Security and Climate Change in Southeast Asia: Managing Risk and Resilience'**

This book brings both an empirical and conceptual dimension to the objective of expanding our understanding of climate change, adaptation, human security and social resilience in Southeast Asia. The chapters present a range of empirical case studies, exploring urban, forest, rural, coastal and river basin communities and ecosystems across the region. Strategies for climate adaptation and social resilience are multi-level as well as multilateral, involving not just governments, but also regional institutions, local communities and non-governmental actors. The case studies therefore also include cross-border regions and regional institutions. The chapters contribute analyses of how key concepts such as risk and resilience should be defined and understood and shed light on key issues and complexities associated with governance and implementation. This edited book brings together authors with local, national and regional expertise in Southeast Asia and is co-edited by Associate Professors Mely Caballero-Anthony and Lorraine Elliott. It is expected to be published by the final quarter of 2010.

Section I: Setting the context

i. Human Security, Climate Change and Social Resilience (Lorraine Elliott and Mely Caballero-Anthony)

Abstract:

This chapter has two purposes. First, it provides the context for contemporary debates about climate change and security, informed by a critical analysis that explains the importance of a human security approach. Drawing on this analysis, the chapter sets the scene for the themes of adaptation and resilience that are woven throughout subsequent chapters. Second, this introductory chapter provides an overview of the structure of the book and foreshadows the key themes and findings.

Those themes include:

- *the need for a critical understanding of ways in which vulnerability and risk (and, therefore, resilience) are socially constructed*
- *the complexities and challenges of governance across multiple scales including the need to improve awareness of governance and capacity deficits and to develop a well-grounded understanding of appropriate enabling environments*
- *the importance of participatory, people-centred approaches within the context of the so-called 'triangle' of cooperation that includes business and government along with civil society*
- *the policy consequences of anticipatory and reactive approaches to adaptation, and the co-benefits of as well as potential policy incoherence of adaptation and mitigation strategies*

– *the role of market and economic incentives*

– *the ways in which scientific research, including social scientific investigation, informs and engages with policymaking and policy implementation*

ii. The Economics of Climate Change in Southeast Asia (Juzhong Zhuang, Suphachol Suphachalasai and Jindra Nuella Samson)

Abstract:

In conjunction with chapter 1, this chapter sets the scene for the analysis of adaptation and social resilience strategies in subsequent chapters. It provides an overview of the impact of climate change on Southeast Asia and reviews adaptation measures that have been adopted by many Southeast Asian countries. It identifies the areas where more efforts are needed, focusing on key climate-sensitive sectors including water resources, agriculture, forestry, coastal and marine resources, and health. It concludes with some key policy messages.

Section II: Conceptual approaches

iii. A Sociology of Risk, Vulnerability and Resilience (Devanathan Parthasarathy)

Abstract:

This chapter provides a critical investigation of the nature of risk, vulnerability and resilience. It offers a complex depiction of the links between poverty, power distribution in society, discrimination and environmental shifts and changes. It engages with some classical sociological perspectives on risk (particularly those developed by Mary Douglas and Ulrich Beck) and offers a critique of their applicability in non-Western contexts. Drawing on research on the vulnerability of the urban poor to climate change, this chapter calls for a more nuanced understanding of vulnerability (and therefore of resilience) that recognises the complexity of social structures within Asia and argues that an understanding of risk is insufficient without a concurrent grasp of the issue of social and cultural choices that social actors are subjected to. In this context, the chapter also questions the dangers of institutional isomorphism and the wisdom (or otherwise) of importing or imitating or even adapting international 'best practice' which might have little fit with local requirements and social processes.

iv. Community Rights and Access (Keokam Kraisoraphong)

Abstract:

This chapter begins also with the argument that analysis of social vulnerability which seeks to enhance social resilience must take into account the social construction of vulnerability and the economic, institutional and political factors which promote or constrain options for adaptation. Drawing on a case study of water security in the Lower Mekong Basin, this chapter argues that what seems to some to demonstrate regime creativity and adaptation in the field of water governance is argued by others, from within a critical hydropolitics perspective, to have been confined by the dominance of law, engineering and economics. This informs a central concern of the chapter, that of the relationship between the apparent resilience of institutions and the resilience of individuals and communities. In response to this concern, the author explores people-centred approaches to resilience that focus on community rights and access.

Section III: Local risk and strategies for local resilience

Abstract:

Developing strategies for adapting to climate change and building social resilience involves complex challenges. In many respects, while we know a lot about the types of adaptation strategies available, much more is required in understanding how to move from general assumptions to implementation in specific circumstances. We also need to explore more carefully the ways in which strategies for mitigation need to be balanced against adaptation, and the ways in which some mitigation strategies can actually undermine social resilience and human security. The chapters in this section draw on case studies to take this research one step further. Each chapter identifies a particular human security challenge (or set of challenges) in the face of climate change, examines and evaluates particular types of adaptation strategies and their impact on or contribution to building social resilience, and offers some thoughts on the policy, implementation and institutional or governance issues that the analysis raises.

v. Coastal Vulnerability and Coastal Resilience: Scenario Research and Management for Social Resilience (Beverley Goh)

Abstract:

This chapter presents a regional assessment of the vulnerability to sea-level rise of coastal areas and coastal communities in Southeast Asia. The human security and climate security dimensions of coastal vulnerability include loss of land and migration pressures. In this chapter, Goh demonstrates and argues for the advantages of resilience approaches that take into account both natural and socio-economic variables (such as the length of coastline, the size of coastal population, the extent of local floodplains, the importance of agriculture, the multiple but often different impacts of sea-level rise including salt-water intrusion, land subsidence, erosion and flooding, and equity). This chapter also examines approaches to policy and cost-benefit analysis relevant to the management of vulnerable coastal areas. In this respect, it provides some insights into ways of how results of scientific research can or should be incorporated into policymaking and governance on adaptation and resilience.

vi. REDD (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation): Mitigation, Adaptation and the Resilience of Local Livelihoods (Enrique Ibarra Gené)

Abstract:

REDD has become a key focus for debates about mitigation of greenhouse emissions. In this chapter, Enrique Gené explores a REDD demonstration activity in Aceh and examines the ways in which this was intended also to enhance social resilience through providing alternative livelihoods, and generating revenue and income. The chapter reveals the complexities associated with REDD when human security and social resilience issues are factored into governance strategies. As this chapter demonstrates, these include the importance of recognising traditional community rights, the need to understand the impact of land reclassification on local livelihoods, multiple strategies for addressing illegal logging, and imperatives for transparency and accountability. This chapter also examines the ways in which understanding market structures and economic incentives are important in the implementation of adaptation, mitigation and resilience strategies.

vii. The Challenges for Gender-responsive Adaptation Strategies (Bernadette P. Resurreccion)

Abstract:

This chapter explores climate change not just as a human security issue but also as a gendered issue, one that affects women and men in different and uneven ways. Drawing on both a broader analysis of adaptation strategies and specific case studies in Cambodia, Vietnam and the Philippines, it argues that making gender prominent requires adaptation strategies that are shaped and influenced by women's and men's relative and differentiated capacities, power and social resilience, vulnerabilities and resources. Social resilience, in this view, is a process that involves the construction of reliable and sustained institutions of support and trust.

Section IV: Scaling up to the region

viii. Development for Climate Security (Irene Kuntjoro)

Abstract:

This chapter examines ways in which the security aspects of climate change are, or could be, integrated within the development agenda with a particular focus on the role of international agencies in promoting adaptation efforts in the region, In particular, it focuses on the role of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific in promoting preventive approaches informed by human security and in supporting governments to develop climate change resilient societies. The chapter explores how a move from reactive to anticipatory adaptation results in a

change in policy instruments and can deliver more effective outcomes including those that speak specifically to human security.

ix. Risk and Resilience in Cross-border Areas (Fitrian Ardiansyah)

Abstract:

This chapter investigates the security impact of climate change in three cross-border areas in Southeast Asia – the Greater Mekong Sub-region, the Heart of Borneo, and the Coral Triangle – through an examination of the ways in which climate change results in both human insecurity and possible social unrest, tension and conflict. It explores regional agreements and actions in each of the three cross-border regions and evaluates them against 'ideal' type models with an emphasis on mainstreaming climate adaptation as well as mitigation in the development agenda. The analysis here points to the importance for adaptation and resilience of identifying other 'real' actors (that is beyond states and inter-governmental actors) and getting them involved: the business sector, local communities, and the public.

x. Regional Cooperation: Enabling Environments and the 'Brain Gain' for Adaptation and Social Resilience (Emil Salim)

Abstract:

This chapter builds on the two previous chapters to explore how adaptation strategies, which are key to social resilience and human security, have been incorporated in sustainable development policy at a national and regional level in Southeast Asia. This chapter pays particular attention to the issue of 'enabling' environments and governance, including the importance of networking scientific endeavours and building a triangle of cooperation that involves government, business and civil society. Enabling environments in Southeast Asia, the author also argues, require human capacity at the local level and a reversal of the 'brain drain' at the national and regional levels.

Second Year, 2010

- **Conference on Climate Change and Food Security: Securing Asia Pacific's Food Futures**

Activities in the second year are focused on the issue of climate change and food security. Climate change is projected to aggravate existing pressure on food security in the Asia-Pacific. The agriculture sector is central to food security in the region and the negative consequences of climate change on agricultural production will in turn affect the availability, access, stability and utilisation of food, all of which are critical elements of food security. The food crises in 2007 and 2008 have shown that the security dimensions of food crises are complex, multi-scale and interconnected, and that they range across human security, economic security and national security. This complexity of security concerns has generated demands for strategic policy responses in agricultural productivity, disaster management, social protection and community-based development.

Moreover, because these are no longer simply local problems, food security requires effective policy responses that are supported and facilitated by regional cooperation. While there has been growth in regional activity under ASEAN, ASEAN Plus Three, and international bodies such as the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, there has been little systematic assessment of the coherence or fragmentation of regional responses, best practices, policy gaps, and their contribution to the human and national security dimensions of food scarcity. This conference aims to evaluate regional food security frameworks in the Asia-Pacific by taking an interdisciplinary and multilateral approach and bringing together regional experts from within academe, the policy community and CSOs. This conference is scheduled to be held within the third quarter of 2010 in Canberra, Australia.

- **Edited book on climate change and food security**

An edited book will be published in addition to conference proceedings as a follow-up to the above-mentioned conference. The chapters in this book will cover key issues on both best practices and policy gaps in regional governance strategies for food security in relation to climate change, and provide appropriate and relevant recommendations for strengthening and enhancing cooperative arrangements. This book will be co-edited by Associate Professors Mely Caballero-Anthony and Lorraine Elliott and is expected to be published by the final quarter of 2011.

Third Year, 2011

In its third year, this programme will be looking at the issue of climate change and migration in the region. The UN estimates that there could be at least 200 million environmentally-induced migrants worldwide by the year 2050. However, claims about the security implications of climate migration need to be revisited both empirically and conceptually. As opposed to securitising the climate migration issue as an exacerbating factor to traditional security concerns such as conflict and war, the programme seeks to elaborate on a human security approach in analysing and responding to the potential insecurities generated by climate migration. Taking a different approach will demand alternative responses that should take into account a number of underlying vulnerabilities associated with the issue of climate migration such as food, livelihood, poverty, health, and disaster management. This project will look at how adaptation policies in the region will be able to address these challenges.

Quick Glance at Upcoming Activities

Food First: Ensuring Food and Nutrition for Urbanites

- Symposium and Expert Group Meeting (in collaboration with the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council), 3–4 August 2010
- International Conference, February 2011

Securing Food Futures in the Asia Pacific: Evaluating Regional Frameworks for Food Security (in collaboration with the Australian National University)

- Public Forum and Focus Group Workshop, 6–8 October 2010

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C) Energy and Human Security Programme

In the face of supply instability and price volatility against the backdrop of surging global demand, energy security has been traditionally viewed among Asian countries as an indispensible component of their development strategies. As Asia has emerged from the financial crisis relatively unscathed compared to the West, Asian countries remain tipped for rapid economic growth. The sustenance of such development hinges in no small part on energy security. However, it is also important to note that energy security is not merely associated with the guarantee of secure access to affordably-priced fuel sources. The heavy reliance on fossil fuels carries far-reaching environmental and socio-economic consequences beyond the mere notion of supply security. These concerns include climate change with its attendant problems of rising sea levels and risks posed to the ecosystem, as well as political impact in the face of public dissatisfaction over rising energy prices.

There has been increased awareness of the consequences brought about by climate change and the continued volatility of fossil fuels which will most probably continue to make up the bulk of the present and future energy mix. In Asia, where the need to reconcile socio-economic development and environmental protection becomes a pertinent issue, strategies are sought after to sustainably harness energy resources while limiting the impact on the environment. Such a strategy is generally two-pronged; consisting of energy efficiency measures and exploration of viable alternative energy solutions. The latter aspect deserves attention. To date, there has been widespread interest shown by Asian countries in clean energy technologies. Clean energy technologies not only help to reduce carbon emissions but also contribute to the reduced dependence on fossil fuels whose prices are often subject to geopolitical and market disruptions.

East Asia in particular has recently witnessed rapid progress in the utilisation of clean energy technologies. For instance, China has emerged as the forerunner in wind energy development and is fast gaining ground on the solar energy sector. The countries of ASEAN are certainly not far behind in the exploration of alternative energy sources, given the relative abundance of such resources in the region. Further, serious interest has been shown among countries across Asia in the use of nuclear energy while existing nuclear-users in the region, such as China, Japan and South Korea, are expanding its use. In the ASEAN region, there has also been what is coined a 'nuclear renaissance' as members of this regional organisation mull over its potential inclusion in their energy mix.

However, the development of alternative energy sources, just like the case of fossil fuels, is not a simple case of demand and supply. This strategy is fraught with a range of pertinent issues that have framed current intense debates among policymakers, the academe and NGOs. For instance, despite being an attractive energy option, nuclear energy is saddled with inherent risks associated to radioactive waste disposal and nuclear weapons proliferation – all of which carry transnational security consequences that cannot be overlooked. While renewable energy technologies continue to mature, coherent policy incentives and support will need to be provided by governments to enlarge the former's share in a country's energy mix. While countries such as China and the Philippines have pioneered in introducing renewable energy laws, these need to be improved further to fully realise the potential of renewable energy. On top of that, deficiencies in energy policymaking shown in Asia have resulted in questions regarding the ability of governments in the region to adequately exercise energy governance, as the rise in CSOs in the contemporary nuclear debate has illustrated. In sum, energy security for Asia in the near future will be confronted by a multifaceted array of factors beyond the notion of supply security. Against the emergent concerns revolving around environment and technological safety for instance, the concept of energy security has to broaden in order to address the interdependent nature of these problems. This paradigm will require transcending the state actor level to involve non-governmental actors while also stressing the need for greater multilateral cooperation. A multifaceted approach to energy security therefore constitutes the framework for this research programme.

Programme Activities

The research programme on energy and human security presently examines two major issues: the future of nuclear energy and governance in Southeast Asia and energy vulnerability and collaboration in East Asia. However, while these fields are often discussed in a geopolitical context, the programme approaches them through a distinct human security paradigm which stresses not just availability, consistency, and non-discriminatory access but also considers inter-related factors involved, such as environmental and security risks. The programme has produced a wide range of publications through RSIS and the Centre. To date, it has organised and will be embarking upon the following projects to further the programme's research pursuits:

- **Project on Nuclear Energy and Human Security: Critical Debates**

In the face of climate change and a projected increase in power consumption, nuclear energy has become a focal point of interest among policymakers across Asia. As such, there has been significant research focusing on the potential of nuclear energy expansion in the region. However, the road to nuclear energy development in the region is not entirely smooth-sailing. Pertinent issues related to environmental, economic and security risks continue to dominate the nuclear debate. As such, the project titled Nuclear Energy and Human Security: Critical Debates was initiated in September 2009 in an attempt to explore these issues.

As part of this project, a workshop on Nuclear Energy and Human Security was convened on 23 April 2010, at Traders Hotel in Singapore. It brought together a total of about 60 participants, mostly from the Singapore Government, to engage in a day's discussion on the merits and drawbacks of nuclear energy in the context of the environment, economics, and security. In addition, the role of CSOs in nuclear energy policymaking was also discussed.

Dr Rajesh Basrur, RSIS Centre for NTS Studies.

It is hoped that the debates fleshed out in the workshop will help policymakers arrive at policy decisions more effectively and help anyone interested in nuclear energy understand the debated issues more thoroughly.

As a follow-up to the workshop, a commentary titled 'Can Nuclear Energy Enhance Nuclear Security in Southeast Asia?', written by Ryan Clarke, Nur Azha Putra, Mely Caballero-Anthony and Rajesh Basrur, was subsequently published.

Summaries of Papers Presented

A total of seven chapters were presented: two each on the environmental, economic and security aspects, as well as one on the role of civil society. These papers will contribute to an edited volume titled *Nuclear Energy and Human Security: Critical Debates*. The brief summaries of these chapters are outlined below.

Nuclear Power and the Environment: Facts vs Fiction

Dr T. S. Gopi Rethinaraj
Assistant Professor
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
National University of Singapore

Contrary to common public perceptions, nuclear energy does not pose environmental risks which are 'dramatic'. The radiation levels of nuclear reactors are often lower than the background radiation humans are typically exposed to and there is no scientific consensus on the implications of low-level radiation. Moreover, nuclear reactors do not explode like a nuclear bomb since a reactor meltdown can be well contained with the advent of modern, safer nuclear technology. Given the present context of rising energy needs and climate change, a complete halt in nuclear power plant construction and spent fuel processing is almost impossible to achieve. Nonetheless, environmental risks associated with nuclear energy can still be effectively controlled through attainable levels of safety in nuclear energy operations.

Critical Environmental Questions: Nuclear Energy and Human Security in Asia

Associate Professor Simon Tay
Chairman
Singapore Institute of International Affairs

The environmental risks of nuclear energy have to be viewed from a broader perspective. Rather than just focusing on the technical aspects of nuclear operations, the culture of safety has to be scrutinised. In the case of Southeast Asia, the culture of safety in common industrial operations leaves much to be desired. Compounding this situation in Southeast Asia is a prevailing culture of secrecy in policymaking that obstructs better public understanding. This has to be rectified with transparent and publicly-accountable nuclear energy policymaking. The conservative, sustainable development perspective does not exclude the nuclear option. However, a precautionary principle needs to be heeded in nuclear energy policymaking.

Nuclear Energy and Economic Costs

Professor Kazuaki Matsui
Executive Director
Institute of Applied Energy
Japan

Among several factors which need to be considered for the costing of nuclear-generated electricity, expenses associated with facility siting, licensing, uncertainty risks and construction capital costs are arguably most critical. These investment capital costs account for 60 per cent of the total cost of nuclear-generated electricity, which is highly sensitive to overnight construction costs and investment capital. Nonetheless, in comparison with other clean energy options, nuclear remains attractive in terms of cost risks. To provide for an investment climate conducive for nuclear industries, investment risks need to be better understood and limited to acceptable levels.

Economics of Nuclear and Renewable Electricity

Dr Mark Diesendorf
Deputy Director
Institute of Environmental Studies
University of New South Wales
Australia

The costs of nuclear-generated electricity can only be accurately evaluated alongside various other clean energy alternatives. Nuclear energy is only economical at the commercial and pre-commercial stages. It still requires backup in times of contingency, thus hiding the true costs. Moreover, accurate gauges of real nuclear-generated electricity costs are also hindered by the tendency of planners to accept nuclear plant manufacturers' cost estimates, of selecting unrealistically low discount rates and of using accounting methods that underestimate capital costs. Major financial hurdles exist to hinder attempts in uncovering lower-cost nuclear technologies such as modularised reactors. The key drawback of nuclear energy lies in proliferation risks, with which renewable energy technologies are not saddled.

Nuclear Energy and Security Risks: Is the Expansion of Nuclear Power Compatible with Global Peace and Security?

Professor Jor-Shan Choi
Professor
Global Center-of-Excellence Program
Nuclear Education and Research Initiative
University of Tokyo
Japan

Despite its contributions and great potential, the expansion of nuclear faces significant challenges in nuclear proliferation, security, and spent fuel/waste management. Other threats to the expansion of nuclear energy include nuclear terrorism executed by rogue actors, weak enforcement of the non-proliferation regime, the potential of nuclear weaponisation under the guise of peaceful uses, and closed fuel cycle as a 'latent proliferation' concern. The world can no longer afford to continue a 'business-as-usual' approach towards nuclear security. A new strategy that helps secure and draw down excess weapons-usable materials and leverage upon technology to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation should be adopted by the international community.

Security Aspects of the Growth of Nuclear Power

Mr Miles A. Pomper
Senior Research Associate
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Washington DC, United States of America

Joint Paper with

Mr Cole Harvey
Research Associate
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Washington DC, United States of America

Uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing can support the civilian nuclear power industry, but they also can be exploited to generate fissile material for nuclear weapons. The expansion of nuclear energy use means more nuclear facilities and more fissile material in transit, thus providing greater target opportunities for terrorists. Moreover, nuclear power plants can also serve as a source of 'dirty bombs' or become 'dirty bombs' themselves – which is compounded by the non-uniform enhancement of nuclear facility security worldwide. Existing international efforts to bolster nuclear security represent more of a patchwork of arrangements than a concrete, focused effort to achieve an overarching international agreement. A balance between nuclear energy growth and proliferation resistance can be achieved, such as efforts to create a multilateral approach to the fuel cycle and the fostering of a nuclear security culture.

CSOs and Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia: Cases of Engagement from Indonesia and the Philippines

Dr Mely Caballero-Anthony
Associate Professor and Head
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Secretary-General
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Joint Paper with

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Though nascent to speak of, CSOs have lately experienced exponential growth in Southeast Asia. They are increasingly better organised and strategic in intra- and interstate interactions with other counterpart institutions. In the realm of nuclear energy policymaking, as it could be seen in the case of Indonesia and the Philippines, CSOs strive to provide alternative viewpoints and independent sources of information to the public. Moreover, they serve as credible alternative actors in proposing alternative policy ideas and frameworks. They also facilitate capacity-building for 'bottom-up' energy policy planning and endeavour to enhance governance through persuasion and/or advocacy.



A full conference report, video interviews, and slide presentations presented during the conference, can be found here.

Seminar on Crafting a Technology Roadmap towards Energy Security and Environmental Sustainability in Singapore: Beginning the Journey

Speaker: Dr Michael Quah Cheng-Guan, Principal Fellow, Energy Studies Institute, 23 February 2010

The technology roadmap illustrates the need for technology. However, technology is a totally insufficient element for addressing the energy security challenges in our carbon-constrained world. While fossil fuels remain a 'fuel reality' over the next few decades, the world would gradually have to transition towards a future of alternative energy solutions. Doing so, Dr Quah contended in the seminar, would require an understanding



of the 'systems of systems' interaction on the use of 'low energy density' sources such as solar energy and biofuels. To illustrate this point, he first highlighted the resource and environmental challenges the world faces. He then moved on to the need to strike a balance between economic development, energy security and environmental sustainability. Dr Quah then proposed some recommendations on improving energy security while promoting environmental sustainability, by combining technology with new thinking.

- **Project on Dealing with Energy Vulnerabilities: Case Studies of Cooperation and Collaboration in East Asia**

Prof. Zha Daojiong, Peking University.

Much literature on energy security in East Asia has focused on the dynamics of competition over resources and how potential conflicts could arise from this. While this perspective of analysis identifies potential risks and problems, it also precludes the possibility that cooperation is possible between the different states of the region. While the themes of competition and conflict will continue to be relevant in discussions on East Asian states and societies, concentrating solely on them risks overemphasising the vulnerabilities East Asian societies face in meeting their energy needs, precluding the exploration of cooperative solutions in addressing energy security.

Dr Chang Youngho, RSIS Centre for NTS Studies.

Going beyond the themes of competition and conflict, this project endeavours to 1) examine cooperation and collaboration against the backdrop of continuing geopolitical uncertainties and tension as a central focus of inquiry, 2) fill a research and knowledge gap attributed to the general tendency to relate energy security to power politics while undervaluing the extent of interdependence in the chain of energy trade and product trade among nation-states in East Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific, and 3) examine how transnational projects of energy cooperation and collaboration have taken place in East Asia, despite the emphasis on geopolitics in determining policy. It is hoped that findings obtained from this project can stimulate debates about energy policymaking and institutionalisation in the region. The case studies centre on the ten member states of ASEAN, as well as China, Japan and South Korea. A key assumption underpinning this project is that shortages in and uncertainties over energy supplies – that is, energy vulnerabilities – constitute a normative part for these case countries under examination. An energy study group inception meeting was held on 4 June 2010, gathering interested energy-related scholars to

discuss this issue and thereafter, commissioning research on selected topics. This will be followed by a regional energy workshop in December 2010 and culminate in an edited volume

- **Published works under the programme**

i. Zha Daojiong, 'Oil Pipeline from Myanmar to China: Competing Perspectives', Asia Security Initiative Policy Series, Working Paper No. 1, March 2010.

ii. Zha Daojiong, 'Oil Pipeline from Myanmar to China: Competing Perspectives', RSIS Commentary 74/2009, 24 July 2009.

iii. Rajesh Basrur, 'Indian Perspectives on the Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons', in Barry M. Blechman and Alexander K. Bollfrass, (eds), National Perspectives on Nuclear Disarmament (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2010).

iv. Rajesh Basrur, 'The India-U.S. Nuclear Deal: Security Implications' in Christopher Len and Alvin Chew, (eds), Energy and Security Cooperation in Asia: Challenges and Prospects (Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2009).

v. Ryan Clarke, Nur Azha Putra, Mely Caballero-Anthony and Rajesh Basrur, 'Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia: Will it Enhance Human Security?', RSIS Commentary 48/2010, 14 May 2010.

vi. Ryan Clarke, Collin Koh and Kevin Punzalan, 'Enhancing Energy Security, Underpinning Development: The Future of Nuclear Energy in ASEAN', NTS Insight, May 2010.

vii. Alvin Chew, 'US Nuclear Summit: Nuclear Warheads vs Nuclear Energy', RSIS Commentary 40/2010, 13 April 2010.

viii. Alvin Chew, 'UAE Nuclear Agreement: A Model for Southeast Asia?', RSIS Commentary 17/2010, 12 February 2010.

ix. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Kevin Punzalan and Koh Swee Lean Collin, 'Renewable Energy: A Survey of Policies in East Asia', NTS Alert Issue 2, March 2010.

x. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Kevin Punzalan and Koh Swee Lean Collin, 'Energy Renaissance in East Asia: Nuclear or Renewables?', NTS Alert Issue 1, March 2010.

xi. Mely Caballero-Anthony and Collin Koh, 'Nuclear-Public Relations Management in Southeast Asia', NTS Alert Issue 2, June 2009.

Please click here to access the Centre's other publications.

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Upcoming Activity

Dealing with Energy Vulnerabilities: Case Studies of Cooperation and Collaboration in East Asia

- Regional Workshop, December 2010

ASI Visiting Fellowship

2009

- Professor Zha Daojiong, Visiting Senior Fellow, Peking University, Beijing

Zha Daojiong is Professor of International Political Economy in the School of International Studies, Peking University. He specialises in issues such as energy, food and water, with particular focus on how these pertain to China, as well as political-economic relations between China and its neighbours. As a Lead Researcher of the Energy and Human Security Programme, he has published a working paper under the ASI Policy Series titled 'Oiling the Wheels of Foreign Policy? Energy Security and China's International Relations'.

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Lorraine Elliott is Associate Professor and Senior Fellow in International Relations at the Australian National University. She also holds a Visiting Senior Fellowship at the Centre for NTS Studies, where she is a lead researcher on the MacArthur Asia Security Initiative project on climate security. She is a member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), the governance board of the ANU Climate Change Institute, and the International Human Dimensions Programme (IHDP) Advisory Group on Global Environmental Change and Human Health. Dr Elliott has published a working paper under the ASI Policy Series titled '"Human Securitising" the Climate Security Debate'.



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2010

- Dr Meenakshi Gopinath, Visiting Senior Fellow, Delhi, India

Meenakshi Gopinath (Founder & Honorary Director) serves as Principal, Lady Shri Ram College for Women, New Delhi, and was the first woman member on India's National Security Advisory Board. Dr Gopinath serves on several boards including co-chair of the Academic Council of the UN University of Peace, Costa Rica; Governing Board of Co-Existence International, USA; Center for Policy Research, New Delhi; The Shri Ram School, New Delhi; Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Sri Lanka; Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, New Delhi etc. She is a member of multi-track peace initiatives in Kashmir and between India and Pakistan including the Neemrana Peace Initiative, Dostaana e' Kashmir and the Pakistan India Peoples' Forum for Peace and Democracy. In recognition of her contribution to the field of women's education and empowerment, she has received several awards including the Indira Priyadarshini Gandhi Award, the Rajiv Gandhi Award for Excellence in Education, the Shiromani Mahila Award and the Delhi Citizen Forum Award. In 2007, she was awarded the Padmashri by The President of India for her distinguished contribution to the field of Literature and Education in India. During her fellowship visit, Dr Gopinath will be working on gender and non-traditional security, and gender, sustainable development and climate change.

- Professor Shaun Breslin, Visiting Senior Fellow, Warwick University, Coventry, UK

Shaun Breslin is Professor of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick in the UK. His research focuses on the political economy of contemporary China, and studies of comparative regionalism. His latest authored book was *China in the Global Political Economy*, and edited collections on online Chinese nationalism (with Simon Shen). The *Handbook of China's International Relations* will be published in 2010.

- Evan Laksmana, Visiting Researcher, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia

Evan A. Laksmana is a researcher with the Department of Politics and International Relations at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta. He is affiliated with a California-based non-profit civil society group called Overseas Think-Tank for Indonesia (OTTI) as a contributing analyst, and has been actively involved in the Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations (HPAIR), including as a paper presenter in 2008 at Harvard University. He writes regularly on defence affairs, national politics, and foreign policy for various local and international newspapers, and has published papers for numerous research institutes. During his fellowship, Evan will work on a project titled '*Tackling the "Green Nexus" of Indonesia's Defense Reform: Energy Security, Climate Change, and Humanitarian Operations*'. The research aims to mainstream the efficient use of defence energy, and seeks to offer a policy blueprint on how the Ministry of Defence can 'go green' while improving its overall readiness and effectiveness.

- Sadhavi Sharma, Visiting Researcher, PhD Candidate, RSIS, Singapore

Sadhavi holds a BA in Sociology from the University of Bombay and a Masters in International Development from the University of Warwick (UK). She has worked with the UNDP NGO WORLDwrite, where she produced a number of documentary films on development, has worked with Bloomberg LP and the Hindustan Times, and more recently was Research Associate at PUKAR, an urban research initiative, tracing redevelopment in Bombay. Her main research interest is in the idea of sustainability and the culture of limits. She is also interested in examining the current international development agenda, the contemporary expression of anti-capitalism and consumption, and the rise of social and political pessimism. She is particularly interested in cities as an articulation of human progress.

About the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies

The Centre for NTS Studies of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, was inaugurated by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretary-General Dr Surin Pitsuwan in May 2008. The Centre maintains research in the fields of climate change, energy security, health security, as well as internal and cross-border conflict. It produces policy-relevant analyses aimed at furthering awareness and building capacity to address NTS issues and challenges in the Asia Pacific region and beyond. The Centre also provides a platform for scholars and policymakers within and outside Asia to discuss and analyse NTS issues in the region.

In 2009, the Centre was chosen by the MacArthur Foundation as a lead institution for the MacArthur Asia Security Initiative, to develop policy research capacity and recommend policies on the critical security challenges facing the Asia-Pacific.

The Centre is also a founding member and the Secretariat for the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia (NTS-Asia). More information on the Centre can be found at www.rsis.edu.sg/nts

Please email us at NTS_Centre@ntu.edu.sg to subscribe to the centre's e-publications.

Appendix (Selected Papers)

- **Non-Traditional Security Issues in Asia: Imperatives for Deepening Regional Security Cooperation (*Mely Caballero-Anthony*)**

- **Oiling the Wheels of Foreign Policy? Energy Security and China's International Relations (*Zha Daojiong*)**

- **'Human Securitising' the Climate Security Debate (*Lorraine Elliott*)**

- **Operationalising Regimes and Recognising Actors: Responding to Crises in Southeast Asia (*Alistair D.B. Cook*)**

9

NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES IN ASIA

Imperatives for Deepening Regional Security Cooperation

MELY CABALLERO-ANTHONY

Over the last decade, the regional security environment in East Asia has changed dramatically. The hope of a more stable and peaceful Asia after the end of the Cold War, premised on the expectations that the geopolitical and security tensions brought on by the Cold War overlay would finally come to pass, were short-lived. Instead, the region is confronted with new security challenges that are proving to be more severe and more likely to inflict more harm to a greater number of people than conventional threats of inter-state wars and conflicts.

These newly emerging threats are referred to as non-traditional security (NTS) threats, and they are defined as challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, cross-border environmental degradation and resource depletion, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime.[1] Moreover, these NTS threats have common characteristics. They are mainly non-military in nature, transnational in scope—neither domestic nor purely interstate, come with very short notice, and are transmitted rapidly due to globalization and the communication revolution. As such, national solutions are rendered inadequate and would require comprehensive (political, economic and social) responses, as well as humanitarian use of military force.[2]

1 This definition of non-traditional security (NTS) has been adopted as the working definition by the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia, otherwise known as NTS-Asia. For more details, see the NTS-Asia website at www.rsis-nts.org.

2 See, for example, Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers & Amitav Acharya (Eds.), *Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitisation* (London: Ashgate, 2006).

To be sure, NTS issues have direct implications on the overall security of states and societies in the region. The gravity of the problem can be seen in the way these transnational threats are now increasingly discussed not only in academic circles but also among policymakers in East Asia. These issues are also portrayed by officials as posing threats to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, as well as to the well-being of their respective societies. As a consequence, policymakers in the region have had to rethink their security agendas and find new and innovative ways to address these new security challenges. These, in turn, have had profound implications for regional security cooperation in the region.

Against this new security environment, it is therefore timely to examine how Asia—particularly the East Asian region—is addressing the emerging security challenges through its various regional institutions, mechanisms and relevant security arrangements. The argument put forward in this chapter is that the trans-border nature of these NTS threats is pushing states in the region to work together to mitigate the impact of these new challenges. And, despite drawbacks arising from issues of sovereignty and non-interference, the lack of state capacity to respond to an array of complex NTS threats make for a compelling case for enhancing multilateral regional security cooperation in Asia.

NTS and the Changing Regional Institutional Landscape

Over the last decade, perceptible trends can be observed in East Asia, particularly in the way regional institutions like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Plus 3 (APT), and even the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) have responded to new security challenges. These significant developments can be briefly described as follows:

First, despite the perceived inertia of regional institutions in responding to security challenges, particularly during the period of the Asian financial crisis (1997–1999), the picture has drastically changed, given that institutions like ASEAN have since embarked on a number of ad hoc mechanisms to address a host of transnational threats that have confronted the region, post the 1997 crisis. These include regional mechanisms that address the threats of infectious diseases, transnational crimes and terrorism, natural disasters, and environmental pollution or haze.

Second, the varieties of regional mechanisms that have in turn led to the creation of new institutional configurations such as the APT and, more recently, the East Asia Summit (EAS). These new institutional configurations have also generated different layers of regional efforts going beyond bilateral and plurilateral arrangements which had, until quite recently, been largely sub-regional in nature. This has significantly altered the contours of regional institutional architecture in Asia.

Third, while these regional efforts are aimed at building regional capacity to address different security challenges, the kinds of measures being adopted have gone beyond the usual process-oriented, confidence-building measures. Instead, many of

the regional measures adopted are now geared toward problem-solving mechanisms to address NTS threats. Thus, despite the perceived lack of institutional capacity of these regional institutions, the plethora of regional cooperative arrangements that have emerged appear to support the idea that multilateral security cooperation in East Asia is robust, as member states have responded to a wide range of new security threats.

Key NTS Issues and Challenges

Against the significant changes that are taking place in the region's institutional architecture, the key question that we need to examine is whether the current regional arrangements are indeed able to mitigate the new attendant instabilities and security challenges facing the region. The following analysis of four recent case studies will enable us to assess whether these new configurations of (regional) multilateral arrangements are adequate to address these new security challenges.

Climate change

A global consensus on how to collectively combat climate change has not been reached yet. However, the urgency to accomplish a worldwide frame of action has been aptly reflected in the release of reports detailing the gloomy implications climate change could bring to mankind, if no concrete action is taken. Such consequences include the rise of health-related problems, increased incidences of natural disasters, impact on food and water security, which could bring in the follow-on effects such as forced migration and sharpening of inter- and intra-state conflicts, especially those over resource issues. Southeast Asia, in particular, is one of the most vulnerable regions, as identified in a recently published climate change vulnerability mapping report.[3] In 2007, the Expert Group Report on Climate Change and Sustainable Development identified five likely outcomes that would be most pertinent, as far as Southeast Asian security is concerned. They include the rise in sea levels, which could submerge low-lying coastal plains and river deltas, consequently affecting the livelihood of coastal communities in particular; more intense summer monsoons resulting in intensified degrees and frequencies of destructive flows and soil erosion; major loss of mangroves and coral reefs that would impact on fish stocks, which are heavily depended on in Southeast Asia as major source of protein; melting of the Himalayan mountain glaciers that would add stress on water

3 In this report, all the regions of the Philippines; the Mekong River Delta in Vietnam; almost all regions of Cambodia; North and East Lao PDR; the Bangkok region of Thailand; and West and South Sumatra, West and East Java of Indonesia are assessed to be among the most vulnerable regions in Southeast Asia. See Arief Anshory Yusuf & Herminia Francisco, *Climate Change Vulnerability Mapping for Southeast Asia*, Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA), January 2009.

resources; and, lastly, greater uncertainty associated with water supply management in the midst of population growth.[4]

Clearly, if no strong actions are being taken, the adverse effects of climate change could potentially reverse the many decades of hard work undertaken by Southeast Asian governments to create an economically vibrant and promising region. Also, climate change could well derail regional efforts to eradicate poverty and accomplish the Millennium Development Goals, since the poor are the most vulnerable to climate change. A point to note is that Southeast Asia produces 12 per cent of the world's greenhouse gases and this share is likely to increase if a "business as usual" attitude continues in the region.[5] More importantly, Southeast Asia is also among the regions with the greatest potential for mitigating carbon emissions by reducing deforestation and improving land management practices.[6] What is needed is not just action at the national level, but also coordinated, committed actions among ASEAN governments and with the wider Asia region. The inclusion of non-state actors (e.g. NGOs, civil societies, etc.) would have to be considered in order to comprehensively adapt to and mitigate climate change.

At the ASEAN level, there has been general recognition of the potential security risks posed by climate change to the region. On 13 December 2007, ASEAN environment ministers met during the UN Climate Change Conference in Bali discussed regional efforts to address climate change, and agreed to encourage efforts to develop an ASEAN Climate Change Initiative (ACCI) to further strengthen regional coordination and cooperation against climate change, as well as undertake concrete actions to respond to its adverse impacts.[7] Despite such efforts, more work clearly needs to be done. As part of the fight against climate change, efforts to prevent burning of peatlands—a major source of carbon emissions and the cause of trans-boundary haze problems prevalent in the region—are crucial, yet beset with problems. Much of the carbon emissions in developing countries in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia especially, result from the burning of peatlands.[8] Notwithstanding the introduction by ASEAN of the Regional Haze Action Plan in 1997, which outlined prevention, mitigation and monitoring, the mitigation part played by Indonesia has been poor. Moreover,

4 See "Confronting Climate Change: Avoiding the Unmanageable and Managing the Unavoidable, Executive Summary, Scientific Expert Group Report on Climate Change and Sustainable Development", Prepared for the 15th Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development, February 2007, available at www.confrontingclimatechange.org.

5 Read, *The Economics of Climate Change in Southeast Asia: A Regional Overview*, Asian Development Bank, April 2009.

6 Ibid.

7 See Press Release, "ASEAN Cooperates on Climate Change", Bali, Indonesia, 13 December 2007, available at www.aseansec.org/21248.htm.

8 57 per cent of land clearing method is done by forest fires, see Executive Summary: Indonesia and Climate Change – Working Paper on Current Status and Policies, March 2007, DFID and World Bank, p. 3.

Indonesia to date still refuses to sign the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, thereby limiting collective ASEAN action against the problem. The issue of peatlands aside, however, ASEAN managed to attempt addressing issues related to climate change, such as sustainable development, in other separate agreements and plans of action, such as the ASEAN Vientiane Action Program (VAP) 2004–2010.

Gradual, incremental steps towards closer regional cooperation to combat climate change have been taken by ASEAN countries, the Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment adopted on 21 November 2007 being a noteworthy example, whereby ASEAN countries affirm their commitment towards an effective approach to inter-related challenges of climate change, energy, environmental and health problems, in the context of sustainable development.[9] In July 2008, the inaugural ASEC Brown Bag Series forum was launched by the ASEAN Secretariat to raise awareness of ASEAN's initiatives among its staff, government officials and the public at large; most notably, climate change tops the list of issues being discussed. In fact, the first of the Brown Bag Series had been titled "Climate Change and Deforestation: What Role for the New ASEAN?", which was organized by ASEAN in cooperation with the German Regional Forest Program (ReFOP).[10]

As far as wider Asian cooperation beyond ASEAN is concerned, there are some initiatives being taken. One of these, which might have signalled closer regional harmonization of plans to mitigate and adapt to climate change, is the East Asian Summit (EAS) Cebu Declaration on East Asian Energy Security, signed in Cebu, Philippines on 15 January 2007. This calls for a new approach linking climate change with the need to develop new, cleaner sources of energy. Goals outlined under this scheme include ways to improve efficiency and environmental performance of fossil fuel use; reduce dependence on conservational fuels through intensified energy efficiency and conservation programme, hydropower, expansion of renewable energy systems, and biofuel production/utilization and for interested parties, civilian use of nuclear power, and mitigating greenhouse gas emission through effective policies and measures—thus contributing to global climate change abatements, for instance.

Clearly, more work has to be done to promote policy coordination among ASEAN member states and with neighbouring Asian countries. Initiatives, such as ACCI, agreed upon need to be implemented in earnest in order for effective measures to be taken against climate change. As the ASEAN trans-boundary haze issues

9 See Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment, Singapore, 21 November 2007, at http://environment.asean.org/index.php?page=agreements:singaporedeclaration.

10 The objective of this first of the series has been to reach a better understanding of the kind of policy coordination and integration that will be required in both the forest and the environment policies in order to mitigate the risks of climate change. See "Secretary-General of ASEAN Launches ASEC Brown Bag Series", *US Fed News*, 8 July 2008; and "ASEAN Forum Raises Awareness on Initiatives", *Thai News Service*, 8 July 2008.

have shown, regional cooperation would be more effective only if all countries in the region play an active role. There is room for optimism, since ASEAN countries recognize the threats posed by climate change, and had pledged serious efforts to combat the adverse consequences. A recent initiative, the ASEAN Multi-Sectoral Framework on Climate Change and Food Security, which envisages an integrated framework to facilitate intra-regional responses to climate change and related food security issues, would soon be endorsed. In fact, the ASEAN Multi-Sectoral Framework on Climate Change: Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry towards Food Security (AFCC) had already been finalized by representatives of the Senior Official Meeting of the Ministers of Agriculture and Forestry at a workshop held in September 2009.[11] Still, whether these regional initiatives will be duly implemented by individual signatories remains to be seen.

Health-related risks

Since the Asia-wide outbreak of the SARS virus in 2003, health-related risks appear to have become more severe. As the SARS experience has shown in this era of globalization and regionalization, such types of infectious diseases have the capacity to detrimentally affect the security and well-being of all members of society and all aspects of the economy.[12] This point was well highlighted in the *Global Risks 2009* report published by the World Economic Forum (WEF). While the report did not extensively discuss health-related risks, it did acknowledge chronic disease, infectious disease and pandemics as remaining high on the assessment, particularly in terms of potential severity in economic and loss of life indices. Chronic disease, as the report highlighted, is particularly prominent in no small part due to its centrality on its strong linkages to food prices and infectious diseases.[13]

11 The overall goal of the AFCC is to contribute to food security through sustainable, efficient and effective use of land, forest, water and aquatic resources by minimizing the risks and impacts of climate change. It pursues a cross-sectoral approach for effective policymaking and implementation, and provides an arena for ASEAN members to better coordinate support from its partners, such as dialogue partners China, Japan and South Korea. See ASEAN Secretariat, *ASEAN Multi-Sectoral Framework on Climate Change and Food Security*, 11 September 2009, available at www.aseansec.org/Bulletin-Sep-09.htm#Article-5.

12 For more on SARS and its security impact, see for example, Mely Caballero-Anthony, "SARS in Asia: Crisis, Vulnerabilities, and Regional Responses", *Asian Survey,* Vol. 45, No. 3, 2005, pp. 475–495; Melissa Curley & Nicholas Thomas, "Human Security and Public Health in Southeast Asia: The SARS Outbreak", *Australian Journal of International Affairs,* Vol. 58, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17–32; Elizabeth Prescott, "SARS: A Warning", *Survival*, 2003, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 162–177.

13 Global Risks 2009: A Global Risk Network Report, World Economic Forum, January 2009, p. 7.

Given that Asia has had a history of being the breeding ground for pandemics, infectious and chronic diseases, the WEF report has therefore come at a critical time when an abundance of policy statements, studies, and other reports have been written, amid a flurry of official and non-official meetings, which have altogether raised the urgency within and outside the region to finding a common approach to prevent the outbreak of a new and devastating pandemic. To be sure, the threat of pandemics and diseases is not a local problem, but a global concern. I argue therefore that for many developing states in the region, particularly in Southeast Asia, the burden of these health-related risks has reached a critical stage where innovation is needed to strengthen the capacity of public health management in the region.

Notably in East Asia, much of the information about pandemic preparedness, response, and capability of countries in the region is sketchy.[14] As shown in recent experience with the SARS crisis, while Singapore and Hong Kong were able to deal with the health crisis in a reasonably effective manner, other countries like China and Vietnam experienced a range of challenges in coping with the problem. Aside from the complex problems faced by states at the national level, such as the lack of contingency planning and coordination among state agencies, there has also been very little institutionalized regional cooperation in the area of public health policy. It was really only after the SARS outbreak that some regional cooperative initiatives and mechanisms were proposed. At the ASEAN and the APT level, these key initiatives include:

- the ASEAN Expert Group on Communicable Diseases
- the ASEAN Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Task Force
- the ASEAN + 3 Emerging Infectious Diseases Program
- the Regional Framework for Control and Eradication of HPAI

Many of these collaborative programmes focus on strengthening the national and regional capacity for disease surveillance and early response and strengthening the capacity to prepare for any pandemic. There are also other collaborative programmes organized under the framework of the wider fora in the region—APEC and the EAS. Most of the measures outlined in these collaborative programmes focus on, among others, strengthening of institutional capacities at national and regional levels to ensure effective and efficient implementation of avian influenza prevention, putting in place disease control programmes and pandemic preparedness and response plans, and enhancing capacity building in coping with a pandemic influenza. Other measures also include establishing information-sharing protocols

14 In June 2005, the Singapore government put into place its avian flu plan. See "Influenza Pandemic Readiness and Response Plan", Singapore Ministry of Health, 29 June 2005, accessed on 15 September 2005, at www.moh.gov.sg/corp/hottopics/influenza/index.do#32112653. Since February 2004, it has also established tight surveillance and control over local poultry population.

among countries and multilateral organizations, and effective, timely, and meaningful communication before or during a pandemic influenza outbreak.[15]

The nature of pandemic threats, however, has compelled ASEAN and other countries within and outside the region to get involved in order to effectively address the complexities of the problem. Hence, outside the East Asian regional framework, other dialogue partners of ASEAN have been encouraged to provide more assistance in preventing the possibility of a pandemic outbreak. The United States, for instance, has been one of the major external actors that has taken a keen interest in this issue. It was one of the largest donors to the global avian flu fund that was set up at the 2006 Beijing conference, having pledged a total of US$392 million to the total fund of US$1.9 billion. Much of these funds had been allocated to the development of stockpiles of health supplies and international research.[16] Moreover, through the APEC framework, the United States has initiated the establishment of a Regional Emerging Diseases Intervention (REDI) Center, in partnership with Singapore. Formally launched in 2003 after the SARS outbreak, REDI would assist Asian countries in "tracking, controlling, and researching emerging infections with appropriate resources and expertise".[17] It is envisaged that the REDI Center would be open to participation by other countries in the Asia Pacific.

Despite the keen interest on pandemics in the region, one should note, however, that many of these proposed measures from ASEAN, the APT, the EAS, and the APEC still need to be implemented. Hence, it would be premature to give a detailed assessment of the effectiveness of these new regional mechanisms to address this NTS threat. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight some of the challenges faced by countries in the region in responding to a regional/global problem. Among the most obvious is the lack of resources allocated to improving public health systems at the domestic level. Given the prevalent condition of poor health infrastructure in many parts of the region, the national and regional capacities to respond to transnational health crises remain inadequate. In this regard, the region needs to consider a broader and more comprehensive strategy to prevent and contain the outbreak of infectious diseases. These would include, among others, focusing on key issues such as building credible and effective regional surveillance systems for monitoring infectious diseases, improving the poor state of health infrastructure in

15 See for example, *APEC Action Plan on the Prevention and Response to Avian and Influenza Pandemics*, 2006/AIPMM/014; and *East Asia Summit Declaration on Avian Influenza Prevention, Control and Response*, available at www.aseansec.org/18101.htm.
16 "United States International Engagement on Avian and Pandemic Influenza", U.S. Department of Health, Bureau of Public Affairs, 22 September 2006.
17 See "Regional Emerging Diseases Intervention (REDI) Center", remarks by Claude Allen, Deputy Secretary of Health and Human Resources, 24 May 2004, accessed on 19 March 2007 at http://singapore:usembassy.gov/utils/eprintpage.html.

less-developed countries, and addressing the politics of crisis health management in the region.[18]

Take the first issue of building regional surveillance and disease control. It has been noted that since national capacities are still quite weak, more efforts should be made to improve national and regional preparedness in containing pandemic outbreaks. A critical step in this direction is creating mechanisms for effective production and distribution of vaccines and other medicines. In this regard, it is worth noting that within ASEAN steps to develop a region-wide mechanism in rapid diseases control has begun with the first PanStop I exercise held in Cambodia in late March 2007.[19] In March of the following year, PanStop II was held, which involved the Philippines, as part of a series of WHO exercises undertaken with various national governments to ensure the ability to implement rapid response and containment of pandemics.[20] In May 2009, the APT health ministers reached an agreement during a meeting in Bangkok, Thailand, to coordinate their responses and to increase their stockpiles of medicines against swine flu.[21] This move came even though the region has been relatively unscathed by the H1N1 influenza.

What all these developments have shown is that while there are several regional initiatives from different regional frameworks to address a pressing NTS issue like infectious diseases, it is often more effective if implementation starts at the sub-regional level. Where the bigger regional frameworks can work better is when efforts are streamlined and where complementarities can be built with other regional bodies in order for gaps to be identified and more inter-regional coordination can be undertaken.

Natural disasters

Asia is a region where major natural disasters often occur. The December 2004 tsunami, and even more recently, Typhoon Ketsana in late September 2009 and the huge

18 For more on this, see Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Combating Infectious Diseases in East Asia: Securitisation and Global Public Goods for Health and Human Security", *Journal of International Affairs* (New York: Columbia University Press), Spring/Summer 2006, pp. 105–127.

19 The exercise, PanStop I, was coordinated by the ASEAN Secretariat with the help of the World Health Organization, together with the Japanese government and the Japan International Cooperation System. This simulation exercise, which involved test procedures to rush antiviral drugs and equipment to infected areas within a short time, was to be the first in the series of tests to be conducted in the Asia-Pacific region. See "WHO, Asian Partners to Simulate Bird Flu Outbreak to Test Readiness to Contain Pandemic", *International Herald Tribune*, 27 March 2007.

20 "The Philippines Checks its Ability to Avert a Flu Pandemic", 5 March 2008, World Health Organization Regional Office for the Western Pacific, Press Release.

21 Claire Truscott, "Asian Nations to Boost Flu Drug Stockpiles", *Agence France Presse*, 8 May 2009.

Sumatra earthquake in early October 2009, illustrated the kind of devastation that natural disasters cause, and the immensity of the tasks involved in undertaking disaster relief operations and in providing humanitarian assistance and post-disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation. Natural disasters generate complex emergencies that require urgent and coordinated responses from a broad range of state and non-state actors.

Unfortunately, many states in Asia are least prepared to cope with these complex humanitarian emergencies. This gap was vividly revealed in the region's experience with the 2004 tsunami. The disaster certainly reflected the lack of any regional capacity to respond to disasters and to provide emergency relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Were it not for the humanitarian assistance provided by external partners like the United States, European Union, Australia and Japan, plus a number of international aid agencies, the impact of the humanitarian emergency could have been far more catastrophic.

Hence, in the aftermath of the tsunami, Southeast Asian countries held a number of meetings and agreed to enhance cooperation in disaster relief, including prevention and mitigation.[22] Specifically, ASEAN members agreed to mobilize additional resources to meet the emergency needs of tsunami victims. They also called upon the international community through the United Nations to convene an international pledging conference for sustainable humanitarian relief efforts and to explore the establishment of "standby arrangements" for other humanitarian relief efforts. ASEAN also called on donor countries—the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and other financial institutions—to provide the necessary funds to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes in disaster-stricken areas. On 26 July 2005, ASEAN acceded to the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), signed in Vientiane. This document is a legally binding agreement that promotes regional cooperation and collaboration in reducing disaster losses and intensifying joint emergency response.

But, post tsunami is the region doing enough to protect the security of its people? Aside from these demonstrations of regional solidarity, one could argue that the region needs to do more in the areas of prevention and mitigation by developing a more effective regional early warning system. It also needs to examine whether there is a shift in thinking in institutionalizing regional cooperation in disaster management. So far, there is the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX-05), which commenced in 2005.[23] Most recently, as seen in the

22 See Statement from the Special ASEAN Leader's Meeting on Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami, Jakarta, 6 January 2005, available at www.aseansec.org/17067.htm.

23 The simulation exercise is envisioned to be an annual exercise, bringing together several personnel and mobilizing light-to-medium equipment geared toward providing immediate humanitarian assistance to affected countries in times of natural disaster. See ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, Vientiane, 26 July 2005, available at www.aseansec.org/17579.htm.

aftermath of Typhoon Ketsana, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre), which is supported by the ASEAN Secretariat, went into action, putting on standby the ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team for deployment to affected areas.[24]

Beyond ASEAN, there are also other ad hoc exercises in disaster management being undertaken within the ARF framework. After the tsunami disaster in December 2004, the ARF ministers have decided to work together in emergency relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, as well as prevention and mitigation efforts in addressing natural disasters.[25] More significantly, at the July 2006 ARF Ministerial Meeting, officials from ARF countries, which include the big powers like the United States, China, and Russia, discussed the possibility of developing guidelines in improving civilian and military cooperation in humanitarian operations—i.e. natural disasters. This would involve developing standard operating procedures on civilian-military cooperation in disaster relief operations and drawing up a database of military assets of ARF members for disaster relief.[26] APEC, on the other hand, has established the Task Force for Emergency Preparedness (TFEP), originally known as the Virtual Task Force (VTF) on Emergency Preparedness, in 2005 to deal with disasters.[27] Further developments came in November 2008 when the APEC-wide Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response in the Asia Pacific Region 2009–2015 was unveiled. Among its objectives, the strategy aims to identify a suite of practical mechanisms, instruments and communication measures to be implemented at the community level.[28]

As with other new measures that are being adopted to address new threats, it remains to be seen if and when many of these new regional mechanisms can be implemented; whether the existing ad hoc arrangements can indeed be sustained;

24 ASEAN's response to national disasters is guided by the AADMER. See ASEAN Secretariat Press Release, "ASEAN Executes Disaster Response", ASEAN Secretariat, 1 October 2009, available at www.aseansec.org/PR-ASEAN-Executes-Disaster-Response.pdf.

25 See "Chairman's Statement of the Twelfth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)", Vientiane, 29 July 2005.

26 "Asia to Strengthen Civilian-Military Disaster Cooperation", *Agence France-Presse*, 28 July 2006.

27 The TFEP is intended to strengthen coordination efforts in disaster relief and improve regional emergency and natural disaster management capability. For more information, refer to the official site detailing TFEP, available at www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/som_committee_on_economic/som_special_task_groups/emergency_preparedness.html.

28 Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response in the Asia-Pacific Region 2009–2015 (TFEP 04/2008A), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, 2008/SOM3/TFEP/012, Agenda Item: IV. Task Force on Emergency Preparedness Meeting, Lima, Peru, 15 August 2008, available at http://aimp.apec.org/Documents/2008/TFEP/TFEP1/08_tfep1_012.pdf.

and whether other preventive measures, especially at the domestic level, can be included. Nonetheless, recent decisive moves by ASEAN members, under the ADDMER auspices, in response to Typhoon Ketsana, for instance, would appear to be an optimistic outcome of regional cooperation. Still, one could argue for instance that states in the region need not wait for calamity to strike before national and regional responses are switched to emergency mode. While regional efforts are being considered to improve disaster management, attention also needs be focused on improving capacity at the national level. One could suggest therefore that countries in the region would need to examine their own capacity and perhaps rethink their own national strategies for disaster mitigation or risk reduction.[29]

Energy security

Asia is projected as a major growth region in the foreseeable future, with the emergence of economic giants China and India, alongside established economic behemoths such as Japan, and to a lesser extent (but no less important) South Korea. With a projected rise in population and the demand for higher standards of living, energy consumption needs in Asia would also correspondingly grow. Therefore, energy security becomes a crucial factor in determining a positive trajectory of continued socioeconomic development in Asia. However, energy security is not just about ensuring supply to meet rising demands, but also inter-related to the pressing issue of climate change. Sustainable development, as discussed earlier on with respect to climate change, constitutes the central component of Asia's efforts to combat climate change yet not compromising on the bid towards continual socioeconomic growth. Some of the energy security initiatives, in considering the effects of climate change, would be to introduce regional measures towards energy efficiency, since Asia is a major emitter of greenhouse gases. Notwithstanding efforts to promote energy efficiency through the development of clean energy sources, Asia on the whole would still largely be reliant on fossil fuels for most part of its overall energy mix even if new and renewable energy (NRE) sources come to be incorporated, albeit incrementally. In the area of energy security cooperation among Asian countries, some notable instances could be observed. At the core of such collaborations to ensure and enhance energy security in the era of uncertainty, ASEAN plays a pivotal role in the region.

Within ASEAN, there has been general acknowledgement of the need to ensure energy security in order to sustain socioeconomic growth in the region. Cooperation is essential and would not just involve ASEAN member countries, but the external partners as well. As a follow on to the ASEAN Plan of Action on Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 2004–2009, the APAEC for the period 2010–2015 has been adopted

29 For more on this, see Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Will Asia Heed Warning of Jakarta's Katrina", *Today*, 7 February 2007, available at www.todayonline.com/articles/170454.

during the 27th ASEAN Ministers of Energy Meeting (AMEM) held in Mandalay, Myanmar, on 29 July 2009. In the Plan of Action, ASEAN members reaffirmed the need for a cleaner, efficient and sustainable energy community in order to facilitate the establishment of an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015, and they pledged to strengthen cooperation to ensure greater energy security and sustainability through diversification, development and conservation of resources, continuity of supply, and efficient energy usage.[30] The APAEC 2010–2015 encompasses seven programmes, some of which were incorporated in the earlier Plan of Action, such as the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) and Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP). Worth mentioning is the latter project, which had begun in the 1990s but sadly met with not much progress, largely due to cost, legal and policy coordination issues.[31] The APG, however, was met with slightly greater success; some inter-connections have already been achieved among countries such as Malaysia and Thailand. Still, more work is clearly required in order to complete the APG and TAGP projects, which would lead to the eventual realization of a Trans-ASEAN Energy Network.

Included in APAEC 2010–2015, notably, is the component on civilian nuclear energy projects. However, efforts are required in order to strengthen cooperation in this area. For one thing, not all countries that had professed intentions to develop nuclear energy had enjoyed progress, since only Vietnam to date had advanced concrete action on how to realize its national nuclear project. Due to close inter-dependence, the security ramifications of nuclear power, such as the problems of radioactive waste management and nuclear proliferation, could have immense trans-national impact. For a start, information sharing is required in order to facilitate confidence building among ASEAN countries in the regional nuclear renaissance. However, this area of cooperation has been found wanting, given the recent alleged Burmese nuclear weapons programme. Such problems of accountability and trans-parency could pose serious challenges to regional nuclear energy cooperation. While nuclear energy cooperation remains a nascent, hitherto unexplored area for ASEAN, cooperation in the area of petroleum has met with greater success. In March 2009, ASEAN signed a petroleum security agreement that envisaged short, medium and long term guidelines to prevent potential supply disruptions, such as the coordination of emergency response measures.

In recent years, there has been progress made beyond ASEAN. Energy cooperation between ASEAN and its dialogue partners—China, Japan and South Korea—has been emphasized. In late June 2009, ASEAN countries reached an agreement with the three dialogue partners during working-level energy talks in Japan to initiate

30 Joint Ministerial Statement of the 27th ASEAN Ministers of Energy Meeting (AMEM), "Securing ASEAN's Energy Future towards Prosperity and Sustainability", Mandalay, Myanmar, 29 July 2009, available at www.aseansec.org/22675.pdf.

31 Benjamin K. Sovacool, "Gas Network May Remain a Pipedream", *The Straits Times*, 5 June 2009.

respective countries' oil stockpiling plans.[32] Such synchronization of energy-related policies at the APT level, rather than ASEAN, is certainly beneficial for not just ASEAN but the wider East Asia as a whole. Even though oil stockpiling is only a portion of energy security policy, this development is significant. Japan and South Korea possess relatively advanced oil reserve systems, and their active support could go a long way to assist ASEAN to establish individual national oil reserves for use in times of emergencies. This could have positive spillovers to the ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement (APSA) signed among the 10 ASEAN member countries in March 2009. In addition, on a broader scheme of things, this benefit Asian energy security, since the roles played by economic giants China, Japan and South Korea are crucial. This move would intensify linkages between ASEAN and major Asian economies as far as energy security is concerned.

It is relatively evident that energy security is a promising area for broader regional cooperation, due to the economic inter-dependence among countries in Asia. ASEAN has been a driving force behind regional energy security collaborations, as indicated in the numerous initiatives introduced by ASEAN to date. However, it must still be said that further efforts are required in order to speed up implementation, though it is often hindered by costs, legal and policy coordination issues. ASEAN countries and their partners are keenly aware of the importance of energy security, while not forgetting the importance also of climate change issues. In the quest for sustainable development, there had been broad attempts, albeit more at the declaratory level, to pledge commitment to such endeavours. In the area of NRE development, practical issues remain, thus impeding ASEAN's aim of becoming a "Green OPEC" despite the huge potentials, such as existence of relevant natural resources for biofuels, for instance.[33] Civilian nuclear energy cooperation up to this point remains rather limited due to the paucity of information sharing and lack of transparency by various nuclear aspirants in Southeast Asia.

However, energy cooperation appears to carry even greater prospects if dialogue partners are included, since more benefits could potentially be reaped. The APT could well become a driving force for energy cooperation within ASEAN and beyond. A crucial facet of this level of cooperation has been the active involvement of the three dialogue partners, whose economic clout meant a considerable stake in

32 "ASEAN Agrees to Develop Plans to Boost Oil Reserves – Kyodo", *Dow Jones International News*, 29 June 2009.

33 Mr. Paolo Frankl, Head of the International Energy Agency's Renewable Energy Division, explained that an integrated approach which looks at the management of natural resources in the most efficient manner possible should be undertaken by ASEAN countries. With this statement, Mr. Frankl appeared to affirm the fact that sustainable development efforts made by ASEAN require more improvements in order for ASEAN to becoming a green energy export hub. See Nachanok Wongsamuth, "Rocky Road Ahead to 'Green Opec'", *Bangkok Post*, 21 September 2009.

regional energy security. Furthermore, the APT could help propel NRE development forward in ASEAN, since Japan and South Korea are relatively further ahead in this field; not to also forget the vast potential in China for NRE development. Through the APT, energy cooperation in the area of fossil fuels had seen progress, evident in the oil reserves agreement. Asia might witness more cooperation in energy security matters, in the foreseeable future, as driven by ASEAN and even as importantly, in the context of the APT level.

Looking Ahead

The preceding discussion set out to examine how regional institutions in East Asia have dealt with emerging regional security challenges, referred to as NTS issues. As discussed, these innovative institutional responses have led to an evolving regional architecture that presents significant characteristics. These are summarized as follows:

- First, the variety of regional mechanisms that were established to address a number of transnational NTS threats, albeit ad hoc in some cases, have led to the creation of new institutional configurations in East Asia, such as the APT and, more recently, the EAS.
- Second, whether conceived within ASEAN or ASEAN-initiated arrangements like the APT and the EAS, the robustness of these multi-layer/multi-level initiatives can be seen in the plethora of cooperative efforts that have emerged—mostly geared toward addressing different NTS threats such as infectious diseases, natural disasters, among others. These sub-regional or minilateral arrangements have added new layers of regional institution and, in the process, have significantly altered the contours of the regional institutional architecture in Asia.
- Third, the extent to which these new regional structures fit, complement, or compete with one another remains to be seen, although it should be noted that in some areas, sub-regional responses either by ASEAN or the APT may be more effective in terms of response time to address specific challenges. This is largely due to the fact that, when compared with bigger regional frameworks like the ARF and APEC, these sub-regional bodies are also more institutionalized. For instance, it was much easier to galvanize regional efforts in responding to health threats through ASEAN and the APT rather than through the ARF.
- Fourth, while these regional efforts are aimed at building regional capacity to address different security challenges, the kinds of measures being adopted have gone beyond the usual process-oriented, confidence-building measures. Instead, many of the regional measures adopted are now geared toward problem-solving, involving sharing of information; developing certain types of regional surveillance systems for early warning on infectious diseases and natural disasters; and providing relief in

disaster management, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Although these problem-solving efforts are at an inchoate stage and would require some time before any definite assessment can be made as to whether these new regional modalities are able to show concrete results, the fact is that these institutions are being built in response to new challenges.

In sum, the institutional developments in East Asia, particularly at ASEAN and the APT, reflect a more qualitative change in inter-state cooperation. These are not only seen in the widening of areas of functional cooperation but also in deepening the nature of existing regional modalities. Against these trends, what does it mean for the future of security cooperation in Asia?

Looking ahead, there are a number of significant developments that could define not just the shape but more importantly the substance of multilateral security cooperation in Asia as different actors—both state and non-state—respond to new security challenges.

One of these challenges is the potential for more intrusive types of regional modalities. In the case of instituting a regional disease surveillance mechanism within the APT framework, it appears that ASEAN member states, as well as China, South Korea and Japan, are prepared to adopt more intrusive arrangements when certain issues threaten the security of states and societies. This is a significant development, albeit limited, given that the regional norm, at least until the emergence of new transnational security threats, has always been for non-intrusive forms of regional arrangements that allow member states to cooperate while being able to protect domestic interests and maintain regime legitimacy. We can thus observe that with the onset of NTS threats, ASEAN—and to some extent the ARF and APEC—have been prepared to adopt some form of intrusive regional cooperative mechanisms if the issues at stake threaten regional security and when certain problems remain intractable. Despite the perceived lack of institutional capacity, as member states respond to a wide range of new security threats, current institutional developments geared toward capacity-building support and multilateral security cooperation in Asia.

On the other hand, against the exuberance brought on by robust regional efforts is the salient issue of efficacy, especially when viewed against the multiple layers of institutional arrangements that have emerged. For example, in the previous discussions on the number of regional efforts that have been established to respond to threats of pandemics and natural disasters, we note that the various ministerial and other meetings of officials at the ASEAN, ARF, and APEC levels revealed striking similarities or even duplication of initiatives. Unless progress is made by these regional bodies in coordinating their efforts, much within their respective initiatives could be superfluous. Thus, to ensure that these different pieces of regional efforts are not consigned to drawing boards and annual declarations, the importance of subsidiarity may need to be emphasized if only to achieve more coherence and focused implementation of many of these initiatives.

Nevertheless, while an East Asian or Asian initiative may prove to be a logical approach in addressing some NTS issues, the importance of maintaining a more inclusive multilateral security cooperation remains critical. This means that when and where external help and expertise are required, this has allowed the participation and involvement of other countries outside the region. As the preceding discussion has shown, grave security threats like pandemics, natural disasters, etc., require multilateral approaches, which inevitably brings in the involvement of extra-regional powers like the United States and the European Union that not only have the resources but whose security interests are compatible with the region. Given that many NTS issues are transnational and trans-regional, regional efforts in addressing NTS issues would need to be complemented with multi-dimensional, multi-level, and multi-sectoral initiatives. The involvement of different actors would, in turn, have significant repercussions not only on regional security cooperation but more importantly, on regional governance as well.

Finally, with the growing emphasis on NTS challenges, one could argue that the new, robust regionalism in East Asia has raised the human and comprehensive security agenda right in the heart of each member's national policies. This could give rise to competing national priorities since addressing certain types of NTS challenges also demand a certain level of consensus on certain values and norms, which could potentially raise tensions among members of regional institutions as the push for new normative frameworks gains momentum. Multilateral security cooperation in Asia has reached a critical point where new security challenges require collective will. As such, declarations of intents and soft commitments have to give way to more common action in solving common problems. This would also mean more binding commitments and credible enforcement by member countries of the regional agreements or modalities that have been adopted to address different types of NTS challenges.

Asia Security Initiative Policy Series
Working Paper No. 1
March 2010

Oiling the Wheels of Foreign Policy? Energy Security and China's International Relations

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Abstract

This paper offers a review of a broad set of issues that are recurrent in international discussions about interconnectedness of energy and security in China's international relations. The primary purpose of this exercise is to identify points of convergence and divergence in Chinese and international commentaries about the motivations behind and consequences of the increasing presence of China in the international energy markets. As oil is the primary commodity that is of issue, in the paper 'energy' more or less equates to oil. The first part of the paper maps out the industry/policy contours leading to the emergence of an energy security discourse within China, and establishes the key distinction between self-sufficiency on one hand and security on the other. The paper then considers the main potential sources of instability that emerge from China's search for energy security. Between China and the West, while mutual suspicion and lack of transparency over processes and objectives might result in pessimistic predictions, China has no choice but to accept that it is now a part of (and partly dependent on) a complex and interdependent global economy. And potential (energy) adversaries must accept that China too is an essential component of this global order. As such, any aggressive action would harm the perpetrator as much as the target – a form of mutually assured (economic) destruction for the post-Cold War era.

Biography

Zha Daojiong is Professor of International Political Economy in the School of International Studies, Peking University. He specialises in issues such as energy, food and water, with particular focus on how these pertain to China, as well as political-economic relations between China and its neighbours.

Zha is first author of Building a Neighbourly Community: Post-Cold War China, Japan, and Southeast Asia (Manchester University Press, 2006), sole author of The International Political Economy of China's Oil Supply Security (in Chinese, 2005), editor of Chinese Scholars View the World: Non-Traditional Security (in Chinese, 2006). He is also a frequent contributor to refereed academic journals both in and outside China. Zha holds a doctoral degree in political science from the University of Hawaii. He has held university teaching posts in the United States, Japan, Hong Kong and Macau.

This Policy Series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment and discussion. The views expressed are entirely the author's own and not that of the RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies. The paper is the result of research conducted under the Asia Security Initiative programme on internal challenges supported by the MacArthur Foundation. Visit www.asicluster3.com to find out more about this initiative. More information on the work of the RSIS Centre for NTS Studies can be found at www.rsis.edu.sg/nts.

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Policy Recommendations

Steering research and policy dialogue towards strategic reassurance

- Available regional dialogue platforms, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC), the ASEAN+1 and East Asia Summit (EAS), must be made to lead to a fuller understanding of the domestic and business dimensions of a country's energy diplomacy, as appreciation of domestic complexities can help dissuade tendencies towards over-securitisation. The same logic should be applied to such Track II programmes as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP).

- The littoral states along the Straits of Malacca should launch programmes to pacify attempts, including those coming from outside the region that can temper with the open access to and navigational safety of the maritime oil transportation routes.

- Relationships between China and such bodies of international energy governance as the International Energy Agency must be streamlined in order to facilitate routine government-to-government dialogues about energy situations and policies.

- Between China and the major powers, there need to be continuous efforts aimed at reiterating strategic reassurance in relation to energy acquisition and transportation.

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Introduction

Resource requirements in general, and energy needs in particular, are an important component of China's international relations from both within and without. From a domestic Chinese perspective, since the turn of the century, there has been a new and urgent focus on the need to ensure reliable and continued access to energy supplies. This focus on energy has in part helped changed the fundamental thinking on the nature of security in China, introducing a much stronger focus on economic security and economic (market) solutions alongside traditional conceptions of inter-state war and diplomacy. But the move from energy self-sufficiency has also fed into existing security anxieties relating to China's vulnerability for those who perceive the West (which usually means but is not restricted to the US) as determined to use its power to prevent China's pursuit of political/diplomatic status and influence commensurate with its economic power. In combination, these economic and strategic considerations have resulted in justification for China's renewed focus of diplomatic and international activities towards Africa and Latin America in addition to the Middle East. Indeed, energy considerations effectively reversed a benign Chinese neglect of those 'third world' states for the previous two decades (i.e., after China re-joined the capitalist world economic system in the late 1970s).

Thus, for China, energy is an arena where old and new security conceptions and practices overlap and coincide.[1] And this is also the case when it comes to external perceptions of the international consequences of China's search for energy security. For example, there is concern that China's search for energy security will result in economic insecurity for others, as increased Chinese demand alters the price and distribution of global resources. For some, rather than viewing China's pursuit of energy overseas as just being the normal consequence of increased global demand, this is exacerbated by the perceived predatory actions of companies acting on behalf of the Chinese state to achieve strategic national objectives. Economic and traditional security concerns combine when this analysis is extended into the possibility of inter-state wars over competition for increasingly scarce resources – the question of whether there are 'oil wars in the pipeline'?[2]

There is also international concern over the extent to which China's new resource diplomacy might undermine the global liberal order. When China engages resource rich states in Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America, it has done so 'with no strings attached', i.e., without attempting to utilise investment and trade capital as an instrument for enticing political and social progress in host countries. In contrast, Western campaigns such as the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative are designed to increase the chances for governments of those resource rich but developing nations to be more accountable about the wealth they accumulate.[3] To be sure, Chinese energy and diplomatic actors overseas are increasingly concerned about the security of their investments and like investors from other countries are looking for transparency and predictability within the host regime, as more and more incidents of kidnapping and other disruptions to Chinese energy projects in Africa take place. But, compared with the West, which has over one hundred years of history in extracting and trading energy worldwide, China is a latecomer in terms of handling the norms of international energy business. A resource rich but 'rogue' (to the West) state is, amidst the international concern over supply security, ironically, in a position of cherry-picking the actors and terms of entry into their home markets, too. In short, demand for political liberalisation is not an easy choice for China to make, either.

This paper first maps out the industry/policy contours leading to the emergence of an energy security discourse within China, and establishing the key distinction between self-sufficiency on one hand and security on the other. It then considers the main potential sources of instability that emerge from China's search for energy security. Between China and the West, while mutual suspicion and lack of transparency over processes and objectives might result in pessimistic predictions, China has no choice but to accept that it is now part of (and partly dependent on) a complex and interdependent global economy. And potential (energy) enemies must accept that China is an essential component of this global order as well. As such, any aggressive action would harm the perpetrator as much as the target – a form of mutually assured (economic) destruction for the post-Cold War era.

Between Sufficiency and Security, 1949–96

Despite the focus in much of the literature on China's recent search for energy resources, in truth resources have been an important component of China's international relations since the onset of CCP rule in 1949. In the early days, ambitious goals for industrialisation with only a very low base of oil production and the US-led trade (and diplomatic) embargo reinforced the need to turn to the Soviet Union for help. Moscow not only provided oil, but the technological know-how and personnel to develop an indigenous Chinese oil industry that (largely thanks to the development of the Daqing oil field in the northeast) resulted in the end of a century-long dependence on imported oil in 1963.[4]

But energy self-sufficiency is not the same thing as energy security. A country has meaningful energy security when its management of energy supply and demand serves the purpose of developing its economy and society. This was not the case in China. By the time that China reached the stage of oil self-sufficiency in 1963, the Soviet Union had already terminated its aid programme (in July 1960) and the Sino-Soviet alliance was transforming into mutual hostility. Indeed, in 1964, the Chinese government formerly began to mobilise the bulk of its financial as well as energy and other industrial resources to build up a 'people's war' capacity in the interior provinces of the country. Dubbed as the 'third front' – after having to give up the coastal (to US and its allies) and northern land borders (to the Soviet Union) – this project dominated China's economic agenda until 1971 and lasted well into the end of the 1970s.[5] In other words, for two decades China had self-sufficiency under strained international circumstances that did not allow the utilisation of resources for development goals – sufficiency but not security.

In the wake of the Cultural Revolution, by the mid-1970s, the Chinese economy was on the verge of collapse. But ironically, as China moved towards losing its self-sufficiency in

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energy, changes in the international environment actually enhanced its energy security. Rapprochement with the US eased access to the industrialised world. Energy, particularly oil and coal, became a primary export commodity for China, in exchange for industrial plants and technology from developed countries, with Japan the primary destination. Moreover, energy policy took on another strategic role during the first oil crisis, as China used crude oil exports to Thailand, the Philippines and other Asian countries as part of its drive to cultivate a favourable regional environment.[6]

Thus, oil and coal played a valuable strategic purpose; it helped develop – in East Asia, at least – an idea and image of Chinese 'responsibility' and earned much-needed hard currency for importing equipment and technology. Partly due to lack of first-hand knowledge about China's energy geography, in the wake of the Arab energy embargo, expectations grew for China to be considered a credible replacement of the Middle East for meeting its neighbours' energy needs. This prompted concerns about China using its 'oil weapon' against United States allies in East Asia.[7] In the long run, more importantly, energy trade between China and its neighbours, Japan in particular, paved the way for the development of China's export-oriented economy, which of course has proved to be pivotal in developing the Chinese economy and society.

Slower growth in domestic production, coupled with growing levels of domestic demand, contributed to the decline in Chinese oil exports in the 1980s. China began to import crude oil from Oman in 1983, originally as a temporary measure for dealing with domestic transportation bottlenecks in moving crude oil from northern China to refineries located along the upper stretches of the Yangtze River. The volume of China's crude oil exports peaked in 1985, reaching 30 Million tons (Mt), and from 1988, Chinese imports of crude and processed fuels began to rapidly rise. In 1993, China became a net oil importer of oil products and in 1996 it became a net importer of crude oil. The rest is history.

The Search for Supplies and Security, 1996–

Despite the move from net exporter to importer in the mid-1990s, this transition did not cause immediate political concerns. Indeed, the concept of energy as a national security issue did not really emerge until the turn of the century. In 2000, the volume of China's oil imports almost doubled from 36.6 Mt to 70.2 Mt, accounting for around a quarter of total Chinese consumption. This dramatic rise in import volume had several causes. First, domestic crude production was insufficient for consumption. Second, China's oil refining capacities had significantly improved, making it possible for China to import more types of oil for refining. Third, in June 2000, China began to reform its pricing system for processed fuel by pegging the domestic sales price level to that in the Singapore commodity futures market. This reform led to four separate increases in domestic oil prices within six months, reflecting the tripling of world oil prices in 1999. The higher sales price encouraged Chinese oil refineries to increase imports amidst concerns about supply interruptions worldwide. Fourth, China's customs statistics more accurately reflected the actual volumes of oil imports, thanks to a nation-wide campaign against oil smuggling between 1998 and 2001.[8]

Since then, researching and 'predicting' China's future energy needs have become something of a cottage industry – both within China and amongst an often nervous international community. Unsurprisingly, there is considerable variety in the tone and findings of the various studies. However, there is convergence on the idea that domestic oil production will continue to stagnate. And this contributes to a second and probably more important convergence: the key conclusion that no matter how China plans and carries out its energy policies, dependence on imported oil will have to continue, with imported oil accounting for a growing proportion of Chinese demand.[9]

Gone is the era of energy independence for China. Also gone for China is the viable application of self-reliance as an ideology guiding its energy policymaking. When added to China's dependence on overseas consumer and technology markets, this has resulted in a key transformation in Chinese security thinking and policy. In short, China has no choice but to learn how to live in a world of (complex) interdependence[10]. In terms of energy, thinking and policy are no longer framed in terms of military threats and diplomatic responses, but instead, fall into the realms of 'geo-economics'; of economic threats and market solutions.[11]

Part of this search for market solutions has entailed 'going global' [12] and acquiring concession rights in foreign oil fields. Chinese oil companies first entered the upstream of the international oil market as early as 1993, when a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) bought the Talara Block in Peru for US$25 million. Since then, Chinese oil companies, principally CNPC, have entered into an array of overseas oil investments. However, as a RAND study concludes, it is not just that these are not growing fast enough to meet projected demand in the future, but that the domestic infrastructure in China (logistics and transportation) simply cannot cope. As such, much of the oil produced in Chinese-owned fields overseas will likely never enter China, but instead be sold on international markets or swapped for oil from other supplies that can be more easily utilised within China.[13]

The solution also entails diversifying sources of oil imports to hedge against potential political obstacles. China's dependence on imported sources of energy is spreading Chinese economic and diplomatic presence to wherever there is spare supply. Out of this dependence arises the question of China's relations with the major powers in the world: how can China and the major industrialised nations co-exist with each other in the field of energy diplomacy? As a consumer country, China does not really have much of a choice in choosing its source of supply. Combined with the learning curve Chinese oil companies are going through as they interact with international oil majors in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa, contention between China and the United States and its allies over China's pursuit of energy supplies can be expected to last for some time to come.

The extension of Chinese interests in Latin America and Africa has been particularly notable. This has included frequent visits to Africa by top Chinese leaders, increasing the Chinese profile in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, the launching of a ministerial-level cooperation forum with African governments, and the offer of debt reduction to African states. China's differences with the United States in the United Nations over dealing with the Darfur atrocities in Sudan led to media speculation that China was 'staking a claim' to Africa before America gains a stronger foothold in the continent, especially the countries around the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea basin.[14] It is possible for China to claim that it inherited Sudan's domestic problems since its oil companies were invited to operate in that country only after American energy business presence there was terminated as a result of a comprehensive embargo by the US government in 1992.[15] Put in the broader context of Chinese diplomacy, this has more to do with long-running Sino-American differences over economic sanctions as a diplomatic instrument. But clearly China also faces the challenge of doing its share to address questionable domestic policies in Sudan, including the enlisting of concerned third governments and parties regardless of the existence of energy connection or the lack thereof.

Notwithstanding this new importance of Africa for China, the Middle East still looms large in terms of oil and gas supplies, and the volatility of international relations in the region is well-documented.[16] But the possibilities of a politically motivated embargo against China by a Middle Eastern exporting country remain low. China has pursued a balanced foreign policy toward the long running Arab-Israeli conflict in the region and has done nothing to raise the enmity of Arab oil exporters. Moreover, by opening talks with the Gulf Cooperation Council over the possibility of a free trade area, China has moved from a single focus on oil supplies to an enlarged scope of economic exchanges. The level of economic interdependence between China and the Middle East is set to grow, barring a catastrophic breakdown of China as a source of demand for oil and other products the Middle East offers. As a matter of fact, it has now become conventional wisdom that in the future the centre of oil consumption worldwide is going to move to the East (China, to be followed by India). In short, the economic imperative that underpins China's ties with the Middle East is set to remain in the foreseeable future.

In the mid-stream of Chinese oil importing, there is no clear threat of a transportation embargo against China. The risk of a military conflict across the Taiwan Straits involving the United States has existed for decades. The worst-case scenario is that the United States repeats its policy of the 1950-70 period by organising China's maritime Asian neighbours to launch a comprehensive blockade against China, in the event of the Chinese mainland initiating a military attack on Taiwan. But as China's economy becomes more deeply integrated into the regional production chain, the associated costs of launching such a blockade are increasing as well. Economic interdependence again serves as perhaps the single most powerful deterrent against an embargo or blockade by China's neighbours.

China's search for (diversified) oil supplies has resulted in ties with a number of states that are considered to be unreliable and/or have gained 'pariah' status in the West. But given this, and the at times tense political relationship between China and some Western states, it is important to note that political motivations have not seriously interrupted China's access to oil imports since it lost its self-sufficiency in oil. The only event that might have threatened the transportation of foreign oil to China's shores was the 1993 *Yinhe* (Galaxy) ship incident. The *Yinhe* container ship was the subject of a forced inspection by the United States in the Persian Gulf because it was suspected of carrying precursors and chemical production equipment en route to Iran. But even this incident concluded without there being any interruption to Chinese oils imports from Iran. Indeed, the biggest problems have been the international energy market's reluctance to accommodate new entrants. For example, in 2003, both CNOOC and Sinopec were blocked from participating in the development of an oil field in the Caspian Sea after the existing partners decided to increase their own stakes.[17] Thus, a key question that remains for Chinese policymakers is where can Chinese oil companies go and not face obstacles put in place by either political or business communities, or both.

To sum up, then, China has lost its self-sufficiency in energy, particularly oil and gas. But in terms of traditional military-related risks, the possibility of a risk turning into a threat to China's energy security is getting lower thanks to the forces of economic globalisation. As long as China does not initiate a military conflict with Taiwan or its neighbours, the primary actor in maintaining the stability-based security China has enjoyed for the past three decades is China itself, not an external actor. So on an everyday basis, managing demand and utilising energy efficiently within China is at least as important as securing foreign supplies.

Domestic Energy Governance

Fluctuation in oil price affects the level of attention, in both domestic and international contexts, to how China factors in the world's energy scene. High oil prices directly cut into profits in the Chinese economy and force the Chinese government as well as oil companies to more aggressively pursue international sources of supply. This in turn drives up international apprehension about China draining an already tight international oil trade market, feeding existing concerns about the implications of China's rise for the global order.

An important key to addressing the situation, however, lies in how Chinese government policy addresses changes in its domestic energy scenes. Energy efficiency is increasing in China. The 3.39 tonnes of standard coal required to produce 10,000 Yuan of GDP in 1980 had been reduced to 1.1 tonne by 2008.[18] Technological collaboration with international corporations, sponsored and/or supported by the Chinese government and international agencies, helped to make such progress possible. But there is still a long way to go.

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Thus, the argument here is that energy industry governance is critical for the future evolution of China's energy sector, which is in turn critical for the evolution of China's international economic relations. Diversifying from oil and gas to other sources of energy is one such governance reform that could have a significant long-term impact. For example, South Korea, a country that was totally dependent on offshore sources of energy, has managed to meet 40 per cent of its electricity consumption through nuclear power. Another area of China's energy industry that requires serious improvement in governance is the coal industry – not just in terms of the efficient production and supply of coal but also in meeting the domestic and international environmental challenges that result from the extent (and inefficiency) of coal usage.

Observers outside China tend to focus on the signs of leadership commitment to addressing China's own and the Chinese source of global climate and environmental challenges. Chinese President Hu Jintao's announcement of the move towards carbon intensity targets in his speech to the United Nations in September 2008 is viewed as one of the latest signs of progress.[19] As a matter of fact, in 2002, the Chinese government introduced its own concept of building a 'circular economy', to address environmental degradation and resource scarcity associated with rapid economic development. Thus far, the scheme – the essence of which is to promote thrift in resource and energy consumption regardless of fluctuation in worldwide energy prices – is showing signs of solid support from local governments and citizen participation.[20]

In short, improved domestic energy governance is one effective and indeed essential route for China to improve its overall energy security situation. In this connection, China must work to make as extensive use of international resources as possible for the sake of promoting more efficient use of energy in the country. At a strategic level, the rest of the world stands to benefit from progress in Chinese efforts.

Energy and China's International Relations

China today is, by and large, on the defensive when it comes to the international reaction to the pursuit of supply security through the exploitation of offshore sources of energy, particularly oil and gas. A case in point is that China's energy policymakers find it necessary to stress that while China is increasingly importing more oil and natural gas from the world market, the country has also become the largest energy producer in the world. Energy statistics produced by the Chinese government itself claims that China is maintaining an energy self-sufficiency rate of over 90 per cent. Given the high level of dependence of the Chinese economy on trade with the rest of the world, there can be some arguable sympathy for these Chinese officials. After all, the making of those products China exports, does require energy. If not in China, it has to be somewhere.

This state of affairs is in some ways a repetition of the Japanese experience in the 1970s and 1980s, when the pursuit of high economic growth by going global led to serious debates about the impact of Japan on the world. Crucially, though, Japan was largely considered to be part of the existing liberal global order and a responsible stakeholder within the existing structure. Despite extensive rhetoric and real policy changes by the Chinese leadership to convince others about Chinese responsibility and an increasingly status quo position, there remains considerable suspicion about China's long-term ambitions and intentions. For those who already think that China plans to change and rule the world, the search for energy resources can be used and manipulated to support these hyperbolic claims. While changing the minds of the already convinced might not be possible, combining economic power with responsibility remains an important task for those engaged in developing China's overseas assets (and not just in energy sectors).

International concerns about how China's economic growth will translate into geopolitical clout play an integral part in the lack of symmetry in China's overall international relations with the major world powers. China's search for overseas oil supplies has led the Chinese government to pursue close diplomatic ties with Iran, Sudan, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela. These are countries that pursue questionable domestic policies and, in many cases, foreign policies in defiance against American and European interests and/or preferences. The situation leads to concern about the strategic intent behind China's oil- and gas-related diplomacy. As one article on China's oil diplomacy asks: why is China seemingly working to challenge the interests of industrialised countries in North America, Europe, and Northeast Asia, when logic tells us that oil should serve as a linchpin of closer relations instead?[21]

A key issue here is the relationship between 'state' and 'market', concepts central to thinking about management of economic ties across national boundaries. Or put another way, the relationship between the Chinese state and the major energy companies makes it difficult to know who is acting to support whom. Is a particular oil/gas venture overseas, the result of the Chinese government dictating its state-owned energy company to carry out a governmental mission, or is it a case of the company using the diplomatic clout of the state to support its own economic interests? In addition, international energy companies have tried hard to enter the Chinese markets but so far with varying levels of difficulty. Since 1980, China has allowed international oil companies to participate in developing its offshore oil and gas reserves and to conduct oil-related business on land. Chinese law, however, requires that international oil companies enter into joint ventures on Chinese territory with Chinese counterparts.[22] Because the Chinese oil industry is state-owned and operates monopolistically, such joint ventures have been limited, especially in distribution. Out of frustration grew imaginations about China doing all it can to protect and expand its oil reserves at the expense of everybody else. This understanding has led to high profile competition for access to international oil fields, which easily and quickly become politicised as international oil majors seek political assistance from their home governments to counter the 'unfair' state assistance granted to Chinese companies.[23]

China shoulders a good part of the blame for this suspicion of its activities because it has been very poor at making its energy transactions with countries such as Iran and Sudan transparent. Lack of transparency fuels speculation that China has a well-coordinated

project of countering US influence, particularly when it comes to dealing with 'rogue states'[24]. For example, Chinese government agencies and oil companies are not known to be forthcoming at all about the China National Petroleum Corporation's Sudan operations. Tracking publicly available industry profiling (often elusive to scholars of international politics, too), tells us that China's Sudan oil operation began as a four-way joint venture involving Canadian, Malaysian, and Sudanese oil companies. Canadian companies had to withdraw from Sudan due in part to protests by human rights activists. The government of Sudan decided against Chinese requests to increase share-holding and awarded to Indian companies the share that had once been Canadian. In other words, the government of Sudan does not appear to be that helpless in handling foreign competition for its oil assets.[25]

Energy concerns have driven China's increased activity in the Middle East in recent years,[26] and since as far back as the 1980s, this has been a contentious issue in Sino-US relations. China is routinely accused by the United States of selling weapons in exchange for oil and thereby undermining the global campaign against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But China's behaviour over the two Iraq wars indicates that China does have shared interests with the United States and other powers in supporting stability in the Persian Gulf region, and that shared interest is to keep Middle Eastern oil flowing to the rest of the world. Moreover, the primacy of maintaining oil supplies even means tolerating a heavy US military presence in the region.[27]

But despite China apparently buying into the existing order and the need to ensure oil supplies, China's pursuit of oil supplies from Iran has been a source of contention with successive administrations in Washington. For example, in 2004, Sinopec, which accounts for over 80 per cent of Chinese oil imports, and is the single most important refiner in China, continued with its bidding for developing 16 Iranian oil fields in the face of a concerted effort from the US to persuade it to drop out of the race. This US intervention in what many in China see as a purely domestic issue gives weight to those voices in China who argue for a move into politically motivated diplomacy as the ultimate instrument for securing China's oil supplies. So too does ongoing US support for India's nuclear energy programme while maintaining sanctions to prevent Chinese acquisition of the same technologies.[28]

And to an extent, diplomacy has been used in this way. Iran (together with Pakistan and India) was granted observer status to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2005. In contrast, the United States has been denied such status, despite repeated statements expressing a wish to be involved. It is also true that the SCO is one of the regional organisations that China actively supports as part of its 'new security concept', which emphasizes the importance of consultation and cooperation as a means for achieving security with its neighbours. But it should be noted that the inclusion of Iran in the SCO framework does not necessarily mean a deliberate challenge to US interests and dominance in the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle Eastern region. After all, to have Iran in the SCO is meaningful for the organisation to be effective in combating terrorism in Central Asia, which has a direct bearing on China.

Central Asia is another region where images of a new 'Great Game' easily re-emerge due to China's thirst for oil and gas. Oil and gas are the major and in most cases the only competitive commodities that landlocked and small states have to offer to the rest of the world. Pipelines are the most logical means of transporting Central Asian oil and gas to markets for consumption. Interest parties from near and afar have come up with a 'spaghetti bowl' of pipeline designs.[29] China is seen to be in a strategic position in deciding whether or not Eurasian oil and gas can pass through China to reach Japanese and South Korean markets, in addition to directly (i.e. without having to go through a third country) importing from Kazakhstan. A Kazak-Chinese pipeline, in turn, allows China access to fields further inland. There is no dearth of materials for dramatising the geo-political significance of China and Central Asia in the world's energy scene.

Increased Chinese use of natural gas from Central Asia can be helpful in altering the energy mix of China's north-western provinces. This in turn is conducive to improving the environmental and atmospheric conditions in those localities, thereby providing an important public good for the rest of China and the entire Northeast Asian region. Seen in this light, increase in natural gas supply in the Chinese energy market, either by way of pipelines or by seaborne transportation (of liquefied natural gas) is a contribution to the agenda of sustainable development. The alternative scenario of increase in coal consumption in China, simply because it is locally produced, is hardly in the interest of any country or people globally.

Energy and Sino-US Relations

As the above brief discussion demonstrates, it is difficult to stray too far from the pivotal Sino-US relationship when it comes to considering the role of energy in China's international relations. Indeed, perceptions of a potentially malign intent on behalf of the US were at the heart of the emergence of the idea of energy as a national security issue in China in the first place. In the 1990s, when it was becoming clear that the Chinese regime was not going to implode as a result of the political and economic difficulties that the 1989 events in Tiananmen Square brought about, a number of key events seemed to point towards a deliberate attempt to prevent China's re-emergence as a key global player. Examples included opposition to China's bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games in 1993, the granting of a visa to then-Taiwanese leader Lee Teng-hui and the ensuing crisis across the Taiwan Strait in 1995–1996, President Clinton's refusal to sign an agreement on China's entry into the World Trade Organization in April 1999, and the 'accidental' US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade one month later. Ongoing debates within US Security studies circles between 'engagers' and 'containers' over how to deal with China's rise only served to heighten the fear that China's energy requirements could become a key source of vulnerability in a US-dominated world.

From such a 'pessimistic' viewpoint, the United States is in a prime position to use oil as a weapon against China[30] – one alarmist view even predicts an inevitable war over oil[31]– their reasoning being that the United States has historically worked to control not just the production, but also the movement of oil supplies worldwide. Crucially, the United States controls vital sea lanes in the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia, making unfettered transportation of oil from Middle Eastern and African ports to Chinese shores a matter of US choice.

Such arguments do not stand the test of intellectual scrutiny. Accusing the United States of working to control international oil production and movement is common among those in the developing world who may be dissatisfied with US diplomacy. The argument that the US government conspires to manipulate world oil prices fails to consider the implications of the United States' place as the largest importer of oil in the world. It would be self-destructive for the US government to support a rise in world oil prices, as oil is openly sold to whoever is willing to pay the highest bidding price. If the price were to be manipulated in any direction, any damage to China would also hurt the United States. In any case, thus far, a solid case of the United States government working to manipulate the world's oil trade is yet to be established.

The fact of the matter is that China benefits from the freedom of commercial navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, which since the late 1970s has been protected by the US naval presence in the region. Chinese analysts who complain about US hegemony in the Middle East fail to take note of their own country's need for security in maritime transport; it is certainly in China's interest for the movement of oil through the Strait of Hormuz to continue to be safeguarded against sabotage.

Chinese-US energy relations are full of ironies. For the past 30 years, China and the United States have actually gained from each other's energy policies. China has benefited from the security that US 'hegemony' has wielded, in stabilising volatile spots of the energy-producing world. Meanwhile, the US economy has on the whole benefited from a steady flow of cheaply made exports from China. Because a sufficient energy supply is crucial to meeting trade demands, the United States and China, as the largest and third-largest trading nations in the world respectively, must treat energy as a key factor in economic interdependence.

There are differences between China and the United States, but it would be a waste of resources on both sides to encourage more competition or confrontation. Both stand to lose from further complication or politicisation of an already complex international energy system. The case for collaboration is easy when there is so much at stake. Collaboration on energy technology development and increasing oil extraction are two politically low-cost solutions for reducing tension between the United States and China. In fact, China has launched the largest number of collaborative energy development programmes and projects with the United States. These activities have in no small part contributed to improvement in energy technology development in China. As a result of these

government-sponsored projects, thousands of energy scientists and policy analysts regularly interact with each other across the Pacific.

For more than a decade, Beijing and Washington have added energy policy to their agenda in governmental-level dialogues. Such vehicles include the US-China Energy Policy Dialogue, the US-China Oil and Gas Industry Forum, the US-China Economic Development and Reform Dialogue, the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technologies Agreement, the Joint Coordinating Committee on Science and Technology, and the US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue. Still, the prevailing sentiment in both capitals is that China and the United States are, at best, parties in dialogue rather than partners in concerted action.

Future research efforts on China's energy diplomacy vis-à-vis the interests of the United States or the West can and should benefit from solid answers to a number of questions. Is it possible to ascertain that China (its government and/or oil companies) have sought to weaken or even drive out the presence of American, Western (or non-Chinese) energy businesses from a third country? In what ways has American or Western access to the energy market in question been adversely affected? Is there solid evidence demonstrating an energy host government and China collaborating to unfairly treat a non-Chinese energy interest? To what extent has the Chinese pursuit of oil investments led to a 'lock out' of energy supplies, as was feared years ago? Do the energy deals imply a shared anti-Western agenda between China and a host government? If so, how solid are the ideological and business foundations of that agenda? Squarely addressing these questions will help greatly contribute towards ascertaining the extent of real competition between China and the United States, and for that matter, the West, over energy supply.

Conclusion

This paper has focused on oil as a means of exploring the more generic issues relating to Chinese energy requirements and the search for energy security. Indeed, much of the analysis could be applied to the search for other resources beyond energy too. To be sure, there are specific issues relating to different resources. But the basic concerns in China about how to gain resource security, and those in the rest of the world about the implications of Chinese resource policy remain the same. Thinking about the future, we might also suggest that food security will emerge to play at least as important a role as energy in China's international relations; possibly even more.

This paper has also focused on the demand and use of energy. Arguably, in the long term, the implications of energy consumption for China's international environmental relations are important. And in terms of both energy and the environment, a key source of 'threat' (either to China or to the world) is the ever growing consumption in China without significant improvement in energy efficiency. In this respect, the global economic crisis that began in 2008 might actually be beneficial, in that part of the response in China has been the expansion of spending and bank lending to promote renewable energy resources and

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energy conservation projects. Proposals to cut China's carbon intensity might remain rather vague, and will at best only reduce the rate of growth of both energy usage and emissions, but recognition of the urgent need to do something with the full backing of the regime from the very apex of the political system is an important starting point. A sensible direction in policy interactions between China and the international community over China's pursuit of energy security is to make China's efficiency in energy consumption a priority area for international collaboration. Focus on energy efficiency in China is probably the single most effective way to prevent the nightmarish scenario of China crowding out the global energy market at the expense of energy needs of both industrialised and industrialising countries.

At the political and diplomatic level, the international community increasingly demands China to behave in politically acceptable and responsible ways in its pursuit of energy and other resource supplies. China must enhance its transparency in those government–business interactions associated with its pursuit of energy interests overseas, so as to increase the level of confidence the international community can have on China's geopolitical intents. Whether it is fair or not, and whether China's leaders like it or not, there is still unease over China's long-term goals; Deng Xiaoping's oft-repeated exhortation to keep China's true objectives is grist to the mill of those who fear the emergence of a Sinocentric world order. And in truth, there are some who are simply not persuadable, no matter what China's leaders say or do. Nevertheless, ultimately it is in China's own self-interest to show that it is becoming the 'responsible great power' of the twenty-first century – a power to be trusted and dealt with fairly and without prejudice in an interdependent global economy.

However, one final word of caution is required here. It is easy to imagine China as a single entity, which is organised, manipulated and controlled by a single leader (or a small group of leaders) in Beijing. And as noted in this paper, when it comes to energy policy and the pursuit of overseas oil supplies in particular, then Chinese policy does appear to be more coordinated and part of an overarching state strategy than is perhaps the case elsewhere. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly important to disaggregate different Chinese actors and interests; for example, an increasingly common complaint in Beijing is that the actions of individual Chinese traders in Africa often (unfairly) reflect poorly on broader perceptions of China and on the Chinese government itself. Commercial interests rather than state strategies already play a role in the overseas activities of China's major resource companies. As the outward investment regime is reformed to make it easier to 'go global', then the ability to control what happens under the name of China (or associated with China) will become ever more difficult. Talking of a thing called China with a single voice, interest, and objective is becoming increasingly problematic. Around the world as well as in China itself, working out whether firms are working for the state or the other way round is becoming an increasingly important task – and in light of what has happened in response to the global crisis, an increasingly difficult task as well.

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[11] Dennis O'Brien, "Mightier than the Sword," *Harvard International Review* 19, 1 (Summer 1997): pp. 8-13
[12] The call to zou chuqu 走出去 literally means "go out", but is widely now referred to as the campaign to "go global" in English language publications.
[13] Erika Downs, *China's Quest for Energy Security* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000).
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[17] "China Oil Giant Dealt a Setback," *New York Times*, 13 May 2003, p. C9.
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[29] Christopher Smith and Leena Koottungal, "Global pipeline plans expand," *Oil & Gas Journal*, 106:7 (18 February 2008): pp. 46-57.
[30] See Ding Yifan, Meiguo Pipan [The paradoxes of U.S. hegemony] (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2006), pp. 143–147.
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Asia Security Initiative Policy Series
Working Paper No. 2
March 2010

'Human Securitising' the Climate Security Debate

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Abstract

Efforts to understand the connection between climate change and national, regional and international security have fuelled something of a climate security industry, evidenced in a range of reports from governments, international organisations, and non-governmental organisations. In much of this, particularly those works produced by defence agencies and individual governments, the focus has been on threats to national security through civil unrest and violence that derive from competition for resources, access to environmental services, and the unregulated movement of people in the face of ecosystem collapse. This paper reinstates a human security approach. It explores not just the human insecurities that are generated by climate change, with a particular focus on the Asia-Pacific, but examines how human security models provide (i) different ways of interpreting climate conflict ‘triggers’ and (ii) different and more effective strategies for responding to climate insecurity. This involves an analytical move from risk to vulnerability and a strategic move from mitigation to adaptation and social resilience. Despite the challenges that this presents for more orthodox approaches to security, it is also more certain to deliver outcomes that can guarantee security for both peoples and for states.

Biography

Lorraine Elliott is Associate Professor and Senior Fellow in International Relations at the Australian National University. She also holds a Visiting Senior Fellowship at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, where she is a lead researcher on the Asia Security Initiative project on climate security. She is a member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), the governance board of the ANU Climate Change Institute, and the International Human Dimensions Programme (IHDP) Advisory Group on Global Environmental Change and Human Health. She also sits on the Board of Directors for the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS). She has held visiting appointments at the University of Oxford (Balliol College), the Asia Research Centre at the London School of Economics and Political Science, the University of Keele, and the Institute for Environmental Studies at the Free University of Amsterdam. Her research and publications include over 80 journal articles and book chapters on global and regional environmental politics and governance, climate and environmental security, and transnational environmental crime. Her publications also include books on Antarctic environmental politics, cosmopolitan militaries, two editions of *The global politics of the environment* (Palgrave Macmillan/New York University Press, 1998 and 2004) and a forthcoming edited volume on comparative environmental regionalism with Routledge.

This Policy Series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment and discussion. The views expressed are entirely the author’s own and not that of the RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies. The paper is the result of research conducted under the Asia Security Initiative programme on internal challenges supported by the MacArthur Foundation. Visit www.asicluster3.com to find out more about this initiative. More information on the work of the RSIS Centre for NTS Studies can be found at www.rsis.edu.sg/nts.

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Policy recommendations

- Plans of action for climate security should be developed at national and regional levels. The development of those plans should include consultation with multiple stakeholders, including civil society groups, non-governmental organisations, academic and scientific researchers, and the corporate sector. Where such plans already exist, they should be re-evaluated to ensure that human security is given adequate attention and appropriate priority. Donor countries should be encouraged to increase their support for capacity building to enhance local and national expertise in the development and implementation of climate security plans of action.

- Climate security plans of action should include strategies for establishing and implementing early warning systems to identify those who are most vulnerable and to assess the nature and extent of that vulnerability.

- Governments, regional organisations and international organisations should ensure that health and food security issues are integrated into policies for adapting to climate change and that those policies support inter-agency cooperation and information exchange.

- Climate security plans of action should include guidelines for institutional practices to manage competition for scarce environmental resources and services such as water and arable land. Those practices should include equity provisions and should take account of the needs of those who are most vulnerable to environmental scarcity.

- Regional and international organisations should support further research on the potential for and the nature of migration in response to climate change. Based on this research, governments at all levels should develop strategies to expand the range of adaptation options available to migration vulnerable communities and to support those communities in their adaptation choices.

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Introduction

Climate change is a crucial issue for the Asia-Pacific. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports a worrying litany of likely climate change impacts for the region: a decline in crop yield, an increase in climate-induced disease, an increased risk of hunger and water scarcity, an increase in the number and severity of glacier melt-related floods, significant loss of coastal ecosystems, a high risk of flooding for many millions of people in coastal communities, and an increased risk of extinction for many species of fauna and flora. In its report on the economics of climate change in Southeast Asia, the Asian Development Bank concludes that the region is ‘likely to suffer more from climate change than the rest of the world’, and that ‘the potential economic cost of inaction is huge’.[1]

As global concerns over the impacts of climate change increase, assessments of the likely social, political and economic consequences have taken on a great degree of urgency. This sense of urgency has now extended to the security sector. The proposition that environmental degradation in general and climate change in particular are or should be considered security concerns is no longer a novelty on the non-traditional security agenda. Put broadly, environmental security falls within two sometimes competing approaches to non-traditional security (other terms include new security, transnational security, comprehensive security, and non-conventional security). The first of these focuses on non-traditional threats to traditional ‘referent objects’ (that is, states) and worries about the potential for conflict and political violence as a result.[2] The primary security problematic remains one that focuses on the maintenance of order and stability and the protection (or securing) of those values that are associated with statehood: political independence, territorial integrity and internal order. The second takes account of what might be called ‘non-traditional’ referents, including individuals, communities, societies, economies and, where environmental issues are concerned, possibly even species and ecosystems. Of the two security models, it is the more traditional statist approach that has dominated the recent resurgence of interest in the link between security and climate change. In a series of reports prepared by government agencies and defence and security think tanks, climate change is presented as a threat multiplier, overstretching societies’ adaptive capacities and creating or exacerbating political instability and violence, possibly to the extent of inter-state conflict.

Two themes are prominent in the various claims and analyses offered from within this climate security industry. First, climate-related instabilities are frequently posed as threats only to the extent that they have ‘grave implications for [the] national security’ of developed countries, through problems of conflict spill-over, destabilising impacts on the security of regions of strategic interest, or because they generate further threats to the integrity of sovereign borders.[3] Second, human security concerns often appear incidental, or relevant only when those who are affected or made insecure by the impacts of climate change are characterised as the likely source of social tension, civil unrest and other pressures. Yet it is people, particularly in developing countries, who ultimately bear the cost of climate-related environmental harm through increased vulnerability to poverty, disease, loss of livelihoods, food insecurity (sometimes to the extent of real malnutrition and starvation), and disasters of nature. Unlike the wealthy, ‘poor people often lack access to alternative services … live in locations that are vulnerable to environmental threats and lack financial and institutional buffers against these dangers’.[4]

The purpose of this paper is to explore these issues in more depth and to examine the contribution that a focus on human security can make to the ways in which policymakers should approach the challenges associated with climate security. In particular, it suggests that a human security approach can actually offer more effective purchase on the problems of instability and social conflict through directing attention to vulnerability rather than risk, and to the importance of social resilience as a security strategy.

Securitising Climate Change

In August 2009, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told a Global Environment Forum in Korea (at the same time that governments were meeting in Bonn for five days of informal climate negotiations) that failure to act quickly on climate change could lead to a worsening of tensions, social unrest and even violence.[5] This was not the first time that the Secretary-General, who has made climate change a touchstone issue of his incumbency, has expressed these kinds of concerns. In March 2007, at a meeting of youth delegates at UN headquarters in New York, he suggested that ‘in coming decades’ climate-related ‘changes in our environment and the resulting upheavals — from droughts to inundated coastal areas to loss of arable lands — are likely to become a major driver of war and conflict’.[6]

The Secretary-General’s August 2009 speech was only the latest warning about climate-induced conflict and instability in what has become a burgeoning climate security industry

[1] Asian Development Bank (ADB), *The economics of climate change in Southeast Asia: A regional review*, Manila: ADB, 2009, p.xxvi.
[2] The literature on environmental security is now extensive. For useful explorations of the various interpretations and contestations surrounding the term and its policy implications see: Simon Dalby, *Environmental security*, University of Minnesota Press, 2002; Jon Barnett, *The meaning of environmental security*, Zed Books, 2001; Lorraine Elliott, *The global politics of the environment*, New York University Press, 2004, Chapter 9; Lorraine Elliott ‘Environment and security: what’s the connection?’, *Australian Defence Force Journal*, No. 174 (2007), pp. 37-50.
[3] See, for example, The CNA Corporation, *National security and the threat of climate change*, The CNA Corporation, 2007, p. 3.
[4] Global Leadership for Climate Action (GLCA), Facilitating an international agreement on climate change: adaptation to climate change, GLCA, 2009, p. 16.
[5] Remarks by the United Nations Secretary-General to the Global Environment Forum, Incheon, Republic of Korea, 11 August 2009, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=557#> (accessed 12 October 2009)
[6] Address to the United Nations International School-United Nations Conference on Global Warming: Confronting the Crisis, 1 March 2007, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=70>

as scholars and policymakers attempt to better understand the possible security threats associated with climate change. Few reports are quite as alarmist as the 2004 report commissioned for (and then suppressed by) the Pentagon which warned that in the face of catastrophic climate change, 'nuclear conflict, mega-droughts, famine and widespread rioting' would erupt across the world as a result of climate change and competition for food, water and energy. Disruption and conflict, the authors predicted, would become 'endemic features of life'.[7] Yet while most reject this dystopia, all assume that some form of disruption and conflict – ranging from civil unrest through inter-communal violence to political radicalisation and, in extreme situations, state collapse – is likely even though the empirical evidence for such claims is often thin.

The 2006 Stern report on the economics of climate change, prepared for the UK government by a former chief economist of the World Bank, suggested that climate change could 'create risks of major disruption to economic and social activity … on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars and economic depression of the first half of the 20th century'.[8] In a widely reported move in January 2007, the Board of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists moved the hands of the Doomsday Clock from seven to five minutes to midnight, concluding that 'global warming poses a dire threat to human civilization that is second only to nuclear weapons'.[9] At the same time, the UK's Ministry of Defence (MoD) released the latest in its strategic trends series identifying climate change, a shifting environment, and increased demand for natural resources – especially food, water and energy – as challenges to stability that would create new sources of insecurity and tension.[10] A few months later, in April 2007, a panel of retired US admirals and generals released a report in which they argued that climate change constituted a significant threat to US national security interests.[11] In the same month, under the presidency of the UK, the UN Security Council held its first debate on global warming. The British Foreign Secretary at the time, Margaret Beckett, told the Council that the threat from climate change has 'grown larger in scale and sharper in outline' with consequences that 'reach to the very heart of the security agenda'.[12]

[7] Cited from Mark Townsend and Paul Harris, 'Now the Pentagon tells Bush: climate change will destroy us', *The Observer*, 22 February 2004. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2004/feb/22/usnews.theobserver>. Admittedly, the report was explicitly intended to assess likely outcomes in the face of *abrupt* climate change. See Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, *An abrupt climate change scenario and its implications for United States National Security*, October 2003, for a public version of the report.
[8] Sir Nicholas Stern, *The economics of climate change,* HM Treasury, 2006.
[9] 'Doomsday Clock Move '"Two Minutes" Closer to Midnight', *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 17 January 2007. Online. Available HTTP:<http://www.thebulletin.org/minutes-to-midnight/board-statements.html>
[10] *Global Strategic Trends 2007-2036*, 3rd edition, Ministry of Defence, Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2007.
[11] CNA Corporation, *National security and the threat of climate change*, The CNA Corporation, 2007.
[12] 'Margaret Beckett at UN Security Council Climate Change Debate', Foreign and Commonwealth Office Press Release, 16 April 2007. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391629&a=KArticle&aid=1176454354972>

In September 2007, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), which styles itself as the world's leading authority on political military conflict, included in its annual Strategic Survey a long discussion that characterised climate change as a potential 'existential security threat'.[13] The climate-security link was reinforced further in October with the awarding of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize jointly to former US Vice President Al Gore and the IPCC for their work on climate change. In announcing the prize, the Norwegian Nobel Committee said that climate change presented a threat to the security of humankind which could bring with it 'increased dangers of violent conflicts and wars within and between states'.[14]

This flurry of activity continued into 2008 and 2009.[15] In March 2008, the High Representative and the European Commission prepared a paper on climate change and international security for the Council of the European Union.[16] In April 2008, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) published its report on *Climate Change and Security: Challenges for German Development Cooperation* on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Development and Cooperation.[17] Climate change featured in the UK government's first-ever National Security Strategy published in March 2008 and in a US National Intelligence Assessment in June later that year.[18] In June 2009, the UN General Assembly adopted a draft resolution sponsored by the Pacific Island countries which called (among other things) for a comprehensive report on the possible security implications of climate change to be prepared for the 64th session of the General Assembly.[19] In September 2009, the UK government appointed from within the ranks of the defence forces, a climate and energy security envoy, Rear Admiral Neil Morisetti, in response to their concerns that 'climate change will act as an increasingly powerful amplifier of instability across some of the most volatile regions of the world'.[20]

[13] 'Strategic Policy Issues', *Strategic Survey*, Vol. 107, No. 1 (2007), p. 47. In September the UK Ministry of Defence also announced a £12 million contract with the UK Meteorological Office Hadley Centre to support research that would focus on the relationship between climate change and conflict, identify countries where there is conflict over food and water scarcity and examine the related conditions in which British troops might be deployed in the future.
[14] See <http://nobelpeaceprize.org/eng_lau_announce2007.html>
[15] Official reports and assessments have been matched by analyses from research institutes, think tanks and academic institutions too numerous to mention.
[16] *Climate change and international security*, Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission (HREC) to the European Council, S113/08, 14 March 2008.
[17] Alexander Carius, Dennis Tänzler and Achim Maas, *Climate Change and Security: Challenges for German Development Cooperation*, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2008.
[18] Cabinet Office, *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world*, Cabinet Office, 2008; Thomas Fingar, National Intelligence Assessment on the National Security Implications of Global Climate Change to 2030, Statement for the Record before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 25 June 2008.
[19] United Nations General Assembly, *Climate change and its possible security implications*, A/63/L.8/Rev.1, 18 May 2009.
[20] 'Climate Security: visit of Rear Admiral Neil Morisetti', Foreign and Commonwealth Office Press Release, 20 November 2009. Online. Available HTTP: <http://ukinnorway.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/news/11814644/21021347/climate-security>

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Climate Change and Conflict

In much of this work, efforts to understand the triggers and pathways that link climate change to conflict and instability, and thus to security, have relied on an updated version of predictions made by scholars in the late 1980s and early 1990s that environmental degradation could contribute to instability, the 'disruption of legitimised and authoritative social relations'[21] and 'civil turmoil and outright violence'.[22] In its 2007 Strategic Survey, for example, the IISS suggested that 'the security dimension [of climate change] will come increasingly to the forefront as countries begin to see falls in available resources and economic vitality, increased stress on their armed forces, greater instability in regions of strategic import, increases in ethnic rivalries, and a widening gap between rich and poor'.[23] A second assumption that characterises the current climate security literature is that the sources of national and societal insecurity will be equally as much internally- as externally-generated.

These are complex processes. The proximate triggers for intra-state social unrest and inter-communal violence are usually argued to involve competition for scarce resources (including water and energy), food insecurity, and pressures that result from internal migration spurred by the impacts of climate change on local environments. This menu of concerns is not surprising. The reports of the IPCC show that climate change will result in a growing pattern of scarcity and vulnerability for an increasing proportion of the world's people. Hundreds of millions of people will be exposed to more severe water stress; cereal production will decrease in most latitudes in the longer term; millions more people will be vulnerable to extreme weather events such as droughts and heatwaves, and to disasters of nature such as floods; and there will be a growing health burden from increases in malnutrition and infectious diseases.

The fear expressed in climate security literature is that intra-state pressures and instabilities over various kinds of environmental scarcities will be internationalised in various ways and therefore make more challenging, the security problems of 'the North' through a geography that moves from borders through regions to the global. The pressures of climate migration, for example (although poorly tested empirically) are assumed to translate into unrest, conflict and perhaps even violence in transit and destination areas. Climate-related resource scarcities have also raised the spectre of more conventional border or territorial disputes between states or adjacent communities. New geopolitical tensions are anticipated as countries' vulnerabilities to resource scarcities, including energy and food, increase or decrease in both comparative and absolute terms. Climate security commentators also worry about 'spill-over' effects if local disputes 'threaten the political stability of countries and regions'[24] and, in turn, the security interests of the more 'stable' parts of the world such as North America, Europe and Australasia.

[21] Thomas F. Homer-Dixon 'On the threshold: environmental changes as causes of acute conflict', *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1991), p. 9.
[22] Norman Myers, 'Environment and security', *Foreign Policy*, No. 74 (1989), p. 24.
[23] 'Strategic Policy Issues', *Strategic Survey*, Vol. 107, No. 1 (2007), p. 68.
[24] HREC, *Climate change and international security*, S113/08, 14 March 2008, p. 4.

Concerns are raised that 'under conditions of severe global climate change, environmental factors may push already failed states deeper into the abyss of ungovernability, while driving other states toward the brink'.[25] In extreme cases, climate-related state failures are feared to provide an avenue for extremist ideologies and create breeding grounds and safe havens for terrorist networks.[26] The multilateral system is also deemed to be 'at risk' if governments are unable to or fail to address these threats.[27] Finally, in a replication of the concerns that are at the heart of realist security debates, observers worry that the divergent regional effects of climate change could affect both global and regional distributions of power with unpredictable consequences for international security.

Climate Security and the Asia-Pacific

Conflict and instability is thought more likely in conditions where people face a contraction of livelihood choices, and where governments face increased demands on critical social infrastructure such as health systems, the overstretch of societies' adaptive capacities, and the growth of a politics of resentment in situations of ecological marginalisation where unequal access to resources is politicised or where resource scarcities feed into existing tensions between ethnic, religious or other identity groups. Many countries in the Asia-Pacific fit this 'profile' and are thus assumed to be more vulnerable to internal conflict and unrest sparked by the environmental, economic and social impacts of climate change.

In a detailed report, the non-governmental organisation, International Alert (IA), identified 46 countries – home to 2.7 billion people – in which it anticipates that 'the effects of climate change interacting with economic, social and political problems will create a high risk of violent conflict'.[28] In the Asia-Pacific, Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines are the three countries identified as most likely to fall into this category. Other analyses have likewise suggested that Indonesia and the Philippines are countries in which unsustainable resource use, mismanagement, and environmental degradation, as well as the more direct impacts of climate change, could drive instability and insurgency 'on a par with ethnic and religious issues'.[29] IA has characterised another 56 countries – home to 1.2 billion people worldwide – in which 'the institutions of government will have great difficulty taking the strain of climate change on top of all their other current challenges'.[30] While IA suggests

[25] International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey, p. 55; Kurt M Campbell et al, *The age of consequences: the foreign policy and national security implications of global climate change*, p. 107.
[26] CNA Corporation, *National security and the threat of climate change*, The CNA Corporation, 2007, p. 31.
[27] See, for example, HREC, *Climate change and international security*, p. 5. Kurt M Campbell et al, *The age of consequences: the foreign policy and national security implications of global climate change*, Centre for Strategic and International Studies/Centre for a New American Security, 2007, p. 107.
[28] Jan Smith and Janani Vivekananda, *A climate of conflict: the links between climate change, peace and war*, International Alert, 2007, p. 3.
[29] See the executive summary of the conference 'Environment and Security in the Asia-Pacific 2002' organised by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 19–21 November, 2002. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.apcss.org/core/Conference/CR_ES/021119-21ES.htm>.
[30] Jan Smith and Janani Vivekananda, *A climate of conflict: the links between climate change, peace and war*, International Alert, 2007, p. 3.

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that the 'risk of armed conflict may not be so immediate' in these countries, they also argue that 'the interaction of climate change and other factors creates a high risk of political instability, with potential violent conflict a distinct risk in the longer term'.[31] IA includes the Asia-Pacific countries of Cambodia, Laos, North Korea, Thailand and Timor-Leste in this category.

Despite efforts at offering an empirical grounding for these kinds of claims, notable differences of opinion remain. For example, IA does not include China in its list of climate-conflict vulnerable countries. The UK MoD, on the other hand, has suggested that 'changing patterns of land use, the failure to deliver per capita prosperity and environmental stresses caused by climate change and pollution, could reduce China's traditional resilience to natural disaster'. The authors of the MoD *2007 Strategic Trends* anticipate that '[a] future large-scale disaster might therefore cause China's progress towards strategic power status to stall and might even result in it becoming a failed state, prone to civil conflict and separatism'.[32]

Climate security analysts have also worried about the potential for climate change to increase the likelihood of state failure in the Asia-Pacific if governments are unable to respond effectively to the social and economic challenges of climate change or the kinds of civil unrest and communal violence that might result. In this view, the impacts of climate change will create demands for resources, food, water, health infrastructure, and social and economic assistance that may be difficult for governments to meet, potentially undermining confidence in those governments and calling their authority and perhaps even legitimacy into question.

In a region that is reported to have an already higher-than-average number of internal armed conflicts and struggles of various kinds,[33] the multiplier effect of climate-induced resource scarcities and stresses should not be discounted. The Asia-Pacific has already seen localised tensions over other kinds of resource and environmental issues although few of these have resulted in the kind of instability and fragility that the more alarmist versions of the climate conflict models might anticipate. The UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) reports that large-scale electricity generation projects have become a source of social conflict in countries such as China and Thailand (though this is often directed against governments or corporations rather than other communities).[34] Problems of environmental degradation and pollution have resulted in unrest in China where these issues are made more complicated by disputes

[31] Ibid.
[32] *Global Strategic Trends 2007-2036*, 3rd edition, Ministry of Defence, Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2007, p. 80.
[33] Benjamin Reilly, 'Internal conflict and regional security in the Asia Pacific', *Pacifica Review*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2002) p. 8.
[34] United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, *State of the Environment in Asia and the Pacific, 2005*, ESCAP, 2006, p. 52.

over land tenure and rural poverty.[35] Concerns about food security – influenced by both prices and availability – have resulted in social protests across the region including in Indonesia, the Philippines and China. Each of these challenges – energy management, pollution and food security – is also a human security issue. Yet, as noted above, the impact of climate change on human insecurity is rarely made a priority in climate security literature.

Climate Change from a Human Security Perspective

In the August 2009 speech referred to earlier in this paper, Secretary-General Ban also drew attention to the catastrophic impact that climate change could have for humanity, a statement that places people at the centre of the climate security debate. The genesis of the human security approach lies in ideas articulated initially by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) but with a genealogy that can be traced at least to the two reports of the Brandt Commission, *North–South: A Programme for Survival* published in 1980 and *Common Crisis* published in 1983. The UNDP presented human security as a universal, people-centred concern with 'human life and dignity' and as an antidote to conventional views of security that had 'for too long … been shaped by the potential for conflict between states … [and] equated with … threats to a country's borders'.[36] While environmental degradation was not the only component of human security, the report nevertheless identified the 'basic question of human survival on an environmentally fragile planet' as a central concern. This theme was also picked up by the Commission on Global Governance in its argument that 'threats to the earth's life support systems … challenge the security of people far more than the threat of external aggression'.[37]

The state-centric (and, for some, adversarial model of security) against which human security was to be the antidote was deemed to be flawed on a number of grounds. First, it ran the risk of militarising non-traditional insecurities, drawing attention away from the underlying causes. Second, it overlooked the extent to which various forms of non-traditional insecurities – such as environmental degradation – might be amenable to cooperation rather than conflict. Third, it restricted who was able to contribute to the security discourse and precluded ideas and concepts that did not have states as the key structures or agents. Thus traditional security models were thought not only inappropriate as a basis for dealing with non-traditional and human security threats, such as those involved with environmental degradation and climate change, but as standing in the way of creative and successful solutions. As Bilgin puts it, the supposed 'commonsense' of

[35] See Kenneth Lieberthal, 'How domestic forces shape the PRC's grand strategy and international impact' in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Willis (eds) *Strategic Asia 2007-08: Domestic politics, internal change and grand strategy*, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2007; and Thomas Lum, 'Social Unrest in China', Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, RL33416, 8 May 2006. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33416.pdf>
[36] United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994*, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 22.
[37] Commission on Global Governance, *Our global neighbourhood*, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 79.

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statism ‘forclos[es] alternative nonstatist conceptions of security and the constitution of alternative futures’.[38]

In the Asia-Pacific, climate change will have a fundamental impact on the livelihoods and even survival of millions of people. Of the 10 countries in the world most imperilled by climate change in terms of the *number* of people likely to be affected, six are in this region: China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand and the Philippines.[39] The IPCC notes that ‘projected climate change-related exposures are likely to affect the health status of millions of people, particularly those with low adaptive capacity’ through increases in malnutrition, greater frequency of death, injury and disease from heatwaves and other disasters of nature, an increased disease burden including diarrhea, cardio-respiratory illness, and infectious diseases.[40] Climate change will create further economic uncertainties and not just for the region’s poorest, although they are likely to be the least resilient and least able to adapt, at least in the short-term. In conditions of economic weakness (the term used by IA), the range of income possibilities is narrowed and the state is also deprived of resources with which to meet people’s needs.[41] In Southeast Asia, for example, over 300 million people live on incomes that fall below US$2.00 per day (over 40 per cent of the region’s population).[42]

Climate change will almost certainly undermine or slow progress towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, including those on reducing poverty and achieving sustainable development, by the 2015 target deadline.[43] Poverty exacerbates climate insecurities and in a region where subsistence lifestyles constitute a significant proportion of human livelihoods, the poor in rural areas in particular will be disadvantaged and impoverished by climate change, a condition the Asian Development Bank refers to as ‘environmental poverty’.[44] Marginal incomes provide little or no safety net against health burdens, food insecurity, flooding and drought, or other impacts of climate change. And

[38] Bilgin, Pinar ‘Beyond statism in security studies? Human agency and security in the Middle East’ *The Review of International Affairs* Vol. 2, No. 1 (2002), p. 100.
[39] The Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA) reports that climate change is less rapid in Southeast Asia when compared with global averages; see Herminia Francisco et al., *Climate change: impacts, adaptation and policy in Southeast Asia,* EEPSEA 2008, p. 5.
[40] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. *Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability – contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 12.
[41] Smith and Vivekananda, *A climate of conflict: the links between climate change, peace and war*, International Alert, 2007, p. 3.
[42] On 2005 figures, about 93 million (18.8 per cent) people in Southeast Asia lived below the $1.25-a-day poverty line, and 221 million (44 per cent) below the $2-a-day poverty line; ADB, *The economics of climate change in Southeast Asia: a regional review*, ADB, 2009, p. 53.
[43] For more, see United Nations Millennium Campaign, *Seal a just deal: the MDG path to a climate change solution*, UNMC (undated); United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP)/ADB, *The Millennium Development Goals: progress in Asia and the Pacific 2007*, UNESCAP, 2007.
[44] See ADB, *Environmental Poverty: New Perspectives and Implications for Sustainable Development in Asia and the Pacific*, ADB, 2007.

those who are economically marginalised are also the least able to pursue adaptive strategies, the least able to buy their way out of the impacts of climate change.

A human security model which takes people (or peoples) as the security referent questions the ‘taken for granted’ assumptions and analyses in the policy community about climate change, threat and (in)security. Making people and their communities the security referent helps us to think differently about the threat multiplier effect that is at the centre of more orthodox approaches to climate insecurity. A closer, albeit brief look at three of the key concerns in the climate security literature demonstrates some of the practical consequences of this discursive move from state to human security.

Food Insecurity:

Food insecurity refers to both a shortage of food and vulnerability to high food prices which puts staples out of reach of the poorest. It is a product of land degradation and loss of soil fertility caused by deforestation, overuse of chemicals, inefficient irrigation and waterlogging as well as drought and desertification; diversion of food crops into biofuels; market failure reflected in rising food prices and an ineffective and unfair distribution of food; over-capitalisation of the global fishing industry and the over-exploitation of many of the world’s fish stocks; and coastal and river pollution from development that destroys breeding grounds. In the more traditional climate security literature, the main concerns are that food insecurity can turn food exporting countries in the region into net food importers, increase their vulnerability to global markets and their reliance on the security of trade routes, heighten poverty, and potentially intensify domestic grievances and social disruptions. Efforts are thus made to identify food security ‘hotspots’: those countries where not just food shortages but also food conflict is a possibility. In the Asia-Pacific region, those countries include Burma, Cambodia, North Korea, Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Vietnam.[45]

From a human security perspective, possible or actual food scarcity generates concerns for those who will be most affected. The unpredictability of wet and dry seasons is already having an impact on agriculture in parts of Southeast Asia, with harvests being disrupted, rural incomes dropping, and hunger and malnutrition increasing, especially among children. In Northeast Asia, the Chinese government’s State Meteorological Administration has calculated that climate change could cause that country’s grain harvest to fall by 5 to 10 per cent, with a food shortfall of 100 million metric tons by 2030, a serious problem for people in a country which is already losing farmland to deserts and which has little capacity to increase arable land.[46] A decline in fisheries production, caused by over-fishing, illegal fishing, and by increases in sea-surface temperatures and salinity, will complicate food security for millions of people in the region who rely on fish stocks as their major source of protein. Coupled with a projected decline in crop yields, particularly in key

[45] UNESCAP, *Sustainable agriculture and food security in the Asia Pacific,* UNESCAP, 2009, p. 29.
[46] ‘Climate change to strain China food supply by 2030’, *Reuters*, 23 August 2007. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.enn.com/top_stories/article/22194>.

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cereal crops, this could result in malnutrition, an increased disease burden, and possible starvation for many of the region's most disadvantaged with an extra 130 million people in the Asia-Pacific anticipated to be at risk of climate change related hunger.

Water Stress:

Most parts of the Asia-Pacific are projected to experience increased water resource stress as a result of climate change. The Consortium of Non-Traditional Security in Asia reports that since 1950, 'water availability per capita has already decreased by 60 per cent in North Asia and by 55 per cent in Southeast Asia'.[47] In the more traditional approach to climate security, vulnerability to water stress and increased drought is anticipated to trigger distributional conflicts and 'fuel existing conflicts over depleting resources, especially where access to those resources is politicised'[48] or where there are limited or weak institutional frameworks for the 'adaptation of water and crisis management systems'.[49] Several countries in the region have a high dependency ratio for renewable water resources (that is, the proportion of their total renewable water resources that originate outside the countries' borders). Trans-boundary river systems are often moderately or highly affected by fragmentation (that is, the river's natural flow is interrupted by dams, inter-basin transfers or other forms of water withdrawal).[50] The MoD anticipates that in the region's trans-boundary river systems, such as the Mekong for example, 'large-scale farmers [will] … benefit at the expense of smaller [farmers], … there will be disruption of fisheries … [and there is] likely to be increased tension over water resources'.[51] Yet these remain controversial claims. Detailed historical studies suggest that interactions over water resources are more likely to result in cooperative rather than conflict outcomes.[52]

From a human security perspective, water (in)security involves more than tension and the possibility of violent competition among competing users (and uses). UNESCAP calculates that up to 650 million people in Asia and the Pacific do not have reliable access to safe water – and this has very real and immediate consequences for human security.[53] Both poor quality water and limited access to water, whether through the overdrafting of water supplies or through drought, can undermine agriculture which accounts for between 70 and 80 per cent of water use in the region, exacerbate food scarcity, and compromise

[47] 'Water security: issues and challenges in Southeast Asia', *NTS-Alert*, No. 2 (September 2008), p. 3.
[48] HREC, *Climate change and international security*, S113/08, 14 March 2008, p. 3.
[49] German Advisory Council on Global Change (WGBU), *World in transition: climate change as a security risk – Summary for Policy-makers*, WGBU Secretariat, 2007, p. 2.
[50] See United Nations Environment Programme, *Vital water graphics 2008*, UNEP 2008. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.unep.org/dewa/vitalwater/article95.html>.
[51] 'Strategic Policy Issues', *Strategic Survey*, Vol. 107, No. 1 (2007), p. 63.
[52] See Aaron T. Wolf, 'Shared waters: conflict and cooperation', *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, Vol. 32 (2007), pp. 241-69.
[53] UNESCAP, *State of the Environment in Asia and the Pacific*, ESCAP, 2006, p. 2. Other reports put the figure higher, closer to 700 million; see The Asia Society, *Asia's next challenge: securing the region's water future*, Asia Society, 2009, p. 7. The Consortium of NTS-Asia reports that since 1950, 'water availability per capita has already decreased by 60 per cent in North Asia and by 55 per cent in Southeast Asia'; 'Water security: issues and challenges in Southeast Asia', *NTS-Alert*, No. 2 (September 2008) p. 3.

sanitation.[54] For many millions of people, and particularly the poor, this has consequences for nutrition, for health and the disease burden and, increasingly, for who lives and who dies.

Climate Migration and Climate Refugees

The potential for large-scale migrations of people – both within countries and across borders – has been described as 'perhaps the most worrisome problem associated with rising temperatures and sea levels … [and one which] could easily trigger major security concerns and spike regional tension.'[55] The Report of the IPCC Working Group II suggests that as well as disruptions of human populations within states and across national borders in the region, sudden sharp spikes in rural to urban migration are likely in some countries with flow-on consequences for shortfalls in food production, rural poverty and urban unrest.[56] The causal chains about climate migration and security have so far 'rarely been substantiated with reliable evidence'.[57] As Preston et al. observe, 'although it is likely that climate change will ultimately force the displacement of some populations within the Asia/Pacific region, considerable uncertainty persists regarding the number of individuals that will be displaced, whether those displacements will drive internal or external migration, the extent to which human adaptation can reduce displacement'.[58] Neither Northeast Asia nor Southeast Asia is among the regions of most concern in terms of the geopolitical challenges of climate-induced migration identified in a 2007 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).[59] On the other hand, IISS reports that 'the Chinese military expects to have to … face refugee flows from Indonesia and the rest of Southeast Asia'.[60] And the MoD indicated, in its 2007 Strategic Trends analysis, that

[54] The problem for human security comes not just from water scarcity. An increase in precipitation and more frequent floods is likely to result in 'degraded water quality and [an increase in] water-borne infectious diseases such as dermatosis, cardiovascular disease and gastrointestinal disease'; see Wong Poh Poh, 'Climate change in the Asia Pacific region', presentation at the Global Climate Change workshop: building "consilience" between science, security and policy, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 14 July 2008. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/cens/events/pdf/14%20July%20Global%20Climate%20Change/Wong%20Poh%20Poh_Paper%20(ed).pdf>.
[55] Kurt M Campbell et al, *The age of consequences: the foreign policy and national security implications of global climate change*, Centre for Strategic and International Studies/Centre for a New American Security, 2007, p. 8.
[56] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. *Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability – contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 488.
[57] Ragnhild Nordås and Nils Petter Gleditsch, 'Climate change and conflict', *Political Geography* Vol. 26 (2007) p. 627.
[58] Benjamin L. Preston et al., *Climate change in the Asia /Pacific region: a consultancy report prepared for the Climate Change and Development Roundtable*, CSIRO Marine and Atmospheric Research, 2006, p. 49.
[59] Kurt M Campbell et al, *The age of consequences: the foreign policy and national security implications of global climate change*, Centre for Strategic and International Studies/Centre for a New American Security, 2007, p. 56.
[60] 'Strategic Policy Issues', *Strategic Survey*, Vol. 107, No. 1 (2007), p. 63.

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climate-related population displacement was a distinct possibility in the major East Asian archipelagos.[61]

Traditional security approaches to climate migration focus on pressures on or threat to states through internal displacement and trans-boundary movements of peoples. A human security perspective focuses on the vulnerabilities of those whose homes, livelihoods and lives are at risk from sea-level rises, desertification and loss of arable land, extreme weather events and disasters of nature. According to the Asian Development Bank, about 20 per cent of people in the world who will be affected by coastal flooding by 2100 live in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam.[62] The IPCC estimates that a 40 cm sea-level rise by 2080 could affect as many as 21 million people in Southeast Asia and the World Bank reports that up to 11 million people just in Vietnam alone could suffer from the impacts of a 1 metre sea-level rise.[63] But this does not necessarily translate into millions of people on the move. Migration is not the only response strategy to climate change: people may, for example, choose to stay in their communities and seek to adapt to the impacts of climate change, or they may choose to stay, accept the costs of climate change and do nothing.[64] Migration patterns are not always evidence of instability. Adger distinguishes displacement migration (or what we might call 'desperation migration') from circular or seasonal forms of migration (or what we might call 'adaptation migration') which could actually be a component of enhanced stability for communities.[65] In situations where migration is the only option, this can generate other human insecurities, including loss of income, loss of social capital, disruption to traditional coping mechanisms, and increased vulnerability for already marginalised groups including the poor, women and children.

Climate Security Strategies: Adaptation and Social Resilience

These three brief examples offer some insight into the ways in which a human security approach delivers a different understanding of the 'triggers' for climate conflict. It also helps to see environmental scarcity as something more than a material problem. As Webersik reminds us, 'scarcity of resources is …caused by failure of institutions, absence of state trust, economic inequalities, and lack of entitlements to access these resources'.[66] Human security approaches also have something to say about strategies for responding to climate insecurity in ways that will simultaneously enhance human security and reduce the

[61] *Global Strategic Trends 2007-2036*, 3rd edition, Ministry of Defence, Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2007, p. 29.
[62] ADB, *The economics of climate change in Southeast Asia: a regional review*, Manila: ADB, 2009, p. 51.
[63] Cited in Herminia A. Francisco, 'Adaptation to climate change: needs and opportunities in Southeast Asia', *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2008). p. 7.
[64] See, for example, Rafael Reuveny, 'Climate change induced migration and violent conflict', *Political Geography*, Vol. 26 (2007), pp. 656-73.
[65] See W. Neil Adger, 'Social and ecological resilience: are they related?', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2000), pp. 347-64.
[66] Christian Webersik, *Methodological pitfalls in addressing the link between environmental scarcity and violent conflict,* paper presented to Conference on Environmental Resources, Conflict, Co-operation and Governance, University of Bradford, 17–18 May 2000, p. 1.

potential for social violence and conflict. The expectation in more traditional models of climate security is that governments should work cooperatively to avoid the kinds of tensions that might result from intra- and inter-state competition for resources and access to environmental services and from cross-border challenges such as those associated with climate migration. In this more traditional approach, governments are also encouraged to prepare themselves for demands on their defence forces to protect borders against refugees, to protect strategic assets and supply lines, or to assist in cases of climate-related humanitarian crises or civil unrest. Certainly cooperative and multilateral approaches to climate change are essential – and preferable to the deployment of military capability. This focus on risk – the *probability* that a location will be affected by problems such as climate change – usually engenders efforts to mitigate or constrain the phenomenon that has the potential to cause harm.[67] Commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have been central to international political debate on climate change. But from both a human and traditional security perspective, it is now too late to rely on these mitigation strategies alone.

Reducing the potential for tension, conflict and social violence requires that a human security focus on vulnerability takes precedence over the traditional security focus on risk. Vulnerability encompasses 'the exposure of groups of people or individuals to stress as a result of the impacts of environmental change'.[68] From a traditional security perspective, it is those stresses that are the source of insecurity and help to define climate conflict 'hot spots'. From a human security perspective, those stresses are the result of insecurity. The complement to vulnerability, as Webersik points out, is social resilience and the 'capacity to adapt'.[69] This involves bolstering societies against threats,[70] and enhancing 'the ability of groups or communities to cope with stresses and disturbances as a result of social, political and environmental change'.[71] In effect, climate security needs to be 'human securitised'. Michael Clarke describes this as a move from geopolitics to biopolitics in which human and social resilience 'is a key building block to more sustainable [and secure] twenty-first century states'.[72]

Based on this human security approach, climate security should include the kinds of strategies that have the potential to increase individual adaptive capacity, build social resilience and save lives. Adaptation to the impacts of climate change can take a variety of forms – technological, behavioural, managerial and regulatory.[73] Adaptation efforts that support those who are most vulnerable to the social and economic consequences of

[67] See Susan E. Clark and Erica Chenoweth, 'The politics of vulnerability: constructing local performance regimes for homeland security', *Review of Policy Research*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2006) p. 96.
[68] W. Neil Adger, 'Social and ecological resilience: are they related?', *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2000), p. 348.
[69] Christian Webersik, *Methodological pitfalls in addressing the link between environmental scarcity and violent conflict,* paper presented to Conference on Environmental Resources, Conflict, Co-operation and Governance, University of Bradford, 17-18 May 2000, p.2.
[70] Michael Clarke, 'Introduction', *Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2007), p. 1.
[71] Adger, 'Social and ecological resilience', p. 347.
[72] Michael Clarke, 'Introduction', *Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2007), p. 1.
[73] IPCC, *Summary for policy-makers: Contribution of working group II*, p. 19.

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climate change can help to reduce human and societal vulnerability and increase resilience. More resilient societies are also those in which structures are in place to manage competition for resources and the displacement of people and this, in turn, can reduce the risk of unrest and social violence. In this way, adaptation and social resilience also serve the interests of the traditional security community in mitigating and managing conflict.

Adaptation alone, however, does not guarantee social and community resilience particularly if it relies on ‘top-down’ decision-making and technocratic responses. Focusing only on the macro-level ‘runs the risk of ignoring the concerns of the most vulnerable people’.[74] This presents a number of challenges for traditional security discourse and the community of practice as they address the security impacts of climate change. Climate security strategies for building social resilience need to be people-centred not just people-oriented. They need to be engaged with and responsive to the vulnerabilities and security needs of local communities. Traditional security, on the other hand, functions primarily at the level of the state and the international. Social resilience requires adaptation strategies and institutions that are inclusive and transparent.[75] Security policy, particularly when this is synonymous with defence policy, is traditionally closed and non-participatory. Social resilience and human security approaches also need to involve actors who are not usually included in either the development or the delivery of more traditional modes of security – non-governmental organisations, civil society, local governments, development agencies and a range of other regional and international organisations. Yet these challenges need to be addressed and overcomed, if people, communities, societies and states are to be more secure and more resilient in the face of climate change.

[74] Global Leadership for Climate Action, *Facilitating an international agreement*, p. 22.
[75] See Global Leadership for Climate Action, *Facilitating an international agreement*, GLCA, 2009, p. 22; Jan Smith and Janani Vivekananda, *A climate of conflict: the links between climate change, peace and war*, International Alert, 2007.

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Asia Security Initiative Policy Series
Working Paper No. 3
March 2010

Operationalising Regimes and Recognising Actors: Responding to Crises in Southeast Asia

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Abstract

Southeast Asia as a region has a unique history, and the evolving relationships between its communities, states, regional organisations and the international community reflect this. Given this context, there is a need to better understand the motivations of the actors in negotiations, to account for the finished agreement and its impact on the region both in the short and long terms. This paper investigates the motivations behind two regional responses in two different periods of time. The first case under investigation is the set of regional responses formulated to address the Indochinese exodus in the 1970s and 1980s. The second case under investigation is the regional response to those affected by Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar during the late 2000s and early 2010. Both of these agreements have been held up as historic and ground breaking achievements within the international relations of Southeast Asia. Firstly, this paper sets the scene by critically surveying some of the literature on regionalism and game theory. Secondly, this paper investigates the politics behind these bargaining agreements and assesses the structural and agency conditions that surrounded their formulation. Finally, this paper evaluates why these agreements are hailed as historic successes, and then assesses both responses in action. Through the investigation of these two agreements, this paper argues that agency in Southeast Asia was best reflected through the coordination of the regional association as demonstrated by the longer term implications of the Cyclone Nargis response. However, while this particular agreement offers an opportunity for a sustained trusting relationship with the stakeholders, it does not necessarily mean it can be replicated elsewhere but rather provides evidence of the actors' motivations and provides some policy recommendations to further ground the progress made to make such occurrences more likely to occur in the future.

Biography

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*The author would like to thank Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke for their constructive comments and helpful feedback. All errors remain his own. Please direct all comments to isdbcook@ntu.edu.sg

This Policy Series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment and discussion. The views expressed are entirely the author's own and not that of the RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies. The paper is the result of research conducted under the Asia Security Initiative programme on internal challenges supported by the MacArthur Foundation. Visit www.asicluster3.com to find out more about this initiative. More information on the work of the RSIS Centre for NTS Studies can be found at www.rsis.edu.sg/nts.

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Abbreviations and Glossary

ADDMER - ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response

AHA Centre - ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management

AHTF - ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force for the Victims of Cyclone Nargis

ARF – ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASEAN FMM – ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting

ASEAN SOM – ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting

CPA – Comprehensive Plan of Action

DALA – Damage and Loss Assessment

ERAT – ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team

ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross

ICIR – International Conference on Indochinese Refugees

IHL – International Humanitarian Law

IHRL – International Human Rights Law

MOU – Memorandum of Understanding

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

ODP – Orderly Departure Program

PMC – ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference

PONJA – Post-Nargis Joint Assessment

PONREPP - Post-Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan

TCG – Tripartite Core Group

UN – United Nations

UNDAC – UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

VTA – Village Tract Assessment

Policy Recommendations

Cooperation Across and Between Levels of Governance

- All regional states should ratify the Refugee Convention and Protocol to recognise refugees and ensure their protection to promote regional peace and security.

- Regional stakeholders should recognise their obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and make every effort to enshrine these in law at the national level.

- The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) should be built upon by formalising the member state financial and personnel contributions to the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) and run responses such as the ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT) to consolidate successes in the wake of Cyclone Nargis.

- Sustained efforts by all stakeholders in the current ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force for the Victims of Cyclone Nargis (AHTF) and Tripartite Core Group (TCG) to assist in capacity building at the community level to 'build back better' through the framework of the Post-Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan (PONREPP).

- Encourage all stakeholders to meet the financial needs of the recovery for those affected by Cyclone Nargis through PONREPP.

- Recognise the good offices of the ASEAN Secretariat, and in particular the role of the ASEAN Secretary-General, in leading and coordinating the regional mechanism to those affected by Cyclone Nargis and work towards further developing the roles of the ASEAN Secretariat and Secretary-General.

- Ensure that a comprehensive approach is taken to identify the stakeholders involved in situations of displacement and ensure their involvement in decision-making particularly vulnerable populations whose voice is oftentimes overlooked.

- Identify the most appropriate facilitator for negotiations of a given situation and provide them support in fostering greater understanding and trusting relationships between the stakeholders.

Introduction

This article analyses the policy responses of two situations, the Indochinese exodus and the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, and investigates the politics of bargaining entered into by stakeholders in the Southeast Asian region. It is an effort to evaluate both the structural and agency conditions that allow for the existence of particular agreements and whether they have any longer term effect on the international relations of Southeast Asia. Providing the conceptual and theoretical backdrop to this investigation is normative scholarship on regionalisation, game theoretical scholarship and issue linkage. Both responses to these two different crises were seen as historic achievements by those involved; then again, it should come as no surprise that vested interests sell the fruits of their labour positively. As a result, this investigation will as objectively as possible assess the role of stakeholders in the formulation and enactment of these bargaining agreements.

During the Indochinese exodus, stakeholders agreed to the Orderly Departure Program (ODP) and the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA). The latter agreement ensured respect for fundamental refugee protection norms, and is arguably one of the better examples of operationalising the refugee protection regime in the international system, and the best example of it in Southeast Asia. In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, stakeholders agreed to establish an ASEAN-led assistance mechanism, the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force (AHTF) and Tripartite Core Group (TCG), to respond to those displaced by the cyclone. These mechanisms have provided the first regionally led effective response to a natural disaster in Southeast Asia. It is in this vein that I investigate these two responses to evaluate whether they were successful in and of themselves, and whether they had any longer term implications.

At the beginning of 2010, Southeast Asia had three signatory states to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol – Cambodia, the Philippines and Timor Leste. However, before the 1979 CPA, there were no signatories in Southeast Asia. Sara Davies (2005, 2008) argues that the absence of Southeast Asian states from the negotiating process that established the global refugee regime and saw the emergence of the Refugee Convention determined the absence of Southeast Asian states. While customary international law and international refugee protection norms are well-established, their application in Southeast Asia has not been guaranteed.

The emergence of the ODP and the CPA ensured that the fundamental refugee protection norms were implemented in Southeast Asia, but for a specific aim and purpose. The aim and purpose was to manage the refugee flow from the Indochinese peninsula, both in the first wave in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the subsequent second wave in the 1980s. Indeed, this is not uncommon to other regions where the application of universal standards has been part of international bargaining, such as the Cartagena conference on Central American refugees. These international bargaining agreements have been initiated through the United Nations via multilateral processes. These *ad hoc* processes have attempted to address specific regional mass movement of refugees (Betts, 2009, 15). Ultimately the application of international refugee protection norms has been initiated through persuading concerned stakeholders that they have an interest in abiding by them.

In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis there was international outrage over the decision by the military government in Myanmar to heavily restrict or refuse international assistance to those affected by the cyclone. As a result of this, Surin Pitsuwan, the ASEAN Secretary-General initiated dialogue and worked with international actors and the military government to find common ground and ways for immediate humanitarian assistance to be delivered. The decision by Surin Pitsuwan to do this was grounded in the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), which at the time of the cyclone had not come into effect. This further highlighted the diplomatic skills of the ASEAN Secretary-General in leading a regional effort to find a solution for those affected by Cyclone Nargis.

The agreed international responses to the Indochinese exodus and Cyclone Nargis differed in many contextual ways, but taking a step back and analysing the structural and agency conditions that led to the responses to these two cases will illuminate some key characteristics of bargaining in the region and provide some insight into why one particular response did not lead to ongoing interaction but stopped at its mandate end, compared to the other response where political space appears to have offered continued interaction over not only the particular response but over longer term issues as well.

Before this article advances further it is important to define the concepts under consideration. This article utilises the definition of regime as espoused by Keohane and Nye (1989) that pushed for a simpler concept of regime, ‘regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations’. However, to operationalise the concept of regime I reflect the observations of Steven Krasner at the beginning of the 1982 *International Organisation* special issue; a regime is

> ‘a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations'. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice’ (Krasner, 1982, 2).

It is through this lens that this article investigates why some particular agreements affecting the displaced are effective and how these can be replicated in the future.

In much of the literature it is recognised that the international refugee protection regime favours the global North over the global South (Chimni 1998; Castles 2004). From the initial bargaining that took place in advance of the Refugee Convention, international refugee protection norms are framed to have three possible outcomes to protect refugees. These are

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voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement (UN 1951, 1967). However, these three outcomes are subject to intense scrutiny and debate between the stakeholders to a given refugee movement. In the next section I unravel the debates and framing actions of the concerned stakeholders to provide a theoretical basis for understanding the implementation of these international refugee protection norms.

Issue Linkage, Localisation and Civil Society

Issue Linkage

The Southeast Asian region has its own characteristics that define its interactions, which are mostly related to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and are consensus building and non-intervention in the internal affairs of a member state (ASEAN 1967, 2008). These regional developments offer competing norms for those associated with international refugee protection. This can be better understood through the tensions illustrated by Checkel (1999) and Florini (1996), where international norms are subject to both domestic political concerns and international agreements. The development of ASEAN has provided another level (regional) through which international norms have to gain acceptance before they can be implemented. Indeed, the regional association plays a gatekeeper's role, where Southeast Asian states frame their decisions within the regionally accepted norms. Admittedly, these regional norms are contested with the promotion of regional peace and security (ASEAN 1967, 2008), so the framing of displacement is a crucial one. This can be taken on by international organisations such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) or another stakeholder (state or civil society organisation) through public diplomacy.

In his recent book, Alexander Betts (2009) argues that smaller states are able to influence larger states if they can link the secondary concern of refugees to a primary concern such as security or trade. So not only are there stakeholder concerns of agency conditions but also concerns over structural conditions. It is through this framing role that one set of norms gains acceptance over another. Betts categorises this interaction as *inter-linkage.* However, the role of regional actors such as ASEAN can provide another avenue for the promotion of refugee protection norms, in addition to the public diplomacy of international organisations such as the UNHCR. *Inter-linkage* can go further in understanding the multiple actors involved in the refugee regime. The numerous actors involved at the local, regional, international and non-governmental level are all stakeholders with their particular interests.

Through the notion of *inter-linkage* Betts operationalises the international refugee protection regime through a suasion game analogy whereby one (weaker) actor 'A' (such as the global South) has a dominant strategy to cooperate, that the other (stronger) one 'B' (such as the global North) can exploit, *or* one (stronger) actor 'B' has a dominant strategy to defect and the other (weaker) actor 'A' must cooperate to avoid an even worse outcome (Betts, 2009, 32). The weaker actor's preferred strategy is to cooperate – either because non-cooperation is not practically viable or because it would lead to even greater costs. The stronger actor, however, is in a position to choose to defect, and that is likely to be its preferred position

(Betts, 2009, 33). In the context of Southeast Asia, it is important to recognise that as a developing region and in the post-1997 Asian Financial Crisis world, it has nuanced differences with other global South regions, a reason why this article focuses only on this particular region; it has an increasingly important international economic role but also remains in close proximity to areas of conflict and natural disaster, two salient factors of displacement.

Betts recognises that the existence of structural conditions such as relevance to the stakeholders does not necessarily translate into concern of the stakeholders. Betts purports that 'cross-issue persuasion depends on the existence of a structural relationship between issue areas. But the existence of these structural interconnections is an insufficient condition for the substantive linkages to influence the behaviour of Northern states. In addition to requiring a structural basis, cross-issue persuasion also requires agency. Which actors influence behaviour depends upon the agency of these actors' (Betts, 2009, 180). Essentially, he argues that without an actor framing a given situation, the states concerned either do not recognise the issue as one of concern or have yet to be convinced otherwise. As a result, the actions of a given actor (UNHCR or ASEAN Regional Forum for example) have been important in altering, drawing on, or simply recognising and effectively communicating substantive issue linkages to persuade other actors to change their behaviour (Betts, 2009, 180). That said, the UNHCR knew it had limited influence and that it could not force Southeast Asian states to comply with international legal mechanisms they were not signatories to (Davies, 2005, 170).

However, while the role of issue framer is significant, it is not a sufficient condition. In other words, public diplomacy by one actor, without structural conditions, is simply not enough to convince states to alter their behaviour. Analytically, institutions can be significant in two respects: they may be more or less effective, and they may be more or less robust (or resilient) (Hansclever et al, 1997, 2). However, the UNHCR has been able to change or recognise and effectively communicate substantive issue linkages: institutional design, an epistemic role, argumentation, and the provision of information (Betts, 2009, 180), i.e. the framing tools that align the interests of refugee producing states, refugee recipient states and resettlement states. However, it is important to note that while a particular issue linkage is important in advancing and responding to protection issues for displaced populations it needs to be tempered with considerations of expediency. In other words, the kind of framing that may appeal to the immediate issue of protection for one group of displaced persons may have wider and longer term implications that undermine the regime.

In the case of the issue framer, the actor identifies *common interests* between the relevant stakeholders. It is important to note that *common interests* do not assume that actors' interests are identical. It is highly unlikely that two states will have identical interests; they can be broadly similar but *common interests* are not necessarily identical at one time, or indeed, the issue linkage may not necessarily be the same. For example, the reason why one particular state adheres to regime norms can be different from why another does so. In this sense I deviate from what Hansclever et al argue '…it is not interests (preferences over

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outcomes) that are adjusted when states cooperate, but policies (preferences over actions). Consequently, the means that states employ to help them realise these common interests do not (or need not) change those interests' (Hansclever et al, 1997, 32). Also, from my reading of it, there is a belief here that interests are not adjusted when states cooperate, i.e. when two states cooperate on one given area, one state can reframe another issue or causally link it to the area of cooperation, thus altering the state's perception and understanding of their interest in pursuing a given policy. In other words, the reason a state adheres to regime norms may vary over time. Simply put, a state may enter a regime for one reason and subsequently realise that they are adhering to the norms for another.

Localisation

The way in which international norms are implemented rests on their acceptability by the stakeholders concerned. On localisation, Acharya (2004) rightly recognises the agency role of local actors in performing, framing and grafting norms. However, as argued earlier in this article, the agency function should not be exclusively assigned to any one actor – local, regional or international. The role of norm entrepreneur is contingent upon stakeholders, whether individual personalities or those operating within an organisation. In other words, the importance of understanding internal dynamics of actors, such as the role of Chairperson at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in agenda setting, needs to be highlighted. Acharya points to Keck and Sikkink (1998) who argue that norm displacement occurs when an external norm attempts to replace a local norm through moral superiority or when greater efficiency has already been internally tested. However, it fails when an internal norm is stronger and/or untested. If a norm entrepreneur finds that it can adapt and co-opt the local norm, then it succeeds (Acharya, 2004, 247). While this argument from Acharya and its application in Southeast Asia has some significance, it appears that there is an assumption that localisation only occurs at the regional level rather than at the state or sub-state level.

Acharya (2004) locates the challenge of normative scholarship as the need to shift the balance of international/external norm entrepreneurs to be contested by national/local level norm entrepreneurs. It can even be a combination of both external and internal norm entrepreneurs working towards a similar outcome but through different histories that can fuel the transition to creative normative shifts. Acharya cites Osborne (1990) to say that in Southeast Asia, society utilises 'foreign ideas to suit their own needs and values'. This could well be part of the case but the norm also needs to be responsive to all those the regime governs if it stands any chance of having a long term impact. In fact, this is where the limitation of the Orderly Departure Program (ODP), the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA), ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force (AHTF), and the Tripartite Core Group (TCG) agreements come into play. While these are examples of effective bargain agreements, they were ultimately only operational for a specific period of time and mandate, and did not necessarily signal a tangible, longer term shift in normative compliance.

The ODP and CPA included the United States, which had strategic interests in maintaining a presence in Southeast Asia, and this was dove-tailed with humanitarian concerns both in the United States as well as other resettlement states like Canada; Vietnam, which had an interest in legitimising its new government and its *doi moi* policies as well as gaining access to significant development aid; and the first asylum states which, in exchange for hosting and recognising the refugees, were able to ensure they would only be temporary populations and their international image would be better as a result of them demonstrating compassion. This last point about international image is a weak but noticeable variable in persuasion of the first asylum states. Ultimately, as the Cold War drew to a close, and the refugee flows took on a new character, 'compassion fatigue' set in, losing US and other resettlement nations' interest because the movement of people began to be seen as illegal economic migration, an implication that brought about the concluding arrangements of the CPA without leaving anything in its place. While the UNHCR remained to observe returning populations, once its mandate for such activities was concluded, its operating space also disappeared. As there was no 'localisation' as Acharya (2004) refers to it, the norms of non-refoulement and burden-sharing simply ended. As part of the CPA there was limited interaction over local capacity building in this regard.

For an international norm to really be localised there needs to be evidence of it at the national or local level. Ultimately this is why when the CPA was concluded, without the significant transfer of the norms to other levels of governance, these norms were disengaged. In the aftermath of the CPA and without it being truly localised, the protection norms simply concluded at the end of the agreement. We can see this through UNHCR assessments, which constantly refer to capacity building, and its lobbying for refugee protection norms to be enacted into national and local legislation. Even the Philippines, which has signed the Refugee Convention, still does not have sufficient domestic legislation to adequately implement its norms. However, this case study is compared to the agreement made after Cyclone Nargis to access and protect those displaced. While it is always difficult to compare with an ongoing and evolving situation, there are already noticeable differences in how the cooperation achieved after the cyclone has dove-tailed into wider issues of concern that were highlighted as a result of the post-cyclone disaster response.

Considering these approaches allows the reader to better understand and explain how complex bargain agreements are made to implement norms such as refugee protection and humanitarian assistance norms. Through these case studies the reader can see the complex relationship between actors and the roles that each of them plays in operationalising these norms at the theoretical and practical levels. To further elucidate these, this article will evaluate and analyse the ODP and CPA, and subsequently the evolving relationship of the AHTF and TCG.

The Indochinese Exodus: Bargaining the Orderly Departure Program and Comprehensive Plan of Action

During the formulation of the ODP and CPA, the most significant UN agency for the Indochinese refugees, the UNHCR, had to meander its way through many obstacles. The UNHCR faced government regulation, confrontations between different political actors, and was backed by a mandate that had not been signed by majority of the affected states.[1] The

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ability of UN agencies to operate in all kinds of territories is paramount to the success of the organisation. Unravelling the relationship between stakeholders in the region, and determining the effects these ultimately had on the promotion of refugee protection norms will show the successes and challenges that the regime faces.

Prior to the CPA, there were some important developments in the treatment of refugees in Southeast Asia; for example, the issuing of identity cards in Thailand. However, these developments were not grounded in law and were *ad hoc* arrangements illustrating the fragility of the international refugee protection regime in Southeast Asia (Chang-Muy, 1991, 1177). Thus an analysis of how the bargaining process works is important to demonstrate regime robustness. There was a reliance on the non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector to assist and protect refugees while *ad hoc* arrangements were considered and worked out. This stems from the regional and international impression that the cause of the first wave of refugees was largely a result of American foreign policy, and ongoing rivalry between China, the USA and the USSR, with the responsibility and ultimate solution in American hands in 1975. However, by 1978 the *Hai Hong* affair – the *Hai Hong* ship was docked off the Malaysian coast for nine days in a standoff with the Malaysian government, who refused the refugees on board entry – mobilised international action and saw the emergence of a regional *quid pro quo* of permanent resettlement for first asylum. The Canadian government offered to resettle 600 of the 2,450 refugees on board the ship. This policy later became known as the 'open door for an open shore' policy. The Canadian strategy was not only a humanitarian one but also in solidarity with the United States (Robinson, 2000, 139).

The policy change by the Southeast Asian governments came in 1979 when Mahathir Mohammad, then deputy prime minister of Malaysia, announced that refugees in Malaysia would be expelled and those seeking to enter in future would be shot if they ignored warnings to go away (Osborne, 1980, 49).[2] Mahathir Mohammed warned that people would drown if they tried to sink their boats in Malaysian waters in hope of rescue (Stone and McGowan, 1980, 43). Only after this announcement was there enough outrage from Western nations and the international community to demand immediate international action (Shawcross 1979, 5). The outrage against Mahathir Mohammad's comments reverberated around the world; the Malaysian government sought to alter the statement. At the time there were 50,897 refugees in Malaysian camps at Pulau Tengah, Pulau Besar, Pulau Bidong, Kota Baru, Kuatan, Sabah, Sarawak, and a transit centre (Stone and McGowan, 1980, 43). The reaction came at the same time as the lobbying of the UN by the then prime minister of UK, to host an international conference on Indochinese refugees and displaced persons in Southeast Asia. The crisis arose out of the refusal of these two states to allow entry to any more refugees and their new policy of forced push backs (Stein, 1979, 717).

The roles of the UN, UNHCR and NGOs faced many challenges during this period, given that the UNHCR had many and competing roles in refugee protection, refugee status determination and repatriation (Nichols and White, 1993, 70). These roles depended on where they operated in Southeast Asia and reflected their relationship with individual governments (Nichols and White, 1993, 25). However, within these constraints, these stakeholders provided assistance to both the first asylum states and the international community. They drew international attention to the Indochinese exodus through both humanitarianism and human rights promotion in the region and internationally. Their roles evolved alongside the regional normative evolution from non-intervention towards intervention in the Indochinese exodus. To map the evolution of these roles it is important to analyse the interactions of the stakeholders throughout the period and reflect on what the two international conferences on the Indochinese exodus achieved.

While a previous attempt to discuss the Indochinese exodus in 1978 failed, the 1979 international conference on refugees and displaced persons in Southeast Asia succeeded. The conference ensured that there was further burden-sharing of the refugee cases in Southeast Asia. The agreement spelt out how to proceed, although no formal agreement was signed at the international conference; the international community was clear as to how it was going to approach the situation. A report from the UN Secretary-General summed up the discussion:

- It was agreed that resettlement should proceed on a larger and faster scale. Worldwide resettlement pledges increased from 125,000 in May 1979 to 260,000 for 1979 and 1980. The United States doubled its monthly quota from 7,000 to 14,000 for an annual figure of 168,000.

- The government of Vietnam gave assurances that it would 'cooperate with UNHCR in expanding the present seven-point program designed to bring departures within orderly and safe channels'. This was in reference to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by UNHCR and Vietnam on 30th May 1979, which spelled out steps for the orderly departure from Vietnam of 'family reunion and other humanitarian cases'.

- The governments of Indonesia and the Philippines each pledged to establish regional processing centres to help move refugees more quickly on to resettlement. The site in the Philippines was to hold 50,000 refugees and the Indonesian site 10,000.

- New pledges to UNHCR totalled about $160 million in cash and in kind. This far exceeded the amount UNHCR had received for Indochinese programmes since 1975.

- 'Finally,' noted the report from the Secretary-General, 'the general principles of asylum and non-refoulement were endorsed' (Robinson, 2000, 53-4).

The significance of the agreement is that resettlement states such as Australia, Canada, France and the United States significantly increased resettlement opportunities. This was particularly noteworthy after the *Hai Hong* affair, when Canada agreed to take 25 per cent

instead of its usual informal quota of 10 per cent of the refugees, and received the Nansen Medal eventually, for its initiatives in breaking the sticking points around an agreement to respond to the Indochinese exodus. Under the second initiative, the UNHCR brokered a deal with the Hanoi government to organise an ODP. Under the 1979 agreement, Vietnam took an active stance against those refugees fleeing clandestinely but allowed them to exit in a legitimate fashion for resettlement in the West (Aldrich, 1986, 296). Vietnam agreed 'that for a reasonable period of time it will make every effort to stop illegal departures' (Stein, 1979, 718). The ODP provided exit visas to applicants through the UNHCR. These applicants were then flown to a recipient state where they remained in processing centres until they were resettled. Resettlement states agreed to take those refugees in the camps in advance of their arrival at the recipient states' camps (Aldrich, 1986, 296). Most important was the agreement that non-refoulement and asylum were assured so long as the resettlement states kept their promise of doubling resettlement opportunities to approximately 250,000 refugees (Stein, 1979, 718).

The 1979 agreement reached in Geneva helped the international community to manage the humanitarian situation in Southeast Asia but also attempted to stem the tide of refugees flowing out of the Indochinese peninsula (Helton, 1989, 25). With the mechanisms in place to cope with the exodus, a new era was ushered in for the Indochinese refugees. One of the main omissions from the conference was the question of where refugees who sought asylum in regional recipient states would go if they were not resettled internationally. At the beginning of the 1980s the international community found that the exodus was to have a second wave. As a result of the Vietnamese economic crisis in 1986, there was an upsurge of the outflow of people, which brought about the hosting of another international conference.

No sooner had the 1979 agreement been made than its inconsistencies became apparent; Western states were pressuring the Soviet bloc to allow anyone wishing to leave while at the same time pressing Vietnam to prevent unsanctioned departures (Osborne, 1980, 52) and provide a regularised and orderly departure programme. The programme assisted in reducing the number of unauthorised departures of Vietnamese refugees significantly. While Hanoi was accused of overzealous implementation of the new agreement in stopping illegal boat departures, the implementation of the programme ensured that departure numbers decreased. Departures fell from 56,941 in June 1979 to 17,839 in July and then to 9,734 in August of the same year, and subsequently non-orderly refugee departures averaged only 2,600 per month. The recipient states were persuaded by the initial ODP success in reducing the number of boat people arriving on their shores and by the large increase in resettlement opportunities offered by the West (Robinson, 2000, 58). As the bargain agreement began to ring true, the regional recipient states adhered to the international refugee regime norm of non-refoulement.

However, the agreement suffered with an imminent threat of breakdown, which was the increasing reluctance from the resettlement states to acknowledge that there were still genuine refugees pouring out of Indochina and the Vietnamese suspension of its ODP to the USA (Helton, 1990, 114). Western commentary focused on the refugees as economic migrants than genuine refugees. It was during the last years of the ODP that the Ford Foundation sponsored a seminar in Thailand in May 1988, bringing together all the stakeholders to share their experiences. The meeting was scheduled to take place in advance of the regular ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (ASEAN SOM) and before it, a meeting of the ASEAN working group on Indochinese Refugees was held. The various recommendations were forwarded to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (ASEAN FMM) in Bangkok and the subsequent discussion between ASEAN and their 'dialogue partners' at the 21st ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) (Jambor, 1992, 25).

During the conference, ASEAN foreign ministers issued a statement calling for the convening of an International Conference on Indochinese Refugees at the ministerial level under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General in 1989 to formulate a new Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, which was subsequently endorsed (ASEAN 1988). The process of instigating the conference is characteristic of how many agendas are formulated but most significantly in Southeast Asia where informal dialogue forms a large part of interstate interactions. The costs of securing temporary asylum in Southeast Asian states without addressing the underlying causes of the exodus finally came to push the international refugee regime to its limits.

The aim of the second International Conference on Indochinese Refugees (ICIR) was to provide a 'region-wide refugee status determination' to consolidate and coordinate the international response to the exodus and to find a solution to the seemingly perpetual nature of the exodus (Helton, 1990, 116).[3] The CPA document included cooperation from Vietnam as well as the good offices of UNHCR to train and provide assistance to those recipient states that needed it (Bari, 1992, 487). The UNHCR was also given a supervisory role in the agreement reached, which ensured that there was an international presence in the revised process (Bari, 1992, 488). The main difference between the two conferences was that the first dealt with the outflow of refugees and their resettlement, whereas the second focused on the root causes of the exodus. The second conference came at a time when major international changes, such as the liberalisation of Vietnam's economic policy and engagement with external development assistance, made it possible to focus on root causes.

The second conference happened after Vietnam decided to pursue *doi moi* economic reforms in 1986 and also moved toward the decision to withdraw from Cambodia. These changes in intrastate and inter-state policy opened the way for addressing root causes, something that was not possible in the circumstances of 1979. International leaders hoped that the second conference would bring an end to the exodus and fulfil the provisions of the international agreements. The CPA was designed as a compromise agreement between the producer, recipient and resettlement states (Bronee, 1993, 535). The main CPA objectives were:

- to prevent organised clandestine departures
- to encourage and promote regular departure procedures and migration programmes
- to maintain guarantees of first asylum
- to establish region-wide consistent refugee status determination procedures
- to continue resettlement of Vietnamese refugees, long-stayers as well as those newly determined to be refugees
- to repatriate rejected asylum seekers to Vietnam (Bronee, 1993, 540)

The CPA brought a regional dynamic to the international refugee regime for the Southeast Asian region. It ensured that there were some modifications to the operational role of the UNHCR as well as the regional refugee regime more generally. The Southeast Asian states agreed upon regional standards in response to the refugee determination procedures and to guarantee first asylum for the Vietnamese. There was a standard imposed after a specific cut-off date, which brought some semblance of consistency. Alongside these regional standards, the role of the UNHCR was expanded to work inside the producer state (Vietnam) to observe the return of those not deemed officially-sanctioned refugees (Helton, 1993, 557). While the CPA arrangements in place were notably successful, their implementation was inconsistent and found as many advocates as critics of the new arrangements.

The CPA for the first time brought the international refugee regime to Southeast Asia and even involved the UNHCR in the returning of those not deemed refugees, and it assigned the UN High Commissioner for Refugees a special role.[4] This arrangement was established in the MOU between the UNHCR and Vietnam, which established that the Hanoi government would ensure that the voluntary repatriation from first asylum states was with dignity and conformed to national and international laws (Bari, 1992, 502).

What the two international conferences, the ODP and the CPA, did was to ensure the continuation of the international refugee regime in a form that was agreeable to all stakeholders. While the applicability of the CPA was time-bound, there were significant experiences that the UNHCR, Southeast Asian states and the international community reflect on when providing and protecting subsequent refugee flows. Indeed, the CPA was noted by the Secretary-General as the first attempt to provide a 'consistent region-wide refugee status determination process to be conducted in accordance with national law and internationally accepted practice' (Helton, 1990, 118). As the West grows increasingly wary of resettlement as a suitable solution for refugees it appears that containment strategies will abound and that regional agreements will be brokered. With this in mind this article draws attention to the role of ASEAN as another actor that can both influence and be a forum for influence by others that will assist those displaced. The strength of a regime lies in its ability to morph into local contexts, allowing assistance and protection to continue in ways that may not always be optimal but does offer those displaced, assistance and protection.

Post-Cyclone Nargis: The ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force and Tripartite Core Group

Before Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, at the beginning of May 2008, the poor flow of information between those who worked inside the country and those based outside ensured that there was little understanding of the situation within Myanmar.[5] At the political and official level, the military regime had reduced ICRC's access to those affected, which resulted in ICRC scaling their activities down in 2006. The internally displaced had limited access to relief assistance because the military regime imposed restrictions on and closely monitored the movement of NGOs (TBBC, 2005, 60). However, while there were restrictions placed on NGOs, some agencies managed to continue to access populations of concern. An example of this is the UNHCR's western border effort, which started with the Rohingya repatriation to Northern Rakhine State from Bangladesh and continues as an integration mission. Most recently, with the focus on preparing for elections, the military government has 'made some overtures to the Muslim residents of Northern Rakhine state, suggesting their legal status may be improved'. As a result, the UNHCR has significantly expanded its activities in education, health and infrastructure (UNHCR 2010).

The UNHCR's involvement was the result of a 1993 MOU involving the UNHCR, the military regime and the Bangladeshi government, with funding from Western donor nations. Previous bilateral efforts in the late 1970s were unsuccessful and were met with widespread international condemnation (Barnett 2000). This agreement allowed the UNHCR access to the refugee population to determine the voluntary nature of their return (Abrar, 1995, 38). Since the voluntary repatriation the UNHCR operation on the western border has focused on Rohingya integration. This operation remains *ad hoc* and reliant on interpersonal relationships between the UN and government officials. It is through this informal channel that the UNHCR has created a political space for itself in Myanmar, which laid the groundwork for some limited access to populations of concern.

However, it is important to note that this operation's *ad hoc* nature ensures that UNHCR activities are contained to a specific area and population. This example demonstrates that there are three identifiable constraints for a regime stakeholder to gain access to a population of concern in Myanmar. The first constraint is an agency's ability to persuade the government that it is the right agency for the job. In this case the UNHCR was positioned as a facilitator between the host and recipient states in the 1993 MOU thus allowing it to utilise its public diplomacy function and promote a trusting relationship with the governments. The previous bilateral efforts were no longer an option for Bangladesh as it sought to avoid international criticism, although recent efforts have seen bilateral agreements between the two governments return regarding the Rohingya in 2010. The second constraint was the availability of funds from donor governments. Without these funds the UNHCR would not operate along the western border. The third constraint is the maintenance of relations between the UNHCR and military officials. These personal relationships between

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government and UN officials ensure access to the population of concern and underline the importance of agency conditions in persuading regime actors to adopt core principles.

The internal dynamics of the state show that international actors face significant constraints in promoting international norms. Through the example of the UNHCR experience along the western border, three constraints emerge: gatekeeper acceptance, a role carried by the UNHCR so long as the other stakeholders continue to recognise this role, continued funding through multiple avenues, and the continuation of good personal relationships between international actors and military officials. If these constraints are met, then the international actors are able to access the population of concern. However, this political space is limited to a specific population of concern and it is unlikely that the political space will be consolidated nationally.

More recently in 2008, in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, there have been more significant developments in the realm of humanitarian assistance, the one area in which the global North is formally engaged in Myanmar under the current sanctions regime. In the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, the initial response of the military regime in Myanmar was to perceive itself as capable of responding to the immediate humanitarian needs of its affected population and to block and delay international aid. However, these efforts proved to do little to alleviate the suffering of those directly affected by the Cyclone (Abramovitz and Pickering, 2008).

However, in the wake of ASEAN diplomacy through the recommendations of the ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT) and based upon the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), the military regime, United Nations and ASEAN agreed to establish the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force (AHTF) and the Tripartite Core Group (TCG), which promote international cooperation and understanding between the military regime and international actors wanting to offer humanitarian assistance. This was initially achieved through the dispatch of ASEAN-ERAT, which consisted of sending medical teams from ASEAN member states to the affected delta areas alongside a government medical team and the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team (ASEAN 2008). Both, the AHTF and TCG groups were established at the 19 May 2008 ASEAN FMM in Singapore, which was shortly followed by a fundraising conference, immediately kick-starting the new mechanism into practice through the 25 May 2008 ASEAN-UN International Pledging Conference in Yangon. The AHTF, which was mandated to provide policy decisions and set priorities and targets, comprised 20 high-level and senior officials from ASEAN member states whereas the TCG was to oversee day-to-day operations. The TCG initially agreed to conduct a Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) on 31 May 2009 to determine the full scale of devastation and the immediate, medium and long term needs of those affected. The key findings of the PONJA Report were:

- More than half of the households living in the most affected townships lost all food stocks.
- While more than half the households reported that they were able to secure food from local markets, this did not preclude their dependence on humanitarian assistance.
- More than 65 per cent of households surveyed reported health problems among household members during early June 2008; mostly, colds, fevers, and diarrhoea.
- 50 to 60 per cent of schools were destroyed or damaged; further limits were placed as they were used for other purposes post-Cyclone.
- Vulnerable groups faced severe challenges including loss of official documents, making it difficult to secure assistance and restart lives; an inflow of male workers added to the gender imbalance created by the cyclone and increased vulnerabilities of women; and potential to engage in high-risk occupations to secure a living (ASEAN 2009).

Following the PONJA report launch at the ASEAN FMM in Singapore on 21 July 2008, the TCG began conducting a series of periodic assessments called Periodic Reviews and Social Impact Monitoring, reflecting quantitative and qualitative methods respectively, to document overall progress towards meeting the goals of emergency relief and recovery efforts (ASEAN 2009). The first Periodic Review was carried out six months after the cyclone. The key findings of the first Periodic Review highlighted that the pre-existing social issues before the cyclone were ongoing; access to healthcare and outreach into communities was good, although there were challenges to the functioning of the healthcare system itself; food aid had reached every survey community, although food insecurity existed around Yangon; many households remained in inadequate shelters; there was improved water security in the immediate term but potential insecurity during the medium term as a result of households using more surface water in the dry season; livelihoods were disrupted and will need long term investment to create sustainable economic growth; and the geographical reach of aid and outreach was not sufficient (ASEAN 2009). These findings mapped out the shorter and longer term challenges facing affected communities and provided a clearer indication of the direction needed to progress on these issues. The PONJA was also unprecedented in that it was the first post-natural disaster assessment conducted under a regional mechanism, the TCG. The PONJA report was prepared by the government of Myanmar, ASEAN and the UN with the support of humanitarian and development organisations (ASEAN 2008b).

The fifth meeting of the AHTF in January discussed progress made on humanitarian assistance, recommendations for the mechanism including mandate extension. As a result of the meeting, the TCG launched the Post-Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan (PONREPP) on 9 February 2009 which provides for the transition from emergency relief to

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longer term recovery. The PONREPP was launched in advance of the ASEAN FMM at the 14th annual ASEAN Summit at Cha-am, Thailand on 27 February 2009, where foreign ministers agreed to extend the AHTF and TCG mandate until July 2010 (ASEAN 2009). One of the significant outcomes of the PONREPP was that in order to maintain the UN cluster system, it was reconfigured into three Delta Working Groups – Basic Services (health, water and sanitation and hygiene, education, and nutrition); Livelihood (economic, personal and food security); and Social and Physical Protection (protection of vulnerable groups, environment, shelter and disaster risk reduction) (ASEAN 2009). These three groups largely fall respectively within the immediate, medium and long term concerns of those affected, and again show that there is significant influence from each of the TCG stakeholders. Subsequently the TCG organised a Post-Nargis and Regional Partnership Conference, which was held on 25 November 2009 in Bangkok and generated US$88 million in financial support pledges for the one-year implementation of the PONREPP (ASEAN 2008c); this was in order to keep to the TCG mandate due to expire in July 2010.

The Periodic Review was initiated by the TCG as a process of assessing, monitoring and reporting on people's needs and the situation in the affected areas. Together with earlier assessments, such as the Village Tract Assessment (VTA) and the Damage and Loss Assessment (DALA), the Periodic Review provided a powerful tool to inform stakeholders of the situation on the ground with those affected so they can tailor their activities according to needs at the household level, whether it be European financial assistance or local providers (ASEAN 2010). The Periodic Review II found that significant progress was made, but the immediate post-disaster efforts were focused on returning conditions to pre-cyclone conditions, and that such conditions were weak and needed strengthening. It also revealed that efforts should focus on the longer-term challenge of 'building back better'. The Periodic Review II laid the groundwork in providing recovery and sustaining the momentum towards successfully addressing longer-term challenges (ASEAN 2008c).

While the TCG mechanism to promote cooperation and understanding in the wake of Cyclone Nargis continues to produce results, it is important to recall previous experiences of other international agencies. The UNHCR operations on the western border in Myanmar is an example suggesting that while access to those affected by Cyclone Nargis in the delta region would be gained, there are three constraints on this partnership continuing. These constraints are the continuance of ASEAN as the gatekeeper or facilitator; continued funding by donor states, and the maintenance of good personal relationships between Myanmar, ASEAN and the UN.

On one level, ASEAN and the international community need to be involved to work with the military regime in Pyinmana to make progress on community level issues. At this level ASEAN and the international community can provide a coordinated policy towards encouraging the greater participation of the international and regional community to recognise, develop and implement policy towards the most vulnerable populations in Myanmar. On the other level the international community needs to develop policies that will foster greater international cooperation towards the most vulnerable in Myanmar and

recognise the limitations and the incremental nature of ASEAN's policymaking process. The most plausible avenue at present is to build on the progress of the TCG, to continue its work in the delta region of Myanmar. Indeed, at present, it appears that the stakeholders in the TCG have discovered their positions of responsibility in emergency disaster response and longer term community capacity building. Ultimately the TCG will have achieved its mandate, nothing more, and nothing less.[6] However, the knock-on effects of the successful conclusion of the TCG and the shift from emergency response to longer term community capacity building is an area where ASEAN is well placed to facilitate and build on its successful experience of coordination during the post-Cyclone Nargis recovery phase.

Conclusion

This article has sought to develop and nuance regime theory to better account for domestic political concerns in operationalising regime norms in different scenarios, and also other agents of change such as civil society. Through the case studies of responses to the Indochinese exodus and Cyclone Nargis, this article has demonstrated that the bargaining process is complex and multifaceted, yet with the use of issue-linkage or framing of a given situation, regime norms can be implemented or upheld. It demonstrated that while the role of regional and international stakeholders is of great significance, the internal dynamics of the state and civil society cannot be overlooked, and to do so is to rule out the ability to identify the persuasion agent. Through a brief survey of the regime literature this article highlighted the conflation of the terms localism and regionalism, where the literature weighs heavily on a top-down approach rather than a balanced view that accounts for internal dynamics and civil society. This article understands regionalism as the intersection of global and local, where states begin a journey of regional self-discovery, common interest and issue linkage in regimes. Additionally this article highlighted a key difference between the two agreements under investigation. It demonstrated that while both agreements are largely seen as a success *per se*, the CPA was not able to dove-tail continued engagement in the longer term under those conditions, whereas the work of the AHTF and TCG have positioned the regionally led mechanism well to continue engagement with the stakeholders involved.

It was the aim of this article to provide a useful critique of regime theory and provide two case studies to investigate the dynamics of the bargaining agreements to illustrate how agreement is formed and operationalises assistance to and protection of those displaced. Another aim was to analyse and better understand the structural and agency conditions of the bargaining arrangements and why, on the one hand, both are seen as historic achievements, but on the other, only one has created political space to continue interaction under similar conditions. Indeed, what these cases have shown is that the agency condition of the regional organisation, ASEAN, was insignificant in the first case whereas in the second case it was much stronger and provided the agency necessary to mediate the needs of those displaced with national political considerations of member states and considerations of the international community and civil society. Indeed, the increase in ASEAN agency during the humanitarian response to Cyclone Nargis is summarised well in the words of Chavarat Charnvirakul, the Thai Minister of the Interior,

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> 'ASEAN's continued journey to creating a caring and sharing ASEAN community by the year 2015, exemplified through the collective response to the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis which may be seen as a successful demonstration of the benefits of closer cooperation, broader integration and multi-stakeholder partnerships...' (ASEAN 2009a).

Above all, the significance of this comparison highlights the growing agency of ASEAN in Southeast Asia to provide an avenue of cooperation. However, it is important to remember the limitations of this comparison; it is a comparison of only two regional, albeit the most significant, responses in Southeast Asia to a regional human security issue. As a result, we must be clear about what we can take away from this. Both case studies highlighted the contentious issue of national sovereignty, but the former case study focused on cross border issues whereas the latter focused on capacity building at the community level. Indeed, this difference can be attributed to the success of the latter and failure of the former to provide an ongoing forum for collaboration and exchange on the particular issue. This comparison also highlighted the importance of regional agency in negotiating agreements with all stakeholders on issues of concern. In response to Cyclone Nargis, the regional level provided the facilitation needed to ensure assistance to and protection of the affected population, and this provides significant lessons for future negotiations in Southeast Asia.

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[1] The UNHCR had a non-operational presence in the first asylum states and its programmes were implemented by government partners and NGOs (CGUS, 1979, 16).
[2] The reason for such statements was the overriding racial tension in Malaysia. As the majority of the Indochinese refugees were ethnic Chinese there was a fear that moves to locally integrate the refugees would promote tension between the ethnic Chinese community and the ethnic Malays. During this time the Malay population constituted 47 per cent of the population and formed the largest group; the ethnic Chinese constituted 34 per cent and formed its second largest group (Stubbs, 1980, 118).
[3] While this was the aim of the conference through the CPA, procedures differed significantly from first asylum state to first asylum state (Nichols and White 1993, 172).
[4] High Commissioner Hocke was appointed at the United Nations Secretary-General's special representative to Vietnam which included duties such as overseeing the repatriation of the failed asylum seekers.
[5] Interview with UN official, 17 March 2010.
[6] Interview with UN official, 17 March 2010.