Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Need for Joint Counter-Terrorism Frameworks
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EBSCO HOST

Need for Flexible and Adaptive Counter-Terrorism Policies

The November issue features three articles highlighting the need for flexible and adaptive counter-terrorism frameworks. In the digital age, rigid and bureaucratic models of counter-terrorism slow the pace of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) interventions while giving an edge to violent extremist groups. As such, contemporary counter-terrorism policies should focus on gendered-specific roles, qualitative changes in terrorist-landscapes of different conflict theatres and evolving tactics by violent-extremist groups.

In the lead article, **Ryamizard Ryacudu** underscores the need for intelligence sharing, coordination and joint counter-terrorism frameworks in Southeast Asia to overcome the ever-changing threat of terrorism. The author notes that Southeast Asian threat landscape has evolved in two waves: Al-Qaeda-centric and Islamic State-centric phases. The current landscape which comprises of the third generation of Islamist militants is decentralised and necessitates collaborative efforts by security agencies to prevent violence. As such, adopting the Our Eyes Initiative (OEI) in October 2018 will facilitate strategic information exchange among ASEAN Member States on terrorism, radicalism and violent-extremism as a template to create more regional platforms. As terrorists operate, train and grow with networks transcending geographical boundaries networked efforts by the nation-states at the regional level are critical to defeat terrorism.

V. Arianti examines the participation of children and their parents, in a wave of terrorist attacks in Surabaya in May 2018. The author notes that due to the institutionalised indoctrination of children by groups affiliated with the Islamic State (IS), participation of children could become a trend in Indonesia's militant landscape. As many as 101 children from Indonesia have been trained by IS as 'cubs of caliphate' in Iraq in 2017. The author has examined the schooling of children in five Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) operated madrassas (also known as Pesantren) in South Java, South Sumatra and Central Sulawesi. These schools promote and inculcate a pro-IS ideology while providing employment to pro-IS individuals as teachers and administrators. The current anti-terror laws and other legal frameworks in Indonesia do not address the indoctrination of extremism towards children. Notwithstanding the significantly low number of pro-IS madrassas in Indonesia, the author highlights the need for joint government and civil society intervention to curb the pro-IS indoctrination.

Lastly, **Alberto Ballesteros** explores structural and ideological differences between Euskadi Ta Askatasuna's (ETA) nationalist-separatist terrorism and IS-inspired Islamist militancy in Spain. The author argues that the counter-terrorism strategy which defeated ETA is outdated in the present struggle against Islamist extremism. The author notes that Islamist militant groups' focus on Spain is due to the country's history of being ruled by Muslims (then known as Al-Andalus), Western/un-Islamic values and participation in international military campaigns against Al-Qaeda and IS. There is a need for holistic counter-terrorism approaches to deal with the challenges of Islamist extremism in Spain. Spanish authorities have relied extensively on intelligence gathering, sharing and coordination, border security and other law-enforcement related measures. However, more focus on social integration and trust-building between the mainstream and marginalised communities is necessary.

Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Need for Joint Counter-Terrorism Frameworks

Ryamizard Ryacudu

Recent developments in Iraq and Syria have contributed to an evolving security environment, where the threat of terrorism has become more decentralised. This has led to sporadic waves of Islamic State (IS)-directed and inspired attacks in Southeast Asia. Hence, there is a need for increased intelligence sharing and coordination among the security agencies as well as joint Counter-Terrorism (CT) frameworks to overcome future challenges from violent-extremism. [1]

Introduction

The threat of violent-extremism in Southeast Asia has evolved in two distinct phases: the al-Qaeda centric phase and the IS-centric phase. During the al-Qaeda-centric phase, as many as 400 terrorist fighters from the region headed to Afghanistan and Pakistan where they gained combat training and experience before returning home. These fighters created Jemaah Salafiyyah in Thailand, Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines, and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Singapore and Indonesia.

In the IS-centric phase, IS-affiliated and associated groups such as Kumpulan Gagak Hitam and al Kubro Generation in Malaysia, Jamaah Ansharud Daulah in Indonesia and Islamic State Lanao (Maute Group) and IS in the Philippines emerged. Since mid-2014, at least 63 groups in Southeast Asia have pledged an oath of allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.

Following the decline of IS in Iraq and Syria, the threat of IS has evolved as it becomes more decentralised. This decentralisation phase of violent-extremism constitutes the

third generation of jihadism in Southeast Asia. At its peak in 2014, IS spread to parts of the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia. The immediate challenge that Southeast Asia faces from this third generation of terrorism is the return of these FTFs from the Middle East. According to estimates from the United States (US), as many as 31,500 FTFs joined IS in Syria and Iraq.[2] According to the Indonesian Ministry of Defence, an estimated 800 of them are from Southeast Asia, of which around 700 are from Indonesia alone.

In recent years, this IS-inspired generation of militants have carried out terrorist attacks in different parts of Southeast Asia including the Thamrin attack in Indonesia in 2016, the Movida club attack in Malaysia in the same year and the Marawi siege in Philippines in 2017. Unlike al Qaeda and JI in the early 2000s which operated discretely, IS, through its use of graphic videos, speeches and attack methods, has opted for open and indiscriminate warfare.

Moreover, several terrorist plots have since been disrupted by the security agencies, including a plan to fly an explosive-laden drone into the police headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, an attempt to mount a suicide attack against the State Palace in Jakarta as well as a plan to fire a rocket at Marina Bay Sands in Singapore. The recent plots, which were uncovered by the security agencies, indicate that these terrorists were planning to make anthrax and botulinum in Malaysia and ricin and thorium in Indonesia. In light of this, it is evident that the terrorists are determined to destabilise the region and sustain a province

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of the so-called caliphate in Southeast Asia (known as a *wilayah*).

Against this backdrop, it is important to take stock of measures enacted by governments and security agencies to mitigate the current and emerging threat. The terrorist threat in Southeast Asia has shifted dramatically after IS linked Filipino groups sieged Marawi city on May 23, 2017. Although IS' plans to establish a *wilayah* in Southeast Asia have been known since 2014, governments had underestimated the extent of the IS threat in the region. Regional authorities were hesitant to share intelligence and failed to devise joint intelligence mechanisms until the fall of Marawi city to IS. In 2017, the IS strength in the Philippines numbered between 1,000 to 1,200, where up to 40 fighters originated from Indonesia. However, the data of the Philippines security agencies had indicated that the IS strength in Marawi did not exceed 50 militants, who were supported by drug cartel networks of up to 500 personnel. It is estimated that as many as 16 IS-affiliated and associated militant groups were active in the Philippines ahead of the Marawi siege. The most capable groups were IS Sulu and Basilan (400-570 fighters), IS Lanao (Maute Group, 263 fighters), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (406 fighters), and Ansar Khilafa Mindanao (7-37 fighters). During the battle of Marawi, which ended in late-2017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines killed or captured around 986 terrorists.

The siege of Marawi is a warning for all the Southeast Asian states to improve intelligence gathering and sharing to stay one step ahead of the terrorists. In conventional and non-traditional warfare, intelligence sharing and collaboration is critical. Had the agencies under the ministries of defence and home affairs shared and exchanged intelligence, this attack could have been prevented or pre-empted. Moreover, the siege of Marawi underscored the fact that Southeast Asia was unprepared for the current and emerging wave of terrorism and demonstrated the need

for new security architecture for the ASEAN region.

Need for a New Security Architecture

In the face of an evolving terrorist threat, a multilateral intelligence sharing platform to detect routes taken by FTFs, location of their training camps, means and patterns of propaganda dissemination as well as sources and channels of their funding is vital.

At the 5th ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting (ADMM) in Singapore on 19 October 2018, defence ministers from the 10 ASEAN nations officially adopted Our Eyes Initiative (OEI), a regional platform which emerged earlier in July 2017 to facilitate strategic intelligence exchange on terrorism, radicalism and violent extremism among ASEAN Member States.[3] Under the OEI initiative, the Defence Minsters for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Brunei agreed on five main components: the creation of a common database, exchange of personnel, joint training and operations, sharing of expertise as well as the sharing of resources and experience.[4] They have also agreed to establish a joint working group that may include Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in the future. As regional partners, the US, Australia, New Zealand and Japan have also agreed to join the OEI.

As seen by the brutal acts of violence in the shooting and beheading of prisoners, burning of churches, kidnappings and use of female captives in Marawi, the IS ideology and methodology has taken root in Southeast Asia. As such, it was a grave concern that the threat might spread from the Philippines to Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand.

Following this, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia developed the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement (TCA) that disrupted terrorist hijackings and hostage-taking in the Sulu Sea.[5] The first component of TCA was the

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[3] Tom Allard, "Southeast Asian States Launch Intelligence Pact To Counter Islamist Threat," *Reuters,* January 25, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-intelligence/southeast-asian-states-launch-intelligence-pact-to-counter-islamist-threat-idUSKBN1FE163.
[4] Prashanth Parameswaran, "What's Next for the New ASEAN 'Our Eyes' Intelligence Initiative?" *The*

Diplomat, January 27, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/asean-launches-new-our-eyes-intelligence-initiative/.
[5] "Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines Start Joint Air Patrols In Sulu Sea," *The Star*, October 12, 2017, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2017/10/12/malaysia-indonesia-philippines-start-air-patrol-sulu-sea/.

launch of the Trilateral Maritime Patrol (TMP) by Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in Tarakan, Indonesia in June 2017. Maritime Command Centres (MCC) were established in Tarakan, Tawau in Sabah and Bongao in the Philippines whereas Singapore and Brunei were invited as observers. In addition, Singapore has offered its Information Fusion Centre (IFC) to facilitate maritime information sharing for the TMP.

The second component of TCA was the 12 October 2017 launch of the Trilateral Air Patrol (TAP) by Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines at the Subang Air Base in Malaysia. Singapore and Brunei were likewise invited as observers. The planning for the third and fourth components, which involves national and joint land forces training and exercises and joint operations are currently underway.

These joint efforts can stem the continuing flow of funds and fighters to Southeast Asia. The creation of OEI was based on the principle that it takes a network to beat a network. If the terrorists in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore can train together in the Philippines, then the Southeast Asian states should also engage in joint training, exercises and operations. The ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting in the Philippines in 2017 reviewed the range of measures to prevent the spread of the terrorist threat from Mindanao to the region. Although the threat diminished after Marawi, the developments in Mindanao demonstrate the continuity of the threat. For instance, the 31 July suicide bombing in Lamitan in Basilan by a Moroccan FTF was the most significant recent attack.[6]

Need for Joint Counter-Terrorism Responses

The primary threat today no longer stems from inter-state conflicts, but from terrorist and criminal actors who are operating in both the physical and cyber space. Hence, CT responses should not be limited to state actors. Governments must engage civil society organisations, the academia and the private sector to prevent and counter violent extremism. Around the world, these actors have proven to be creative and effective in crafting initiatives to counter the terrorist threat and promote moderation. While governments should lead and coordinate these efforts, civil society actors have a better reach within the respective communities.

Although the creation of the right CT architecture is certainly a work in progress, partnerships with countries in the region and beyond on both the operational and intelligence front have produced significant successes. With more nations both within and outside the region requesting to join hands to collectively fight terrorism, OEI has the potential to grow and surpass Five Eyes, the intelligence alliance that comprises Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US. Extra-regional partners of Southeast Asia, such as the US, have provided significant intelligence and operational leadership. This includes a US-led CT operation against Bahrun Naim[7] in Ash Shafa, Syria on 8 June 2018.

The operation against Bahrun Naim has once again demonstrated the value of government-to-government cooperation in dealing with the changing threat landscape in Southeast Asia. It is also crucial that militaries, law enforcement and intelligence services closely monitor the ever-evolving landscape of in terrorism, extremism and exclusivism in the region.

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[6] Jaime Laude, "Moroccan Bomber Eyed In Lamitan City blast," *The Philippine Star*, August 11, 2018, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/08/11/1841515/moroccan-bomber-eyed-lamitan-city-blast.

[7] Bahrun Naim provided leadership for over a dozen successful and failed attacks, including a plot to fire a rocket at Marina Bay Sands in Singapore.

Participation of Children in Terrorist Attacks in Indonesia: A Possible Future Trend

V. Arianti

The involvement of children – and their parents – in the suicide bombing at the Surabaya churches and the Greater Surabaya Police Headquarters in May 2018 could become a trend in Indonesia's future terrorist landscape, partly due to the institutionalised indoctrination of children by the Indonesian Pro-Islamic State (IS) community.

Background

The suicide attacks conducted by Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD), an IS-affiliated Indonesian terrorist group on churches and the Greater Police Headquarters in Surabaya, Indonesia on 13 and 14 May 2018 were among the first attacks conducted by families which involved children. Separately, another family that consists of the parents and their child was killed in Sidoarjo, East Java in a premature explosion while the father was assembling the bomb on 13 May 2018.

 Previously, a 17-year old pro-IS militant Ivan Armadi Hasugian stabbed a priest and tried to detonate a homemade bomb in a church in Medan, the capital city of North Sumatra in August 2016. The bomb failed to explode. Against such a backdrop, the Indonesian government estimated that approximately 101 children have joined the IS in Iraq and Syria in 2017.[1] At least two Indonesian children[2] had lost their lives while fighting for IS in 2016.

This article argues that the Indonesian children's participation in current or future terrorist attacks could be partly attributed to the institutionalised indoctrination by the country's pro-IS community. It defines children in combat as any person below 18 years who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, as outlined in the 2007 United Nation's Paris Principles on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.[3]

Institutionalised Indoctrination

In 2017, John G. Horgan and colleagues outlined six stages that elaborated on the socialisation of children into IS. They are: seduction, schooling, selection, subjugation, specialisation and finally, stationing.[4] The initial stage of "seduction" refers to the possible exposure to ideas, norms and practices of IS through propaganda, peripheral participation in public events, and indirect access to pro-IS figures in Indonesia from their pro-IS parents. This occurs when parents bring their children to regular pro-IS study sessions, such as those held in the Greater Jakarta area. The study sessions have been conducted publicly in a small number of mosques[5] or more privately in the houses of individuals who have pledged allegiance (*ba'iat*) to IS [6].

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[1] "97 dari 671 WNI Gabung ISIS di Suriah Tewas," *Berita Satu,* September 19, 2017, http://www.beritasatu.com/hukum/453442-97-dari-671-wni-gabung-isis-di-suriah-tewas.html.
[2] They are Hatf and Abu Musa al-Indunisi (aliases).
[3] John G. Horgan, Max Taylor, Mia Bloom & Charlie Winter, "From Cubs to Lion: A Six Stage Model of Child Socialization into the Islamic State," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40, no. 7 (2017): 645 – 664.
[4] John G. Horgan, et.al, *Ibid.*
[5] At least 16 mosques in 7 provinces in Indonesia hosted pro IS activities, i.e. spreading IS ideology

and recruitment. See: "Penelitian: 16 Masjid Ditemukan Dukung ISIS," *Republika*, July 31, 2017, https://www.republika.co.id/berita/internasional/abc-australia-network/17/07/31/oty8hk415-penelitian-pemerintah-ri-nyatakan-16-masjid-dukung-isis.
[6] For instance, the indoctrination of the children perpetrators of the Surabaya bombings was conducted privately in the house. See "Ini Cara Doktrinasi Keluarga Pengebom di Surabaya," *Berita Satu*, May 15, 2018, http://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/492461-ini-cara-doktrinasi-keluarga-pengebom-di-surabaya.html.

Meanwhile, the schooling stage involves the exposure to teachers and staff who were pro-IS meant that the process was coupled with intensive indoctrination. Research conducted by ICPVTR has shown that the Indonesian IS community has no shortage of manpower whom are graduates of Islamic schools. Given their madrasah or *pesantren* background, these graduates are proficient in Arabic. Some of them, who have chosen teaching as their vocation, have taught in pro-IS schools or have provided private tutorials on the Arabic language for children. These schools have in turn also provided income for pro-IS individuals who either serve as administrators or teachers on the campus. At the same time, pro-IS parents would also send their children to schools that are aligned with IS ideology. The funds for operating the schools (including teachers' salaries) comes from public donations. Some pro-IS parents (including prisoners) who have insufficient income are possibly attracted to the low or free tuition fee charged by these schools.

This article will focus on five religious boarding schools, which are also known as *Pesantren*, whose advisory boards, administrators or staff members are supporters of IS. Most of these schools are located across Java, and among the five selected *Pesantren*, three of them are located in West Java: a) Ibnu Mas'ud *Pesantren* in Bogor, b) Miftahul Huda *Pesantren* in Subang, and c) Anshorullah *Pesantren* in Ciamis. The other two schools are Miftahul Huda and Ma'had Darul Anshor which is located in the Muara Enim regency, South Sumatra and Central Sulawesi respectively. Notably, these schools are administered by JAD.

A former leader of JAD who is currently believed to be in Syria with IS, Abu Musa alias Hari Budiman, was among the founders of Ibnu Mas'ud *Pesantren*.[7] By 2017, around 260 students from both genders and aged between 10-13 years were enrolled in the school.[8] At least 18 people that were linked with the *pesantren* were arrested for being involved in planning and the execution of terrorist attacks in Indonesia. Between 2013 and 2016, 8 teachers and 4 students of the school had departed for Syria to join IS.[9] Ibnu Mas'ud *Pesantren* was under the Al Urwatul Wutsqo Foundation[10] which also runs the Abu Bakar Assidiq *Pesantren* in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara, where the JAD leader Iskandar (alias Abu Qutaibah) taught.

Meanwhile, Anshorullah *Pesantren*, which is based in Ciamis was run by JAD ideologue Fauzan al-Anshori.[11] Founded in 2007, the *pesantren* hosted pledge of allegiance (*ba'iat*) events to IS leader Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi in 2014-2015, where thirty to forty people attended the event. The *pesantren* also serves as the meeting point of JAD members of West Java, as well as to shelter other JAD members.

Another *pesantren* in Subang located in a quiet district in West Java, Miftahul Huda, was run by the head of JAD West Java, Khairul Anam. Founded by Khairul Anam's father-in-law, the *pesantren* followed the teaching of moderate Nahdhlatul Ulama (NU) tradition in the 1980s and has since changed after it was being taken over by Khairul Anam.[12] Having less than 40 students as of late 2016, the *pesantren* also doubles as a meeting point for JAD's West Java administrators and also facilitated paramilitary trainings.[13]

Other than hosting JAD meetings, the Miftahul Huda *Pesantren* had in the past also sheltered a few terrorist fugitives such as Noordin M.

[7] Jolene Jerard and V. Arianti, "Commentary: Why The Use of Women and Children Raises the Stakes in the Fight Against Terrorism," *Channel News Asia*, May 18, 2018, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/surabaya-bombing-women-children-cubs-of-the-caliphate-10242118.

[8] "Ponpesnya Bakal Ditutup, Ratusan Santri Ibnu Mas'ud Pilih Pulang Kampung," *Tribun News*, September 18, 2017, http://bogor.tribunnews.com/2017/09/18/ponpesnya-bakal-ditutup-ratusan-santri-ibnu-masud-pilih-pulang-kampung.

[9] "Indonesian School a Launchpad for Child Fighters in Syria's Islamic State," *Reuters*, September 7, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-militants-school-insight/indonesian-school-a-launchpad-for-child-fighters-in-syrias-islamic-state-idUSKCN1BI0A7.

[10] "Ponpes Ibnu Mas'ud Bogor Resmi Ditutup, Ini Alasannya," *Faktual News,* September 18, 2017, https://faktualnews.co/2017/09/18/ponpes-ibnu-masud-bogor-resmi-ditutup-alasannya/37812/.

[11] Jolene Jerard and V. Arianti, *Op.Cit.*

[12] "Pembom Sarinah, Pernah Mondok Bareng Noordin M. Top," *Sindo News*, January 15, 2016, https://daerah.sindonews.com/read/1077462/21/pembom-sarinah-pernah-mondok-bareng-noordin-m-top-1452865932.

[13] "Pembom Sarinah, Pernah Mondok Bareng Noordin M. Top," *Op.Cit.*

Top – the mastermind of series of suicide bombings in Indonesia from 2003 to 2009.[14] While Noordin was hiding in the *pesantren*, Ahmad Muhazan, one of the 2016 Jakarta Thamrin attackers from JAD was studying there in 2007. Noordin's wife, Munfiatun al Fitri had also briefly sought refuge in the *pesantren* in 2004.[15]

Outside Java, another pro IS *pesantren* Miftahul Huda, is located in the Muara Enim regency, South Sumatra.[16] Established in 2009 by Sholihin, Miftahul Huda not only serves as a gathering place for pro-IS individuals in Muara Enim, but also as an education hub for the children of pro-IS individuals. In early 2017, the *pesantren* changed its curriculum fully to conform with IS ideology, and introduced the importance of *bai'at* and jihad. *Muqarrar Fit Tauhid* (IS ideology as interpreted by Aman Abdurrahman) was among the references for its teaching. As a result, many parents withdrew their children from the *pesantren*. Similarly, many adults no longer attended religious study sessions led by Sholihin in the *pesantren*. Only those supporting IS ideology were enrolled in the *pesantren*. The *pesantren* had since groomed 11 students, and exposed them to IS ideology and *i'dad* (commonly referred as physical preparation to wage jihad) for hours on a daily basis. Four terrorist suspects at large also found shelters and subsequently taught in the *pesantren*.[17] Two of them reportedly left for Marawi in October 2017. Sholihin was arrested in December 2017.

Another pro-IS *pesantren* would be the Ma'had Darul Anshor in Central Sulawesi. Established since 2012 [18] and owned by Yasin (who is currently serving his prison sentence), the *pesantren* has two compounds, in Kayamaya, Poso (for female students) and Malino, Morowali (for male students). As of 2017, 40 male students and 22 female students were enrolled in the school. The *pesantren* caters to children of terrorist inmates and terrorist suspects from another pro-IS terrorist group Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia). The *pesantren* once served as the meeting point of MIT personnel – some of them were teachers at the *pesantren* – where they prepared logistics and bombs. Solihin (different from Sholihin above) , one of the suicide bombers of the Jakarta Kampung Melayu bus terminal bombings in May 2017 was an admin staff at the *pesantren*.[19] It seems that the *pesantren* struggles to meet its monthly operational costs that amounts to Rp 8-12 million (around US$615 – US$ 923) monthly. In addition to calls for donations to meet its monthly operational cost, it had also launched several "ambitious" fundraising projects targeted at the pro-IS online community. In 2016, it managed to collect Rp 66 million (around US$5,076), out of the Rp 189 million (around US$14,538) needed to renovate the mosque and male *pesantren* facility[20]. In 2017, it called for donations for land acquisition and the renovation for the female *pesantren* building, which amounted to Rp 150 million (around US$11,538).

Response from the Government and Community

Generally, the Indonesian government and the community are well aware of the existence of pro-IS *pesantren*. Yet, in comparison to the 28,194 *pesantren* that are registered with the Ministry of Religious Affairs [21], the number of *pesantren* manned by pro-IS supporters is significantly fewer. However, current anti-terror law and other legal frameworks in

[14] "Pembom Sarinah, Pernah Mondok Bareng Noordin M. Top", *Ibid.*

[15] "Lika-Liku Pernikahan Munfiatun dan Noordin M. Top", *Detik*, October 9, 2004, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-221556/lika-liku-pernikahan-munfiatun-dan-noordin-m-top.

[16] Jolene Jerard and V. Arianti, *Op.Cit.*

[17] Two of the wanted terrorist suspects are Abdul Kodir alias Yazid alias Abu Ibrahim and Abu Alana alias Sunardi. See: "Polri Hingga Kini Terus Selidiki Rencana Penyerangan Teroris ke Mapolres OKU", "Kabar Dwipa", December 15, 2017, http://kabardwipa.co/polri-hingga-kini-terus-selidiki-rencana-penyerangan-teroris-ke-mapolres-oku/.

[18] "Darul Anshor Poso Bantah Tak Kena; Solihin Tapi", *Kini*, May 26, 2017, http://nasional.kini.co.id/2017/05/26/22985/darul-anshor-poso-bantah-tak-kenal-solihintapi.

[19] 'Perkembangan Program Renovasi Ma'had Darul Anshor", *AshShobirin*, December 16, 2016, https://mtashshobirin.wordpress.com/2016/12/16/perkembangan-program-renovasi-mahad-darul-anshor/.

[20] "Perkembangan Program Renovasi Ma'had Darul Anshor", *Ibid.*

[21] "Pertumbuhan Pesantren di Indonesia Dinilai Menakjubkan," *Republika*, November 30, 2017, https://www.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/17/11/30/p088lk396-pertumbuhan-pesantren-di-indonesia-dinilai-menakjubkan.

Indonesia do not address the indoctrination of children towards extremism. Legally, the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Indonesian Police are unable to close down any *pesantren*, even if they are registered with the Ministry and despite that fact that many of its teachers and students were involved in terrorism. As a result, the local government has mainly been driven by the demands of the local communities' demands to react. Local communities within the neighborhood of the *pesantren* have become more aggressive in their demands to shut down the *pesantren* and have conducted rallies, signed petition, or threatened to torch or destroy the *pesantren*.[22]

In response, the local government has cooperated with the local police and other mainstream Muslim clerics to mediate the dispute between the *pesantren* administration and the local communities, in urging the *pesantren* to be shut down. However, the decisions are sometimes made in the interest and safety of the students and teachers of the *pesantren*, who might be subjected to the physical abuse from the community.[23] For instance, the Ministry of Social Affairs had to look after the students of Miftahul Huda *Pesantren* in Subang for three months after the community ousted them from the *pesantren* in December 2017. Likewise, hundreds of students from the Ibnu Mas'ud *Pesantren* in Bogor had to leave the school after its neighbourhood community demanded the school to be shut down in September 2017. Moreover, as the decision to close down the *pesantren* is not legally binding, a *pesantren* administration could decide to

return and resume its operations. Furthermore, according to the newly revised anti-terrorism law, Indonesian Police are unable to arrest the teachers and students of a *pesantren* if they are not members of any terrorist group or do not partake in planning attacks.

Conclusion

Unless the government starts working with NGOs and various ministries in creating intervention programmes to prevent the indoctrination of the offspring of pro-IS members, the latter could potentially perpetrate more attacks in Indonesia. There is thus an urgent need to establish more *pesantren* and a prime example would be the Al-Hidayah *Pesantren* in Deli Serdang, which was established by former terrorist inmate Khairul Ghazali. Currently, 20 students are enrolled in the BNPT-led [24] program dedicated for children of terrorist inmates [25]. Although it would be "costly" to run such *pesantren*, a less costly option for the Indonesian government would be to sponsor the tuition fee of the terrorist inmates' children to study in *pesantren* or schools that promote a moderate form of Islam. While the move of sending the children to government schools could be met with objections -as they are provided an alternative education pathway, a legal framework to accompany its implantation is vital. For example, the pro-IS parents could be penalised for not consenting their children to be sent to study at the approved *pesantren*. Else, the indoctrination of extremist ideology in children may continue in Indonesia.

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[22] "Pemkab Cari Solusi Penanganan Ponpes Miftahul Huda," *Jabar Publisher*, December 26, 2017, http://jabarpublisher.co/2017/12/26/pemkab-cari-solusi-penanganan-ponpes-miftahul-huda/; "Sebar Radikalisme, 39 Santri Ponpes Miftahul Huda Ditangkap," *Liputan 6*, December 25, 2017, https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/3206314/sebar-radikalisme-39-santri-ponpes-miftahul-huda-ditangkap; "Ponpesnya Bakal Ditutup, Ratusan Santri Ibnu Mas'ud Pilih Pulang Kampung," *Op.Cit*; "Warga Demo Karena Mendapat Kabar Ponpes Ibnu Mas'ud Hanya Diliburkan", *Sindo News*, September 18, 2017, https://metro.sindonews.com/read/1240676/170/warga-demo-karena-mendapat-kabar-ponpes-ibnu-masud-hanya-diliburkan-1505715720; Imam Jasuli, "Miftahul Huda dan Radikalisme Pesantren," *Nalar Politik*, January 4, 2018, https://nalarpolitik.com/miftahul-huda-dan-radikalisme-pesantren/.

[23] "Pemkab Cari Solusi Penanganan Ponpes Miftahul Huda," *Ibid*; "Sebar Radikalisme, 39 Santri Ponpes Miftahul Huda Ditangkap," *Ibid.*

[24] The programme is led by the Indonesian Counter-Terrorism Agency and includes elements of deradicalisation.

[25] "Pengakuan Anak Mantan Teroris, Sering Diejek Hingga Diajarkan Pegang Senjata oleh Orangtua," *Tribun News Makassar*, May 16, 2018, http://makassar.tribunnews.com/2018/05/16/pengakuan-anak-mantan-teroris-sering-diejek-hingga-diajarkan-pegang-senjata-oleh-orangtua?page=all; "Dalami Program Pencegahan Terorisme, Delegasi Bundeskriminamt Jerman Kunjungi Ponpes Al-Hidayah," *BNPT*, July 11, 2018, https://www.bnpt.go.id/dalami-program-pencegahan-terorisme-delegasi-bunderkriminalamt-jerman-kunjungi-ponpes-al-hidayah.html.

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Counter-Terrorism Efforts in Spain

Alberto Ballesteros

In its recent history, Spain has experienced two waves of terrorism. The first involved Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)[1], a nationalist and separatist organisation that was engaged in an armed struggle for more than forty years. The authorities subsequently developed a successful counter-terrorism strategy to defeat ETA. However, this strategy is outdated in the present struggle against Islamist extremism. This article examines several structural and ideological differences between the two waves of terrorism and posits that state responses to the present threat are insufficient.

Fight Against Nationalist Extremism

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) grew out of a long held sentiment for political and economic autonomy in the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC), which comprises the provinces of Vizcaya, Álava and Guipúzcoa in Northern Spain. Founded in 1959, ETA evolved from a group that promoted traditional Basque culture to a nationalist, secessionist paramilitary group engaged in a violent campaign of bombing, assassinations and kidnappings. The group carried out its first attack in Spain ten years later, when it assassinated a member of the Guardia Civil – the Spanish military police body. Until its dissolution in 2018, the group killed 829 people, making it the deadliest terrorist organisation in Spain's history. The goals of ETA included; (i) waging a war of psychological and physical attrition against the State, (ii) achieving independence for the entire Basque region, which included the

territories of Navarra in the North of Spain and Iparralde in the South of France.[2] While it initially exclusively targeted agents of the State Security Forces and Bodies (Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado, FCSE), the organisation gradually widened its targets to include politicians, journalists and civilians.[3]

ETA functioned in a hierarchical structure. Decision making rested within three main apparatuses: the executive, the military and the political wings.[4] At the same time, the organisation also had a political arm, the *Herri Batasuna* (HB) party*,* highlighting its extensive reach. All activities undertaken by the group were tightly coordinated within this power structure. ETA sought to keep public opinion in its favour in order to legitimise their fight. The group found traction among the Basque populace by framing its armed struggle as an effort to create an independent Basque state. This narrative allowed the group to mobilise a large network of civil society groups to its cause, including newspapers, youth organisations and private businesses that proved to be a vital source for finances.[5]

The counter-terrorism strategy against ETA consisted of two lines of action. The first line of action included the dismantling of ETA's organisational apparatus and cells through a series of arrests and prosecutions by the Spanish security forces. The state's intelligence services underwent sweeping reforms in the 1970s and 80s to improve their operations and processes, which were previously used under dictatorship of General Franco to maintain control of the country.

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[1] Although other terrorist groups, such as the GRAPO and GAL, were active in Spain along with the ETA, none have had the sustained impact on Spanish civil and political discourse as ETA.

[2] Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio, "The Persistence of Nationalist Terrorism: The Case of ETA," Juan *March Institute,* March 2008, http://recursos.march.es/web/ceacs/proyectos/dtv/pdf/ETA%20(Kledja).pdf (accessed July, 2018).

[3] Domínguez, Florencio, "ETA: Un Análisis De La Situación," *Asociación Almendrón*, December 2004,

https://www.almendron.com/politica/pdf/2005/spain/spain_1896.pdf (accessed July, 2018).

4 Vasco Press, "ETA Ha Modificado Su Estructura Interna Por Motivos De Seguridad," *El Correo*, March 23, 2006, https://www.elcorreo.com/vizcaya/pg060323/actualidad/politica/200603/23/ECD_eta_funcionamiento.html (accessed July, 2018).

[5] Sánchez-Cuenca, "The Persistence of Nationalist Terrorism: The Case of ETA," March 2008.

Gradually, the changes enabled security operatives to act preemptively and capture ETA militants before they were able to carry out terrorist attacks.[6] Furthermore, the Spanish government enhanced cooperation with France, where joint counter-terrorist operations enabled the FCSE to target the bulk of the ETA's logistic infrastructure between the 1980s and 1990s.[7]

In its second line of action, the state focused on ETA's capacity to mobilise popular support. A strategy that combined law enforcement with efforts to undermine the group politically was successful. The FCSE first targeted ETA's civilian network, arrested dozens of supporters and closed down businesses that were linked to the terrorist group. Vital sources of funding were lost, and sponsors and followers were reduced.[8] In addition, the ban imposed on the HB party led to conflict between the radical militants and others who advocated for political participation as a means to achieve ETA's objectives. This power struggle within ETA resulted in internal divisions that led to its gradual collapse. Subsequently, ETA announced an end to the armed campaign in October 2011 and later in 2018, the organisation was dissolved permanently. Consequently, some of its members have since joined *Euskal Herria Bildu*, a leftist and nationalist political party that occupies 18 of the 75 seats in the Basque parliament.

Al-Qaeda and Islamic State

The 1980s saw several cells of foreign Sunni and Shia extremists emerge in Spain. In 1985, the Hezbollah-linked group Islamic Jihad bombed a restaurant in Madrid, killing 18 people, marking the first attack in Spain carried out by a radical Islamist organisation.

Spain has suffered subsequent attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS), the two biggest Islamist terrorist groups, which have killed more than two hundred people in Spain in total.

There are three factors that explain the fixation that the jihadists have with Spain. Firstly, large parts of Spain (then known as Al-Andalus) that were under Islamic rule were taken over by Christians. This historical narrative has been used by both AQ and IS as their justification to re-conquer Spain.[9] Secondly, these terrorist groups are known to perceive Western/European values as un-Islamic. Lastly, they oppose Spain due to its participation in international military campaigns against AQ and IS.

AQ was the dominant jihadist group operating in Spain in the early 2000s with multiple active cells in the country during the 1990s. Sources stated that Osama Bin Laden had given the green light for the 2004 Madrid bombings as revenge for Spain's participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003.[10] However, after IS seized the reigns of the jihadist movement in 2014, there has been a change in tactics employed by the terrorists. While Al-Qaeda had traditionally preferred to carry out large-scale, symbolic attacks that took years to plan[11], IS favors indiscriminate acts of violence. IS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has made repeated calls for the group's supporters to carry out attacks in Europe, either by acting alone or in groups, using bombs, knives or cars. In the last two years, Europe has seen a rise in terrorism-related incidents. In this time, at least eight IS-inspired vehicle-ramming attacks have taken place in cities like Berlin, Stockholm, Nice, Paris and London.[12] Although Spain did not experience an Islamist attack for over a decade following

[6] Reinares, Fernando, "Análisis Y Evaluación De La Política Antiterrorista En España," *Dialnet*, June 23, https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/5774718.pdf.2004 (accessed July, 2018).

[7] Domínguez, Florencio, "Las Claves De La Derrota De ETA," *Informe Del Centro Memorial Víctimas Del Terrorismo*, November, 2017, http://www.memorialvt.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Informe03.pdf. (accessed July, 2018).

[8] Ibid.

[9] BBC Mundo, "¿Por Qué Al Qaeda Y Estado Islámico Ven En España Un Territorio a "reconquistar"?", *El Comercio*, August 23, 2017, https://elcomercio.pe/mundo/actualidad/qaeda-

islamico-ven-espana-territorio-reconquistar-bbc-noticia-451737 (accessed August, 2018).

[10] Muñoz, Pablo, "El 11-M Fue Una Venganza Por Los Golpes De España Al Yihadismo; Irak, El Pretexto," *ABC*, March 10, 2014, https://www.abc.es/espana/20140310/abci-reinares-201403100949.html. (accessed August, 2018).

[11] Byman, Daniel L, "Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different Goals, Different Targets," *Brookings*, April 29, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets (accessed July, 2018).

[12] Telegraph Reporters, "From Westminster to Nice: Vehicle Rampage Attacks in UK and Europe," *The Telegraph*, August 14, 2018,

the 2004 Madrid bombing, this changed on 17 and 18 August 2017, when an alleged IS cell killed sixteen people in the Catalan cities of Barcelona and Cambrils. The attack was conducted by running over the crowd with a van while several pedestrians were attacked with knives. IS claimed responsibility for the attack, and justified it as revenge for Spain's military involvement as a part of the international coalition in the Middle East. A Spanish IS member also recorded a video that was distributed by the group's media channels one week after the attacks, stating that IS would fight to "reconquer" Spain for the Muslims, indicating that Spain's fight against radical Islam is anything but over.[13]

Differences between ETA and Islamist Terrorist Groups

One of the major factors that distinguishes the Islamist terrorist groups' threat and the ETA movement is the lack of a concentrated geographical support base. Neither AQ nor IS can count on a solid base of supporters from within Spain. Muslims form a minority (there are less than two million Muslims)[14] and they are geographically dispersed around the country. These terror groups also operate within a decentralised structure in Spain, with many members acting independently of one another or as lone wolves. Despite IS claiming responsibility, there has been no proof hitherto of direct communication between its leadership and the cell that orchestrated the attack in Barcelona and Cambrils in 2017.[15]

Although such tactics were effective against ETA, the current counter-terrorism strategy adopted by the Spanish authorities cannot be

based upon targeting the key leaders of the Islamist terror groups. This new threat landscape has led the State to embrace a profound reform of the security apparatus after the 2004 Madrid attack. Previously, only 140 agents of the National Police Body [16] were entrusted with the task of investigating jihadi groups in the country[17]. Today, there are now close to 3,000 members who, among other things, sift through social media accounts, investigate religious congregations known to harbor extremists and work with informers to gain knowledge of terrorist networks.[18]

Factors Facilitating Islamist Extremism

There has been a worrying spike in the number of radicalised individuals over the last decade in Spain. Recent estimates point to at least 5,000 individuals (both men and women) who have embraced the Salafi-jihadist ideology propagated by the terrorists and developed radical attitudes. Significantly, an increasing number of them – 4 out of 10 – are Spanish citizens. This contrasts with the first decade of the 21st century, when most terrorists operating in Spain were identified as Moroccan immigrants.[19] This indicates a growing threat from homegrown terrorism. The average age of extremists has also decreased from 34 to 29 years old, indicating that a growing number of younger people are being radicalised and joining these networks.[20]

In this regard, a recent study conducted by the Spanish think-tank Elcano Royal Institute has concluded that environmental factors are significant drivers that lead to radicalisation

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/westminster-nice-vehicle-rampage-attacks-uk-europe/ (accessed September 26, 2018).

[13] Mills, George, "ISIS Warns of More Attacks in Spain in First Spanish-language Video," *El País*, August 24, 2017, https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/08/24/inenglish/15035 61689_277218.html (accessed August, 2018).

[14] "Europe's Growing Muslim Population," *Pew Research Center*, November 29, 2017, http://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/ (accessed August, 2018).

[15] Reinares, Fernando, and Carola García-Calvo, "Un Análisis De Los Atentados Terroristas En Barcelona Y Cambrils," *Elcano Royal Institute*, February 01, 2018, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano _es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/

elcano_es/zonas_es/ari12-2018-reinares-garciacalvo-analisis-atentados-terroristas-barcelona-cambrils (accessed July, 2018).

[16] The National Police Body comprises of the *Cuerpo Nacional de Policía,* CNP), Guardia Civil and the National Intelligence Center (*Centro Nacional de Inteligencia,* CNI and are the main security agencies involved in counterterrorism.

[17] Irujo, José María, "La Silenciosa Lucha De España Contra La Yihad," *El País*, June 04, 2017, https://elpais.com/politica/2017/06/02/actualidad/149 6415429_943704.html (accessed August, 2018).

[18] Ibid.

[19] Reinares, Fernando, "Un Nuevo Yihadismo En España," *El Correo*, August 17, 2018, https://www.elcorreo.com/opinion/nuevo-yihadismo-espana-20180817204624-nt.html (accessed July, 2018).

[20] Ibid.

amongst Spain's Muslims. According to the study, contact with jihadist operatives, both personal and online communication, was highlighted as a significant factor. Social ties within the family, neighborhood and societal levels, was another factor. However, the online sphere has emerged as the crucial battleground against IS. At least 35 people who were arrested between 2013 and 2016 had been radicalised almost exclusively through online channels. Many of these individuals were said to have found a sense of belonging and identity as part of an online community.[21]

These factors played a key role in the cell that attacked Barcelona and Cambrils in 2017.[22] Of the ten members of the cell, there were four pairs of brothers. Despite being well integrated into the Catalan community, the cell members were found to be radicalised by Abdelbaki Es-Satty, the imam of a local mosque who had previously been investigated for links to other jihadi operatives in Spain and Morocco.

More Holistic Approaches to Counter Islamist Extremism

Spain's current counter-terrorism strategy rests on three pillars: the analysis of information gleaned by the CNI, enforcement carried out by the Guardia Civil and the CNP, and the judicial authority under the Audiencia Nacional, a special high court with significant legal powers which extend to international crimes linked to the State. To enhance coordination between the various bodies and international agencies, Spain launched the Center of Intelligence against Terrorism and Organised Crime (*Centro de Inteligencia contra el Terrorismo y el Crimen Organizado,*

CITCO).[23] The new entity has had some initial success. In August, the CNP arrested a Moroccan man for engaging in radicalisation activities in Spain. The security services had long kept track of this individual and subsequently discovered his ties to another extremist in Morocco, who he aimed to smuggle into Spain through clandestine immigration networks operating off the Straits of Gibraltar. Their goal had been to carry out an attack on Spanish soil [24]. This case is not an exception. Between 2004 and 2017, the FCSE has detained over 700 individuals for jihadist related activities.[25]

Considering the traction of Islamist extremist ideology, the counter-terrorism strategy cannot rely exclusively on kinetic approaches. There is a need to consider other socioeconomic and cultural factors as well. This includes poverty, unemployment and the lack of integration of Muslims within the mainstream society that engenders some to be vulnerable to extremist propaganda[26]. As such, there is a need for social integration and resilience in the Muslim communities in Spain.

In the development of effective countermeasures, the Muslim community has to be given a voice. The Spanish Islamic Commission (SIC), an entity that represents the Islamic communities in the country, has proposed the founding of national education centers to educate local imams on the cultural norms in Spain. Additionally, the SIC has led calls for the creation of a census for imams, where each attains valid credentials before being allowed to preach, although a lack of resources has proved prohibitive in this endeavor. Moreover, low salaries meant that

[21] Reinares, Fernando, Carola García-Calvo, and Álvaro Vicente, "Dos Factores Que Explican La Radicalización Yihadista En España," *Elcano Royal Institute*, August 08, 2017, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/terrorismo internacional/ari62-2017-reinares-garciacalvo-vicente-dos-factoresexplican-radicalizacion-yihadista-espana (accessed July, 2018).

[22] Reinares, Fernando, and Carola García-Calvo, "Un Análisis De Los Atentados Terroristas En Barcelona Y Cambrils," February 01, 2018

[23] Reinares, Fernando, "After the Madrid Bombings: Internal Security Reforms and Prevention of Global

Terrorism in Spain," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32, no. 5 (2009): 367-88

[24] Gorospe, Pedro, "Detenido Un Yihadista En Vitoria Que Planeaba Atentar En España," *El País*, August 07, 2018, https://elpais.com/politica/2018/08/07/actualidad/1533641087_346090.html (accessed August, 2018).

[25] Irujo, José María, "La Silenciosa Lucha De España Contra La Yihad," *El País*, June 04, 2017, https://elpais.com/politica/2017/06/02/actualidad/1496415429_943704.html (accessed August, 2018).

[26] Afsah, Ebrahim, "After the Arab Spring: Democratic Aspirations and State Failure," *SSRN*, July 14, 2017, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3002518 (accessed July, 2018).

mosques have often resorted to using volunteers to perform the duties of imams.[27]

Spain's security apparatus faces other looming threats. While most of the world is preoccupied with Islamist extremism, the threat of right-wing extremism needs closer examination. Spain has to be cautious of the rise of far-right organisations with the emergence of several "alt-right" parties in France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Some of these were conceived as a result of public backlash to IS-inspired attacks and immigration policies in Europe. These populist groups tend to use hate speech and divisive anti-immigration rhetoric.

Spain has circumvented this trend with the notable exception of Catalonia, where an anti-immigration, Islamophobic party, *Plataforma per Catalunya* (Platform for Catalonia, PxC) has found traction politically since 2002. This development requires close monitoring as the use of anti-immigration and xenophobic rhetoric is likely to aggravate discrimination against minorities in Spain, further fueling radicalisation and extremism.[28] Following the spike in terrorist attacks on European soil, the European Union (EU) recently released a report urging member states, including Spain, to step up their preparedness and resilience to terrorist threats - by coordinating policies to better contain hate speech that promotes violence as well as other radicalisation and terrorist financing activities.[29] Spain needs to play its part in this effort.

Conclusion

Even though the Spanish security apparatus had designed a counterterrorism strategy that succeeded in dismantling both ETA's security threat and limiting them to the political arena, the current Islamist extremist threat is different. In order to weaken groups such as AQ and IS, long-term policies are needed. So far, Spanish authorities have focused on the need to address intelligence and border security shortcomings while stepping up enforcement measures. However, the rising

number of Islamist extremists in Spain over the last decade has highlighted that marginalisation and mistrust between authorities and communities can fuel terrorism. Hence, it is necessary to develop policies to counter and prevent violent extremism that incorporate community engagement involving key stakeholders, specifically civil society members from Muslim communities. Moderate Muslim scholars also need to provide a theological counter narrative to the extremist and exclusivist propaganda of these groups. The media should also play a key role in showing young Muslims they are accepted in the country, while the government needs to take steps to reduce social inequalities among minority groups.

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[27] Marcos, José, "Los Musulmanes De España Tendrán Un Censo De Imanes," *El País*, August 23, 2017, https://elpais.com/politica/2017/08/23/actualidad/1503516960_254346.html (accessed September 19, 2018).

[28] Ebrahim, "After the Arab Spring: Democratic Aspirations and State Failure," July 14, 2017
[29] Lázaro, Fernando, "La Eurocámara Pide Cerrar Las Mezquitas Que No Acepten Los Valores De La Unión Europea," *El Mundo*, July 20, 2018, http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2018/07/20/5b50ddb146163fe4598b4578.html (accessed July, 2018).

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
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
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
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
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Rohan Gunaratna and Stefanie Kam (eds) (Imperial College Press, 2016)

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
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
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